GIFT    OF 
EVGENE  MEYER^R. 


THE  LIFE  OF 
THADDEUS  STEVENS 


A  STUDY  IN  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  HISTORY.  ESPECIALLY 

IN  THE  PERIOD  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  AMD 

RECONSTRUCTION 


JAMES  ALBERT  WOODBURN 

(PH.  D.,LL.fc.) 


THE  AMERICAN  REPUBLIC  AND  ITS  GOVERNMENT 

POLITICAL  PARTIES  AND  PARTY  PROBLEMS 

IN  THE  UNITED  STATES,  ETC. 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE   BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 
PUBLISHERS 


THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 


m 


PREFACE 

The  period  of  the  Civil  War  and  the  Reconstruction 
of  the  Union  has  been  the  subject  of  more  historical 
inquiry  and  production  within  recent  years  than  has 
any  other  in  American  history.  The  books,  essays, 
magazine  articles,  monographs  and  reminiscences  that 
have  been  devoted  to  this  period  indicate  the  prevalent 
interest  which  the  epoch  holds  for  many  men  of  many 
minds.  As  the  period  recedes  in  time  and  other  events 
of  moment  come  and  go,  there  may  be  a  recession  in 
this  interest,  but  it  is  not  likely  permanently  to  decline. 
As  the  history  of  modern  Europe  still  centers  about  the 
French  Revolution,  so  will  the  tremendous  upheaval  of 
the  Civil  War  continue  to  occupy  the  center  of  the 
stage  in  the  history  of  the  nineteenth  century  in  Amer 
ica.  That  struggle  has  been  called  from  the  bench  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  "the  greatest 
civil  war  known  in  the  history  of  the  human  race."  It 
is  but  natural,  indeed  inevitable,  that  generations  of 
Americans  should  be  interested  in  a  struggle  that  has 
so  vitally  affected  the  history  and  destiny  of  their 
nation. 

Thaddeus  Stevens  was  the  dominant  figure  in  the 
American  Congress  during  this  notable  period.  It 
may  reasonably  be  claimed  that  no  more  masterful 
leader  evet  «lirecto.d  the  politics  and  legislation  of  the 
Honc ,  of  Representatives.  The  House  under  Stevens 
i^r  uot  ruled  by  a  system  that  created  a  one-man  of 
ficial  power.  A  man  then  led  the  House  according  to 
his  strength  and  the  strength  of  his  cause.  Stevens 
wa*  given  no  set  of  rules  that  arbitrarily  suppressed 


268681 


PREFACE 

opposition.  The  House  following  was  free  to  aci;  it 
was  free  to  accord  or  to  withhold  support,  and  Stevens, 
while  the  recognized  leader,  often  found  himself  de 
feated  and  frustrated  in  the  ends  that  he  wished  to  ac 
complish.  But  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  preeminence 
of  Stevens'  personality  in  the  House  in  the  War  dec 
ade,  and  it  may  be  said  that  for  a  part  of  this  decade 
he  led  both  the  House  and  the  nation  by  the  sheer  force 
and  energy  of  his  mind  and  will.  He  was  the  strong 
man  in  the  arena,  and  it  seems  fitting  that  these  con 
secutive  studies  in  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction 
should  be  gathered  around  the  life  and  career  of  this 
Congressional  leader. 

During  the  War,  under  the  leadership  of  Lincoln, 
the  presidency  was  the  dominant  department  of  the 
government.  In  Reconstruction  the  presidency  was 
subordinate,  if  not  impotent,  and  the  Congressional 
arm  of  the  government  was  all-powerful.  In  that  pe 
riod  the  leadership  of  Stevens,  especially  of  his  party 
majority  in  the  House,  was  unquestioned.  His  career 
there  and  his  speedies  throughout  the  bitter  period  of 
war  and  the  more  bitter  strife  that  followed  the  war 
offer  a  subject  for  study  tb^tno  historian  can  neglect. 
It  can  hardly  be  claimed  that  this  biography  makes  a 
full  or  adequate  presentation  of  any  part  of  Stevens' 
career;  nor,  in  view  of  the  great  amount  of  matter  that 
has  been  published  on  this  era,  that  it  throws  a  great 
deal  of  new  light  upon  the  period  in  which  he  figured 
so  largely.  But  it  may  be  claimed,  however,  that  it 
does  enable  Stevens  to  speak  more  fully  for  himself 
than  he  has  been  allowed  to  do  by  others  who  have 
treated  in  a  more  limited  way  his  principles  and  poli 
cies.  The  biography  also  brings  into  greater  prC.iIf- 
nence,  and  presents,  as  I  have  ventured  to  believe,  a 
more  equitable  review  of  Stevens'  opinions  and  agency 


PREFACE 

in  the  important  financial  controversies  of  his  times  in 
which  he  took  such  a  vigorous  part. 

Stevens'  views  on  money  and  finance  have  usually 
been  referred  to  as  errors  and  vagaries  by  orthodox 
writers  on  finance  as  well  as  by  most  of  the  historians 
of  the  time.  But  these  views  may  hardly  be  said  to 
have  been  fully  and  impartially  presented  by  many  of 
those  who  have  been  most  severe  in  their  criticisms.  It 
is  due  to  Stevens  that  in  any  treatise  on  his  life  and 
times,  the  "other  side"  of  the  financial  issue  for  which 
he  so  stoutly  and  constantly  stood  should  be  more  ade 
quately  presented.  Wherein  this  biography  appears  to 
condone  his  "errors"  or  show  too  much  sympathy  for 
his  "heterodoxy"  it  will,  of  course,  be  subject  to  the 
same  condemnation  and  rebuke  with  which  Stevens' 
financial  utterances  were  always  visited  in  his  day.  But 
it  is  believed  that  his  cause  is  better  understood  than  it 
was  in  his  generation  and  that  if  it  is  not  approved  by 
academic  economists  it  will  at  any  rate  find  more  sup 
port,  sympathy  and  appreciation  than  in  former  days 
among  thoughtful  and  intelligent  students  of  finance. 

I  am  indebted  to  Honorable  Samuel  W.  McCall's  ex 
cellent  brief  Life  of  Stevens;  to  Mr.  W.  U.  Hensel, 
of  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania,  for  his  study  of  Stevens 
as  a  Lawyer,  and  to  Mr.  Hensel  and  other  citizens  in 
Lancaster  for  help  in  other  ways;  to  my  colleague, 
Professor  William  A.  Rawles,  for  helpful  suggestions 
in  certain  parts  of  the  volume ;  to  Mr.  Herbert  Putnam, 
Librarian  of  Congress,  for  liberal  privileges  in  the  use 
of  the  Stevens  letters  and  manuscripts  in  the  Mac- 
Pherson  papers  that  are  yet  unpublished.  The  scope 
of  the  vcl^me  has  permitted  the  use  of  these  papers  to 
but  ;»  limited  extent.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  some  stu 
dent  of  the  period  will  soon  edit  and  bring  to  the  light 
these  letters  and  papers  which  the  late  Edward  Mac- 


PR  EF ACE 

Pherson  had  intended  before  his  death  to  ma 
basis  of  a  full  and  adequate  presentation  of  th 


the 
5  life, 
biog- 


letters  and  speeches  of  Thaddeus  Stevens.  Thi 
raphy  is  offered  not  as  such  a  work,  but  ratHer  as 
merely  a  further  contribution  to  the  study  of  an  impor 
tant  period  and  character  in  our  history. 

JAMES  A.  WOODBUJIN. 


Indiana  University,  Bloomington. 
January  8,  1913. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PASS 

I    EARLY  DAYS 1 

II    THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON 13 

III  THE  BUCKSHOT  WAR 28 

IV  DEFENDER  OF  FREE  SCHOOLS 41 

V    THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER 55 

VI  IN  CONGRESS  BEFORE  THE  WAR;  AJSTTI- SLAVERY 

PHILIPPICS 73 

VII    ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR 125 

VIII  DISUNION,  SECESSION,  AND  No  COMPROMISE  .      .      .152 

IX     SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR 168 

X    THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR 207 

XI  WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR;  THE  GREENBACK    .  239 

XII    RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  THE  WAR 293 

XIII  JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 324 

XIV  THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON 339 

XV  THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      .....  369 

XVI  THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE  .......  406 

XVII  MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION     .            ......  431 

XVIII  MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION   (Continued)      .      .      .  458 

XIX    IMPEACHMENT 491 

XX  CONFISCATION        .      .      .      ....      .      .      .  521 

XXI  THE  GREENBACKER;  FUNDING,  DEBT  PAYMENT  AND 

CONTRACTION .      .      .  536 

XXII  TTIL  GREENBACKER;  FUNDING,  DEBT  PAYMENT  AND 

CONTRACTION  (Continued)        ....  561 

XXIII  CLOSING  DAYS  AND  CHARACTERISTICS  584 


THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 


THE   LIFE   OF 
THADDEUS   STEVENS 


CHAPTER  I 

EARLY   DAYS 

^HADDEUS  STEVENS  was  born  in  Danville, 
•*•  Vermont,  April  4,  1792,  the  year  following  the 
admission  of  Vermont  to  the  Union.  His  parents  had 
come  from  Massachusetts  a  few  years  before,  in  a 
family  migration  with  the  Harrises,  Morrills  and 
others.  The  mother  of  Stevens  was  a  Morrill,  who, 
judging  from  all  accounts  that  have  come  down,  was  a 
woman  of  the  finest  and  highest  type.  The  father  was 
not  thrifty  nor  enterprising  and  did  not  succeed  in  pro 
viding  very  well  for  his  family.  He  was  a  shoemaker ; 
and  the  son,  Thaddeus,  learned  enough  of  the  father's 
trade  to^  enable  him  to  make  shoes  for  the  family. 
Through  all  his  long  life  Thaddeus  Stevens  was  sel 
dom  heard  to  refer  to  his  father,  and  perhaps  he  knew 
little  about  him.  He  spoke  of  his  father's  great  repu 
tation  as  an  athlete,  and  Thaddeus  remembered  that  his 
father  had  been  known  as  the  champion  wrestler  in  all 
the  country  round.  The  later  years  of  the  elder 
Stevens'  life  appear  to  be  wrapped  in  mystery.  Some 
say  that  he  left  his  family  soon  after  settling  in  Ver 
mont,  and  was  never  heard  of  again.  Another  tradi- 

I 


2     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tion  is  to  the  effect  that  he  was  killed  in  the  War  of 
1812;  while  still  others  assert  that  he  died  at  home 
when  his  children  were  very  young.1  Certain  it  is  that 
the  mother,  with  four  little  children,  all  boys,  was  left 
in  dire  poverty.  Thaddeus,  the  youngest,  and  the 
mother's  favorite,  came  up  through  adversity  and  the 
trials  of  penury.  He  never  ceased  to  recall  with  af 
fection  and  gratitude  his  mother's  love  and  sacrifices 
for  him  in  these  trying  years. 

Stevens  grew  up  in  a  democratic  society.  The 
Revolutionary  War  was  a  recent  event  at  the  time  of 
his  birth,  but  ten  short  years  having  elapsed  since  its 
close.  Its  heroes  and  its  issues  were  fresh  in  mind  and 
that  great  struggle  was  generally  thought  of  as  a  con 
flict  for  human  equality  and  the  rights  of  man.  The 
early  settlers  in  Vermont  who  had  borne  their  fair 
share  in  the  Revolutionary  struggle,  were  an  honest, 
rugged,  independent  God-fearing  people.  The  great 
mass  of  them  were  engaged  in  making  a  plain  living 
by  industrious  toil,  and  an  aristocracy  of  wealth 
and  rank  was  practically  unknown.  Men  were  not 
measured  by  the  property  they  had,  but  were  recognized 
for  what  they  were,  for  what  they  could  do,  for  what 
service  they  were  able  and  willing  to  render  to  the  com 
munity.  Men  and  women  alike  were  hardy  toilers,  and 
there  was  a  neighborliness  among  them  that  led  them 

1  Stories  are  told  to  the  effect  that  the  paternity  of  Thaddeus 
Stevens  is  wrapped  in  mystery,  and  a  former  resident  of  Lancaster 
asserted  that  circumstantial  and  documentary  evidence  once  ex 
isted  to  show  that  he  was  the  illegitimate  son  of  Count  Talley 
rand,  who,  in  the  year  of  Stevens'  birth,  was  a  visitor  in 
America.*  This  may  be  only  irresponsible  gossip  about  the  family 
of  Stevens,  but  it  will  serve  to  show  the  kind  of  stories  that 
have  gathered  in  undue  volume  around  Stevens'  name. 


EARLY  DAYS  3 

to  share  one  another's  burdens  and  to  respect  one  an 
other's  virtues.  There  were  no  rich  to  be  oppressors ; 
luxury  was  unknown  and  the  poor  were  not  despised. 
In  such  a  social  surrounding  Stevens  grew  up,  all  his 
early  impressions  being  calculated  to  implant  in  his 
mind  hatred  of  privilege  and  of  all  inequalities  that 
may  be  promoted  by  artificial  restraints  and  favors  of 
government. 

Stevens,  besides  being  lame  from  birth,  was  a  sickly 
youth.  He  seemed  too  frail  and  tender  to  earn  his 
living  by  manual  toil.  This  fact  may  have  been,  in 
part,  the  reason  why  his  mother  determined  to  send 
him  to  college ;  but  it  must  also  have  been  true  that  she 
detected  within  him  a  talent  and  disposition  that  edu 
cation  and  a  college  training  were  likely  to  develop. 
The  mother  must  have  perceived  the  great  intellectual 
possibilities  of  the  son,  and  she  wished,  above  all,  to 
provide  for  him  opportunity  for  growth  and  a  career. 
She  must  have  been  led  many  times  to  ponder  in  her 
heart  the  sayings  and  inquiries  of  a  bright  boy. 
Stevens  was  sensitive  to  her  suffering,  to  her  spirit  of 
sacrifice  and  self-denial.  One  of  the  lasting  memories 
and  impressions  of  his  childhood  was  of  his  mother's 
service  during  a  plague  of  the  spotted  fever  in  Dan 
ville  and  the  surrounding  country.  At  a  time  when 
so  many  were  stricken  that  medical  attendance  and 
nursing  could  not  be  secured,  Mrs.  Stevens  was  un 
tiring  in  her  devotion  and  attention  to  her  stricken 
neighbors,  to  those  in  worse  circumstances  than  herself. 
She  ministered  to  their  wants,  going  from  house  to 
house  and  relieving  their  suffering  in  every  possible 
way.  Young  Thaddeus  was  frequently  taken  with  his 


4      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

mother  upon  these  errands  of  mercy,  and  the  impres 
sions  that  he  received  from  the  suffering  that  he  wit 
nessed,  combined  with  his  own  experience  in  lameness 
and  illness,  led  him  to  a  keen  and  lifelong  sympathy 
with  suffering  which  was  one  of  the  notable  traits  of 
his  character.1 

In  later  years  Stevens  gave  frequent  tributes  to  his 
mother's  virtues.  In  one  of  these  expressions,  recall 
ing  her  early  hardships  and  poverty,  he  said : 

"  I  really  think  the  greatest  pleasure  of  my  life  resulted 
from  my  ability  to  give  my  mother  a  farm  of  two  hundred 
and  fifty  acres  and  a  dairy  of  fourteen  cows,  and  an  occa 
sional  bright  gold  piece  which  she  loved  to  deposit  in  the 
contributors'  box  of  the  Baptist  church,  which  she  at 
tended.  This  always  gave  her  much  pleasure  and  me  much 
satisfaction.  My  mother  was  a  very  extraordinary  woman. 
I  have  met  very  few  women  like  her.  She  worked  day 
and  night  to  educate  me.  I  tried  to  repay  her  afterwards, 
but  the  debt  of  a  child  to  his  mother,  you  know,  is  one  of 
the  debts  we  can  never  pay." 

The  county  court  with  its  court-house  was  settled 
at  Danville,  but  a  county  academy  was  established  in 
Peacham,  an  adjoining  town,  and  Mrs.  Stevens  moved 
from  Danville  to  Peacham  to  educate  her  boys.  To 
her  mind  the  schoolroom  was  better  than  the  court 
room.  The  Peacham  Academy,  established  in  1795, 
has  had  a  long  career  of  usefulness,  and  in  its  early 
days  it  attained  an  enviable  reputation  as  a  good  fitting 
school  for  college. 

Stevens'  academy  days  there  were  without  unusual 
event.  The  one  event  that  has  survived  the  humdrum 

i  McCall,  p.  8. 


EARLY  DAYS  5 

of  his  school  life  was  his  rebellion,  with  twelve  other 
students,  against  a  rule  forbidding  "  tragedies,  come 
dies  and  other  theatrical  performances."  The  rebel 
lious  students  were  censured  by  the  board  of  control 
for  proceeding  to  exhibit  a  "  tragedy  "  on  the  evening 
of  September  4,  181 1.  This  was  denounced  by  the  au 
thorities  as  "  contrary  to  the  known  rules  and  orders 
of  the  school  and  the  express  prohibition  of  the  precep 
tor,  a  gross  violation  of  the  rules  and  by-laws  of  the 
institution,  tending  to  subvert  all  order  and  subordina 
tion  in  said  school,  and  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the 
Society."  The  students  were  required  to  sign  articles 
of  submission  asserting  that  upon  reflection  they  were 
convinced  that  they  had  done  wrong,  and  promising 
that  as  long  as  they  continued  students  of  the  academy 
they  would  observe  the  rules  laid  down  by  the  board. 
It  is  said  that  Stevens  signed  this  paper  with  reluctance 
and  chagrin,  and  that  he  soon  thereafter  completed  his 
preparation  for  college. 

Stevens  entered  Dartmouth  as  a  sophomore  in  the 
fall  of  1811  in  his  twentieth  year.  He  spent  one  or 
two  terms  of  his  college  life  in  the  University  of  Ver 
mont  (1812-13),  but  he  returned  to  Dartmouth  and 
graduated  there  in  iSi/j..1  Then,  as  now,  Dartmouth 

1A  story  is  told  of  Stevens'  Kfe  while  at  the  University  of 
Vermont,  which  illustr^t  ^  his  character.  An  obstinate  farmer 
insisted  upon  let+;-  _  ms  cow  run  loose  for  pasturage  on  the 
college  cam<-  ihis  was  irritating,  especially  at  commence 
ment  *-"  .and  some  of  the  students  made  way  with  the  cow. 
Stevens  and  another  student  had  killed  the  animal,  perhaps  while 
carrying  a  practical  joke  farther  than  they  intended.  The  irate 
farmer  demanded  payment  and  a  certain  student  who  was  alto 
gether  iruiocent  of  the  deed,  but  whom  circumstantial  evidence 
seemed  to  convict,  was  about  to  be  expelled  from  college. 
Stevens  and  his  guilty  comrade  could  not  see  the  innocent  suffer 
for  their  wrong-doing  while  they  escaped  by  silence.  They  deter- 


6   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

was  one  of  the  leading  colleges  of  New  England.  It 
then  numbered,  approximately,  as  many  graduates  in 
a  decade  as  Harvard,  Princeton,  or  Yale,  and  its  presi 
dent  and  faculty  were  as  well-known  in  the  world  of 
learning.  Doctor  John  Wheelock,  the  son  of  the  dis 
tinguished  Eleazar  Wheelock  who  had  founded  Dart 
mouth  nearly  half  a  century  before,  was  President 
when  Stevens  came.  George  Ticknor  had  graduated 
there  in  1807  and  Daniel  Webster  in  1801. 

It  was  a  restricted  classical  course  that  was  laid 
out  for  Stevens  in  his  college  days,  consisting  chiefly 
of  the  Latin  and  Greek  classics  and  the  higher  mathe 
matics,  with  the  addition  of  mental  and  moral  philos 
ophy,  and  perhaps  a  study  of  the  Greek  Testament. 

Stevens  studied  well,  appreciating  his  time  and  oppor 
tunity  and  keeping  in  mind,  no  doubt,  the  sacrifices  of 
his  mother  for  his  education.  His  training  in  the 
classics  gave  accuracy  and  precision  to  his  style  of 
speech,  and  while  in  his  subsequent  public  speeches  he 
professed  to  despise  form  and  rhetorical  rules,  the 
clearness  of  his  thought  and  the  directness  and  force  of 
his  speeches  gave  to  his  sentences  a  grammatical  qual 
ity  that  would  always  stand  the  test  of  criticism.  His 
classical  studies  and  logical  mathematical  processes  al 
ways  stood  him  in  good  place. 

Stevens  was  twenty-two  when  he  graduated  from 
Dartmouth.  He  had  determined  to  study  law,  and 

mined  to  make  a  clean  breast  of  the  matter  and  confessed 
fully  to  the  owner  of  the  cow.  He  generousiv  refused  to  take 
pay  for  his  lost  property  and  shielded  the  culprits  while  exoner 
ating  the  student  under  suspicion.  The  interesting  sequo1  of  the 
story  is  that  years  afterward  Stevens,  who  was  ever  mindi.:t  of 
ia  friendly  act,  sent  the  farmer  a  gold  watch  and  chain  with  a 
draft  for  more  than  the  value  of  the  cow.  (McCall,  p.  18.) 


EARLY  DAYS  7 

in  order  to  support  himself  while  pursuing  his  studies, 
he  taught  for  a  year  in  Peacham.  The  following  year, 
moved  partly  by  the  spirit  of  youthful  venture  and 
from  a  desire  to  find  a  wider  opportunity  for  the  future 
practise  of  his  chosen  profession,  he  went  to  York, 
Pennsylvania,  where  through  the  influence  of  Samuel 
Merrill,  a  friend  and  former  teacher  of  Stevens,  he  had 
secured  a  position  as  instructor  in  the  academy  of 
York.  This  important  step  in  Stevens'  life  was  pro 
moted  primarily  by  the  influence  of  Merrill.  Samuel 
Merrill  was  a  Peacham  boy  and,  like  Stevens,  was  a 
graduate  of  Dartmouth.  He  and  Stevens  seem  to  have 
been  very  close  friends.  In  a  letter  written  by  Stevens 
to  Merrill  in  1814,  a  gossipy  account  is  given  of  mar 
riages  and  other  personal  matters  in  Peacham  and  of 
college  affairs  at  Dartmouth.  He  spoke  of  an  uncom 
mon  epidemic  at  Peacham, 

"which  it  is  sincerely  hoped  will  thin  the  ranks  of  our  old 
maids  and  send  their  withered  ghosts  to  the  dominion  of 
that  old  tyrant  Hymen."  He  told  of  the  literary  societies 
at  Hanover ;  that  "  Old  Josh  Holt  is  President  of  the  fra 
ternity  ; "  that  "  Joseph  Tracy,  Gent,  has  been  loaded  with 
Phi  Betian  honors,  Kent  likewise ; "  that  "  Fisk  is  the 
Social's  orator.  Sam  Wells  hopes  to  be  the  Prater's,  but 
is  loosing  [  ?]  popularity.  Charles  Leverett  has  entered  into 
the  service  of  the  aristocracy,  in  the  capacity  of  scullion; 
and  it  is  expected,  as  a  reward  for  his  services,  he  will  be 
knighted,  i.  e.,  elected  Phi  Betian."  ..."  Those  fawning 
parasites  who  are  grasping  at  unmerited  honors,  seem  for 
once  to  have  blundered  into  the  truth, —  that  they  must 
flatter  the  nobility,  or  remain  in  obscurity;  that  they  must 
degrade  themselves  by  sycophancy,  or  others  will  not  exalt 
them.  The  democracy  rule  in  the  fraternity.  The  aristoc 
racy  make  threatening  grimaces,  but  it  is  only  sport  for  us 


8      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

poor  plebeians."  ..."  Friend  Sam,  I  assure  you,  you  can 
•hardly  conceive  the  anxiety  your  friends  feel  for  you  in 
that  distant  country.  Considering  you  exposed  to  the  in 
vincible  charms  of  those  fair  Dutch  wenches,  with  their 
dozen  pair  of  petticoats,  they  are  really  afraid  that  you  will 
lose  your  heart  or  get  lost  with  Goodie  T  wilier' s  ladle,  in 
one  corner  of  their  pockets;  that  filthy  lucre  will  induce 
you  to  become  the  son-in-law  to  some  Ten-Breeches,  and 
then  we  shall  despair  of  seeing  you  again." 

Stevens  in  his  letter  then  spoke  of  his  anticipated 
graduation  from  Dartmouth  the  following  August, — 
"  unless  honored  with  degradation  " —  and  then  he 
would  confront  the  necessity  of  entering  into  a  school. 
"If  you  think,"  he  wrote,  "  that  I  could  be  sure  of  em 
ployment  in  Pennsylvania,  I  should  like  very  well  to 
come  into  those  parts.  If  you  know  of  any  vacancies 
and  could  assist  me,  without  trouble  to  yourself,  you 
would  do  me  a  favor."  He  closes  with  his  compli 
ments  to  Merrill's  brother  and  to  Mr.  Blanchard. 

This  letter  explains  Stevens'  coming  to  Pennsyl 
vania.1  It  shows  a  feeling  that  was  a  part  of  his 

1  The  Samuel  Merrill  to  whom  Stevens  wrote,  was  a  man  of 
unusual  parts,  who  became  one  of  the  pioneer  commonwealth- 
builders  of  Indiana.  He  removed  to  Indiana  in  1816,  the  year 
in  which  the  state  was  admitted  to  the  Union.  He  was  a  mem 
ber  of  the  Legislature  which  selected  Indianapolis  as  the  capital 
of  the  state,  and  he  assisted  in  giving  the  name  to  the  capital 
city.  He  was  elected  Treasurer  of  State  in  1820,  a  position 
which  he  held  for  twelve  years.  In  1820  he  helped  to  remove 
the  state  archives  and  property  from  Corydon,  the  old  capital, 
to  Indianapolis.  After  retiring  from  the  state  treasurership,  he 
helped  to  organize  the  State  Bank  of  Indianapolis  and  was  its 
President  for  many  years.  This  was  one  of  the  few  state  banks 
of  the  time  to  win  financial  success  and  hono*.  Merrill  after 
ward  became  President  of  the  Indianapolis  and  Madison  Rail 
road,  the  first  railroad  in  Indiana.  He  died  in  1855,  o.n  honored 
citizen  of  the  state.  His  descendants  have  won  distinction  in 
the  civic  and  educational  life  of  Indiana,  in  the  professions  and 
in  business,  and  many  of  them  have  rendered  notable  service  to 
the  commonwealth. 


EARLY  DAYS  9 

wHole  life,  of  sympathy  and  fellowship  for  the  "  poor 
plebeian  "  against  the  "  aristocracy."  His  remarks 
about  the  "  Pennsylvanian  Dutch  "  were  merely  idle 
cajolery  and  should  not  be  taken  to  indicate  a  lack 
of  sympathy  or  appreciation  of  that  worthy  stock  with 
many  of  whose  representatives  Stevens  afterward  en 
tered  into  many  and  enduring  ties  of  friendship. 

At  York  in  Pennsylvania,  a  county  seat  of  impor 
tance,  Stevens  pursued  the  study  of  the  law.  As  a 
teacher  and  as  a  student  of  law,  he  was  diligent  in  his 
studies  and  retiring  in  his  habits.  He  had  begun  his 
legal  studies  in  Vermont  under  Judge  Mattocks;  he 
now  continued  them  diligently  in  York  under  David 
Casset,  a  leader  of  the  local  bar. 

The  familiar  account  of  his  admission  to  the  bar 
was  afterward  related  by  Stevens.  For  some  unex 
plained  reason  he  did  not  apply  for  admission  in  York. 
Some  rule  of  bench  or  bar  may  have  made  his 
admission  difficult  if  not  impossible,  probably  the  rule 
that  forbade  a  man's  admission  to  the  bar  while  he  was 
pursuing  some  other  occupation.  At  any  rate  he  rode 
on  horseback  to  Bel  Air,  the  county  seat  of  Harford 
County,  Maryland,  the  adjoining  county  to  York,  and 
presented  himself,  an  entire  stranger,  for  membership 
at  the  bar.  Theodore  Bland,  Zebulon  Hollingsworth, 
and  Joseph  H.  Nicholson  were  the  judges  presiding. 
Their  committee  on  the  examination  of  the  applicant 
learned  that  young  Stevens  had  read  Blackstone,  Coke 
upon  Littleton,  Gilbert  on  Evidence  and  a  work  on 
Pleading,  and  that  he  knew  some  of  the  elementary 
legal  definitions.  Before  this  strenuous  examination 
began,  the  aspiring  candidate  was  informed  that  a 


io   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

couple  of  bottles  of  good  Madeira  were  requisite,  and 
as  the  examination  drew  to  a  close  two  more  bottles 
were  required.  As  the  quality  of  Stevens'  wine  passed 
the  sampling  process  of  the  dignified  judges,  his  certif 
icate  was  signed  and  he  was  duly  admitted  to  the  bar. 
The  "  subsequent  proceedings  "  consisted  of  a  game  of 
"  fiploo  "  before  a  crowd  of  spectators,  a  game  that 
was  new  to  Stevens  and  in  which  he  lost  a  considerable 
part  of  the  fifty  dollars  that  he  had  brought  with 
him  to  court.  The  minutes  of  the  court  recording  his 
admission  are  as  follows : 

"  Upon  the  application  of  Stevenson  Archer,  Esq., 
for  the  admission  of  Thaddeus  Stevens,  Esq.,  as  an 
attorney  of  this  court,  the  said  Thaddeus  Stevens  is  ad 
mitted  as  an  attorney  of  this  court  and  thereupon  takes 
and  signs  the  several  oaths  prescribed  by  law,  and  re 
peats  and  signs  a  declaration  of  his  belief  in  the  Chris 
tian  religion." 

A  son  of  this  Stevenson  Archer,  bearing  the  same 
name,  entered  Congress  in  March,  1867.  After  he  was 
sworn  in,  Stevens  came  over  and  shook  hands  with  him 
and  inquired  whether  he  was  the  son  of  the  Judge 
Archer,  of  Maryland,  on  whose  motion  Stevens  had 
been  admitted  to  practise  law.  On  learning  that  such 
was  the  case,  Stevens  indulged  in  the  reminiscences 
from  which  this  account  is  substantially  drawn.1 

The  day  after  his  admission  to  the  bar,  Stevens  rode 
back  to  Pennsylvania.  He  narrowly  escaped  drown 
ing  while  crossing  the  Susquehanna  at  McCall's  Ferry. 
He  revisited  York,  but  decided  not  to  settle  there.  He 

1  Hensel,  W.  U.,  Thaddeus  Stevens  as  a  Country  Lawyer,  p.  4. 


EARLY  DAYS  n 

went  to  Lancaster  and  inspected  that  flourishing  and 
interesting  town,  but  for  some  reason  unknown  he 
turned  aside  from  its  opportunities  and  went  to  Gettys 
burg,  the  county  seat  of  Adams  County,  the  town  that 
has  given  its  name  to  the  most  famous  battle  in  Amer 
ican  history.  There  he  settled  to  begin  practise,  start 
ing  "  upon  his  career  as  a  lawyer,  without  friends, 
fame,  family,  or  fortune."  1 

For  a  number  of  years  in  Gettysburg  he  experienced 
the  life  of  the  struggling  young  lawyer.  On  a  meager 
budget  of  income  and  expenses  and  while  waiting  for 
clients,  he  spent  his  leisure  hours  in  intelligent  and 
diligent  reading,  thus  adding  to  his  store  of  literary  and 
historical  knowledge  that  he  was  afterward  able  to 
draw  upon  with  such  effect.  His  success  at  the  law 
seemed  at  first  doubtful  even  to  himself.  But  it  was 
not  long  until  a  case  came  to  him  by  which  he  was  able 
to  attain  to  success  and  reputation.  He  was  called 
upon  to  defend  a  murderer,  a  defense  that  no  other 
lawyer  seemed  willing  to  assume.  Stevens  undertook 
the  case  and  managed  it  with  such  ability,  adroitness 
and  skill  that,  while  he  was  not  able  to  secure  an  ac 
quittal  for  his  client,  who  was  notoriously  guilty  and 
was  hanged  for  his  crime,  he  attracted  attention  and 
favorable  comment  from  the  bar  and  from  the  com 
munity.  Stevens  put  up  a  plea  of  insanity  for  his 
client,  which  was  not  a  very  usual  plea  in  those  days. 
Stevens  himself  believed  in  the  plea,  since  many  years 
later,  after  he  had  been  the  attorney  for  the  defense  in 
more  than  fifty  other  murder  cases,  in  all  of  which  he 

1  Hensel,  W.  U. 


12   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

was  successful,  he  asserted  that  every  one  of  the  de 
fendants  deserved  conviction  but  this  one,  who,  as 
Stevens  averred,  was  insane. 

It  is  asserted  that  Stevens  received  a  fee  of  fifteen 
hundred  dollars  in  this  case.  This  has  been  doubted, 
as  it  is  thought  unlikely  that  such  a  fee  in  those  days 
would  be  paid  to  an  unknown  local  lawyer  by  a  mur 
derer  who  was  unable  to  have  his  case  appealed,  and 
who  was  hanged  for  his  crime.  But  it  is  certain  that 
Stevens  ever  looked  upon  this'Case  as  the  beginning  of 
his  professional  success. 

He  soon  came  to  the  front  of  the  Adams  County 
bar,  with  a  general  and  lucrative  practise.  From  1821 
to  1830  he  appeared  in  almost  every  important  case 
at  the  local  bar,  and  in  the  various  appeals  to  the  Su 
preme  Court  in  which  Stevens  appeared  he  won  in 
nine  out  of  ten,  securing  six  reversals  from  the  decis 
ion  of  the  lower  court.  He  was  now  the  recipient  of 
lucrative  fees,  he  had  won  local  fame  as  a  lawyer  and 
had  attained  honorable  standing  and  reputation 
throughout  his  adopted  county.  He  was  ready,  well 
equipped,  and  the  time  had  come  for  his  entrance  into 
public  life. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON 

QTEVENS'  first  appearance  in  public  life  was  in 
^  1833,  when  he  became  a  member  of  the  Pennsyl 
vania  Legislature,  from  Adams  County.1  He  had 
formerly  been  in  sympathy  with  the  Federalist  party, 
and  after  the  disappearance  of  that  party  he  took 
no  active  part  in  politics  until  the  appearance  of 
the  Anti-Masonic  party  in  1829.  The  disappearance 
and  probable  murder  of  Morgan  in  New  York  State 
had  caused  much  agitation  against  the  Free  Masons, 
and  a  political  party  arose  pledged  to  oppose  the  power 
and  influence  of  this  oath-bound  secret  order  whose 
members,  it  was  asserted,  were  banded  together  to  con 
trol  the  government  and  to  direct  or  prevent  the  admin 
istration  of  the  courts  and  the  laws  in  their  own  in 
terests.  Stevens  became  one  of  the  adherents  and 
leaders'  of  this  new  party  in  Pennsylvania.  He  re- 

1  This,  Doctor  McCarthy,  the  historian  of  the  Anti-Masonic 
party,  calls  the  most  significant  fact  in  the  history  of  Anti-Masonry 
in  Pennsylvania.  At  this  time  Stevens  was  described  by  one  of 
his  political  opponents  as  "  a  lawyer  of  much  cunning  and  adroit 
ness  and  of  considerable  celebrity.  He  was  originally  an  East 
ern  man,  and  has  been  all  his  life  a  uniform  and  undeviating 
Federalist,  a  warm  friend  of  John  Quincy  Adams  and  a  vio 
lent  opponent  of  General  Jackson.  He  is  now  the  great  lumi 
nary  of  Anti-Masonry  in  Adams  County,  within  whose  orbit  all 
the  lesser  planets  of  the  new  system  revolve  and  reflect  the  light 
he  dispenses."  Pennsylvania  Reporter,  March  23,  1830,  cited  in 
McCarthy's  "  Anti-Masonic  Party,"  American  Historical  Associa 
tion  Reports,  1903,  p.  456. 


14   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

garded  Masonry  as  an  imperium  in  imperio  and  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  denounce  the  lodge  as  "  a  secret,  oath- 
bound,  murderous  institution  that  endangered  the  con 
tinuance  of  Republican  Government." 

In  1829  the  Anti-Masonic  party  in  Pennsylvania, 
with  Stevens  as  one  of  its  leaders,  made  a  campaign 
for  the  governorship,  running  Joseph  Ritner  as  its 
candidate  for  Governor.  In  1831  this  party  held  a 
National  Convention  and  nominated  William  Wirt  as 
its  candidate  for  President.  Stevens  was  one  of 
the  prominent  figures  of  this  convention,  the  first  in  the 
history  of  American  politics  after  the  pattern  of  the 
modern  presidential  nominating  convention.  Among 
other  prominent  supporters  of  this  strange  new  party 
were  J.  Q.  Adams,  William  H.  Seward,  John  Marshall, 
Richard  Rush,  Amasa  Walker,  Myron  Holly,  and 
William  Slade. 

As  a  member  of  this  first  historic  nominating  con 
vention  Stevens  made  a  notable  speech  arraigning  the 
unrepublican  spirit  of  Free  Masonry.  He  com 
plained  of  the  unfair  and  discriminating  silence  of  the 
press.  The  papers  had  made  no  mention  of  the  con 
vention  and  the  people  scarcely  knew  of  it.  "  Not  one- 
fourth  part  of  the  people  of  Philadelphia  know  that  you 
are  in  session,"  and  this  he  regarded  as  evidence  enough 
that  there  was  "  an  influence  operating  higher  than 
human  curiosity  and  higher  than  the  laws  of  the  land." 
You  are  here  in  the  presence  of  grave  charges  brought 
against  public  men  and  facing  important  disclosures 
of  vital  interest  to  the  public,  "  yet  the  papers  which 
surround  you  are  as  silent  as  the  grave,"  while  on 


THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON  15 

the  other  hand,  the  opposition  press  "  brand  the  efforts 
of  Anti-Masonry  with  infamy." 

Stevens  proceeded  to  defend  the  morality  of  the 
men  who  had  disclosed  the  oaths  and  secrets  of  Free 
Masonry.  He  denounced  the  lodge  as  an  improper 
banding  together  of  men  under  oath  of  mutual  support, 
to  secure  immunity  in  improper  conduct  and  to  pro 
mote  one  another  to  improper  place  and  power, —  to 
secure  power  for  other  than  public  ends  in  every  place 
where  power  is  of  importance.  "  Look  around : 
Though  but  one  hundred  thousand  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  are  Free  Masons,  yet  almost  all  the 
offices  of  high  profit  and  high  honor  are  filled  with 
gentlemen  of  that  institution.  Out  of  the  number  of 
law  judges  in  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,  eighteen- 
twentieths  are  Masons;  and  twenty-two  out  of  twenty- 
four  states  of  the  Union  are  now  governed  by  Masonic 
chief  magistrates.  Although  not  a  twentieth  part  of 
the  voters  of  this  commonwealth,  and  of  the  United 
States  are  Masons,  yet  they  have  contrived,  by  con 
cert,  to  put  themselves  into  eighteen  out  of  twenty  of 
the  offices  of  profit  and  power.  I  defy  contradiction  to 
this  statement." 

Since  this  was  so,  Stevens  wished  to  know  whether 
it  was  because  the  uninitiated  were  not  fit  for  office 
or  whether  the  members  of  the  lodge  acted  secretly 
upon  the  malign  principles  that  had  been  disclosed. 
He  further  denounced  Masonry  as  an  irreligious  and 
blasphemous  institution,  and  he  called  upon  the  people 
to  exclude  "  with  a  sorrowful  but  determined  force, 
from  all  places  of  power,  those  who  still  belong  to  the 


i6   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

institution,  and  to  put  them  out  from  all  communion 
with  the  holy  and  the  good."  l 

It  was  as  a  member  of  this  party  and  with  firm'  con 
victions  in  its  cause  that  Stevens  came  to  the  State 
Legislature  of,  Pennsylvania  in  1833.  He  soon  of 
fered  a  resolution  proposing  to  inquire  into  the  ex 
pediency  of  a  law  making  membership  in  a  Masonic 
lodge  sufficient  cause  of  peremptory  challenge  in  court, 
when  one  of  the  parties,  and  not  both,  was  a  Mason, 
and  in  all  criminal  cases  if  the  defendant  was  a  Mason ; 
and  that  a  Masonic  judge  should  be  barred  from  trying 
a  case  if  one  of  the  parties  in  the  suit  was  a  Mason. 
This  resolution  of  Stevens  was  defeated  by  the  narrow 
margin  of  eleven  votes. 

Stevens  believed  that  Masonry,  standing  for  secrecy, 
"  implied  shame  and  guilt " ;  that  the  members  of  the 
order,  if  called  upon  to  act  as  witnesses,  magistrates, 
sheriffs,  jurors,  or  legislators,  would  violate  their  oaths 
and  their  most  sacred  obligations  in  these  civil  rela 
tions;  that  they  would  spirit  away  witnesses,  perjure 
themselves  in  court,  and  do  whatever  they  found  neces 
sary  to  prevent  the  attainment  of  judicial  justice,  in 
order  to  shield  their  fellow-members.  Accordingly  he 
and  the  honest  men  of  his  party  believed  that  Masonry 
threatened  the  existence  of  free  institutions. 

In  1834  Stevens  offered  another  resolution  in  the 
Legislature,  instructing  the  judiciary  committee  to  bring 
in  a  bill  for  the  suppression  of  Masonry.  This  also 
was  defeated,  but  in  the  following  year  he  secured  the 
appointment  of  a  committee  to  investigate  the  evils  of 
Free  Masonry  and  other  secret  societies.  As  the  com- 

1  Speech,  1831,  Christian  Cynosure,  April  5,  1883. 


THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON  17 

mittee  had  no  power  to  commit  witnesses  for  contempt, 
it  could  not  compel  the  Masons  whom  it  summoned  to 
testify,  and  consequently  its  investigations  amounted  to 
but  little. 

This  committee  service,  however,  gave  Stevens  an 
opportunity  to  make  a  report,  and  this  he  couched  in 
characteristic  language.  It  was  desirable,  he  said,  that 
the  government  and  the  judges  of  the  courts  should  be 
summoned  as  witnesses.  This  would  enable  the  public 
to  learn  how  far  Masonry  secures  political  and  exec 
utive  power;  whether  applications  for  office  have  been 
founded  on  Masonic  merit  and  claimed  on  Masonic 
rights ;  whether  the  "  significant  symbols "  and  the 
"  mystic  watchword  "  of  Masonry  have  been  used  in 
procuring  executive  patronage;  how  many  convicted 
felons  who  have  been  pardoned  by  the  present  govern 
ment  are  "  brethren  of  the  mystic  tie  "  and  connected 
by  blood  and  politics  with  members  of  that  institution ; 
and  whether,  before  the  judges,  "  the  grand  hailing 
sign  had  ever  been  handed,  sent,  or  thrown  to  them 
by  either  of  the  parties  litigant,  and  if  so,  what  had 
been  the  result  of  the  trial." 

One  at  this  day  is  disposed  to  have  very  little  sym 
pathy  with  the  designs  of  the  Anti-Masons  and  he 
reads  with  some  amazement  that  so  many  men  and  so 
many  leading  minds  were  led  to  become  members  of 
this  ephemeral  party.  But  if  one  examines  carefully 
into  the  motives  governing  the  members  of  the  Anti- 
Masonic  party  and  of  its  leaders,  like  Stevens,  he  will 
find  that  the  movement  was  very  largely  prompted 
by  an  earnest  desire  to  secure  freedom  and  equality 
among  all  citizens  and  to  prevent  the  establishment  of 


i8      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

orders  and  ranks  that  seemed  calculated  to  promote 
special  privileges  among  men.  Here  again  it  was 
Stevens'  democracy  and  love  of  free  institutions,  his 
love  of  "  equal  rights  and  unshackled  republicanism  " 
that  controlled  him,  that  led  him  to  become  a  promoter 
of  the  Anti-Masonic  Movement.  Whatever  we  may 
think  of  the  peculiar  tenets  of  this  party  it  is  entitled 
to  respect  for  its  fundamental  political  doctrine, —  the 
supremacy  of  the  laws.  The  honest  Anti-Masons 
favored  a  government  of  laws,  equally,  openly,  and 
justly  administered,  and  it  was  their  belief  that  Free 
Masonry  was  opposed  to  this  fundamental  principle 
of  our  civil  institutions.  The  advocates  of  Anti- 
Masonry  always  and  consistently  contended  that  the 
selection  of  men  for  office  should  ever  be  subservient 
to  these  principles  and  never  should  these  principles  be 
subservient  to  the  elevation  of  men.  Such  was 
Stevens'  political  faith.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of 
Stevens'  deep  and  sincere  convictions  in  the  Anti- 
Masonic  cause,  and  no  one  of  its  advocates  could  set 
forth  that  cause  with  greater  ability  or  a  more  trenchant 
eloquence  than  he. 

In  1835,  in  response  to  an  invitation  extended  to  him 
by  citizens  of  Washington  County,  Maryland,  Mr. 
Stevens  attended  an  Anti-Masonic  meeting  in  Hagers- 
town  and  delivered  a  speech.  An  extended  extract 
from  that  speech  may  not  be  out  of  place,  since  it  shows 
Stevens'  youthful  fire  and  illustrates  the  heated  political 
literature  of  the  Anti-Masonic  conflict.  Whatever  one 
may  think  of  the  merit  of  his  main  contention  he  is 
bound  to  acknowledge  the  invigorating  and  courageous 
quality  of  Stevens'  eloquence.  Among  other  things  he 


THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON  19 

said:  "Wherever  the  Genius  of  Liberty  has  set  a 
people  free,  the  first  object  of  their  solicitude  should 
be  the  destruction  of  Free  Masonry  and  all  other  secret 
societies.  Where  tyrants  rule  they  are  fit  engines  of 
despotism,  but  under  free  republican  government  se 
cret  societies  are  dangerous  and  are  not  to  be  tolerated. 
"  The  oaths  of  Free  Masons  are  inconsistent  with 
pure  morals,  true  religion,  and  the  permanent  existence 
of  liberty.  .  .  .  They  swear  to  promote  one  another's 
political  preferment.  This  vow  is  not  a  dead  letter. 
It  is  acted  on  throughout  the  Union.  Twenty  of  the 
twenty- four  states  are  governed  by  Masons.  They 
hold  two-thirds  of  the  offices.  None  but  a  Mason  can 
be  President.  Henry  Clay  is  Grand  Master  of  Ken 
tucky.  All  this  monopoly  of  power  is  brought  about 
by  a  band  of  men  constituting  less  than  one-twentieth 
of  our  voters.  Surely  there  is  a  magic  influence  in 
Free  Masonry.  It  corrupts  the  fountains  of  justice; 
stays  the  arm  of  the  law;  stops  the  regular  action  of 
government ;  binds  the  mind  in  darkness. 

'  Two  things  are  indispensable  to  the  continuance 
of  national  liberty, —  the  independence  of  the  public 
press  and  the  impartial  administration  of  justice.  The 
tyranny  of  Masonry  destroys  both.  This  prostituted 
harlot  has  entered  the  courts  of  justice  and  seduced  the 
venerable  judges  into  her  foul  embrace.  They,  too, 
seek  to  extricate  their  brothers,  whether  right  or 
wrong. 

"  How  can  the  evil  be  destroyed  ?  Undermine  its 
foundation, —  the  hope  of  power  and  place.  It  is 
founded  on  selfishness,  love  of  gain,  personal  ambition, 
desire  of  emolument.  Remove  these  or  it  will  con- 


20   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tinue  to  flourish.  Refuse  to  trust  Masons  with  any 
office  of  profit  or  trust,  until  they  are  shorn  of  their 
locks  and  become  as  other  men.  Turn  their  weapons 
against  themselves.  Think  not  to  dissolve  this  insti 
tution  by  appealing  to  their  moral  feeling.  It  would 
be  useless  to  attempt  to  touch  the  feelings  of  the  heart. 
They  would  but  sneer.  It  is  idle  folly  to  address  the 
sympathies  of  political  partisans.  Although  they  were 
touched  in  strains  as  tender  as  the  mournful  music  of 
Orpheus,  it  would  fall  unavailingly  on  listless  ears.  It 
would  sooner  wring  compassion  from  the  heart  of 
Cerberus  and  his  infernal  attendants. 

"  Has  this  institution  outgrown  the  law,  become 
stronger  than  the  civil  power,  or  the  will  of  a  sovereign 
people?  Has  this  base-born  issue  of  a  foreign  sire  be 
come  so  powerful,  that  even  the  Young  Lion  of  Amer 
ican  Liberty  can  not  crush  him?  Is  this  bloody  god 
too  strong  for  us  to  overcome  ?  Then  let  us  tremble  at 
his  power,  fall  down,  bow  ourselves  in  the  dust  before 
him  and  supplicate  his  favor.  For  my  single  self  I 
would  rather  be  the  victim  of  his  fury  than  the  slave  of 
his  favor. 

"  Some  are  afraid  of  being  in  the  minority, —  tame 
souls  who  delight  to  dwell  on  neutral  ground,  who 
tremble  lest  they  should  mistake  the  strong  side,  who 
hover  around  the  confines  of  the  battle-field  ready  to 
throw  up  their  caps  and  shout  hosannas  to  the  victors. 
Such  men  we  would  advise  to  remain  where  they  are, 
in  dull  and  useless  slothfulness.  Those  who  are  not 
with  us  in  moral  feeling  we  are  better  without.  We 
want  no  hireling  forces.  Those  who  address  them 
selves  to  this  warfare  must  do  it  from  love  of  country. 


THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON  21 

Who  would  not  rather  be  vanquished  with  honorable 
associates  than  triumph  with  a  horde  of  mercenary 
traitors?  If  you  must  fall  you  will  have  the  consola 
tion  to  know  that  you  have  lived  while  there  was  any 
thing  worth  living  for.  .  .  .  Who  would  not  rather  be 
come  food  for  worms  while  the  lamp  of  liberty  may  yet 
light  him  to  his  grave  than  to  survive  its  extinguish 
ment,  to  grope  through  ages  of  the  darkness  of  despo 
tism,  a  trembling  coward  slave?  Who  would  not 
rather  sleep  with  honor  in  the  Spartan's  grave  side  by 
side  with  Leonidas  and  his  little  band  of  martyred 
patriots  than  to  ride  triumphant  over  a  prostrate  world 
with  the  principles  and  in  company  of  Neroes  and 
Caligulas  ?  If  any  such  recreant  freemen  there  are,  let 
them  turn  and  flee."  1 

The  Gettysburg  Republican  Compiler  published  a  re 
port  of  this  speech  in  a  letter  from  Hagerstown,  and 
with  the  report,  published  some  personal  reflections 
upon  the  speaker,  which  became  the  basis  of  a  suit  for 
libel  brought  by  Stevens.  The  letter  described  Stevens 
as  "  a  stout  man,  about  forty  years  of  age,  with  a  bald 
head,  and  lame."  It  charged  him  with  impudence  in 
presuming  to  instruct  the  citizens  of  another  state, — 
no  foreign  influence  should  direct  or  control  the  course 
of  the  citizens  of  Maryland ;  it  asserted  that  the  speaker 
was  incapable  of  feeling  aright  on  any  matter  and  that 
his  speech  was  "  a  compound  of  the  vilest  slanders, 
most  barefaced  falsehoods  and  pandemoniac  malignity 
against  respectable  citizens  that  ever  fell  from  the  lips 
of  any  man."  With  a  jibe  at  Stevens'  Yankee  extrac- 

1-"Free   Masonry   Unmasked,"    1835.     Pamphlet   of   The  His 
torical  Society  of  Pennsylvania. 


22   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tion  the  writer  asserted  that  "  this  Anti-Masonry  was 
not  born  in  Pennsylvania,  but  was  imported  from  that 
part  of  our  country  whose  people  are  proverbial  for 
their  tricks  and  frauds,  as  the  venders  of  the  most 
worthless  and  deceptive  commodities, —  flannel  sau 
sages,  wooden  nutmegs,  and  horn  gun-flints." 

This  seems  strong  enough  for  ordinary  political  war 
fare,  but  there  must  have  been  other  parts  of  the  letter 
that  were  used  in  the  successful  libel  suit  that  Stevens 
brought  against  the  publisher,  as  the  defendant,  Jacob 
Le fever,  was  convicted,  fined  fifty  dollars,  and  sen 
tenced  to  three  months'  imprisonment.  But  Governor 
Wolf,  a  Mason,  as  Stevens  expressed  it,  "  extricated  his 
brother  by  pardoning  him." 

Because  of  divisions  among  the  Democrats,  the 
Whigs  and  Anti-Masons  combined  were  able  to  carry 
Pennsylvania  in  1835.  They  elected  Ritner,  an  Anti- 
Mason,  to  the  governorship  and  these  united  parties 
controlled  the  lower  house  of  the  Legislature,  and,  on  a 
joint  vote,  both  houses.  Stevens  was  regarded  as  one 
of  the  confidential  advisers  of  the  Governor,  a  member 
of  his  "  Yankee  Kitchen  Cabinet."  Some  of  the  dis 
senting  Democrats  who  had  supported  Muhlenberg  for 
Governor  against  Governor  Wolf,  the  regular  nominee 
of  the  party,  were  inclined  to  vote  with  the  Anti- 
Masonic-Whig  combination.  They  were  dissatisfied 
because  of  increased  taxation  resulting  from  the  free 
school  law  and  from  canal  construction.  Governor 
Ritner  interpreted  this  election  as  a  triumph  of  Anti- 
Masonry  and  in  his  first  message  he  asserted  that  the 
supremacy  of  the  laws  and  the  equal  rights  of  the  peo 
ple  should  be  maintained,  "  whether  assailed  by  indi- 


THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON  23 

viduals  or  by  secret  sworn  associations.  The  people 
have  willed  the  destruction  of  secret  societies  and  that 
will  can  not  be  disregarded." 

On  December  7,  1835,  Stevens  introduced  into  the 
Legislature  a  bill  to  suppress  secret  societies  bound  to 
gether  by  unlawful  oaths,  and  on  December  19,  a  com 
mittee  of  five,  with  Stevens  as  chairman,  was  appointed 
to  investigate  the  evils  of  Free  Masonry,  with  power 
to  send  for  persons  and  papers.  Stevens  immediately 
summoned  Ex-Governor  Wolf  and  other  political  op 
ponents  to  appear  before  the  committee,  and  upon  their 
refusal  to  take  any  notice  of  the  summons  he  offered 
a  resolution  in  the  House  "  to  compel  the  attendance 
of  these  and  other  delinquent  witnesses."  It  was  voted 
to  bring  these  men  before  the  committee  by  authority 
of  the  House.  There  was  much  excitement  and  an  in 
terested  crowd  of  spectators  came  to  the  sessions  of  the 
committee  to  hear  the  secrets  of  Masonry  revealed,  and 
Stevens'  committee  was  ridiculed  and  denounced  by  his 
Masonic  opponents  as  "  An  Old  Woman's  Curiosity 
Convention,"  with  Stevens  as  "  Chief  Old  Woman,"  or 
the  "Arch  Priest  of  Anti-Masonry."  The  Masons 
who  were  summoned  refused  to  answer  the  questions 
that  were  put  to  them,  and  each  read  a  lengthy  protest 
instead.  Stevens  then  arranged  to  have  twenty-five  of 
them  arraigned  before  the  House  and  as  "  prisoners  at 
the  bar  to  be  committed  to  the  charge  of  the  sergeant- 
at-arms  until  delivered  by  due  course  of  law."  The 
House  soon  tired  of  its  prisoners  and  ordered  their 
release,  the  Whig  allies  of  the  Anti-Masons  failing  to 
give  their  continued  support. 

Stevens'  investigation  was  defeated,  but  in  a  speech 


24      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  March  5,  1836,  he  vowed  everlasting  opposition  to 
the  "  unholy  orders."  "  Sir,"  he  said,  "  I  will  go  home 
again  in  a  minority,  and  call  again  and  again  upon  the 
people  and  will  either  succeed  in  crushing  that  polluting 
order,  which  will  sustain  itself  by  trampling  over  the 
best  interests  of  the  country,  or  will  go  down  to  the 
grave  never  faltering  in  a  righteous  cause."  He  be 
lieved  that  the  people  would  soon  perceive  that  there 
was  "  no  other  question  than  Masonry  and  Anti- 
Masonry."  l 

As  the  campaign  of  1836  came  on,  divisions  appeared 
in  the  ranks  of  the  Pennsylvania  Anti-Masons.  Some 
favored  the  nomination  of  General  Harrison  for  the 
presidency ;  but  Stevens  and  the  more  radical  members 
of  the  party  protested.  Stevens  took  it  upon  himself 
to  submit  a  series  of  questions  to  Harrison.  He 
wished  to  know  whether  Harrison  believed  that  oath- 
bound  secret  societies  were  an  evil  and  inconsistent 
with  the  genius  and  safety  of  republican  government 
and  whether  he  would  join  his  Anti-Masonic  fellow- 
citizens  in  using  "  constitutional,  fair,  and  honorable 
means  for  their  final  and  effectual  suppression."  Har 
rison  answered  that  the  attempt  to  exercise  such  au 
thority  might  be  conducive  of  more  mischief  than  the 
evils  it  was  proposed  to  remedy.  The  answer  was  not 
satisfactory  to  Stevens,  and  he  threw  the  weight  of  his 
influence  to  Webster  as  the  Anti-Jackson  candidate. 
But  a  state  convention  of  the  Anti-Masons  in  Decem 
ber,  1835,  refused  to  send  delegates  to  an  Anti-Masonic 
National  Convention,  and  it  proceeded  to  nominate 

1  McCarthy,  "  Anti-Masonic  Party,"  American  Historical  Asso 
ciation  Papers,  1903,  pp.  474-475. 


THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON  25 

Harrison  and  Granger  for  President  and  Vice-Presi- 
dent,  whereupon  the  radicals  led  by  Stevens  protested 
and  withdrew  from  further  participation  in  the  pro 
ceedings. 

The  seceding  Anti-Masons  proposed  to  hold  a  Na 
tional  Convention  in  May,  and  appointed  delegates 
to  it.  Stevens  and  Amos  Ellmaker  were  among  the 
delegates  appointed.  The  address  which  they  issued 
throws  light  upon  Stevens'  extreme  spirit  of  Anti- 
Masonry.  This  address  charged  that  the  Masonic- 
Whig  State  Convention  which  had  declared  for  Harri 
son  had  been  influenced,  if  not  controlled,  by  Masons, 
or  "strenuous  defenders  of  the  lodge,"  or  by  those 
who  were  made  to  believe  that  the  road  to  patronage 
and  public  office  led  on  through  support  of  Harrison. 
This  convention,  the  address  asserted,  had  sat  with 
closed  doors,  like  a  Star  Chamber,  and  had  voted  down 
a  resolution  asking  General  Harrison  to  declare  him 
self  for  Anti-Masonic  principles.  Stevens'  address 
called  upon  every  true  Anti-Mason  in  the  state  to  re 
fuse  to  sanction  this  coalition,  but  to  hold  himself 
bound  by  the  decisions  of  the  National  Convention 
soon  to  be  held.  There  was  to  be  no  repose  in  defense 
of  equal  rights  but  the  armor  was  to  buckled  on  anew 
"  to  meet  and  again  to  overthrow  the  evil  monster 
whose  slightest  touch  is  pollution."  1 

This  appeal  was  not  effective  in  arousing  a  popular 
response;  the  policy  of  continuing  a  political  party  on 
the  one  idea  of  opposition  to  Masonry  was  dying  out; 
the  party  was  being  absorbed  into  the  general  Whig 
movement,  and  the  Whig  National  Convention  having 

1  McCarthy,  "  Anti-Masonic  Party,"  p.  481. 


26      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

nominated  Harrison,  Stevens  was  compelled  by  his 
spirit  of  opposition  to  the  Jacksonian  Democracy  to 
come  to  Harrison's  support,  though,  no  doubt,  his  sup 
port  was  lukewarm,  while  many  of  the  radical  Anti- 
Masons  refused  to  vote  for  Harrison.  The  elections 
in  the  state  in  1836  went  against  the  Whigs  and  the 
Anti-Masons,  and  Stevens  was  not  returned  to  the 
Legislature.  The  result  is  accounted  for  by  the 
"  fiasco  of  his  investigation  and  by  his  arbitrary  meas 
ures  in  regard  to  Masonry."  1 

But  the  lack  of  unity  and  cohesion  in  the  Anti-Ma 
sonic-Whig  combination,  their  party  quarrels  and 
schisms,  and  their  divisions  on  state  issues,  offer  a 
more  probable  cause  for  their  defeat. 

One  should  not  be  led  into  the  error  of  supposing 
from  this  account  that  Stevens  was  so  absorbed  in  this 
period  of  his  life  with  the  cause  of  Anti-Masonry  that 
he  was  indifferent  to  all  other  political  and  public  ques 
tions  of  the  time.  The  anti-slavery  cause  and  the 
cause  of  free  schools,  as  we  shall  see,  occupied  much 
of  his  interest  and  attention.  He  offered  a  resolution 
in  the  Legislature  instructing  Pennsylvania's  delega 
tion  in  Congress  to  favor  internal  improvements  by 
promoting  measures  for  improving  the  navigation  of 
the  Ohio.  He  proposed  a  Pennsylvania  charter  fo/r 
the  second  United  States  Bank,  which  Jackson  was 
pounding  to  its  death.  This  showed  Stevens'  Anti- 
Jackson  temper.  Other  national  and  local  interests  in 
public  affairs  required  his  time  and  labor.  In  1838 
he  became  canal  commissioner  of  the  state,  which  gave 
him  control  of  considerable  patronage,  and  one  of  his 

1  McCarthy,  p.  483. 


THE  EARLY  ANTI-MASON  27 

political  opponents  and  colleagues  in  Congress  asserted 
in  later  years  that  he-"  inaugurated  a  system  of  colon 
ization  for  political  effect  which  politicians  have  im 
proved  upon  and  practised  more  or  less  ever  since."  1 
When  Porter  beat  Ritner  for  Governor  of  Pennsyl 
vania  in  1838,  Stevens  made  what  some  of  his  friendly 
critics  consider  to  be  the  capital  mistake  of  his  early 
political  life.  He  and  his  party  managers,  believing 
they  had  been  beaten  by  fraud,  determined  to  treat  the 
election  as  if  it  had  not  occurred.  This  brought  on 
the  "  Buckshot  War,"  which,  though  it  wrought  no 
great  revolution  in  politics,  assisted  in  taking  Stevens 
out  of  public  life  for  a  number  of  years.  The  account 
of  that  bloodless  war  it  is  now  in  place  to  give. 

1  Judge  Woodward  Memorial  Address  on  the  Life  of  Stevens, 
Congressional  Globe,  188,  p.  72. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   BUCKSHOT   WAR 

>TpHE  "  Buckshot  War  "  was  the  outcome  of  election 
•*•  disputes  in  Philadelphia  County  in  1838.  The 
control  of  the  Legislature  depended  on  the  Philadelphia 
contest,  and  a  seat  in  the  United  States  Senate  was  at 
stake.  If  the  Whig  candidates  were  elected  from  this 
county  that  party  could  control  the  Legislature ;  if  the 
Democrat  candidates  were  elected,  the  Legislature 
would  be  Democratic.  One  set  of  partisan  returning 
officers  made  out  a  return  in  favor  of  the  Whigs,  an 
other  set  made  out  a  return  in  favor  of  the  Democrats. 
The  Whigs  claimed  the  disputed  district  of  Northern 
Liberties  by  one  thousand  votes,  but  the  judges  de 
clared  that  the  whole  district  should  be  thrown  out,  and 
this  elected  the  Democratic  ticket.  Burrowes,  the 
Whig  Secretary  of  State,  who  was  also  chairman  of 
the  Whig  State  Campaign  Committee,  recognized  the 
Whig  returns,  which  he  had  received  first,  in  due  and 
legal  form.  The  Democratic  return  was  later  and  not 
so  regular.  Burrowes  also  declared,  in  a  Whig  party 
address,  that  the  Democratic  majority  in  the  state  had 
been  secured  by  fraud,  that  the  Whigs  should  immedi 
ately  begin  an  investigation  and  proceed  as  if  they  had 
not  been  defeated  in  the  recent  election.1 

1  This  is  printed  in  Niles'  Register  under  the  caption,  "  Ad 
dress   of  the   Democratic   State   Committee   to  the   Friends   of 

28 


THE  BUCKSHOT  WAR  29 

The  Whig  contestants  were  thus  recognized  by  the 
constituted  authority  as  having  legal  certificates  of  elec 
tion.  Were  they  to  be  allowed  to  take  their  seats  and 
vote  upon  all  questions  relating  to  the  permanent  or 
ganization  of  the  House  ?  If  so,  their  party  would  be 
able  to  obtain  permanent  control.  Stevens  was  the 
Whig  leader.  He  published  an  able  argument  in  favor 
of  this  plan  of  procedure.  He  argued  most  plausibly 
that  the  only  way  to  organize  the  House  was  to  swear 
in  the  members  who  had  been  designated  in  the  legal 
returns.  There  must  be  a  prima  facie  decision  as  to 
the  contested  seats.  It  was  absurd  to  say  that  this  de 
cision  should  be  postponed  until  all  the  undisputed  re 
turns  were  read  and  to  allow  only  those  members  whose 
election  was  undisputed  to  decide  as  to  the  disputed 
ones;  because,  until  the  House  was  organized  and  a 
Speaker  elected,  it  was  not  competent  to  entertain  any 
question,  and  if  there  could  be  no  initial  decision  as  to 
disputed  seats  and  such  decisions  had  to  be  postponed 
until  the  House  was  organized,  officers  elected,  and 
committees  appointed,  it  would  be  very  easy  to  con 
test  any  number  or  all  of  the  seats,  and  no  one  would 
be  left  to  act  as  umpires  and  judges.  Until  the  House 
was  organized  no  members  were  competent  to  vote 
as  to  the  right  of  other  members  to  their  seats.  "  They 
must  in  every  instance  be  sitting  members  upon  the 
returns  furnished  by  the  secretary  of  the  common 
wealth;  the  only  way  the  sitting  members  can  be  un 
seated  is  by  a  petition  presented  by  the  claiming  mem- 
Joseph  Ritner."  It  appears  that  the  name  "Democratic"  was 
too  popular  to  allow  its  being  monopolized  by  the  "  Van  Buren 
Democrats." 


30      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

bers,  and  that  petition  referred  to  a  committee  selected 
by  lot,  according  to  the  act  of  1791,  whose  report  is 
final  and  conclusive." 

Such  was  Stevens'  argument.  It  is  difficult  to  see  a 
loophole  in  it  from  the  standpoint  of  law  and  Amer 
ican  parliamentary  procedure.1 

As  the  day  approached  for  the  organization  of  the 
Legislature  crowds  of  party  contestants  came  to  the 
state  capitol.  Threats  of  violence  were  made,  and  it 
was  asserted  that  bayonets  were  to  bristle  at  Harris- 
burg.  The  Democrats  rallied  their  forces;  commit 
tees  of  safety  came  from  Philadelphia;  leaders  were 
appointed ;  armed  belligerents  filled  the  town,  and  when 
the  House  met  for  its  first  session  "the  hall  was 
crowded  to  the  door  with  outsiders."  2 

Stevens'  address  to  his  constituents  described  the 
situation  as  follows :  "  An  unusual  number  of  people 
filled  the  galleries  and  lobby.  Several  of  the  aisles, 
and  the  open  space  in  front  of  the  Speaker's  chair, 
were  choked  up  with  rude-looking  strangers,  and  the 
chairs  of  several  members  were  surrounded  with  rough 
brawny  bullies.  My  seat  had  the  honor  of  being 
guarded  by  eight  or  ten  of  the  most  desperate  brawlers 
of  Kensington  and  Spring  Garden,  who  thrust  them 
selves  determinedly  against  my  chair,  and  when  I  left 
it  occasionally,  one  of  them  occupied  it  until  my  re 
turn.  Most  of  them  wore  coats  with  outside  pockets 
in  which  their  hands  were  generally  thrust;  and  it 
was  afterward  satisfactorily  ascertained  that  they 

1  See  Stevens'  address  to  the  citizens  of  Adams  County,  Penn 
sylvania  Telegraph,  January  17,  1839. 

2  McCarthy,  p.  497. 


THE  BUCKSHOT  .WAR  31 

were  armed  with  double-barreled  pistols,  bowie  knives, 
and  dirks."  * 

The  result  of  the  attempt  to  organize  the  House  was 
that  two  Houses  were  organized,  two  Speakers  were 
elected,  and  two  sets  of  committees  were  appointed  to 
inform  the  Governor  and  the  Senate  that  the  House 
was  organized  and  ready  for  business.  Stevens,  for 
the  Whigs,  nominated  their  Speaker,  appointed  tellers, 
put  the  motion,  declared  his  Speaker  elected  and  con 
ducted  him  to  the  chair.  He  took  no  counsel  of 
timidity ;  he  was  not  governed  in  the  least  by  doubt  or 
hesitation.  He  pursued  the  means  best  calculated  to 
reach  the  end  he  had  in  view. 

The  two  Speakers,  Cunningham,  the  Whig,  and  Hop 
kins,  the  Democrat,  occupied  the  platform  and  the  two 
contending  factions  were  known  as  the  "  Hopkins 
House "  and  the  "  Stevens  Rump."  Of  course,  no 
business  could  be  transacted.  The  question  was,  which 
of  the  two  Houses  would  the  Senate  recognize  and  thus 
constitute  a  Legislature  ? 

The  Whigs  had  organized  the  Senate,  greatly  to  the 
disgust  of  the  Democratic  partisans  who  had  packed 
the  galleries  and  lobbies.  Violent  threats  were  made 
against  Penrose,  the  President  of  the  Senate,  and 
against  Stevens  and  Burrowes,  who  had  come  to  the 
Senate  and  were  sitting  as  spectators.  When  one 
Brown,  a  Democratic  contestant,  who  had  been  ex 
cluded  from  the  Senate,  demanded  a  hearing,  it  was  at 
first  denied,  and  a  motion  made  to  adjourn.  "  A  scene 
ensued  which  baffles  description.  Apparently  a  thou 
sand  voices  cried  out  for  Brown!  Brown!  and  with 
1  Pennsylvania  Telegraph,  January  17,  1839. 


32   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  clapping,  stamping,  and  hallooing  exceeded  in  tu 
mult  and  confusion  anything  ever  witnessed.  Finally 
Brown  had  leave  to  speak.  When  he  had  concluded 
the  spectators  rushed  into  the  middle  of  the  chamber 
and  had  complete  possession  of  the  place."  1 

As  the  Harrisburg  Intelligencer  expressed  it,  when 
the  new  Senators  (the  contested  Whigs)  were  sworn 
in,  "  A  scene  of  riot  ensued  beyond  all  description, 
which  finally  obliged  the  Senate  to  adjourn,  when  the 
mob  took  possession  of  the  hall."  2  When  the  dis 
order  had  become  so  uproarious  that  the  proceedings 
had  to  be  adjourned,  "  Mr.  Penrose  and  Mr.  Stevens, 
with  a  majority  of  the  Senators,  left  the  hall  by  jump 
ing  from  the  windows."  3 

Stevens  gives  the  following  account  of  his  escape  on 
this  occasion :  "  Mr.  Burrowes  and  myself  were  stand 
ing  in  front  of  them  near  the  fire.  We  were  urged 
several  times  to  withdraw  as  the  only  means  of  safety, 
and  of  preventing  the  effusion  of  blood.  .  .  .  Private 
information  was  conveyed  both  to  Mr.  Penrose  and 
myself  by  persons  from  the  crowd,  that  the  ruffians 
were  arranging  to  '  stab  '  or  '  knife  '  us.  Mr.  Bur 
rowes  had  left  the  house  by  a  back  window,  and,  as 
the  tumult  grew  thicker  and  nearer,  after  dark  Mr. 
Penrose  and  myself  did  the  same  and  were  followed 
by  a  large  number  of  gentlemen,  Senators  and  mem 
bers  of  the  House,  as  well  as  others.  We  had  scarcely 
got  behind  the  Treasury  Building  when  twenty  or 
thirty  of  the  mob  broke  out  of  the  capitol  and  ran 

1  Correspondent  in  the  Baltimore  American,  Niles'  Register, 
Vol.  55,  p.  237. 

2  Niles  45,  P-  238. 

3  Writer  in  the  Baltimore  American,  Niles  55,  p.  237. 


THE  BUCKSHOT  WAR  33 

round  to  the  window  whence  we  escaped.  On  seeing  it 
open  a  person  present  testifies  that  they  said,  '  We  are 
a  minute  too  late/  and  inquired  for  Penrose."  1 

Democratic  writers  denounced  Stevens  as  the  head 
of  a  Whig  conspiracy,  who,  with  his  "  supple  coadju 
tors,"  was  seeking  "  to  consummate  the  frauds  and  in 
iquities  which  they  have  been  practising  upon  our  bleed 
ing  commonwealth  during  the  last  three  years." 
"  How  much  longer,"  it  was  asked,  "  are  the  good, 
moral,  quiet  citizens  of  Pennsylvania  to  be  tormented 
by  this  arch  conspirator,  who  has  for  three  years  agi 
tated  the  commonwealth  without  ceasing, —  who  has 
been  incessantly  engaged  in  endeavoring  to  overturn 
our  institutions,  and  who  has  been  the  cause  of  squan 
dering  millions  of  the  people's  money  to  construct  a 
useless  railroad  to  his  iron  works  —  to  buy  up  bullies 
to  intimidate  freemen  at  the  polls  ?  " 

The  Democratic  reporter  referred  to  Stevens  as  the 
oracle  and  the  conscience-keeper  of  Governor  Ritner, 
and  it  was,  therefore,  to  be  expected  that  his  course 
would  be  "  sinister  and  hypocritical."  This  Democratic 
journalist '  constantly  called  the  Whigs  the  "Federal 
members,  or  Federal  Whigs,"  or  "  our  corrupt  Federal 
rulers,"  seeking  to  identify  them  with  the  old  unpopu 
lar  Federalist  party,  and  he  commented  upon  the  ease 
with  which  Stevens  "molded  every  Federal- Whig- 
Anti-Masonic  member  to  his  views,"  and  "  how  ser 
vilely  they  followed  their  leader  and  basely  executed 
all  his  reckless  commands." 

After  the  mob  had  broken  up  the  session  of  the 

^Pennsylvania  Telegraph,  January  17,  1839.  Cited  by 
McCarthy,  p.  499. 


34      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Senate,  the  city  was  in  the  hands  of  rioters.  The  Dem 
ocrats  organized  a  "  provisional  government,"  and 
Whig  officers  hardly  dared  to  appear  upon  the  streets, 
and  the  threat  was  made  that  if  they  should  attempt 
to  organize  a  Legislature  Harrisburg  "  would  be 
smothered  in  blood."  1 

Stevens,  in  a  letter  to  his  constituents,  came  back 
at  his  opponents,  who  claimed  to  be  freemen  seeking 
to  vindicate  the  outraged  liberties  and  rights  of  the 
people,  by  the  following  description  of  the  mob.  (  The 
most  respectable  of  them,  the  '  Captains  of  tens/  were 
keepers  of  disorderly  houses  in  Kensington.  Then 
came  journeymen  butchers,  who  were  too  worthless  to 
find  regular  employment;  next,  professional  boxers, 
who  practise  their  pugilistic  powers  for  hire ;  low  gam 
blers,  who  infest  the  oyster  cellars  of  the  suburbs.  A 
portion  of  them  consisted  of  a  class  of  men  whose  busi 
ness  you  will  hardly  understand, —  dog-keepers  who, 
in  Spring  Garden  and  Southwark,  raise  and  train  a 
ferocious  breed  of  dogs,  whom  they  fight  weekly  for 
wages,  and  for  the  amusement  of  the  '  indignant  peo 
ple.'  Their  troop  was  flanked  by  a  few  professional 
thieves  and  discharged  convicts.  These  men,  gathered 
up  from  the  hotels  and  hovels,  were  refitted  with  such 
cast-off  clothes  as  their  employers  could  command,  and 
hired  at  fifteen  dollars  the  head  and  freighted  to  come 
to  Harrisburg  to  instruct  the  Legislature  in  its  duties 
and  protect  their  rights."  2 

With  the  mob  in  possession  of  the  state-house  and 
•city,  overawing  the  Senate  and  not  permitting  it  to 

1  McCarthy,  p.  449- 

2  Stevens'  Address,  Pennsylvania  Telegraph,  January  17,  1839. 


THE  BUCKSHOT  WAR  35 

assemble,  Governor  Ritner  issued  a  proclamation  de 
scribing  this  condition  of  lawlessness,  ordering  the  mi 
litia  to  be  in  readiness,  and  calling  on  all  good  citizens 
to  aid  in  the  restoration  of  order.  By  the  Governor's 
order,  General  Patterson,  in  command  of  a  division  of 
the  state  militia,  ordered  out  a  part  of  his  division, 
"  provided  with  thirteen  rounds  of  buckshot  cartridges, 
and  seven  rounds  of  ball  cartridges."  1 

The  troops  proceeded  to  Harrisburg  and  quieted 
the  opposing  forces.  Colonel  Pleasanton,  of  Philadel 
phia,  afterward  testified  under  oath  that  McElwee, 
the  Democratic  leader,  had  told  him  that  the  Demo 
crats  were  determined  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  these 
troops  at  all  hazards,  on  the  supposition  that  they  were 
all  Whigs  and  favorable  to  the  state  administration. 
To  this  end  it  was  determined  to  remove  some  rails  at 
a  dangerous  part  on  the  railroad,  "  to  form  a  mine 
under  the  most  exposed  part  to  be  filled  with  gunpow 
der  so  that  in  the  confusion  the  mine  might  be  sprung 
and  the  whole  body  of  them  be  blown  into  the  air  to 
gether"  2 

It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  such  bitter  and  reckless 
partisanship  should  exist  among  a  peaceful  and  sober 

1  From  this  and  from  the  fact  that  a  negro  was  caught  carry 
ing  some  of  this  ammunition  from  the  Whig  headquarters  came 
the  name  "  Buckshot   War."     A   verse   of  popular   doggerel  en 
titled  Last  Days  of  Governor  Ritner,  ran  as  follows : 

"  Come  up  and  come  down 
Come  from  country  and  town 

And  obey  the  fat  Deutschlander's  writ,  Sir ; 
Come  one  and  come  all 
With  buckshot  and  ball 

And  take  care  of  Governor  Ritner." 
McCarthy,  "  Anti-Masonic  Party,"  p.  500. 

2  See  Niles'  Register,  Vol.  57,  p.  27,  cited  in  Callender,  p.  41. 


36   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

people,  and  if  one  is  sometimes  displeased  at  Stevens' 
extreme  partisanship  it  is  well  to  reflect  with  what  he 
had  to  contend  and  the  conditions  under  which  his  par 
tisanship  was  begotten. 

The  Governor  also  called  on  the  President  for  a  com 
pany  of  the  United  States  regulars  stationed  at  Carlisle, 
but  his  request  was  refused  by  President  Van  Buren.1 

During  the  struggle  the  Democrats,  in  order  to  pre 
vent  the  state  militia  from  securing  arms,  made  a  dem 
onstration  on  the  state  arsenal,  and  some  one,  claim 
ing  to  represent  Stevens  and  the  Governor,  agreed  with 
the  Democratic  leaders  that  no  arms  would  be  issued. 
Stevens,  in  a  newspaper  letter,  repudiated  this  agree 
ment,  declaring  that  he  had  had  no  communication  with 
the  "  rebels  "  and  that  he  would  "  consider  it  disgrace 
ful  to  treat  with  them  on  any  subject,"  2  an  attitude 
that  was  quite  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  shown  by  him 
in  the  later  and  larger  conflicts  of  his  public  life. 

The  conflict,  as  might  be  supposed  while  Stevens  was 
leading  one  of  the  parties,  was  to  end  in  no  compro 
mise.  It  ended  in  a  defeat  for  Stevens  and  his  faction. 
Three  of  his  followers  in  the  House  went  over  to  the 
Democrats,  giving  them  a  clear  and  undisputed  major 
ity,  and  thereupon  the  Senate  recognized  the  Hopkins 
House,  and  the  bloodless  "  Buckshot  War,"  in  which 
no  shot  was  fired  and  no  blood  was  shed,  was  at  an  end. 
So,  too,  was  the  Anti-Masonic  party  in  Pennsylvania. 

But  Stevens  did  not  surrender.  It  was  not  his  way. 
He  absented  himself  from  the  House  from  December 

1  See  debate  in  H.  of  R.,  25th  Congress,  326  Session,  Decem 
ber  19,  1838,  cited  by  McCarthy. 

2  McCall's  Stevens,  pp.  52,  53. 


THE  BUCKSHOT  WAR  37 

till  May  as  a  protest  against  the  outcome,  meanwhile 
publishing  vigorous  denunciations  of  the  proceedings 
of  the  Democratic  Legislature.  The  Democratic  ma 
jority  decided  to  postpone  the  admission  of  Mr.  Stev 
ens  to  his  seat  for  the  present  and  to  appoint  a  com 
mittee  "  to  inquire  whether  Thaddeus  Stevens,  a 
member  elect  from  the  county  of  Adams,  has  not  for 
feited  his  right  to  a  seat  in  the  House," —  on  the  ground 
of  non-user,  mis-user,  or  contempt  of  the  House.  A 
number  of  Democratic  members  protested  against  this 
proceeding.1 

Stevens  declined  to  appear  before  this  committee. 
He  replied  to  its  notification  of  a  readiness  to  hear 
him,  in  a  letter  defending  his  right  to  his  seat  and  at 
tacking  the  committee.  He  would  not  agree  "  to  ad 
mit  the  intellectual,  moral  or  habitual  competency  of 
Thomas  B.  McElwee  (the  mover  of  the  resolution  of 
inquiry),  his  compeers,  coadjutors,  and  followers,  to 
decide  a  question  of  decency  and  morals."  His  "  only 
anxiety  was  that  the  Constitution  may  not  further  be 
violated  and  that  the  people  may  yet  have  some  ground 
for  hope  that  Liberty,  although  deeply  wounded,  may 
not  expire."  2 

Stevens'  seat  was  declared  vacant,  whereupon  he 
issued  an  address  to  his  constituents  in  Adams  County, 
calling  their  attention  to  this  violation  of  the  Constitu 
tion  and  to  the  outrage  upon  the  rights  of  the  people,  by 
which  "  under  a  most  shallow  and  hypocritical  pre 
tense  "  there  was  imposed  upon  his  constituents  the  ex 
pense  of  a  new  election.  "  The  tyrants,"  said  Stevens, 

1  Niles,  56,  p.  229. 

2  Niles'  Register,  56,  p.  229. 


38   THE  LIFE  OF.  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

"  who  have  usurped  power  have  determined  to  oppress 
and  plunder  the  people.  It  is  for  you  to  say  whether 
you  will  be  their  willing  slaves."  His  inclination  and 
interest  both  prompted  him  to  retire  from  public  life, 
but  he  would  not  execute  that  settled  intention  when  it 
might  be  construed  into  cowardice  or  despondency. 
"  To  refuse  to  be  a  candidate  now,"  he  said,  "  would 
be  seized  upon  by  my  enemies  as  an  evidence  that  I  dis 
trust  the  people  and  am  afraid  to  intrust  to  them  the 
redress  of  their  own  wrongs.  I  feel  no  such  fear,  no 
such  distrust."  He,  therefore,  without  waiting  to  re 
ceive  a  party  nomination  from  his  friends,  presented 
himself  as  a  candidate  on  a  question  which,  as  he  said, 
"  would  be  disgraced  by  sinking  it  to  the  level  of  a  party 
contest."  1 

He  was  triumphantly  reelected  and  was  allowed  to 
take  his  seat,  but  as  the  Legislature  soon  adjourned 
he  had  not  much  opportunity  to  get  even  with  his  op 
ponents  on  the  floor  of  the  House.  But  he  had  not  long 
to  wait.  The  "  whirligig  of  time "  brings  strange 
changes  in  politics,  and  a  year  later,  Mr.  McElwee,  the 
Democratic  leader  who  had  brought  about  Stevens'  ex 
clusion,  was  himself  expelled  from  the  Legislature,  be 
cause  of  personally  insulting  a  fellow-member,  and  he 
did  not  venture  to  present  himself  for  reelection.2 

This  contest  will  serve  to  show  Stevens'  partisan 
and  uncompromising  disposition  and  that  he  was  ever 
at  a  keen  "  fighting  edge  "  whenever  the  interest  of 
his  party  or  his  cause  demanded  it.  This  fighting  par 
tisanship  was  obviously  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of 

1  Niles'  Register,  56,  p.  216. 
2Niles  58:  p.  96. 


THE  BUCKSHOT  WAR  39 

the  time.  It  is  not  easy  for  us  to  appreciate  the  inten 
sity  and  bitterness  of  political  feeling  in  those  days. 
The  lines  were  sharply  drawn,  and  one's  political  op 
ponents  were  not  graciously  spoken  of  as  "  our  friends, 
the  enemy."  An  enemy  in  politics  was  likely  to  be  an 
enemy  in  personal  relations,  a  tendency  that  accentu 
ated  the  state  of  strife  and  of  unseemly  political  con 
duct. 

Upon  Stevens'  retirement  from  the  Legislature  in 
1841,  in  spite  of  the  bitter  personal  strife  in  which  he 
had  been  engaged  during  the  "  Buckshot  War,"  the 
Harrisburg  Telegraph  paid  the  following  tribute  to 
his  character  and  ability  as  a  legislator:  "  To  judge 
of  the  varied  powers  of  Thaddeus  Stevens,  it  is  only 
necessary  to  review  his  course  during  the  brief  limit 
of  the  present  session.  In  this  review  would  be  in 
cluded  his  powerful  argument  on  the  right  of  petition; 
.  .  .  his  cogent  appeals  on  the  necessity  of  placing  a 
constitutional  limit  to  the  state  debt;  .  .  .  his  able 
and  practical  remarks  on  the  vital  importance  of  the 
protective  policy  to  the  interests  of  our  nation,  showing 
how  the  flood  of  commerce  poured  into  England  under 
the  Navigation  Act,  how  Holland,  once  the  commer 
cial  carrier  of  the  world,  was  paralyzed  under  the  in 
fluence  of  the  free  trade  doctrines,  and  how  the  first 
principle  of  legislation  demands  that  home  labor  should 
be  fostered  and  protected.  Whoever  has  heard  Mr. 
Stevens  at  this  session  or  at  any  other,  can  not  hesitate 
to  accord  to  him  the  most  commanding  abilities  and 
sound  constitutional  sentiments.  Hence  it  is,  stand 
ing  as  he  does  a  giant  among  his  pigmy  opponents, 
that  every  shaft  of  malice  and  invective  is  hurled  at 


40   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

him  by  every  puny  whipster,  who,  like  the  fool  of  Crete, 
exposes  his  waxy  softness  to  the  fervid  glow  of  his  elo 
quent  reply.  ...  It  is  not  so  much  our  wish  to  eulo 
gize  Mr.  Stevens  as  to  direct  the  public  attention  to  the 
position  he  has  attained,  and  so  well  maintains.  We 
want  the  eyes  of  the  commonwealth  directed  toward 
him.  We  want  him  judged  of  by  his  acts,  and  not 
through  '  the  false  medium  of  political  vituperation.'  "  1 

1  Calender's  Life  of  Stevens,  pp.  51,  52. 


CHAPTER    IV 

DEFENDER  OF   FREE   SCHOOLS 

TT  was  during  this  legislative  career  of  Stevens  in 
•*•  Pennsylvania,  in  the  fourth  decade  of  the  nine 
teenth  century,  that  he  rendered  his  great  and  distin 
guished  service  to  the  cause  of  free  schools.  This  was 
a  preeminent  service.  It  is  not  only  worthy  of  a  spe 
cial  chapter  in  his  life  from  his  biographer,  but  of  an 
historic  memorial  from  the  great  commonwealth  which 
he  served  so  well. 

When  Stevens  came  to  the  arena  of  public  action, 
education  was  offered  to  the  rich  at  reasonable  rates, 
while  only  the  self-confessed  poor  were  to  be  schooled 
for  nothing.  Thus  a  class  distinction  existed  in  the 
public  schools,  and  the  poor  but  self-respecting  parents 
who  could  not  afford  to  pay  the  price  named  for  their 
children's  tuition  preferred  to  keep  them  at  home  rather 
than  to  subject  themselves  to  the  humiliation  of  having 
their  children  put  upon  the  lists  as  public  charges. 

By  an  act  in  1834  the  Pennsylvania  legislature  pro 
posed  to  extend  to  the  whole  state  the  free  school  sys 
tem  that  had  been  locally  applied  in  Philadelphia,  recog 
nizing  the  great  democratic  principle  of  free  schools 
for  all  on  equal  terms.  Stevens  was  a  warm  supporter 
of  this  law,  and  when  it  was  passed  the  friends  of  edu 
cation  and  the  enlightened  advocates  of  popular  gov- 

41 


42      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ernment  felt  that  a  great  advance  had  been  made  in  the 
support  of  an  intelligent  citizenship  and  free  institu 
tions.  The  new  law  would,  in  time,  mean  great  things 
for  Pennsylvania, 

This,  of  course,  meant  new  taxes,  since  the  schools 
were  to  be  free  in  the  sense  of  being  supported  from 
the  public  treasury.  A  year  later  there  was  reaction, 
and  a  legislature  was  elected  that  was  expected  to  re 
peal  the  law.  The  thrifty  and  charitable  taxpayers  of 
Pennsylvania  were  ready  to  pay,  if  necessary,  to  edu 
cate  pauper  children,  but  the  rich  and  the  well-to-do 
who  had  no  children  did  not  propose  to  support  schools 
for  the  children  of  others  who  could  afford  to  pay. 
Others  said  that  those  who  had  no  children  should  not 
be  made  to  pay  to  educate  the  children  of  other  peo 
ple.  If  the  poor  man  could  not  afford  to  school  his 
children  let  him  say  so,  and  the  charitable  taxpayers 
would  dole  out  the  necessary  funds. 

In  the  following  legislature  the  State  Senate  voted 
for  summary  repeal  of  the  free  school  law,  by  passing 
a  substitute  bill  bearing  the  title,  "  An  act  making  pro 
vision  for  the  education  of  the  poor  gratis."  This 
passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  two  to  one  with  only 
eight  dissenting  votes.  Thirteen  Senators  voted  for 
it  who  had  voted  for  the  free  school  act  of  the  pre 
vious  session.  It  appeared  certain  that  the  cause  of 
free  schools  would  also  be  lost  in  the  House.  Many 
members  who  had  voted  for  the  cause  in  the  previous 
session  had  been  retired  to  private  life.  A  committee 
favorable  to  free  schools  found  a  "  deplorably  large  " 
petition  containing  thirty-two  thousand  names  praying 
for  repeal,  while  only  twenty-five  hundred  were  peti- 


DEFENDER  OF  FREE  SCHOOLS         43 

tioning  for  the  retention  of  the  law.  The  Democratic 
legislative  caucus  warned  the  Democratic  Governor,  a 
friend  of  free  education,  against  opposing  repeal  by  his 
veto,  as  that  would  be  sure  to  defeat  him  for  reelection. 
In  this  desperate  situation  one  stout  obstacle  stood 
in  the  path  of  repeal.  It  was  Thaddeus  Stevens,  the 
commoner,  the  democrat,  the  friend  of  the  poor,  the 
man  who  believed  with  his  whole  soul  in  popular  edu 
cation  and  republican  government.  He  stood  ready 
to  resist  the  pride  and  prejudice  of  a  class,  the  selfish 
ness  of  the  rich,  or  the  popular  passion  of  the  multi 
tude,  and  to  speak  for  what  he  considered  a  noble  and 
righteous  cause.  He  had  been  returned  to  the  legisla 
ture  by  a  small  majority  under  instructions  to  vote  for 
the  repeal  of  the  law,  but  instead  of  obeying  his  in 
structions  he  stood  by  his  convictions  and  became  the 
chief  defender  of  free  schools.1 

"  The  people  might  reject  him,  but  so  long  as  he  was 
their  representative  he  would  follow  his  convictions  of  duty. 
He  braved  the  storm  when  it  was  at  its  fiercest  pitch  and 
boldly  moved  to  strike  out  all  the  Senate  bill  and  to  substi 
tute  for  it  a  bill  strengthening  the  law  which  it  proposed  to 
repeal."  2 

On  that  motion  Stevens  made  one  of  the  noblest 
speeches  of  his  life,  a  speech,  says  Mr.  McCall,  that 
"produced  an  effect  second  to  no  speech  ever  uttered 
in  an  American  legislative  assembly."  3  The  speech 
reveals  the  high  and  fearless  public  spirit  of  the  man 
and  the  liberal  democratic  principle  that  governed  him 
throughout  his  long  life. 

1  Callender's  Stevens,  p.  32. 

2  McCall's  Stevens,  p.  38. 
s  Ibid.,  p.  38. 


44   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

He  undertook  to  show  that  the  free  school  law  was 
salutary  and  useful  and  that  instead  of  being  oppres 
sive  to  the  people  it  would  "  lighten  their  burdens  and 
elevate  them  in  the  scale  of  human  intellect."  1  He 
assumed  the  necessity  of  education  in  a  free  govern 
ment  ;  it  would  be  humiliating  to  be  under  the  necessity 
of  proving  it.  In  an  elective  republic  expected  to  en 
dure,  the  electors  must  have  information,  to  direct 
wisely  their  legislatures  and  executives;  some  agency 
in  governing  will  fall  to  every  freeman.  Government, 
then,  must  see  that  the  means  of  information  be  dif 
fused  to  every  citizen.  "  This  is  a  sufficient  answer  to 
those  who  deem  education  a  pivot  and  not  a  public 
duty, —  who  argue  that  they  are  willing  to  educate  their 
own  children,  but  not  their  neighbors'  children." 
While  few  were  so  ignorant  and  shameless  as  to  deny 
the  advantages  of  general  education,  many  were 
alarmed  at  its  burdens.  He  proceeded  to  show  that 
the  free  schools  would  be  less  burdensome  than  the 
"present  disgraceful  plan."  With  good  "male  teach 
ers  "  to  be  had  at  eighteen  dollars  a  month  and  board 
themselves,  and  "  females  "  at  nine  dollars,  he  was  able 
to  show  a  saving  of  half  to  the  average  township  of 
two  hundred  children  where  two  dollars  a  quarter  for 
each  child  was  paid  in  tuition.  Thus  on  the  half  mil 
lion  children  of  the  state  more  than  one  million  dollars 
would  be  saved. 

"The  repealing  act  is,  in  my  opinion."  said  Stevens,  "of 
a  most  hateful  and  degrading  character.  It  is  a  reenact- 
ment  of  the  pauper  law  of  1809.  It  proposes  that  the 

1  My  review  of  the  speech  is  based  on  a  reprint  published  at 
Lancaster,  Pennsylvania,  in  1865. 


DEFENDER  OF  FREE  SCHOOLS         45 

assessors  shall  take  a  census  and  make  a  record  of  the  poor. 
This  shall  be  revised  and  a  new  record  made  by  the  county 
commissioners,  so  that  the  names  of  those  who  have  the 
misfortune  to  be  poor  men's  children  shall  be  forever  pre 
served,  as  a  distinct  class,  in  the  archives  of  the  county. 
The  teacher,  too,  is  to  keep  in  his  school  a  pauper  book  and 
register  the  names  and  attendance  of  poor  scholars;  thus 
pointing  out  and  recording  their  poverty  in  the  midst  of 
their  companions.  Sir,  hereditary  distinctions  of  rank  are 
sufficiently  odious;  but  that  which  is  founded  on  poverty  is 
infinitely  more  so.  Such  a  law  should  be  entitled,  '  An  act 
for  branding  and  marking  the  poor,  so  that  they  may  be 
known  from  the  rich  and  proud/  Many  complain  of  this 
tax,  not  so  much  on  account  of  its  amount,  as  because  it  is 
for  the  benefit  of  others  and  not  themselves.  This  is  a 
mistake;  it  is  for  their  own  benefit,  inasmuch  as  it  perpetu 
ates  the  government  and  insures  the  due  administration  of 
the  laws  under  which  they  live,  and  by  which  their  lives 
and  property  are  protected.  Why  do  they  not  urge  the  same 
objection  against  all  their  taxes?  The  industrious,  thrifty, 
rich  farmer  pays  a  heavy  county  tax  to  support  criminal 
courts,  build  jails,  and  pay  sheriffs  and  jail  keepers,  and 
yet  probably  he  never  has,  and  never  will  have,  any  direct 
personal  use  of  either.  He  never  gets  the  worth  of  his 
money  by  being  tried  for  a  crime  before  the  court,  or  being 
allowed  the  privilege  of  the  jail  on  conviction,  or  by  re 
ceiving  an  equivalent  from  the  sheriff  or  his  hangman 
officers !  He  cheerfully  pays  the  tax  which  is  necessary  to 
support  and  punish  convicts,  but  loudly  complains  of  that 
which  goes  to  prevent  his  fellow-being  from  becoming  a 
criminal,  and  to  obviate  the  necessity  of  those  humiliat 
ing  institutions." 

Stevens'  plea  was  against  the  establishment  of  castes 
and  grades,  and  against  the  cultivation  of  an  aris 
tocracy  of  wealth  and  pride.  The  tax  was  said  to 
be  unjust  because  the  industrious  money-making  man 


46      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

would  find  constant  employment  for  his  children,  while 
the  idle  man,  finding  little  employment  for  his  family, 
would  constantly  send  his  children  to  school  at  the  ex 
pense  of  others. 

"  I  know/'  said  he,  "  that  there  are  some  men  whose  whole 
souls  are  so  completely  absorbed  in  the  accumulation  of 
wealth,  and  whose  avarice  so  increases  with  success,  that 
they  look  upon  their  very  children  in  no  other  light  than  as 
instruments  of  gain  —  that  they,  as  well  as  the  ox  and  the 
ass  within  their  gates,  are  valuable  only  in  proportion  to 
their  annual  earnings.  According  to  the  present  system  the 
children  of  such  men  are  reduced  almost  to  an  intellectual 
level  with  their  co-laborers  of  the  brute  creation,  This 
law  will  be  of  vast  advantage  to  the  offspring  of  such 
misers.  If  they  are  compelled  to  pay  their  taxes  to  sup 
port  schools,  their  very  meanness  will  induce  them  to  send 
their  children  to  them  to  get  the  worth  of  their  money. 
Thus  it  will  extract  good  out  of  the  very  penuriousness  of 
the  miser." 

He  referred  to  "  the  languishing  and  sickly  condi 
tion  "of  the  colleges  of  Pennsylvania.  She,  with  all 
her  fertile  riches,  had  "  scarcely  one-third  as  many 
collegiate  students  as  cold  barren  New  England."  The 
reason  was  obvious.  She  had  no  free  schools. 

"  In  New  England  free  schools  plant  the  seed  and  the 
desire  of  knowledge  in  every  mind,  without  regard  to  the 
wealth  of  the  parent  or  the  texture  of  the  pupil's  garments. 
When  the  seed,  thus  universally  sown,  happens  to  fall  on 
fertile  soil,  it  springs  up  and  is  fostered  by  a  generous  public 
until  it  produces  its  glorious  fruit.  .  .  .  Not  to  mention 
any  of  the  living,  it  is  well  known  that  that  architect  of  an 
immortal  name,  who  '  plucked  the  lightning  from  heaven 
and  the  scepter  from  tyrants '  was  the  child  of  free  schools. 
Why  should  Pennsylvania  now  repudiate  a  system  which  is 


DEFENDER  OF  FREE  SCHOOLS         47 

calculated  to  elevate  her  to  that  rank  in  the  intellectual, 
which  by  the  blessing  of  Providence  she  holds  in  her  natu 
ral  world?  .  .  .  Sir,  when  I  reflect  how  apt  hereditary 
wealth,  hereditary  influence,  and  perhaps,  as  a  consequence, 
hereditary  pride  are  to  close  the  avenues  and  steel  the  heart 
against  the  wants  and  rights  of  the  poor,  I  am  induced  to 
thank  my  Creator  for  having  from  early  life,  bestowed  upon 
me  the  blessing  of  poverty.  Sir,  it  is  a  blessing,  for  if 
there  be  any  human  sensation  more  eternal  and  divine  than 
all  others,  it  is  that  which  feelingly  sympathizes  with  mis 
fortune." 

Much  of  the  unpopularity  of  this  law  Stevens 
charged  upon  "the  vile  arts  of  unprincipled  demo- 
gogues." 

"  Instead  of  attempting  to  remove  the  honest  misappre 
hensions  of  the  people,  they  cater  to  their  prejudices,  and 
take  advantage  of  them,  to  gain  low,  dirty,  temporary  local 
triumphs.  I  do  not  charge  this  on  any  particular  party. 
Unfortunately  almost  the  only  spot  on  which  all  parties 
meet  in  union  is  this  ground  of  common  infamy ! " 

He  then  proceeded  to  defend  the  Democratic  Gov 
ernor,  who  had  been  assailed  as  the  father  of  the  law. 
Stevens  had  opposed  Governor  Wolf  stoutly  and  with 
all  the  bitterness  common  to  those  early  party  contests. 
Though  the  Governor  had  been  guilty,  as  Stevens 
thought,  "  of  many  deep  political  sins,  yet  he  deserves 
the  undying  gratitude  of  the  people  for  the  steady  un 
tiring  zeal,  which  he  has  manifested  in  favor  of  com 
mon  schools."  These  exertions  had  atoned  for  many 
of  his  errors,  in  Stevens'  opinion. 

"I  trust  that  the  people  of  this  state  will  never  be 
called  upon  to  choose  between  a  supporter  and  an  opposer 


48      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  free  schools.  But  if  it  should  come  to  that;  if  that  should 
be  made  the  turning  point  on  which  we  are  to  cast  our  suf 
frages;  if  the  opponent  of  education  were  my  most  inti 
mate  personal  and  political  friend,  and  the  free  school 
candidate  my  most  obnoxious  enemy,  I  should  deem  it  my 
duty  as  a  patriot,  at  this  moment  of  our  intellectual  crisis, 
to  forget  all  other  considerations,  and  I  should  place  myself 
unhesitatingly  and  cordially  in  the  ranks  of  him  whose 
banners  stream  in  light.  I  would  not  foster  nor  flatter 
ignorance  to  gain  political  victories,  which,  however  they 
might  profit  individuals,  must  prove  disastrous  to  our 
country. 

"  Those  who  have  failed  of  reelection  on  this  issue  have 
been  passed  by  only  for  the  moment.  They  had  earned  the 
approbation  of  all  good  and  intelligent  men  more  effectually 
by  their  retirement  than  they  could  ever  have  done  by  re 
taining  popular  favor  at  the  expense  of  self-humiliation. 
They  have  fallen  between  the  powers  of  light  and  darkness; 
but  they  fell,  as  every  Roman  mother  wished  her  sons  to 
fall,  facing  the  enemy  with  all  their  wounds  in  front.  .  .  . 
Instead  of  flattering  the  people  and  prophesying  smooth 
things,  it  is  the  duty  of  faithful  legislators  to  create  and 
sustain  such  laws  and  institutions  as  shall  teach  us  our 
wants,  foster  our  cravings  after  knowledge,  and  urge  us 
forward  in  the  march  of  intellect." 

Stevens  closed  this  great  speech  with  a  stirring  plea 
for  political  courage  as  the  basis  of  a  true  popularity. 
Then,  as  ever  after,  he  stood  ready  to  rebuke  the  time- 
servers  of  his  party.  Some  weak-kneed  members  were 
voting  to  maintain  a  temporary  popularity  in  "  the  ten 
miles  square  of  their  ambition."  Stevens  pleaded  for 
a  popularity  that  would  outlive  its  possessor,  that  would 
"  not  be  buried  in  the  same  grave  which  covers  his  mor 
tal  remains,"  and  for  the  fame  that  comes  from  uncon- 


DEFENDER  OF  FREE  SCHOOLS         49 

querable  courage  devoted  to  the  uplift  of  the  poor 
and  the  welfare  of  mankind.  "  In  giving  this  law  to 
posterity  you  act  the  part  of  the  philanthropist,  by  be 
stowing  upon  the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich  the  greatest 
earthly  boon  which  they  are  capable  of  receiving  .  .  . 
for  what  earthly  glory  is  there  equal  in  luster  and  dura 
tion  to  that  conferred  by  education?  ...  I  trust," 
said  Stevens,  in  conclusion,  "  that  when  we  come  to  act 
on  this  question  we  shall  take  lofty  ground,  look  beyond 
the  narrow  space  which  now  circumscribes  our  vision, 
beyond  the  passing,  fleeting  point  of  time  on  which 
we  stand;  and  so  cast  our  votes  that  the  blessing  of 
education  shall  be  conferred  on  every  son  of  Pennsyl 
vania  — •  shall  be  carried  home  to  the  poorest  child  of 
the  poorest  inhabitant  of  the  meanest  hut  of  your  moun 
tains,  so  that  even  he  may  be  prepared  to  act  well  his 
part  in  this  land  of  freemen  and  lay  on  earth  a  broad 
and  a  solid  foundation  for  that  enduring  knowledge 
which  goes  on  increasing  through  increasing  eternity." 
To  this  speech  of  Stevens  has  been  attributed  the 
saving  of  Pennsylvania's  "  free  school  system  from 
ignominious  defeat."  The  vote  was  taken  immediately 
after  Stevens  sat  down  and  the  victory  so  confidently 
anticipated  by  the  friends  of  repeal  was  suddenly  turned 
into  defeat  and  Stevens'  motion  was  carried  by  a  nearly 
two-thirds  majority.  "  Most  remarkable  of  all,  the 
Senate,  whose  members  were  listening  to  the  House  dis 
cussion,  and  who  but  a  short  time  before  had  so  de 
cisively  voted  for  repeal,  returned  to  its  chamber 
thrilled  and  delighted  with  the  great  effort,  converted 
as  no  Senate  had  ever  been  converted  before,  and  im- 


50   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

mediately  concurred  with  a  few  unimportant  amend 
ments  in  the  House  substitute  bill."  1 

"  Never  will  the  writer  of  these  lines  forget,"  wrote 
Colonel  John  W.  Forney  after  the  death  of  Stevens  in 
1868,  "  the  effect  of  that  surpassing  effort  pronounced 
by  the  undaunted  opponent  of  the  Democratic  party, 
and  of  the  great  Masonic  brotherhood.2  All  the  bar 
riers  of  prejudice  broke  down  before  it.  It  reached 
men's  hearts  like  the  voice  of  inspiration.  Those  who 
were  almost  ready  to  take  the  life  of  Thaddeus  Stevens 
a  few  weeks  before  were  instantly  converted  into  his 
admirers  and  friends.  During  its  delivery  in  the  hall 
of  the  House  at  Harrisburg,  the  scene  was  one  of  dra 
matic  interest  and  intensity.  Thaddeus  Stevens  was 
then  forty-three  years  of  age  and  in  the  prime  of  life, 
and  his  classic  countenance,  noble  voice,  and  cultivated 
style,  added  to  the  fact  that  he  was  speaking  the  holiest 
truths,  and  for  the  noblest  of  all  human  causes,  created 
such  a  feeling  among  his  fellow-members  that  for  once, 
at  least,  our  State  Legislature  rose  above  all  selfish  feel 
ings  and  responded  to  the  instincts  of  a  higher  na 
ture."  3  Forney  is  also  authority  for  the  story  that 
.immediately  after  Mr.  Stevens  concluded  this  great 
speech  he  received  a  message  from  Governor  Wolf, 
a  Mason,  a  political  opponent  of  Stevens,  but  also  an 
earnest  and  sincere  friend  of  education.  When  Stev 
ens,  in  answer  to  the  Governor's  message,  entered  the 
executive  chamber,  Wolf  threw  his  arms  about  his 
neck  and  with  tearful  eyes  and  broken  voice  thanked 

1  McCall's  Life  of  Stevens,  p.  40. 

2  Forney  himself  was  a  Democrat  and  a  political  opponent  of 
Stevens  in  those  days. 

3  Philadelphia  Press,  August  12,  1868. 


DEFENDER  OF  FREE  SCHOOLS    51 

him  for  the  great  service  he  had  rendered  to  their  com 
mon  humanity.  Stevens  was  ever  afterward  delighted 
to  relate  this  incident,  and  it  was  Forney's  regret  that 
he  could  not  relate  it  to  his  readers  in  Stevens'  own 
inimitable  and  sympathetic  manner.1  A  great  man  had 
grappled  with  a  fierce  prejudice  of  the  hour  and  had 
risked  everything  for  a  great  object.2 

Stevens  himself  styled  this  effort  as  the  crowning 
utility  of  his  life,  and  he  afterward  said  that  he  would 
feel  abundantly  rewarded  for  all  his  efforts  in  behalf 
of  universal  education  "  if  a  single  child,  educated  by 
the  commonwealth,  should  drop  a  tear  of  gratitude  on 
his  grave."  3 

Stevens'  bold  and  noble  attitude  on  all  questions  re 
lating  to  public  education  was  illustrated  repeatedly 
on  subsequent  occasions.  He  was  ever  a  valiant  sup 
porter  of  Pennsylvania  College,  and  although  he  was 
by  nature  a  strong  partisan  he  never  allowed  politics 
nor  the  interest  of  his  party  to  stand  in  the  way  when 
he  had  an  opportunity  to  render  service  to  the  cause 
of  public  and  higher  education.  He  looked  to  higher 
education  by  the  state  as  the  essence  and  foundation 
for  an  enduring  democracy.  When  he  was  told  by  a 
party  friend,  who  was  anxious  that  Stevens  should 
continue  to  be  the  candidate  of  his  party,  that  his  sup- 

1  Ibid. 

2  The  Pennsylvania  Reporter  of  April   15,   1835,   said  of  this 
speech  of  Stevens, —  which  will  be  recognized  as  high  praise,  com 
ing  as  it  did  from  a  warm  political  opponent  of  the  time,  "  The 
acknowledged  talents  of  this   gentleman  were  never  exerted  in 
a  nobler  cause  or  with  greater  effect  than  on  this  occasion,  and 
we   feel   assured  that  a   more   powerful   effort  of  oratory   was 
never  listened  to  within  the  walls  of  this  or  any  other  legislative 
hall."     McCarthy's  Anti-Masonic  Party,  p.  466. 

3  Callender,  p.  32. 


'£2   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

port  of  the  state  college  would  injure  his  political 
party  and  lose  him  support  at  home,  Stevens  wrote: 
"  However  I  may  sacrifice  myself,  I  do  not  assume  the 
right  to  sacrifice  you.  But  that  could  only  happen  upon 
the  supposition  that  I  become  unpopular  and  still  con 
tinue  to  be  your  candidate.  That  I  will  never  do.  I 
have  already  resolved  that  the  weight  of  my  name 
shall  never  again  burden  your  ticket.  I  will  withdraw 
from  any  active  part  in  your  political  discussions.  And 
if  it  be  necessary  to  the  well-being  of  our  country,  dear 
to  me  as  are  all  my  friends  and  constituents,  I  will 
withdraw  from  your  county  to  some  place  where  the 
advocates  of  Anti-Masonry  may  be  also  the  advocates 
of  knowledge."  1 

The  second  notable  speech  of  Stevens  in  the  cause 
of  education  was  made,  March  10,  1838,  on  a  bill  "  to 
establish  a  school  of  Arts  in  the  City  of  Philadelphia, 
and  to  endow  the  colleges  and  academies  of  Pennsyl 
vania."  He  made  a  strong  plea  against  that  spirit  of 
parsimony  which  had  usually  governed  State  Legisla 
tures  in  their  allowances  for  higher  institutions  of 
learning.  He  wished,  above  all  things,  to  see  Pennsyl 
vania  stand  erect  in  intellectual  preeminence,  and  he 
appealed  to  her  sons,  who  were  in  the  enjoyment  of 
such  material  prosperity,  to  stand  for  a  liberal  policy 
in  higher  education  that  was  so  calculated  to  save  the 
state  from  misery  and  infamy  and  promote  her  true 
happiness  and  glory.  A  passage  will  illustrate  the 
force  of  his  direct  and  trenchant  eloquence : 

1  Pennsylvania  Telegraph,  January  25,  1834,  cited  by  McCarthy, 
Anti-Masonic  Party,  p.  466. 


DEFENDER  OF  FREE  SCHOOLS         53 

"  Never  was  there  a  grosser  or  more  injurious  error  than 
to  suppose  that  learning  begets  pride.  Ignorance  is  the 
parent  of  pride  and  disgusting  vanity;  he  only  has  censur 
able  pride  who  has  too  little  knowledge  to  know  that  he  is 
himself  a  fool.  But  he  who  has  long  and  arduously  labored 
up  the  hill  of  science  and  there  found  himself  but  standing 
upon  the  threshold  of  her  temple  —  who,  after  a  toilsome, 
and  perhaps  successful  examination  of  the  works  of  nature 
and  art,  discovers  that  he  has  scarcely  yet  entered  upon 
the  confines  of  the  inimitable  works  of  an  omniscient  artist, 
will  surely  find  nothing  in  his  own  weak  blind  insignifi 
cance  to  flatter  pride  or  foster  vanity.  It  is  the  illiterate,- 
ignorant,  senseless,  witless  coxcomb  that  struts  and  fumes, 
proud  perhaps  of  his  ignorance,  himself,  his  baubles,  and  his 
folly !  " 

Only  a  year  before  Stevens'  death,  at  a  time  when 
he  was  the  unchallenged  leader  of  his  party  in  the  na 
tional  councils,  after  he  had  for  years  enjoyed  a  fame 
that  was  nation-wide ;  while  he  was  still  standing  as  he 
had  been  for  nearly  a  decade  in  the  forefront  of  the  bat 
tle  in  the  greatest  civic  and  political  struggle  of  the  cen 
tury  and  had  thus  been  the  target  of  attack  and  the 
object  of  abuse  for  all  the  force  of  a  violent  opposition, 
—  in  these  closing  years  of  his  life,  Henry  Ward 
Beecher  said  of  him  in  a  sermon  in  Plymouth  church, 
Brooklyn:  "When  Thaddeus  Stevens  shall  die  his 
virtues  will  be  better  appreciated  and  his  name  will 
be  more  highly  honored  than  now;  for  he  is  one  of 
those  men  who  are  very  inconvenient  when  alive  and 
very  valuable  when  dead.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
in  the  dark  hours  of  his  country's  history  when  other 
men  were  afraid  to  speak,  he  was  not  afraid  to  speak, 
and  when  other  men  were  afraid  to  be  unpopular  he 


54      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

was  not  afraid  to  be  unpopular  and  did  not  count  his 
life  dear.  But  I  think  that  if  I  were  he  I  would  rather 
have  written  on  my  gravestone,  'Father  of  the  Com 
mon  Schools  of  Pennsylvania'  than  any  other  inscrip 
tion  that  could  be  put  there.  It  might  justly  be  written 
there.  And  from  the  grave  no  purer  light  could 
stream,  so  far  as  humanity  is  concerned,  than  the  in 
scription  to  him  as  his  life-work,  the  founding  of  a 
system  of  common  schools  which  has  disenthralled  that 
state  from  its  ignorance  and  is  bringing  it  by  knowl 
edge  to  the  stature  and  power  of  a  gigantic  common 
wealth."  r 

This  great  service  of  Stevens  to  the  state  of  his 
adoption  has  now  come  to  be  recognized,  and  it  is 
but  just  and  seemly  that  an  appreciative  and  grateful 
people  in  that  commonwealth  should  erect  a  noble  and 
suitable  memorial  to  the  greatest  man,  save  one,2  who 
ever  lived  within  her  borders.  That  memorial  fittingly 
represents  Stevens  as  the  founder  and  defender  of  the 
free  school,  standing  by  the  temple  of  learning  to 
which  with  benevolent  leading  he  is  directing  the  chil 
dren  of  the  humble  poor. 

From  this  noble  service  for  the  education  of  all  the 
children  of  the  state,  he  was  soon  to  be  called  to  an 
other,  the  struggle  for  free  soil  and  for  the  freedom 
of  the  slave,  to  which  he  devoted  all  of  his  remarkable 
talents  and  almost  all  the  remaining  years  of  his  life. 

1  Stevens'  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

2  Benjamin  Franklin. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   EARLY   FREE-SOILER 

ANOTHER  cause  than  Anti-Masonry  elicited 
Stevens'  early  and  deeper  interest.  This  was  the 
anti-slavery  cause.  Hatred  of  slavery  and  the  disposi 
tion  to  oppose  it  seemed  ingrained  in  his  nature.  This 
anti-slavery  spirit  came  to  him  from  his  antecedents, 
his  training,  his  childhood  convictions, — >it  was  the 
innate  bent  of  his  mind.  It  was  a  part  of  his  de 
mocracy.  He  was  never  converted  to  the  anti-slavery 
cause.  That  cause  was  a  part  of  his  being, —  he  could 
not  do  otherwise  than  speak  and  boldly  fight  for  its 
promotion  and  success.  He  had  no  argument  with 
himself  about  it.  To  oppose  slavery  and  to  use  all 
means  at  hand  to  uproot  it  seemed  to  him  a  course  so 
obviously  right  that  argument  in  the  case  was  uncalled 
for. 

He  had  settled  for  his  life's  work  upon  the  border 
line,  as  it  were,  between  the  Slave  and  the  Free  States. 
Here  the  forces  met  in  conflict  that  represented  the 
antagonistic  labor  systems,  the  slave  labor  system  and 
the  free.  Here  opinion  was  not  unevenly  divided, 
and  one  found  ample  apology  in  conservative  minds 
and  easy  consciences  for  the  slave  system  that  existed 
just  across  the  border.  But  Stevens'  mind  was  not 
conservative,  and  it  mattered  little  to  him  what  the 
custom  was  or  what  majority  of  opinion  sustained 

,55 


56   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  established  order.  If,  in  his  judgment,  the  social 
status  violated  justice,  if  it  led  to  oppression,  to  legal 
impositions  and  inequalities,  he  would  cry  against  it 
and  spare  not. 

The  little  he  had  seen  of  slavery  confirmed  his  op 
position  to  it.  Godlove  S.  Orth,  of  Indiana,  is  quoted 
as  authority  for  an  anti-slavery  story  in  Stevens'  early 
life.  Orth  grew  up  in  Pennsylvania,  was  educated 
at  Gettysburg,  and  could  probably  have  verified  the 
story.  The  story  was  that  once  while  going  to  Balti 
more  to  buy  books  for  his  law  library,  Stevens  stopped 
for  the  night  at  a  hotel  in  Maryland,  kept  by  a  man 
with  whom  he  was  well  acquainted.  His  attention  was 
aroused  by  a  commotion  among  the  servants  of  the 
hotel.  .When  he  inquired  the  cause  of  the  trouble  a 
woman  approached  him  in  tears  and  implored  him  to 
do  what  he  could  to  prevent  the  contemplated  sale  of 
her  husband,  who  was  a  slave.  On  inquiring  who  and 
where  her  husband  was,  she  replied,  "  Why,  Massa 
Stevens,  he  is  the  '  boy '  who  took  your  horse  to  the 
stable."  Stevens  knew  the  "  boy  "  and  he  at  once  went 
to  the  owner  and  remonstrated  with  him  in  reference 
to  the  contemplated  sale.  He  offered  the  owner  one 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  half  the  sale  price,  if  he 
would  give  the  slave  his  liberty.  But  the  owner  was 
inexorable  and  Stevens,  knowing  the  relation  that 
existed  between  the  slave  and  his  master,  replied, 

"  Mr. ,  are  you  not  ashamed  to  sell  your  own  flesh 

and  blood  ?  "  This  cutting  inquiry  brought  only  the 
response  that  the  master  must  have  money  and  his  slave 
boy  was  cheap  at  three  hundred  dollars.  Stevens' 
generous  nature  responded  to  the  situation.  He  paid 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  57 

three  hundred  dollars  and  set  the  young  slave  free,  the 
sacrifice  requiring  his  return  to  Gettysburg  and  the 
postponing  of  his  replenishing  his  law  library  until  a 
more  convenient  season.1 

There  was  a  strong  tendency  among  Anti-Masons, 
especially  among  the  Pennsylvania  Quakers,  to  become 
anti-slavery  men,  and  they  urged  in  the  Pennsylvania 
Legislature,  though  without  success,  a  bill  providing  a 
jury  trial  for  fugitive  slaves.  It  was  a  common  rumor 
concerning  Stevens  in  his  early  struggling  years  as  a 
young  lawyer  and  while  he  was  active  in  Anti-Masonic 
politics,  that  no  fugitive  slave  who  reached  a  court 
where  he  practised  was  ever  taken  back  into  bondage. 
In  such  a  cause  he  despised  a  fee  and  entertained  no 
hope  of  reward. 

In  the  year  that  Governor  Ritner  was  elected  in 
Pennsylvania,  Jonathan  Blanchard  came  into  the  state 
to  speak  for  the  anti-slavery  cause,  as  an  agent  of  the 
American  Anti-Slavery  Society.  Blanchard  was  an 
abolitionist,  but  the  people  were  so  mad  against  aboli 
tionism  that  he  had  found  no  hospitable  welcome  in  the 
old  Keystone  State,  but  he  had  to  face,  instead,  villi- 
fication,  contumely,  and  violence.  He  reported  that 
the  ministers  of  the  gospel  in  private  would  bid  him 
Godspeed  but  in  public  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  they 
were  as  silent  as  the  tomb.  Blanchard  was  a  stern 
Puritan,  and  during  a  long  life  devoted  to  the  Chris 
tian  ministry  and  to  public  efforts  in  moral  reforms,  he 
exemplified  a  deep  intensity  of  faith  in  the  Christian 
religion  and  manifested  in  his  life  the  spirit  of  a  de- 

^  Congressional  Memorial  Reminiscent  Addresses  on  Stevens, 
cited  by  W.  U.  Hensel  in  "  Stevens  as  a  Lawyer,"  pp.  7,  8. 


58      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

voted  servant  and  martyr  for  his  cause.  As  he  re 
flected  on  the  intense  pro-slavery  character  of  the 
churches,  Blanchard  found  some  reason  why  Stevens 
as  a  man  of  the  world  looked  upon  the  churches  with 
contempt.  Stevens  despised  both  bigotry  and  hypoc 
risy.  But  while  Blanchard  found  a  culpable  silence 
upon  the  evils  of  slavery  among  the  churches  and  its 
ministers  he  did  not  find  Stevens  silent.  Blanchard 
said  to  Stevens :  "  Mr.  Stevens,  if  you  can  turn  your 
Anti-Masons  into  abolitionists,  you  will  have  a  party 
whose  politics  will  not  bleach  out.  The  slaveholders 
will  not  'possum'  like  Free  Masons,  but  will  die 
game."  Stevens  took  out  his  pocketbook,  handed 
Blanchard  ninety  dollars  in  bank  bills  and  said : 
"  Take  that  and  go  down  into  Adams  County  and 
lecture,  and  if  they  Morganize  you,  we'll  make  a 
party  out  of  it."  Upon  Blanchard' s  reluctance  to  take 
the  money  Stevens  said,  "  Never  mind,  I  am  twenty- 
one  in  such  things  and  I  know  they  can  not  be  done 
without  money." 

Blanchard  went  to  Gettysburg,  as  Stevens  advised, 
but  a  mob,  encouraged  by  one  Judge  McLean,  an  elder 
in  an  orthordox  church,  broke  up  his  meeting.  This 
aroused  Stevens'  anger.  He  came  down  from  Harris- 
burg,  called  a  meeting  in  the  court-house  which  "  was 
crowded  to  a  jam,"  and,  continues  Blanchard  in  his 
description  of  the  meeting  nearly  fifty  years  after,  "  I 
never  listened  to  such  speaking  from  human  lips. 
Every  sentence  was  argument,  eloquence,  and  invec 
tive,  combined  and  condensed.  Giving  his  words  as  a 
report  of  his  speech,  without  his  overwhelming,  crush 
ing  looks  and  intonations,  seems  like  pointing  to  a 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  59 

shivered  tree  as  a  description  of  a  thunder-storm." 
Elder  McLean  had  said,  "  We  have  no  slaves  here,  why 
come  here  to  disturb  our  borough  with  a  discussion  of 
slavery?  "  "  Indeed!  "  exclaimed  Stevens,  "  so,  then, 
human  liberty  is  become  a  local  question,  is  it  ?  To  be 
discussed  only  in  particular  localities?  A  Universal- 
ist  comes  here  preaching  universal  salvation  and  deny 
ing  the  faith  of  the  orthodox,  and  you  hear  him  quietly 
and  allow  him  to  pass  on.  But  if  a  man  comes  to 
speak  for  universal  liberty,  you  answer  him  with  vio 
lence  and  rotten  eggs !  Shame !  Shame ! !  Shame ! ! ! 
What  freeman  does  not  feel  himself  covered  all  over 
with  burning  blushes  to  find  himself  surrounded  with 
such  freemen  ?  " 

Blanchard  reports  that  poor  old  Judge  McLean 
broke  through  the  crowd  and  fled  from  the  court 
house  and  that  there  were  no  more  pro-slavery  mobs  in 
Gettysburg.1 

Whenever  any  of  the  Anti-Masons,  like  Stevens, 
gave  expression  to  their  anti-slavery  sentiments  their 
Democratic  opponents  charged  them  with  a  readiness 
"  to  mount  the  abolition  hobby."  This,  they  said,  was 
now  to  be  the  leading  policy  of  those  "  who  formerly 
ranged  themselves  under  the  equally  prescriptive  but 
less  bloody  banner  of  Anti-Masonry." 

In  the  fall  of  1836  a  convention  was  elected  to  re 
vise  the  constitution  of  the  state  of  Pennsylvania. 
Stevens  was  chosen  as  a  delegate  from  Adams  County. 
The  convention  was  a  partisan  body ;  the  majority  of 
its  members  were  Democrats,  and  it  may  safely  be 
concluded  that  Stevens  did  nothing  to  allay  its 

1  Reminiscences,  Christian  Cynosure,  April  5,  1883. 


60      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

partisan  spirit.  The  political  opponents  of  Stevens 
sought  to  break  him  down  and  destroy  his  influence 
before  the  work  of  the  convention  began.  They 
wished  to  identify  him  with  abolitionism  and  to  make 
use  of  the  hot  sentiment  of  the  people  against  these 
meddlesome  and  pestiferous  agitators  who  were 
thought  to  be  threatening  the  very  foundations  of  the 
Union.  These  Democratic  enemies  of  Stevens,  led  by 
one  McGrimn,  issued  a  call  for  a  "  convention  of  the 
friends  of  the  integrity  of  the  Union,"  and  they 
planned  to  have  their  convention  meet  just  the  day 
before  the  assembly  of  the  Constitutional  Convention. 
These  "  friends  of  the  integrity  of  the  Union  "  wished 
to  rebuke  the  abolitionists  and  to  do  what  they  could 
to  restrain  the  anti-slavery  agitation.  The  idea,  with 
a  little  clever  spontaneous  cultivation  from  a  few  self- 
seeking  leaders,  seemed  to  be  overwhelmingly  popular. 
Over  seven  hundred  delegates  were  elected  to  the 
"  Union,"  or  Anti-Abolition,  Convention.  Not  many 
seemed  ready  to  raise  their  voices  on  behalf  of  the 
slave.  A  constable  in  Chambersburg  had  lately  re 
ceived  one  thousand  dollars  for  catching  and  return 
ing  fugitive  slaves.  A  military  major  had  lately 
seized  and  sold  a  free  w7oman  and  five  children  out  of 
the  same  county,  pretending  that  they  were  slaves,  and 
with  the  thirty  or  more  pieces  of  silver  that  he  had 
received  in  reward  for  his  deed  he  had  bought  his 
uniform. 

It  was  such  mercenary  "  Union  "  patriots  who  were 
arousing  mobs  of  irresponsible  men  to  break  up  the 
meetings  of  the  zealous  abolitionists  in  order  to  close 
their  mouths.  At  this  juncture  Jonathan  Blanchard, 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  61 

fighting  as  it  were  with  his  back  to  the  wall  in  a 
desperate  effort  to  influence  public  sentiment,  wrote  to 
Stevens,  who  was  at  his  home  in  Gettysburg,  to  have 
Charles  B.  Penrose,  of  Carlisle,  appointed  to  the  "  In- 
tegrity-of-the-Union "  Convention.  Blanchard's  idea 
was  to  get  some  one  into  the  convention  who  would 
force  that  body  to  commit  itself  for  or  against  slavery. 
"  If  they  oppose  slavery  the  South  will  oppose  them. 
If  they  go  for  slavery  we  can  lead  the  people  who 
really  hate  slavery,  to  oppose  them."  He  wished  some 
brave  man  to  step  in  to  force  the  fight  into  the  open 
and  to  get  a  direct  issue  on  the  merits  of  slavery. 
What  was  Blanchard's  astonishment  and  delight  when 
he  learned  that  Stevens  had  secured  his  own  appoint 
ment  to  the  Union  Convention  instead  of  sending 
Penrose.  Doctor  Blanchard's  description  of  Stevens 
in  that  convention  is  worthy  of  preservation. 

"  The  day  came.  I  managed  to  squeeze  into  the 
densely  packed  old  court-house  in  Harrisburg.  I 
stood  behind  a  pillar,  and  sketched,  and  afterward 
wrote  out  a  report  of  that  remarkable  melee.  The  re 
port  was  published  and  I  was  told  that  Mr.  Dunlap 
and  others  at  the  state-house  next  day  were  so  over 
whelmed  with  Stevens'  truth,  patriotism,  justice  and 
eloquence,  blended  with  wit,  satire  and  sarcasm,  that 
reading  the  report  they  rolled  on  the  carpet  and  shook 
their  sides  with  laughter.  .  .  .  Stevens  had  come  in 
late  and  his  coming  was  greeted  by  the  dense  crowd 
with  looks  of  fear,  hatred,  and  wrath.  An  old  Whig, 
Judge  Beard,  was  in  the  chair.  A  preacher  from  Pitts 
burgh  rose  and  on  some  motion  said :  '  Born,  sir,  in 
Tennessee,  raised  in  Kentucky,  I  am  an  exile  from 


62      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

my  native  state  on  account  of  slavery;  yet  I  have  come 
to  this  convention  ready  to  peril  my  all  in  the  cause 
of  our  national  Union/  Stevens,  as  soon  as  the  man 
had  done,  sprang  to  his  feet.  In  an  instant  every  spit- 
box  was  kicked  and  rattled.  Hundreds  hissed  and 
the  mouths  that  did  not  hiss  groaned  and  howled.  It 
was  bedlam  uncapped.  For  a  moment  I  was  stunned, 
till  I  looked  at  Mr.  Stevens.  He  turned  with  calm 
haughtiness  around  and  looked  that  storm  of  howls 
and  hisses  in  the  face!  Then,  turning  with  an  em 
phasis  utterly  indescribable  above  the  uproar,  he  said : 
'  Mr.  President ;  we  are  not  slaves  here  in  Pennsyl 
vania!  And'  (with  slow  and  solemn  emphasis)  '  if 
the  attempt  is  made  to  make  us  such  there  are  some  of 
us  in  this  court-house  who  will  make  resistance  enough 
to  let  Pennsylvanians  outside  know  the  doom  that 
awaits  them ! '  The  house  was  now  so  still  that  you 
could  hear  the  clock  tick.  He  then  turned  toward  the 
preacher  and  imitating  his  drawl,  said : 

"  '  Sir,  I  deeply  sympathize  with  my  respected  friend 
over  the  way  in  all  that  he  has  done  and  suffered  in 
the  cause  of  our  glorious  Union  which  we  have  now 
first  met  to  promote!  Indeed,  sir,  so  moved  am  I  at 
beholding  him,  an  exile  from  his  native  state,  driven 
out  by  slavery,  that  I  am  ready  to  join  this  convention 
in  a  vote  of  reprobation  of  that  foul  institution  which 
drives  white  men  from  their  homes  to  wander  as  exiles 
in  distant  states/ 

"  There  was  an  uproar  of  applause,  some  of  it  com 
ing  from  men  who  had  hissed  him  but  a  few  moments 
before.  Stevens  continued  to  expose  the  hypocritical 
patriotism  of  the  preacher,  who  had  been  circulating  a 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  63 

subscription  paper  and  soliciting  funds.  Imitating  the 
preacher's  voice  and  manner,  with  mock  commisera 
tion  for  his  suffering,  with  keen  satire  on  the  pro- 
slavery  leaders  of  the  crowd  who,  he  assumed,  were 
all  anti-slavery  as  he  was,  Stevens  by  his  drollery,  wit 
and  shafts  of  truth  and  fearless  justice,  finally  won 
entire  control  of  the  convention.  When  the  resolu 
tions  were  offered  Stevens  would  move  to  amend  by 
adding  words  in  favor  of  liberty  from  the  Pennsyl 
vania  Constitution  and  Bill  of  Rights,  which  the  con 
vention  dared  not  vote  down,  with  the  result  that  the 
proceedings  were  turned  into  a  farce  and  broke  up 
in  laughter.  Stevens  had  shown  himself  such  a  force 
as  was  not  to  be  answered  nor  suppressed."  * 

Another  account  relates  that  Stevens  in  one  of  the 
discussions  so  completely  demonstrated  the  absurdity 
of  a  proposed  resolution  that  a  spineless  doughface 
member  declared  that,  while  he  "  abhorred  abolition 
ism,  he  could  never  endorse  such  a  doctrine."  There 
upon  a  clergyman  —  it  may  have  been  the  same  pious 
martyr  from  Pittsburgh  —  aroused  by  the  headway 
Stevens  was  obviously  making  in  the  convention, 
took  the  floor  and  accused  Stevens  of  "  coming  to 
the  convention  while  holding  to  the  abominable  doc 
trines  of  the  abolitionists,  to  sit  in  sheep's  clothing 
among  the  friends  of  the  Union,  while  in  his  heart  he 
is  wishing  to  throw  his  firebrands  to  consume  it." 
Stevens  immediately  rebuked  the  clergyman  for  in 
dulging  in  personalities.  "  I  meant  no  one  in  par 
ticular,"  replied  the  clergyman.  "  Indeed,"  said 

1 "  Reminiscences  on  Stevens,"  by  Jonathan  Blanchard  in  the 
Christian  Cynosure,  April  5,  1883. 


64   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Stevens,  "  I  certainly  understood  the  gentleman  to 
insinuate  that  my  friend  yonder," — the  colleague 
whom  he  had  just  forced  to  disclaim  the  pro-slavery 
resolution,  and  whose  hair  Was  a  fiery  red, — "  that  my 
friend  yonder  looked  very  much  like  a  firebrand !  "  * 

While  Stevens  was  possessed  with  a  consuming  ha 
tred  of  the  slave  system,  yet  at  no  time  throughout  his 
life  did  he  propose  to  attack  it  by  any  process  that 
was  beyond  the  Constitution  and  the  laws.  During 
his  legislative  career  in  Pennsylvania  in  the  winter  of 
1836-7  he  offered  a  resolution  relating  to  slavery,  to 
the  effect  that  "  slaveholding  states  alone  have  the 
right  to  regulate  and  control  domestic  slavery  within 
their  limits,"  but  that  "  Congress  possesses  the  consti 
tutional  power,  and  it  is  expedient,  to  abolish  slavery 
and  the  slave  trade  within  the  District  of  Columbia." 
This  indicates  that  he  stood  from  the  beginning  on 
the  Free-soil  and  Republican  ground  in  reference  to 
the  great  sectional  question  with  which  he  had  so  much 
to  do  in  his  later  life. 

Stevens  served  in  the  Constitutional  Convention  with 
some  of  the  ablest  men  of  Pennsylvania,  including  John 
Sargent,  James  C.  Biddle,  Thomas  Earle,  Joseph  H. 
Hopkinson  and  Charles  J.  Ingersoll,  all  of  Philadelphia, 
and  with  James  Merrill,  of  Union  County,  "  the  in 
defatigable  and  laborious  searcher  after  facts,"  who 
had  preceded  Stevens  as  a  teacher  in  York  County. 
Stevens  bore  his  full  share  of  the  convention's  burdens 
and  debates.  The  most  notable  aspect  of  his  record 
was  his  protest  in  the  convention,  which  he  urged  with 
all  his  might,  against  the  fatal  folly  of  inserting  the 

1  McCall,  p.  50. 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  65 

word  white  into  the  clause  of  the  Constitution,  defining 
the  qualifications  for  voters.  Stevens  felt  that  it  was 
a  mean  and  unjustifiable  discrimination.  It  violated 
his  innate  instinct  in  favor  of  democratic  equality,  and 
when  it  was  done  he  lost  interest  in  the  proceedings, 
and  was  so  offended  and  disgusted  by  the  act  that 
he  refused  to  attach  his  name  to  the  Constitution.  He 
believed  that  the  unjust  discrimination  had  been  per 
petrated  through  the  influence  of  slaveholders  and 
"  doughfaces  "  who  had  been  excited  by  the  abolition 
agitation.  In  the  heated  and  protracted  debate  on  the 
subject  Stevens'  invective  came  into  play,  and  then, 
as  ever  after,  he  refused  to  yield  an  iota  in  the  demo 
cratic  cause  to  which  he  had  dedicated  his  life, —  the 
cause  of  the  equal  rights  of  all  before  the  law,  regard 
less  of  race,  color,  religion,  or  nationality. 

Stevens  was  active  in  promoting  the  nomination  and 
election  of  Harrison  to  the  presidency  in  1840.  He 
was  opposed  to  Clay,  and  it  is  said  that  Clay's  open 
opposition  to  Stevens'  appointment  to  the  Harrison 
cabinet  led  to  the  disappointment  of  Stevens,  who  had 
been  promised  the  position  of  postmaster-general.1 

^ a  Harris,   Biographical  History    of  Lancaster  County,  p.   582, 
cited  by  McCall,  p.  57,  and  Harris'  Political  Conflict,  p.  91. 

Colonel  A.  K.  McClure  is  sponsor  for  a  Stevens  story  touch 
ing  his  agency  in  the  nomination  of  Harrison  by  the  Whigs  in 
1840.  The  Virginia  delegation  was  hesitating  between  Harrison 
and  Scott.  Stevens,  the  leader  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation, 
turned  the  Virginians  from  Scott  to  Harrison  by  a  questionable 
political  trick.  Scott  had  written  a  letter  to  Francis  Granger,  of 
New  York,  seeking  to  conciliate  the  anti-slavery  sentiment  of 
that  state.  It  was  a  private  letter,  but  Granger  gave  it  to 
Stevens.  Stevens  called  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Virginia 
delegation  and  inadvertently  (?)  dropped  the  letter  to  the  floor, 
and  its  contents  became  known  to  the  Virginians.  They  turned 
from  Scott  to  Harrison.  Either  could  have  been  elected. 
"  My  authority  for  this,"  says  McClure,  "  is  Stevens  himself.  He 


(56      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

In  1841,  after  his  defeat  in  the  Buckshot  War,  Stev 
ens  was  once  more  elected  to  the  Pennsylvania  Legis 
lature.  At  this  session  he  spoke  vigorously  in  favor 
of  the  rights  of  petition,  in  favor  of  limiting  the  state 
debt  and  in  opposition  to  those  who,  as  he  thought, 
were  recklessly  attacking  sound  banking  institutions 
and  systems  of  banking.  He  was  Anti-Jackson  and 
Anti-Democratic  and  whatever  the  advocates  of  the 
Jackson  party  favored  he  would  be  likely  to  antagonize. 

Stevens  removed  from  Gettysburg  to  Lancaster  in 
1842.  He  now  retired  from  politics  for  a  period  of 
eight  years,  a  retirement  made  necessary  because  of 
the  entangled  condition  of  his  private  affairs,  and  be 
cause  he  did  not  stand  in  favor  with  the  dominant 
and  more  conservative  faction  of  the  Whig  party  in 
Lancaster  county.  He  wrote  to  a  friend  who  urged 
him  to  embark  actively  into  the  anti-slavery  cause  for 
the  sake  of  his  country  and  humanity,  that  he  would 
do  so  but  for  the  failure  of  his  partner  whom  he  had 
trusted  with  the  entire  charge  of  his  business.  "  I 
have  failed  for  ninety  thousand  dollars/'  he  wrote, 
and  "  I  know  of  no  way  out  of  such  things  but  to  pay 
the  uttermost  farthing.  I  have  moved  up  to  this  rich 
country  to  earn  the  means  to  pay  my  honest  debts."  1 

disliked  Scott  for  his  vanity,  but  his  strong  reason  for  support 
ing  Harrison  was  a  letter  from  Harrison  assuring  Stevens  of  a 
place  in  his  cabinet.  After  the  election  Stevens  made  no  effort 
for  the  place,  feeling  secure;  while  Josiah  Randall  (father  of 
Samuel  J.  Randall)  and  Charles  B.  Penrose  (grandfather  of 
Boise  B.  Penrose)  entered  aggressively  as  candidates.  Stevens 
was  dumfounded  when  he  saw  that  his  name  was  omitted  from 
the  cabinet  list.  He  never  forgave  Webster,  who,  as_  Stevens 
believed  to  the  day  of  his  death,  had  prevented  his  appointment." 
Our  Presidents  and  How  We  Make  Them,  p.  68. 

1  Correspondence  with  Jonathan  Blanchard.  Alexander  Hood 
is  authority  for  the  statement  that  Stevens'  debts  in  1843 
amounted  to  $217,000.  History  of  Lancaster  County. 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  67 

He  soon  paid  the  last  dollar  of  this  enormous  debt, 
which  he  was  able  to  do  because  of  a  growing  and 
lucrative  practise.  Stevens  was  competent  in  busi 
ness,  though  he  was  open-hearted  and  open-handed 
with  his  means. 

Though  the  Lancaster  bar  was  a  very  able  one  and 
the  old  lawyers  were  somewhat  jealous  of  the  new 
comer,  Stevens'  practise  grew  so  rapidly  that  he  soon 
took  a  front  rank  among  his  colleagues,  with  a  practise 
that  brought  him  an  income  of  from  twelve  thousand 
to  fifteen  thousand  dollars  a  year.  Within  six  months 
after  his  arrival  no  member  of  that  able  bar  dared  to 
dispute  Stevens'  "  intellectual  and  legal  kingship."  * 
He  appeared  in  most  of  the  cases  coming  to  the  Su 
preme  Court  from  Lancaster  County.  When,  after  a 
few  years,  his  debts  had  been  reduced  to  thirty  thou 
sand  dollars,  he  began  to  look  forward  again  to  activity 
in  politics,  for  which  he  had  a  strong  liking  and  a 
natural  bent. 

During  this  period  of  his  retirement  in  1842, 
Stevens  received  a  letter  from  Salmon  P.  Chase,  writ 
ten  from  Cincinnati,  by  which  Chase  sought  to  in 
terest  Stevens  in  the  cause  of  the  Liberty  party.  The 
two  men  were  strangers  to  each  other,  but  Chase  had 
noticed  Stevens'  career  and  he  wrote  to  him  frankly 
on  behalf  of  a  cause  in  which  both  men  felt  a  deep 
interest.  Chase  enclosed  an  "  address  "  of  the  Liberty 
party  published  by  a  convention  at  Columbus,  Ohio, 
in  December,  1841.  This  address,  obviously  written 
by  Chase,  drew  a  distinction  between  abolitionism 
and  the  Liberty  party.  The  one  sought  to  abolish 

1  Harris,  Political  Conflict,  p.  87. 


68   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

slavery  everywhere,  the  means  being  only  of  a  moral 
nature,  as  by  argument,  reason,  and  persuasion.  The 
Liberty  party,  on  the  other  hand,  sought  only  to 
abolish  slavery  wherever  it  exists  within  reach  of  the 
constitutional  action  of  Congress,  to  restrict  slavery 
within  the  Slave  States,  and  to  deliver  the  government 
from  the  control  of  the  slave  power.  Chase  made  a 
strong  plea  for  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press; 
he  sought  to  draw  Stevens'  attention  to  this  cause  and 
he  invited  an  expression  of  his  viewrs.  "  What  I  hear 
of  your  character,"  wrote  Chase,  "  leads  me  to  think 
you  will  take  it  in  good  part.  Can  not  you  take  ground 
with  us?  Can  not  you  bring  the  old  Anti-Masonic 
party  of  Pennsylvania  on  to  the  Liberty  platform? 
Could  Seward,  of  New  York,  or  Judge  McLean,  of 
Ohio,  be  obtained  to  lead,  or  shall  we  retain  Birney  ?  " 
Stevens'  former  friend,  Jonathan  Blanchard,  was 
then  a  Presbyterian  minister  in  Cincinnati.  He  also 
wrote  to  Stevens  for  the  Liberty  cause.  He  spoke 
of  Samuel  Lewis  —  •"  a  lawyer,  a  Methodist  preacher 
and  an  honest  man,  three  extremes  which  rarely  meet 
in  the  composition  of  man  " —  and  of  Doctor  Aydelotte, 
"  the  highly  esteemed  President  of  Woodward  Col 
lege,"  as  being  interested  with  Chase  in  a  proposed 
anti-slavery  meeting'  in  Cincinnati,  and  if  the  meeting 
was  held  Blanchard  was  anxious  to  have  Stevens  pres 
ent.  "  You  know/'  he  wrote,  "  that  I  am  very  anxious 
to  have  you  become  a  Christian  for  the  salvation  of 
your  own  soul.  Next  to  this  I  am  anxious  to  have 
you  employ  your  extraordinary  powers  with  which 
God  has  endowed  you  for  the  furtherance  of  right 
eousness  and  justice  in  this  wretched  earth.  .You  are 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  69 

utterly  unfit  to  make  speeches  on  the  common  miser 
able  topics  of  political  strife.  Another  thing  I  want 
is  that  you  should  help  Chase  to  displace  the  name  of 
Birney  and  substitute  that  of  Seward  or  J.  Q.  Adams 
as  the  anti-slavery  candidate  for  President,  and  in 
such  a  way  as  to  prevent  a  break  between  eastern  and 
western  abolitionists.  ...  I  meddle  but  little  with 
politics,  seeking  only  to  vote  as  near  right  as  I  can. 
But  I  remember  you  with  gratitude.  I  have  an  almost 
superstitious  belief  in  your  talents  and  I  do  not  think 
you  understand  their  extent."  1 

Stevens  delayed  his  answer  to  these  urgent  letters, 
being  undetermined  what  answer  to  give.  He  then 
wrote  to  Blanchard : 2  "I  need  not  say  how  entirely 
my  views  and  wishes  accord  with  your  own  in  the 
object  you  have  in  view.  The  only  question  is  as  to  the 
means  most  likely  to  accomplish  it.  I  have  believed 
that  could  best  be  done  by  declining  as  yet  to  organize 
a  distinct  political  party.  I  am  aware  how  often  we 
have  been  cheated  by  the  men  of  other  parties, —  how 
few  of  them  prove  faithful  after  being  elected.  And 
yet  I  think  the  cause  of  liberty  has  gained  and  is  gain 
ing  more  friends  by  the  tyranny  of  slaveholders  and 
their  abetters  than  could  have  been  done  in  the  same 
time  by  the  most  strenuous  associated  party  effort  by 
us. 

"  In  thinking  of  the  next  President,  I  know  that  be 
fore  Harrison's  nomination  Gerrit  Smith  was  in  favor 
of  General  Scott  and  I  suppose  he  would  not  have 
been  so  without  good  reason.  I  have  corresponded 

1  Letters  and  Papers  of  Stevens,  April  9,  1842. 

2  Under  date  of  May  24,  1842. 


70  THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

with  the  general  lately  and  find  him  in  favor  of  the 
right  of  petition  in  its  largest  sense  and  a  firm  and  fear 
less  condemner  of  the  proceedings  against  Mr.  Gid- 
dings.1  This  is  a  good  deal  in  these  times,  enough  to 
make  slaveholders  and  their  adherents  hate  him.  Be 
lieving  that  he  can  be  elected  and  will  not  deceive  us, 
and  will  do  more  for  our  cause  elected  than  can  be 
done  by  suffering  defeat  with  a  still  more  thorough 
anti-slavery  man,  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  to  sup 
port  him  for  the  presidency." 

Stevens  then  expressed  his  admiration  for  the  ad 
dress  of  the  Liberty  Convention  and  for  its  author, 
who,  as  he  said,  "  possesses  a  cool  head  and  deep  knowl 
edge  of  mankind  as  well  as  a  right  heart." 

The  Liberty  address,  which  we  would  now  call 
a  platform,  justified  the  formation  of  a  new  party  be 
cause  of  the  ascendancy  of  slaveholding  influence  in 
all  departments  of  the  national  government.  There 
was  no  manly  and  resolute  resistance  to  slaveholding 
pretensions;  no  firm  and  successful  vindication  of  the 
claims  of  free  labor;  no  bold  and  energetic  assertion  of 
the  great  principles  of  constitutional  liberty  nor  can 
any  be  expected  from  the  two  old  parties.  The  right 
of  petition  is  denied  at  the  violent  dictation  of  slavery. 
The  address  denounced  the  slaveholders  as  a  "  priv 
ileged  order,"  whose  representatives  have  always 
acted  in  solid  phalanx  whenever  the  interests  of  slave 
labor  were  in  question,  and  they  made  the  protection 
and  advancement  of  those  interests  the  price  of  their 
political  influence  in  the  scales  of  parties.  This  power 

1  This  refers  to  the  expulsion  of  Giddings  from  the  House  of 
Representatives  in  1842,  on  account  of  the  Creole  Resolutions. 


THE  EARLY  FREE-SOILER  71 

controlled  the  country,  upholding  slavery  in  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia  and  territories,  creating  new  slave 
states  and  it  has  again  and  again  prostrated  free  labor 
in  the  dust.  "  It  has  interfered  with  the  domestic 
legislation  of  the  Free  States,  stifled  freedom  of  speech 
and  debate,  set  at  naught  the  right  of  petition,  promoted 
mob  violence  within  our  own  border  by  sending  its 
enemies  among  us  to  delude  and  inflame  the  ignorant 
and  the  vile,  and  in  a  neighboring  state  has  stained  the 
soil  with  blood, —  the  blood  of  an  upright  citizen  ob 
noxious  only  as  a  fearless  asserter  of  human  rights."  1 

In  conclusion,  the  address  demanded  the  absolute 
and  unqualified  divorce  of  the  government  from 
slavery  and  it  "  gave  to  the  breeze  the  banner  of  Con 
stitutional  Liberty  on  whose  folds  were  inscribed, 
Liberty,  Equal  Rights,  Protection  to  Free  Labor,  Gen 
eral  Education  and  Public  Economy !  " 

This  voiced  fully  and  forcibly  Stevens'  sentiments 
on  slavery  and  the  times.  He  was,  however,  an  astute 
politician  who  was  playing  the  game  within  the  Whig 
party  for  the  control  of  that  organization.  He  was 
looking  not  only  to  agitation  and  education,  but  to 
success  in  carrying  elections.  His  dislike  of  Clay  was 
prompted  partly  by  his  distrust  of  that  great  leader  on 
the  slavery  question  and  partly  by  Clay's  Masonic  at 
tachments.  He  anticipated  Clay's  nomination  in  1844, 
and  while  he  did  not  break  with  the  Whig  party  and 
while  he  nominally  supported  its  candidate,  he  was 
known  not  to  be  disappointed  greatly  in  Clay's  defeat. 
Publicly  he  supported  Clay,  but  he  was  accused  of 
secretly  conniving  at  his  defeat  by  privately  advising 

1  Referring  to  the  death  of  Love  joy  in  Illinois. 


72   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

and  encouraging  anti-slavery  Whigs  to  go  off  to  Birney 
or  to  abstain  from  voting.  Stevens  had  written  to 
General  Scott  in  February,  1842 :  "  The  Clay  men  are 
taking  courage  again.  They  soon  forget  their  de 
feats.  It  is  best  to  let  them  have  undisturbed  sway 
until  after  the  next  election  so  that  they  can  not  deny 
that  that  is  a  test  of  their  power.  They,  of  course, 
will  be  annihilated  everywhere,  but  whether  that  will 
teach  them  wisdom  remains  to  be  seen.  Our  true 
course  seems  to  me  to  be  to  remain  on  the  turf  and 
await  events."  * 

After  the  election  of  1844,  Stevens  gave  his  atten 
tion,  as  far  as  he  was  in  politics,  to  leading  his  wing 
of  the  Whig  party  into  dominance  and  control  in 
Lancaster  County.  He  remained  "  on  the  turf  "  and  in 
the  running.  He  maintained  his  party  regularity,  and 
after  another  four  years  had  rolled  round,  his  leader 
ship  was  recognized  in  his  new  location  and  he  stepped 
forth  again  into  public  life,  this  time  as  a  Whig  candi 
date  for  Congress. 

1  Stevens'  Papers,  Library  of  Congress,  February  15,  1842. 


CHAPTER  VI 

IN;  CONGRESS   BEFORE   THE   WAR;   ANTI-SLAVERY 
PHILIPPICS 

TN  1848  Stevens  received  the  Whig  nomination  for 
-••  Congress  in  the  Lancaster  district.  He  had 
triumphed  over  the  "  machine "  of  his  party,  and 
was  elected  by  the  voters  of  the  district  by  more  than 
four  thousand  majority  over  his  Democratic  opponent. 
The  Thirty-first  Congress  of  which  he  became  a 
member  was  a  notable  one  in  American  history.  It 
met  at  a  time  when  the  country  was  in  the  throes  of  a 
renewed  agitation  on  the  slavery  question,  an  agitation 
that  threatened  the  continuance  of  the  Union.  Texas 
had  been  annexed  in  spite  of  anti-slavery  opposition. 
The  Mexican  War  had  followed  and  had  just  been 
brought  to  a  successful  conclusion.  As  one  of  the  re 
sults  of  that  war,  the  United  States  had  received  from 
Mexico  a  large  accession  of  new  territory.  California 
had  been  taken  possession  of  by  right  of  conquest  dur 
ing  the  war,  and  in  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo, 
closing  the  war,  Mexico  acknowledged  the  south 
western  boundary  that  Texas  had  claimed,  and  ceded 
to  the  United  States,  in  addition  to  California,  large 
areas  in  the  Southwest,  including  New  Mexico  and 
Arizona,  Nevada,  Utah,  and  parts  of  Colorado  and 
Wyoming. 

73 


74      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

The  question  immediately  arose,  what  shall  be  the 
status  of  this  new  territory  as  to  slavery?  Shall 
slavery  be  permitted  there  ?  Or,  shall  it  be-  excluded 
by  congressional  power  ? 

This  question  which  arrayed  the  two  sections  of  the 
country  against  each  other  and  became  the  political 
issue  of  the  hour,  was  associated  with  a  number  of 
other  sore  and  exciting  questions  relating  to  slavery. 
A  summary  of  all  these  controverted  questions  that 
were  pending  before  Congress  and  the  country  at  the 
opening  of  the  Thirty -first  Congress  in  December, 
1849,  is  essential  to  an  understanding  of  the  political 
situation. 

The  first  and  most  important  of  all  was  the  ques 
tion  of  slavery  in  the  new  territories,  to  which  we 
have  referred.  Shall  slave  property  be  recognized  and 
permitted  in  the  Mexican  cessions  under  national  law 
or  shall  it  be  prohibited?  The  Mexican  War  had 
hardly  begun  when,  in  anticipation  that  Mexico  would 
be  forced  to  cede  territory  to  the  United  States,  an  ap 
propriation  bill  was  offered  granting  money  to  the 
President  to  provide  for  the  negotiation,  with  a  view 
to  the  purchase  of  territory.  To  this  "  three  million 
bill,"  David  Wilmot,  a  Democratic  Representative  of 
Pennsylvania,  moved  his  celebrated  "  Wilmot 
Proviso,"  to  the  effect  that  "  neither  slavery  nor  in 
voluntary  servitude,  except  in  punishment  of  crime 
whereof  the  party  shall  have  been  duly  convicted,"  shall 
ever  exist  in  any  part  of  any  Mexican  territory  that 
might  be  obtained.  It  was  this  proposition  particularly 
that  threw  Congress  and  the  country  into  an  excit 
ing  agitation.  The  "  Proviso  "  did  not  pass  with  the 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  75 

original  appropriation  bill  in  connection  with  which  it 
was  proposed;  but  the  proposal  remained  before  the 
country  and  there  was  a  grim  anti-slavery  determina 
tion  in  the  North  to  apply  the  principle  of  the  Wilmot 
Proviso  to  the  Mexican  cessions,  and  exclude  slavery 
from  the  new  possessions. 

This  proposition  was  very  offensive  to  the  South. 
The  Mexican  War  had  been  especially  promoted  and 
supported  by  the  people  of  that  section.  If,  now,  the 
fruits  of  the  war  were  to  be  denied  them  and  their 
"  peculiar  institution "  were  to  be  denied  legitimate 
recognition  and  protection  in  the  new  possessions 
which  had  come  to  the  United  States  by  the  expendi 
ture  of  Southern  blood  and  treasure,  there  would  be 
reason  enough,  according  to  Southern  opinion,  for  a 
dissolution  of  the  Union.  The  Virginia  Legislature 
asserted  that  the  passage  of  the  Wilmot  Proviso 
would  be  an  "  outrage,"  and  that  the  Southern  States 
should  never  submit  to  it;  such  a  denial  to  the  South 
of  "  equal  rights  in  the  territories  "  would  be  in  itself 
equivalent  to  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Calhoun  and 
Rhett,  of  South  Carolina,  Berrien,  Toombs,  and  Steph 
ens,  of  Georgia,  and  other  able  statesmen  of  the  South, 
defended  the  rights  of  the  Southern  people  to  carry 
their  slave  property  into  the  new  territory  and  have  it 
protected  there  by  national  power,  and  they  gave  notice, 
substantially,  that  if  this  equal  protection  to  their  slave 
property  were  denied,  the  Union  would  be  of  no  further 
use  to  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  public  sentiment  of  the  North 
was  just  as  decidedly  opposed  to  the  further  extension 
of  slavery;  and  while  both  of  the  leading  political  par- 


76   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ties  refused  to  insert  the  principle  of  the  Wilmot  Pro 
viso  in  their  campaign  platforms  in  1848  for  fear  of 
losing  their  Southern  supporters,  the  rank  and  file  of 
both  the  Whigs  and  the  Democrats  in  the  Northern 
States  were  stoutly  opposed  to  the  extension  of  slavery. 
So  positive  was  this  sentiment  that  when  the  parties 
refused  to  come  out  openly  for  the  policy  of  the  Wil 
mot  Proviso,  the  more  radical  and  pronounced  anti- 
slavery  men  in  both  parties  came  out  of  their  parties 
and  united  in  the  new  Free-soil  party  whose  pri 
mary  purpose  was  to  exclude  slavery  from  the  terri 
tories.  This  new  party  declared  for  "  free  soil  for  a 
free  people  "  and  asserted  that,  with  "  free  men,  free 
labor,  free  press  and  free  soil "  inscribed  upon  its 
banners  it  would  fight  on  and  fight  ever  until  a  triumph 
ant  victory  had  crowned  its  efforts.  This  party  stood 
for  uncompromising  opposition  to  slave  extension.  It 
polled  292,000  votes  for  President  in  1848,  for  Martin 
Van  Buren,  a  Democratic  leader  of  former  days,  and 
this  vote  represented  also  the  sentiment  of  many  voters 
who,  for  reasons  of  expendiency  and  party  loyalty, 
refused  to  come  out  of  their  old  parties.  Thousands 
of  Democrats  and  Whigs  who  refused  to  leave  their 
parties,  believed  in  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
new  party  —  the  principle  of  the  Wilmot  Proviso. 
They  continued  to  hope  that  the  object  in  view  could 
be  obtained  without  the  sacrifice  of  their  party  interests 
and  ties. 

When  Congress  met  in  December,  1849,  the  question 
as  to  whether  the  Wilmot  Proviso  should  be  applied 
to  the  Mexican  cessions  was  still  pending.  The  Free- 
soilers  had  elected  a  handful  of  Congressmen,  thir- 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  77 

teen  in  number,  who  would  be  governed  in  their  public 
conduct  primarily  with  reference  to  the  slavery  issue 
alone,  and  it  was  evident  that  a  sharp  contest  was 
pending. 

Another  prominent  question  was  whether  California 
should  be  admitted  as  a  Free  State.  Gold  was  dis 
covered  in  California  in  January,  1848,  a  few  days 
before  the  peace  treaty  was  made  with  Mexico.  Im 
migrants  from  the  Eastern  States  and  from  all  parts  of 
the  world  began  to  flow  into  California,  across  the 
plains,  by  way  of  the  isthmus,  around  the  Horn.  These 
"  forty-niners "  were  mostly  Americans,  but  there 
were  among  them  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men. 
Vigilance  committees  and  lynch  law  were  at  first  their 
only  means  of  government.  But  within  a  year  and  a 
half,  a  time  that  seems  almost  incredible  for  such  a 
work,  a  state  of  more  than  100,000  people  had  been 
organized  in  this  new  land.  By  the  fall  of  1849  a 
Constitutional  Convention  had  been  held  under  the 
direction  of  the  Military  Governor ;  a  state  constitution 
was  adopted  by  which  slavery  was  excluded  from  the 
state  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote  of  the  convention, 
and  when  Congress  met  in  December,  1849,  California 
presented  herself  at  the  portals  of  the  Union  asking 
admission  as  a  Free  State. 

The  slaveholders  of  the  South  saw  that  the  admis 
sion  of  California  would  break  the  "  balance  of 
power  "  in  the  Senate,  between  the  Slave  States  and  the 
Free.  Iowa  had  offset  Texas  and  Wisconsin  had  off 
set  Florida.  There  was  no  other  slave  state  ready 
to  come  in  to  offset  California,  and  there  was  no 
prospect  of  any.  The  Southern  leaders  therefore  ob- 


78      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

jected  to  the  admission  of  California.  They  said  she 
was  not  ready  for  statehood,  that  her  organization  had 
been  irregular  and  disorderly  and  without  the  au 
thorization  of  Congress;  that  she  should  be  remanded 
to  the  territorial  status  and  come  in  when  ready  by 
the  usual  "  enabling  act  "  of  Congress.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  anti-slavery  men  insisted  that  California 
should  be  immediately  admitted  with  her  free-state  con 
stitution. 

Another  aspect  of  the  slavery  question  that  had  been 
before  Congress  for  a  number  of  years,  through  the 
persistent  and  pestiferous  petitions  and  activities  of 
the  abolitionists  of  the  North,  was  that  of  abolishing 
slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  Petitions  to  bring 
this  about  continued  to  come  to  Congress.  The  anti- 
slavery  men  of  the  North  who  wished  to  relieve  them 
selves  of  all  responsibility  for  Southern  slavery,  felt 
that  as  long  as  slavery  existed  at  the  national  capital 
they  were  partly  responsible  for  it.  They  wished  slav 
ery  abolished,  or  prevented,  wherever  the  national  au 
thority  extended  or  wherever  it  might  be  held  that 
the  national  authority  was  responsible  for  it.  That 
authority  was  supreme  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  as 
well  as  in  the  territories,  and  the  anti-slavery  agitators 
were  determined  that  the  detestable  system  of  slavery 
should  no  longer  continue  under  the  dome  of  the  na 
tional  capital. 

On  the  other  hand,  Southern  leaders  contended  that 
to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia  would 
be  a  violation  of  good  faith  toward  the  people  of 
Maryland  and  Virginia,  who  had  ceded  this  territory 
to  the  federal  government  as  slave  territory;  that 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  79 

abolition  should  not  be  permitted  in  the  District  so 
long  as  slavery  existed  in  Maryland  and  Virginia,  and 
not  at  all  except  by  the  consent  of  the  people  of  the 
District  and  with  due  compensation  for  the  eman 
cipated  slaves.  This  was  a  sore  question  which  had 
been  for  nearly  twenty  years  a  cause  of  dispute  and 
alienation  between  the  Southern  defenders  of  slavery 
and  the  Northern  abolitionists,  and  one  rash  Souther 
ner  went  so  far  as  to  say  in  Congress  that  if  slavery 
were  abolished  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  Maryland 
should  reassert  her  jurisdiction  over  that  territory  and 
enforce  her  slave  code  in  Washington.  This  question 
was  pending  when  the  Thirty-first  Congress  met. 

Further,  the  Southern  slaveholders  were  insisting 
upon  a  more  stringent  fugitive  slave  law.  The  public 
sentiment  of  the  North  against  slavery,  the  "  Personal 
Liberty  Bills  "  in  many  of  the  states,  the  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  Prigg  vs.  Pennsyl 
vania,  by  which  it  was  decided  that  state  officers  and 
agencies  could  not  be  required  for  use  in  enforcing  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Act  of  1793, —  these  influences  made  it 
very  difficult  for  the  Southerners  to  recover  their  run 
away  slaves  in  the  Northern  States.  They  demanded 
that  their  right  to  the  recovery  of  this  property,  so 
clearly  recognized  in  the  Constitution,  should  be  made 
secure  by  the  exercise  of  national  authority,  and  they 
came  to  the  Thirty-first  Congress  with  an  earnest  and 
determined  demand  that  the  Northern  States  should 
be  required  to  live  up  to  their  constitutional  compact 
obligations  in  this  regard. 

This  demand,  as  might  be  expected,  met  resistance 
among  representatives  of  strong  anti-slavery  constitu- 


8o   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

encies.  They  asserted  it  to  be  their  duty  to  protect 
their  free  colored  inhabitants  from  being  kidnaped 
and  carried  into  slavery,  and  that  the  freedom  and 
safety  of  a  single  one  of  these  free  negroes  was  a  more 
important  matter  than  the  escape  of  many  fugitives 
from  bondage.  The  "  slave  catcher  "  was  hateful  to 
Northern  communities,  and  while  the  politicians  and 
thousands  of  others  in  the  North  who  were  indifferent 
to  the  cause  of  the  slave  were  willing  that  the  obligation 
to  return  the  slave  should  be  lived  up  to,  there  were  yet 
thousands  of  anti-slavery  men  who  were  determined 
that,  law  or  no  law,  the  fugitive  should  not  be  re 
turned.  This  was  a  constant  source  of  irritation  and 
quarrel. 

Further,  Northern  men  were  insisting,  as  a  means 
of  crippling  slavery,  that  the  interstate  slave  trade 
should  be  prohibited, —  which,  of  course,  would  be  an 
offense  to  the  South ;  while  Southern  men  were  stand 
ing  up  for  the  full  recognition  of  the  extensive  claims 
of  Texas  to  the  Rio  Grande  as  her  southwestern  boun 
dary,  a  claim  that  was  denounced  as  extravagant  and 
absurd  even  by  some  men  from  the  Slave  States,  and 
which,  if  allowed,  would  materially  extend  slave  juris 
diction;  while  the  more  ardent  friends  of  Texas  were 
threatening  to  "  light  the  fires  of  civil  war  from  the 
Potomac  to  the  Rio  Grande"  if  the  claim  were  not 
allowed. 

Never  before  had  Congress  met  in  such  trying  times. 
These  questions  had  all  been  hotly  discussed  by  the 
press  and  on  the  hustings  in  both  sections  of  the 
Union.  A  temper  had  been  aroused  on  both  sides  of 
the  great  slavery  controversy  that  was  disposed  to  per- 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  81 

mit  of  no  further  yielding.  Moderate  men  believed 
that  unless  this  contentious  and  antagonistic  spirit 
could  be  curbed  and  the  spirit  of  conciliation  and  com 
promise  be  substituted  for  it,  the  Union  was  in  serious 
danger.  If  the  preservation  of  the  American  Union 
was  to  be  regarded  as  the  paramount  consideration  of 
the  hour  and  as  the  most  precious  object  of  American 
statesmanship,  then  a  public  character  like  that  of 
Henry  Clay,  and  not  like  that  of  Thaddeus  Stevens, 
was  the  kind  of  a  man  the  times  called  for.  Clay 
was  the  man  who  was  needed"  to  adjust  matters,  to  fix 
up  difficulties,  to  put  restraints  upon  men's  purposes 
and  desires  for  the  sake  of  peace. 

The  opening  days  of  the  Thirty-first  Congress  illus 
trate  the  sharp  divisions  between  the  sections.  The 
Congress  was  organized  amid  passion  and  strife,  after 
a  sharp  and  protracted  struggle  over  the  election  of  a 
Speaker,  and  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  Con 
gress  a  Speaker  was  elected  by  only  a  plurality  of  votes. 
There  were  nine  Free-soil  members  of  the  House 
who  would  give  their  votes  to  neither  party,  unless 
pledges  were  made  favorable  to  the  Free-soil  cause, 
and  there  were  several  other  members  who,  it  seems, 
voted  independently  of  their  party  caucus  nominations. 
The  more  positive  anti-slavery  men  were  dissatisfied 
with  the  course  of  Robert  C.  .Winthrop,  the  Whig 
Speaker  of  the  former  House,  and  they  now  stoutly 
refused  to  vote  for  his  reelection;  nor  would  they 
vote  for  the  Democratic  candidate,  Mr.  Howell  Cobb, 
of  Georgia.  The  consequence  was,  neither  party  could 
muster  a  majority  of  the  House.  The  struggle  was 
over  the  committees.  The  Free-soilers  were  anxious 


82      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

that  the  committees  on  the  territories,  the  judiciary, 
and  the  District  of  Columbia,  should  be  made  up  in  a 
way  that  would  be  satisfactory  to  them,  and  they 
would  vote  for  no  one  for  Speaker  who  would  not  give 
satisfactory  pledges  on  that  score.  They  wished  their 
cause  to  have  a  fair  and  open  hearing  and  that  all 
projects  in  opposition  to  slavery  should  not  be 
smothered  in  committee,  but  that  the  public  sentiment 
of  the  North  might  have  a  chance  to  be  heard  on  "  the 
great  question  that  now  agitated  the  country."  1 

On  one  ballot  five  of  these  Free-soilers  voted  for 
William  J.  Brown,  a  Democratic  member  from  Indiana, 
who  had  been  put  forward  by  the  Democrats  after  re 
peated  trials  for  Cobb,  in  the  hope  of  uniting  enough 
votes  to  elect.  Brown  came  within  two  votes  of  be 
ing  elected,  Wilmot  and  other  Free-soilers  aiding  him, 
because  Brown  had  written  to  Wilmot  saying  that  he 
(Brown)  being  a  representative  of  a  Free  State  had 
"  always  been  opposed  to  the  extension  of  slavery," 
and  that  he  would  "  constitute  the  committees  on  the 
District  of  Columbia,  the  territories,  and  the  judiciary 
in  such  a  manner  as  shall  be  satisfactory  to  yourself 
and  friends."  When  it  was  noticed  that  Free-soilers 
were  voting  for  the  Democratic  candidate,  suspicion 
was  aroused  and  when  the  fact  was  brought  out  that 
Brown  had  made  pledges  to  one  of  the  Free-soil  lead 
ers,  he  was,  as  might  be  expected,  abandoned  and  de 
nounced  by  the  Southern  Democrats. 

While  Wilmot  was  explaining  the  uncovered  "  bar 
gain  "  between  Brown  and  the  Free-soilers,  Stevens 
sought  to  bring  out  by  a  question  whether  or  not  Wil- 

1  Globe,  December  12,  1849,  p.  21. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  83 

mot  had  reason  to  believe,  from  Brown's  pledges,  that 
the  committees  would  be  composed  of  members  who 
were  in  favor  of  free  soil.  Wilmot  replied  that  he  had 
reason  to  believe  that  "  the  majority  of  the  committees 
would  be  composed  of  fair  Northern  men,"  at  which 
there  was  "  great  laughter  over  the  hall  "  and  applause 
in  some  parts  with  several  voices  inquiring,  "  Where 
are  the  three  aces  ?  "  Wilmot  explained  that  by  "  fair 
Northern  men  "  he  meant  "  men  who  would  not  give 
their  aid  to  stifle  the  expression  of  the  sentiments  of 
the  people  of  the  North," —  namely,  that  slavery  should 
go  no  further,  which  Wilmot  believed  to  be  the  senti 
ment  of  two-thirds  of  the  Northern  people.  Stevens, 
by  another  question  to  Wilmot,  called  the  attention  of 
the  House  and  country  to  the  fact  that  his  Free-soil  cor 
respondence  with  Brown  merely  showed  the  same  state 
of  things  as  that  which  took  place  two  years  before 
between  certain  gentlemen  and  Mr.  Winthrop  previous 
to  Winthrop's  election  as  Speaker  of  the  preceding 
Congress.  Pledges  had  appeared  to  be  necessary  then, 
and  the  committees  had  been  subsequently  organized 
in  a  way  calculated  to  suppress  anti-slavery  discus 
sion,  presumably  in  accordance  with  Winthrop's  agree 
ment.  The  anti-slavery  men  complained  that  in  spite 
of  pressure  and  petitions  from  the  North,  these  im 
portant  committees  would  not  act,  and  that  the  com 
mittees  had  been  "  fixed  "  by  agreement  to  secure  this 
masterly  inactivity.  They  would  have  no  more  such 
committees,  nor  a  Speaker  who  would  so  use  his 
power  to  frustrate  and  defeat  the  anti-slavery  cause. 

This  little  band  of  Free-soilers,  led  by  David  Wil 
mot,  of  Pennsylvania,  Joshua  R.  Giddings  and  Joseph 


84   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

M.  Root,  of  Ohio,  George  W.  Julian,  of  Indiana,  Pres 
ton  King,  of  New  York,  and  Charles  Allen  and  Horace 
Mann,  of  Massachusetts,  here  gave  formal  and  pub 
lic  notice  that  they  were  ready  to  subordinate  all 
other  causes  to  that  of  resisting  the  further  spread 
of  slavery;  that  they  would  resist  any  further  national 
protection,  or  patronage,  to  the  slavery  interest;  and 
that  they  proposed  to  use  all  the  political  power  and 
influence  at  their  command  in  organizing  the  House, 
and  in  all  other  ways  to  arouse  the  latent  sentiment 
among  the  old  parties  in  the  North  to  assert  itself 
against  what  they  deemed  the  aggressions  of  slavery. 

This  policy  met  with  fierce  resentment  on  the  part 
of  Southern  leaders.  They,  also,  proposed  to  resist 
"  aggression."  They  considered  all  opposition  to 
slavery  as  "  aggression  on  the  rights  of  the  South," 
and  they  gave  peremptory  notice  that  they  would  not 
yield  to  anti-slavery  influences,  the  control  of  the  im 
portant  committees  having  Southern  interests  in  charge. 
They  were  ready  to  sink  their  former  political  and 
party  differences  in  order  to  defeat  the  Free-soil  pro 
gram.  Meade,  of  Virginia,  expressed  his  willingness 
to  take  a  Speaker  from  either  party,  provided  he  were 
known  to  be  opposed  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia  and  its  prohibition  in  the  terri 
tories.  "  If  slavery,"  he  said,  "  is  to  be  abolished  in 
the  District  or  prohibited  in  the  territories,  I  trust  in 
God  that  my  eyes  have  rested  upon  the  last  Speaker 
of  the  House  of  Representatives."  1 

Meade  admitted  that  the  delay  in  organizing  the 
House  came  from  the  fear  that  certain  anti-slavery 
1  Dec.  13,  1849,  Globe,  p.  26. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  85 

bills  would  be  introduced,  reported  favorably  and 
passed, —  referring  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  and  its  prohibition  in  the  terri 
tories.  If  this  were  done,  he  said,  it  would  "either 
destroy  the  Confederacy  or  enslave  a  large  portion  of 
it,"  and  he  called  upon  the  conservative  elements  of 
both  parties  to  unite,  to  "  crush  the  demon  of  dis 
cord  "  by  opposing  these  anti-slavery  measures. 
Meade  said  that  he  was  but  expressing  the  one  de 
termination  of  the  South, — "  one  solemn  resolve  to  de 
fend  their  homes  and  maintain  their  honor,  contending, 
as  they  were,  for  their  firesides,  against  the  robbers  who 
are  seeking  to  despoil  them  of  their  rights  and  degrade 
them  before  the  world." 

Mr.  Toombs,  of  Georgia,  whose  mien  and  words 
were  adapted  to  "  firing  the  Southern  heart,"  spoke 
even  more  threateningly.  He  did  not  propose  to  be  re 
strained  by  eulogies  upon  the  Union,  and  he  was  de 
termined  to  make  the  slavery  interests  of  his  con 
stituents  the  basis  of  his  political  action.  "  I  do  not 
hesitate,"  he  said,  "to  avow  before  this  House  and 
the  country,  and  in  the  presence  of  the  living  God, 
that  if  by  your  legislation  you  seek  to  drive  us  from  the 
territories  of  California  and  New  Mexico,  purchased 
by  the  common  blood  and  treasure  of  the  whole  peo 
ple,  and  to  abolish  slavery  in  this  District,  thereby  at 
tempting  to  fix  a  national  degradation  upon  half  the 
states  of  this  Confederacy,  /  am  for  disunion:  and  if 
my  physical  courage  be  equal  to  the  maintenance  of 
my  convictions  of  right  and  duty,  I  will  devote  all  I 
am  and  all  I  have  on  earth  to  its  consummation." 
Toombs  demanded  securities  that  the  organization  of 


86      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  House  should  not  be  used  to  the  injury  of  his  slave- 
holding  constituents.  If  these  were  given  there  would 
be  cooperation  and  tranquillity :  if  not,  then,  so  far  as 
he  was  concerned,  "  Let  discord  reign  forever."  1 

Alexander  H.  Stephens,  a  colleague  of  Toombs  from 
Georgia,  explicitly  endorsed  what  Toombs  had  said. 
'  The  day  in  which  aggression  is  consummated/'  he 
said,  "  the  Union  is  dissolved.  We  do  not  intend  to 
submit  to  aggressions  on  our  rights."  The  Reverend 
Mr.  Hilliard,  a  Methodist  preacher,  who  represented 
one  of  the  Alabama  districts,  in  a  prepared  speech  de 
livered  soon  after  the  organization  of  the  House,  spoke 
with  the  same  spirit  of  defiance  and  boldness.  Hill 
iard,  like  Toombs,  was  one  of  the  more  violent  of  the 
Southern  "  fire-eaters  "  and  was  among  the  most  in 
sistent  defenders  of  slavery.  He  was  charged  by 
Stanly,  a  Whig-Unionist  of  North  Carolina,  with  ap 
pealing  to  the  spirit  of  revolution  and  disunionism.2 
Hilliard  asserted  that  the  passage  of  the  Wilmot  Pro 
viso  would  drive  the  Southern  States  to  resistance.  He 
did  not  propose  to  discuss  slavery  as  a  moral  question ; 
it  was  entirely  political ;  but  he  gave  notice  to  the  North 
that  "  the  declaration  of  your  fixed  purpose  to  bind 
down  the  slaveholding  states  within  their  present 
limits,  has  aroused  a  spirit  which  you  will  find  it  no 
easy  task  to  subdue."  He  asserted  that  "  one  feeling, 
one  purpose,  one  spirit,  moves  the  entire  mass  of 
awakened  and  indignant  freemen;  it  is  their  solemn 
purpose  not  only  to  resist  your  threatened  encroach- 

1  Globe,  Dec.  13,  1849,  p.  28. 

^2See    the    controversy    between    Hilliard    and    Stanly    in    the 
Globe,  March  6,  7,  1850. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  87 

ments,  but  to  demand  guarantees  for  their  future 
safety.  If  you  mean  to  deny  us  participation  in  the 
territories,  then  the  time  is  come  when  the  Southern 
States  must  decide  a  grave  question, —  either  to  submit 
to  gradual  but  perfectly  certain  change  in  their  organic 
structure  or  resist  the  threatened  encroachment  on  their 
rights  at  every  hazard."  *  lj 

It  was  in  this  spirit  of  positive  and  radical  resistance 
to  the  anti-slavery  cause  that  most  of  the  Southern 
members  of  both  parties  came  to  the  Thirty-first  Con 
gress.  There  were  ominous  signs  of  discord  and  dis 
union.  Southern  States  had  expressed  open  defiance 
of  the  Northern  purpose  to  restrict  slavery,  and  a  deter 
mination  had  been  expressed  to  resist  restriction  at  all 
hazards.  The  Virginia  Legislature  had  requested  the 
Governor  to  call  an  extra  session  of  that  body  if  Con 
gress  should  pass  the  Wilmot  Proviso,  and  other  of 
ficial  expressions  had  been  taken  looking  toward  a 
Southern  Disunion  Convention  in  that  event.  There 
was  no  mistaking  the  Southern  temper  on  the  question 
of  slavery. 

There  were  very  few  men  in  Congress  from  the 
North  who  were  prepared  to  meet  this  Southern  bold 
ness  of  spirit  with  a  like  attitude  of  defiance  and  re 
sistance.  The  Free-soilers  were  among  these  few  and 
they  were  there  with  the  purpose,  and  with  the  courage, 
to  press  their  cause  even  in  the  face  of  these  threats 
of  disunion.  Joseph  M.  Root,  of  Ohio,  ridiculed 
Meade's  threat  of  dissolution,  saying  that  if  the  Union 
must  be  dissolved  he  hoped  it  would  come  before  the 
House  were  organized,  for  "  then  it  would  not  be 

1  Globe,  Feb.  14,  1850,  p.  360. 


88      THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

binding  and  might  be  restored."  But  if  it  should  come 
upon  a  report  of  a  bill  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia, — "why,  then,  would  come 
the  time  for  a  fight  in  defense  of  wife  and  little  ones, 
the  household  gods  and  all  the  other  household  furni 
ture."  Root,  in  good-natured  satire,  expressed  assur 
ance  that  nothing  would  allay  discord  more  than  such 
calm  and  moderate  speeches  as  the  one  just  made  by 
Southern  gentlemen!  The  Wilmot  Proviso  had  been 
denounced  as  "  humbug  and  tomfoolery,"  but  Root 
ventured  to  assert  that  "  nine  out  of  ten  Whig  repre 
sentatives  of  the  North  would  not,  and  the  others  dare 
not,"  say  such  a  thing  to  their  constitutents.  "  Let 
them  do  so  and  there  would  be  in  his  section  of  the 
country  political  graves  as  thickly  spread  as  the  graves 
of  the  victims  of  the  cholera  in  those  villages  over  which 
the  pestilence  had  swept,  whose  fields  would  be  so  full 
of  graves  as  to  make  them  look  like  stone-quarries, 
where  there  would  not  be  turf  enough  for  a  man  to 
wipe  his  feet  on." 

The  Free-soilers  believed  that  the  principle  of  the 
Wilmot  Proviso  was  a  deep  immovable  sentiment  fixed 
in  the  hearts  of  the  Northern  people,  who  expected 
their  representatives  to  speak  out  on  all  proper  occa 
sions,  and  that  the  sole  policy  of  the  old  parties  was  to 
dodge  this  question  and  to  shirk  responsibility.  The 
Free-soilers  were  determined  that,  if  they  could  pre 
vent  it,  there  should  be  no  dodging,  but  that  the  men 
from  the  North  in  the  old  parties  should  go  upon 
record  on  this  "  most  absorbing  and  exciting  question 
of  public  policy  that  was  then  overriding  all  others." 
When  it  was  proposed  to  elect  the  Speaker  by  ballot,  or 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  89 

to  deprive  him  of  the  power  to  appoint  the  committees, 
Root  denounced  both  processes.  One  plan,  he  said, 
would  enable  men  to  skulk  under  the  secret  ballot; 
while,  under  the  other,  the  House  would  find  it  as  hard 
to  name  the  committees  as  to  name  the  Speaker,  and 
in  the  attempt,  the  same  old  question  would  arise,  and 
the  same  terrible  "  demon  of  discord  would  have  its 
horns  up."  It  would  not  answer  for  a  good  dodge.  If 
it  were  mtended  to  open  a  hole  for  tender- footed  Free- 
soil  Democrats  to  escape  by,  it  would  not  answer  the 
purpose.  They  could  not  get  out  of  it.  No;  they 
must  face  the  music, —  God  help  them!  If  the  gen 
tlemen  got  through  such  a  loophole  they  would  find 
worse  troubles  beyond.  There  must  be  marching 
boldly  up  and  taking  the  bull  by  the  horns." 

Root  denied  that  it  was  the  fault  of  the  "  impracti 
cable  Free-soilers  "  that  the  House  had  not  been  or 
ganized.  If  the  majority  wished  to  carry  out  the 
policy  of  Southern  gentlemen  and  put  a  gag  upon  a 
sentiment  that  was  firmly  established  in  the  North,  let 
them  do  it;  they  have  the  votes.  But  they  should  do 
it  boldly,  openly,  manfully;  there  should  be  no  loop 
holes.  He  did  not  quarrel  with  Southern  men  for 
speaking  out  and  acting  upon  their  honest  convictions, 
a  right  which  the  Free-soilers  claimed  for  themselves. 
"But  I  would  to  God,"  said  Root,  "that  Northern 
men  representing  Northern  constituencies  would  stand 
up  with  the  same  manliness  in  defense  of  their  rights  as 
Southern  representatives  do  and  always  have  done 
since  I  have  been  a  member  of  this  House.  Let  North 
ern  men  meet  this  question  boldly  and  not  try  to 
dodge.  Let  them  represent  the  will  of  their  constitu- 


90   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ents,  if  they  can  conscientiously;  if  not,  let  them  back 
out  and  leave  the  people  free  to  send  other  representa 
tives  here  who  will  fairly  represent  their  views  and 
feelings  on  this  subject."  * 

Finally,  on  December  22nd,  after  three  weeks  of 
wrangling,  a  resolution  was  passed  declaring  that  a 
plurality  vote  should  elect  a  Speaker,  and  Mr.  Howell 
Cobb,  of  Georgia,  a  pro-slavery  Democrat,  was  chosen 
to  the  position.  During  the  days  of  balloting,  as 
many  as  twenty- four  members  of  the  House  voted  for 
Stevens  for  Speaker,  among  them  being  a  number  of 
Free-soilers,  including  Giddings,  Root  and  Horace 
Mann.  Giddings  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Free- 
soilers  were  ready  to  accept  Stevens  on  the  strength 
of  his  known  opinions  and  record  on  the  subject  of 
slavery.  Stevens  was  not  a  Free-soiler;  that  is,  he 
had  not  left  the  Whig  party  to  join  a  new  one,  to 
act  in  politics  primarily  with  reference  to  the  slavery 
issue;  and  in  the  struggle  over  the  speakership  he 
supported  the  caucus  action  of  his  party  and  voted  for 
IWinthrop.  But  he  had  strong  anti-slavery  convic 
tions  ;  he  believed  in  the  principle  and  policy  for  which 
the  Free-soilers  were  standing;  and  he  was  the  kind 
of  a  Northern  representative  that  Root  had  prayed 
for, —  he  would  stand  up  boldly  and  declare  his  con 
victions  about  slavery  extension;  he  was  not  disposed 
to  compromise,  nor  sneak  into  some  loophole  of 
escape  from  responsibility,  and  he  would  not  be  cowed 
by  Southern  threats  of  discord  and  disunion. 

Stevens  soon  found  opportunity  to  show  his  ag 
gressive  and  unyielding  spirit.  He  believed  that 
1  Globe,  Dec.  14,  1849,  pp.  32,  33. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  91: 

Northern  representatives  were  shrinking  too  timidly 
before  the  angry  menaces  and  threats  from  the  South. 
He  was  not  alarmed  by  these  threats  of  disunion, 
which,  as  it  appeared  to  him,  were  leading  many 
Northern  men  to  disavow  their  solemnly  declared 
opinions  and  to  prove  recreant  to  the  interest  of  the 
nation  by  withdrawing  opposition  to  the  spread  of 
slavery.  That  the  Union-saving  propensities  of  the 
Northern  Whigs  were  leading  them  to  abandon  their 
former  anti-slavery  purposes  was  seen  in  the  fact  that 
Root's  resolution  prohibiting  slavery  in  the  newly  ac 
quired  territory  was,  on  February  4,  1850,  laid  on  the 
table  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  and  five  to  seventy-five. 
Five  weeks  before  this  motion  had  been  rejected,  and 
it  appeared  that  a  majority  were  going  to  stand  out 
stoutly  against  slavery  extension.  But  now  thirty 
Northern  members,  eighteen  Democrats  and  fourteen 
Whigs,  voted  against  the  principle  of  the  Wilmot  Pro 
viso  and  Congress  refused  to  promote  the  policy  of 
keeping  slavery  from  the  territories. 

To  Stevens  this  seemed  like  yielding  to  Southern  dic 
tation  and  like  an  unworthy  surrender  of  anti-slavery 
convictions.  On  February  29th,  while  the  House  was 
in  the  committee  of  the  whole  on  the  state  of  the 
Union,  he  obtained  the  floor  and  spoke  for  an  hour 
on  the  slavery  question.  He  assumed  an  attitude  like 
that  of  a  bold  and  honest  Southerner,  as  defiant  as 
Toombs, —  quite  different  from  what  Southern  gen 
tlemen  were  used  to  in  their  Northern  colleagues. 
They  were  accustomed  to  pleas  for  peace,  and  to 
honeyed  speeches  about  the  Union  and  the  glorious 
sacrifices  of  the  sisterhood  of  states  in  the  Revolution. 


92      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Stevens  showed  them  another  tone,  a  tone  that  was 
quite  different  from  that  of  the  "  doughfaces  "  from 
the  North  that  the  advocates  of  slavery  were  used  to 
dealing  with,  and  it  was,  perhaps,  a  tone  that  the  fiery 
•  spirits  from  the  South  stood  in  need  of. 

Stevens'  apology  for  speaking  and  consuming  the 
time  of  the  House  in  a  general  discussion,  was  that 
he  saw  no  prospect  of  any  practical  legislation;  the 
time,  as  he  thought,  was  being  occupied  by  speeches  on 
the  subject  of  slavery,  mostly  by  Southern  men  with 
a  well-defined  object,  partly  to  intimidate  Congress, 
partly  to  kill  time,  so  that  no  legislation  could  be  ma 
tured  obnoxious  to  Southern  gentlemen.  Indeed,  on 
that  point  the  House  was  not  left  to  conjecture,  since 
Mr.  Clingman,  of  North  Carolina,  who  had  "  been 
selected  to  open  the  debate  in  behalf  of  human  bond 
age,  distinctly  notified  us  that  unless  Congress  sub 
mitted  to  settle  the  slavery  question  according  to 
Southern  demands,  there  should  be  no  legislation,  even 
to  the  passage  of  the  appropriation  bills  necessary  to 
sustain  the  government."  Stevens  denounced  this  pur 
pose  as  a  well-defined  and  palpable  conspiracy  of 
Southern  members  to  stop  the  supplies  and  disorganize 
and  dissolve  the  government, —  if  any  anti-slavery 
legislation  were  attempted.  "  We  can  say  anything 
within  these  walls  or  beyond  them  with  impunity, 
unless  it  be  to  agitate  in  favor  of  human  liberty  — 
that  is  aggression!" 

What  was  the  grave  offense  that  was  held  to  justify 
the  threat  of  disunion  ?  The  refusal  to  extend  an  evil, 
an  unmitigated  wrong, —  the  apprehension  that  the 
Congress  of  this  free  republic  would  not  propagate, 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  93 

nor  permit  to  be  propagated,  the  institution  of  human 
slavery  into  her  vast  territories  now  free.  This  thing 
sought  to  be  forced  upon  the  territories  at  the  risk  of 
treason  and  rebellion,  Stevens  described  as  "  a  gigantic 
evil  that  ought  to  be  interdicted  and  opposed  by  states 
men,  philanthropists  and  moralists,"  notwithstanding 
the  bold  position  taken  by  the  gentlemen  from  the 
South. 

While  thus  announcing  his  unchangeable  hostility  to 
slavery  in  every  form  and  in  every  place,  Stevens 
avowed  his  determination  to  stand  by  all  the  compro 
mises  of  the  Constitution  and  carry  them  into  effect. 
Some  of  these  compromises  he  very  much  disliked,  but 
they  were  in  the  Constitution  and  he  would  not  disturb 
them.  Under  these  compromises  he  recognized,  with  , 
regret,  that  Congress  had  no  power  over  slavery  in 
the  states.  But  wherever  that  institution  was  within 
the  control  of  Congress  he  would  go,  regardless  of  all 
threats,  for  its  certain  and  final  extinction. 

"  I  know  of  no  one  who  claims  the  right,  or  desires 
to  touch  it  within  the  states.  But  when  we  come  to 
form  governments  for  territories  acquired  long  since 
the  formation  of  the  Constitution,  and  to  admit  new 
states  whose  only  claim  for  admission  depends  on  the 
will  of  Congress,  we  are  bound  to  discharge  that  duty 
as  shall  best  contribute  to  the  prosperity,  the  power, 
the  permanency  and  the  glory  of  the  nation." 

Stevens  then  brought  into  review  the  merits  of 
slavery,  to  determine  whether  in  any  respect  it  tended 
to  contribute  to  the  national  welfare.  He  first  de 
nounced  the  system  of  slave  labor  from  an  economic 
point  of  view.  Slavery  absorbed  the  land  for  the 


94      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

few,  preventing  its  being  settled  by  freemen.  Its  la 
borers,  "  having  no  ambition  to  gratify,  no  love  of 
gain  to  stimulate  them,  no  parental  feelings  to  impel 
them  to  action,  are  idle  and  wasteful.  When  the  lash 
is  the  only  stimulant,  the  spirit  of  man  revolts  from 
labor.  Despotism  may  be  powerful  and  long  sustained 
by  a  mixed  population  of  serfs  and  nobles;  but  free 
representative  republics  that  rely  upon  the  voluntary 
action  of  the  people  never  can.  Under  such  govern 
ments  those  who  defend  and  support  the  country  must 
have  a  stake  in  the  soil ;  must  have  interests  to  protect 
and  rights  to  defend.  Slave  countries  can  never  have 
such  a  yeomanry. 

"  There  is  no  sound  connecting  link  between  the 
aristocrat  and  the  slave.  True,  there  is  a  class  of 
human  beings  between  them;  but  they  are  the  most 
worthless  and  miserable  of  mankind'.  The  poor  white 
laborer  is  the  scorn  of  the  slave  himself.  For  slavery 
always  degrades  labor.  The  white  people  who  work 
with  their  hands  are  ranked  with  the  other  laborers, — 
the  slaves.  They  feel  that  they  are  degraded  and 
despised  and  their  minds  and  conduct  generally  con 
form  to  their  condition." 

Slavery,  besides  degrading  the  laboring  population, 
tends  to  exhaust  and  waste  the  land.  Sloth,  negli 
gence,  improvidence  are  its  consequences.  Stevens 
proceeded  to  compare  Virginia  very  unfavorably  with 
her  sister  states  in  the  North.  The  richest,  most 
populous,  most  powerful  state  at  the  time  of  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  what  is  Virginia  now? 
With  a  climate  and  natural  resources  unsurpassed, 
Virginia  has  fallen  behind.  Now  New  York  will 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  95 

treble  her  in  population.  While  towns  and  thriving" 
cities  are  springing  up  in  the  North,  in  Virginia  there 
is  scarcely  a  new  town  within  her  borders,  and  "  her 
ancient  villages  wear  the  appearance  of  mournful  decay. 
Her  minerals  and  timber  are  unwrought.  Her  noble 
water  power  is  but  partially  occupied.  Her  fine  har 
bors  are  without  ships,  except  from  other  ports;  and 
her  seaport  towns  are  without  commerce  and  falling 
into  decay.  Ask  yourself  the  cause,  sir,  and  I  will 
abide  the  answer." 

Slavery  prevents  the  diffusion  of  education.  Under 
that  system  education  is  a  privilege  only  for  the  rich. 
"The  poor  white  laborer's  children  could  never  be 
permitted  to  mingle  in  the  same  schools  and  sit  upon 
the  same  benches  with  the  rich  men's  sons.  That 
would  be  offensive." 

In  referring  to  the  "  blood  and  treasure  and  gallantry 
of  the  South,"  of  which  much  had  been  said,  Stevens 
admitted  that  the  South  had  furnished  "  most  of  the 
men  who  have  borne  the  official  burdens  of  the  govern 
ment  both  in  the  civil  and  the  military  list."  "  The 
South  has  always  furnished  officers  for  our  armies; 
Presidents  for  the  republic;  most  of  our  foreign  am 
bassadors;  heads  of  departments;  chiefs  of  bureaus; 
and,  sometimes,  in  her  proud  humility,  has  consented 
that  the  younger  sons  of  her  dilapidated  houses  should 
monopolize  the  places  of  clerks  and  messengers  to  the 
government.  But  whence  are  drawn  the  common 
soldiery,  the  men  who  peril  their  lives  and  win  victories 
for  your  glory  ?  Almost  entirely  from  the  Free  States. 
.  .  .  Our  Northern  freemen  have  always  filled  the 
ranks  of  the  regular  army.  The  South  has  lent  us 


96   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  gentlemen  to  wear  the  epaulettes  and  the  sword ;  to 
take  command  of  our  troops  and  lead  them  to  southern 
and  western  climates  to  fight  the  frontier  battles  and 
whiten  your  fields  with  their  bones." 

Stevens  opposed  the  diffusion  of  slavery  because 
confining  it  "  within  its  present  limits  would  bring 
the  states  themselves  to  its  gradual  abolition." 
"  Let  the  disease  spread,  and  although  it  will  render 
the  whole  body  leprous  and  loathsome,  yet  it  will  long 
survive.  Confine  it,  and  like  the  cancer  that  is  tending 
to  the  heart,  it  must  be  eradicated  or  it  will  eat  out 
the  vitals." 

This  result,  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery,  which 
according  to  the  admission  of  Southern  men  them 
selves  would  follow  its  restriction,  was  to  Stevens' 
mind  the  most  agreeable  consequence  of  that  policy. 
"  Confine  this  malady  within  its  present  limits.  Sur 
round  it  by  a  cordon  of  freemen  that  it  can  not  spread, 
and  in  less  than  twenty-five  years  every  slaveholding 
state  in  this  Union  will  have  on  its  statute  books  a 
law  for  the  gradual  and  final  extinction  of  slavery. 
Then  will  have  been  consummated  the  fondest  wishes 
of  every  patriot's  heart.  Then  will  our  fair  country 
be  glorious  indeed,  and  be  to  posterity  a  bright  example 
of  the  true  principles  of  government  —  of  universal 
freedom." 

Referring  to  the  claim  set  forth  by  Meade,  of  Vir 
ginia,  that  the  value  of  Virginia's  half  million  of 
slave  population  was  chiefly  dependent  on  Southern 
demand,  Stevens  asked  what  meaning  attached  to  such 
a  humiliating  confession.  "  In  plain  English,  what 
does  it  mean?  That  Virginia  is  now  only  fit  to  be 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  97 

the  breeder,  not  the  employer  of  slaves.  That  she 
is  reduced  to  the  condition  that  her  proud  chivalry 
are  compelled  to  turn  slave-traders  for  a  livelihood! 
Instead  of  attempting  to  renovate  the  soil,  and  by 
their  own  honest  labor  compelling  the  earth  to  yield 
her  abundance;  instead  of  seeking  for  the  best  breed 
of  cattle  and  horses  to  feed  on  her  hills  and  valleys 
and  fertilize  the  land,  the  sons  of  that  great  state 
must  devote  their  time  to  selecting  and  grooming  the 
most  lusty  sires  and  the  most  fruitful  wenches  to 
supply  the  slave  barracoons  of  the  South!  And  the 
gentleman  pathetically  laments  that  the  profits  of  this 
genteel  traffic  will  be  greatly  lessened  by  the  circum 
scription  of  slavery.  This  is  his  picture,  not  mine." 
He  denounced  the  government,  both  state  and  na 
tional,  as  a  despotism  to  the  extent  of  government's 
support  of  slavery.  That  government  is  despotic 
where  the  rulers  govern  subjects  by  their  own  mere 
will.  "  In  this  government  the  free  white  citizens 
are  the  rulers, —  the  sovereigns,  as  we  delight  to  call 
them.  All  others  are  subjects.  In  this  government 
the  subject  has  no  rights,  social,  political  or  personal. 
He  has  no  voice  in  the  laws  which  govern  him.  He 
can  hold  no  property.  His  very  wife  and  children 
are  not  his.  His  labor  is  another's.  He  and  all  that 
pertains  to  him  are  the  absolute  property  of  his  rulers. 
He  is  governed,  bought,  sold,  punished,  executed,  by 
laws  to  which  he  never  gave  his  assent,  and  by  rulers 
whom  he  never  chose.  He  is  not  a  serf  merely,  with 
half  the  rights  of  men,  like  the  subjects  of  despotic 
Russia;  but  a  naked  slave,  stripped  of  every  right 
which  God  and  nature  gave  him,  and  which  the  high 


98      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

spirit  of  our  revolution  declared  inalienable  —  which 
he  himself  could  not  surrender,  and  which  man  could 
not  take  from  him.  Is  he  not  then  the  subject  of 
despotic  sway? 

"But  we  are  told  that  it  is  none  of  our  business; 
that  Southern  slavery  is  a  matter  between  the  slave 
holder  and  his  own  conscience.  I  trust  it  may  be 
so  decided  by  impartial  history  and  the  unerring 
Judge;  that  wre  may  not  be  branded  with  that  great 
stigma  and  that  grievous  burden  may  not  weigh  upon 
our  souls.  But  could  we  hope  for  that  justification,  if 
now,  when  we  have  the  power  to  prevent  it,  we  should 
permit  this  evil  to  spread  over  thousands  of  square 
leagues  now  free  and  settle  upon  unborn  millions? 
Sir,  for  myself,  I  should  look  upon  any  Northern 
man,  enlightened  by  a  Northern  education,  who  would, 
directly  or  indirectly,  by  omission  or  commission,  by 
basely  voting  or  cowardly  skulking,  permit  it  to  spread 
over  one  rood  of  God's  free  earth,  as  a  traitor  to 
liberty  and  a  recreant  to  God !  " 

Stevens  again  quoted  Meade  to  the  effect  that  though 
the  South  had  been  "  in  a  numerical  minority  in  the 
Union  for  fifty  years  yet  during  the  greater  part  of 
that  period  we  have  managed  to  control  the  destinies 
of  the  Union."  Stevens  regarded  this  statement  as 
both  candid  and  true,  and  he  did  not  complain  of  it. 
"  But,"  he  said,  "  I  can  not  listen  to  the  recital  without 
feeling  the  burning  blush  on  my  countenance  that  the 
North,  with  her  overshadowing  millions  of  freemen, 
has,  for  half  a  century,  been  tame  and  servile  enough 
to  submit  to  this  arrogant  rule."  He  denounced  the 
arrogance,  the  insults,  and  insolent  threats  of  Southern 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  99 

men.  Congress  had  been  intimidated  and  the  North 
had  been  frightened  from  its  proper  course.  "  Dough 
faces  "  had  been  found  in  plenty  to  act  as  the  servile 
tools  of  the  slave-driver.  He  hoped  that  the  race  of 
the  "  doughface "  had  become  extinct.  They  were 
an  unmanly  unvirile  race;  the  old  ones  were  in  deep 
political  graves  and  it  was  hoped  that  they  had  left 
no  descendants.  "  For  them  I  am  sure  there  is  no 
resurrection,  for  they  were  soulless.  Now,  when  the 
whole  civilized  world  is  denouncing  slavery  as  a  curse, 
a  shame  and  a  crime,  I  trust  that  when  the  great  battle 
between  liberty  and  slavery  comes  to  be  fought  on  this 
floor,  there  will  none  be  found  hiding  among  the 
stuff,  no  fraudulent  concealments,  not  one  accursed 
Achan  in  this  whole  camp  of  the  Representatives  of 
freemen."  1 

Stevens  closed  his  speech  with  an  appeal  to  the  ac 
complished  gentleman  from  Alabama  (Reverend  Mr. 
Hilliard)  who  might,  he  said,  "  with  fervid  piety  and 
eloquence  more  thrilling  than  that  which  made  Felix 
tremble,  warn  his  illustrious  friend,  the  President,  of 
the  awful,  the  inexorable  doom — 'Accursed  is  the 
man-stealer '  " ;  and  he  asked  the  House  spokesman  of 
the  lowly  Nazarene  to  inquire  of  his  own  conscience, 
as  he  contemplated  "  the  thronging  thousands  travel 
ing  to  the  great  dread  tribunal,  summoned  to  give 
evidence  of  deeds  done  in  the  body,  who  was  most 
likely  to  meet  a  hearty  welcome  there, —  he  whose  cause 
was  advocated  by  the  supplicating  voices  of  thousands 
with  whom  he  had  dealt  justly  on  earth  and  made 
free  indeed,  or  he  whose  admission  should  be  with- 
1  Globe,  Feb.  20,  1850,  Append.  Vol.  22,  Part  I,  pp.  141-143. 


ioo     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

stood  by  myriads  of  crushed  and  lacerated  souls,  show 
ing  their  chains,  their  stripes  and  their  wounds  to 
their  Father  and  to  his  Father;  to  their  God  and  to 
his  Judge."  1 

As  was  to  be  expected,  this  speech  did  not  go  down 
very  well  with  Southern  members.  It  was  made  with 
a  purpose,  not  of  arousing,  but  of  opposing  the  fiery 
Southern  spirit,  by  setting  forth  something  of  the 
same  bold  and  fighting  temper  that  Southern  repre 
sentatives  had  been  manifesting.  Such  a  speech  was 
most  irritating  to  the  ardent  defenders  of  slavery.  A 
few  days  later  Millson,  of  Virginia,  reflected  this  irri 
tation.  He  took  special  umbrage  at  Stevens'  refer 
ence  to  the  "  degradation  of  Virginia,"  the  land  of 
Washington,  Jefferson,  Mason,  Marshall,  the  Ran 
dolphs  and  the  Lees.  He  referred  to  the  "  gross  and 
offensive  allusions,"  the  "  feeling  of  loathing  and  in 
dignation  "  excited  by  language  that  "  was  so  gross 
as  not  to  bear  repetition."  2 

Williams,  of  Tennessee,  said  that  the  gentleman 
from  Pennsylvania  had  "  grossly  slandered  the  South, 
forcing  the  conviction  that  he  had  at  some  period  of 
his  life  been  a  political  bankrupt;  that  he  was  here 
by  accident;  that  he  had  made  a  desperate,  reckless, 
daredevil  move  to  obtain  a  forward  position  in  Penn 
sylvania  on  a  popular  hobby."  3 

Stanton,  of  Kentucky,  resented  Stevens'  description 
of  the  free  white  population  of  the  South.  He  him 
self  had  sprung  from  that  class  so  wantonly  denounced. 

1  Globe,  Appen.,  Feb.  20,  1850,  pp.  141-143. 

2  Globe,  Feb.  21  and  26. 

3  Appendix,  Globe,  p.  292,  March  12,  1850. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  101 

He  pronounced  Stevens'  charges  as  "  base  unmiti 
gated  slanders,"  and  he  affirmed  that  the  free  laborers 
of  his  state  were  as  "  moral,  intelligent,  high-minded 
and  patriotic  a  class  of  men  as  could  be  found  in 
any  state  of  the  Union."  "If  the  gentleman  with 
his  dispostion  to  vilify  and  slander  persons  of  whom 
he  knows  nothing,  should  come  among  us  there  is  not 
a  respectable  negro  who  would  deem  him  a  fit  asso 
ciate.  Let  the  gentleman  look  at  the  poverty  of  the 
North  and  the  wretched  condition  of  the  free  laborers 
there."  1 

Stanly,  of  North  Carolina,  denounced  Stevens  for 
uttering  "  sentiments  clothed  in  language  that  a  South 
ern  gentleman  would  not  use  to  a  respectable  negro." 
He  referred  to  Stevens  as  an  old  "  Anti-Mason,"  from 
whom  ultraism  was  to  be  expected.  "  And  since  Anti- 
Masonry  will  no  longer  serve  for  a  hobby-horse,  the 
gentleman  must  preach  against  the  horrors  and  despot 
ism  of  slavery.  I  hope  his  next  speech  will  be  fit  to 
read  in  the  families  of  Pennsylvania  farmers,"  and  that 
"the  gentleman  will  find  some  other  Morgan  to 
frighten  the  grandmothers  and  children  of  Pennsyl 
vania  with.  I  ask  him  to  let  us  alone." 

It  is  doubtless  true  that  if  the  Southern  slave 
holders  had  been  "  let  alone "  in  their  purpose  and 
desire  to  retain  and  extend  human  slavery  there  would 
have  been  no  quarrel,  no  antagonism,  no  friction. 
But  if  any  one  attempted,  without  mincing  his  words, 
to  lay  bare  the  evils  of  slavery;  if  he  sought  boldly 
to  restrict  its  area  and  to  use  the  power  of  the  national 
government  to  weaken  and  restrain  it  and  to  put  it  in 

1  Globe,  March  11,  1850. 


THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  course  of  ultimate  extinction,  then  he  was  "  an 
enemy  to  the  South,"  he  was  "vilifying  the  Southern 
people,"  and  he  was  "  fomenting  dangerous  agitation, 
sectionalism  and  disunion."  In  the  bitter  hostility 
that  was  visited  upon  him  for  his  course  in  this  mat 
ter,  Stevens  was  no  exception.  Horace  Mann,  edu 
cator,  philanthropist,  and  friend  of  humanity,  shared 
with  Stevens  and  all  other  radical  anti-slavery  men, 
the  denunciation  of  Southern  representatives.  Mann 
had  asserted  that  the  term  "  Free-soiler,"  which  ap 
plied  to  him,  was  constantly  used  upon  the  floor  of 
Congress  as  "  a  term  of  ignominy  and  reproach." 
When  he  spoke  out  in  defense  of  the  cause  for  which 
the  Free-soiler  stood,  i.  e.,  the  exclusion  of  slavery 
from  the  territories,  and  the  purpose  "  to  stand  upon 
the  frontier  to  keep  the  sin  of  slavery  from  crossing 
its  borders,"  Mann  was  denounced  for  making  a  speech 
that  was  "  offensive  to  every  Southern  man  in  the 
house,  as  if  he  delighted  to  wound  Southern  feel 
ing  "  ;  he  was  represented  as  "  fanning  the  flames  of 
fanaticism  "  and  "  outraging  the  feeling  of  his  fellow- 
members,"  whose  speech  was  "  unworthy  of  being 
spoken  of  in  respectful  terms."  1 

Mann  had  drawn  a  forcible  picture  of  the  dark  and 
dread  conditions  under  civil  war  and  disunion  which, 
he  said,  rash  spirits  from  the  South  were  threatening. 
They  were  proposing  such  a  hazard,  not  that  they 
"  might  defend  the  rights  of  man  but  in  order  to 
subjugate  a  realm  to  slavery."  But  with  all  the  hor 
rors  of  disunion  and  civil  war  before  him  Mann  said 
he  would  accept  such  a  war  rather  than  an  extension  of 

1  Stanly,  of  North  Carolina,  March  6,  1850.    Append.,  p.  341. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  103. 

slavery, — "  better  anything  that  God  in  His  providence 
shall  send  than  an  extension  of  the  boundaries  of 
slavery."  * 

If  Mann,  gentle,  refined  and  scholarly,  who  uttered 
his  severe  truths  without  any  spirit  of  retaliation  or 
crimination,  could  be  so  denounced  for  his  noble  speech 
—  noble  both  in  its  content  and  its  purpose  —  how 
much  more  might  it  be  expected  that  Southern  wrath 
would  descend  upon  the  head  of  Stevens,  who  had  less 
regard  for  the  tender  feelings  of  his  opponents,  and 
who  had  no  scruple  against  fighting  a  foe  with  his 
own  words  and  weapons.  No  outspoken  opponent 
of  slavery  could  expect  to  escape  Southern  wrath. 
The  sum  total  of  anti-slavery  sinning  was  in  the  fail 
ure  to  keep  silence.  But  if  sharp  and  bitter  words, 
if  anger  and  indignation  and  hot-tempered  denuncia 
tion  were  to  be  a  part  of  the  legislative  warfare  upon 
which  the  slaveholders  had  entered,  they  were  to  find 
in  Stevens  an  opponent  who  was  also  past  master  in 
that  art.  He  was  more  than  a  match  for  any  of 
them  in  that  kind  of  fighting.  He  anticipated  exactly 
the  spirit  that  he  had  aroused.  It  is  not  improbable 
that  he  took  a  wee  bit  of  pleasure  in  irritating  the 
Southern  leaders  and  provoking  them  to  excessive 
speech.  And  when  they  exposed  themselves  by  de 
fending  a  social  system  so  indefensible  as  was  Amer 
ican  slavery,  they  gave  him  the  cue  for  his  stinging 
shafts.  He  was  unmoved  by  their  angry  denuncia 
tion.  At  any  rate,  he  did  not  propose  to  be  deterred 
from  expressing  on  the  floor  of  the  American  Con 
gress  and  in  the  face  of  slaveholders,  if  need  be,  his 

1  Globe,  Feb.  15,  1850,  Append.,  pp.  218-224. 


'104     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

abhorrence  of  slavery  and  his  belief  in  its  criminal- 
ity. 

Later  in  the  session,  on  June  10,  1850,  while  dis 
cussing  the  California  question,  he  improved  the  op 
portunity  again  to  discuss  the  evils  of  slavery,  and 
jthis   second   attack   was   even   fiercer   than  the  first 
(As  to  California  and  the  territories,  he  first  laid  down 
/  the  sound  constitutional  doctrine  —  a  doctrine  since 
/  affirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Insular  cases  — 
1  that  the  Constitution  does  not  of  itself  extend  over 
new  territory.     No  territorial  officer  holds  by  a  con 
stitutional  tenure.     No  law  of  the  United  States  was 
ever  supposed  to  be   extended  to  any  of  the  terri 
tories  by  mere  force  of  the  Constitution.     The  Fugi 
tive  Slave  Clause  does  not,  and  a  slave  escaping  to 
New  Mexico  or  California  would  be  instantly  free. 
A  special  act  of  Congress  would  be  necessary  to  make 
the  law  apply.     Such  was  Stevens'  argument. 

He  held  that  Congress  could  abolish  or  prevent 
slavery  in  the  territories,  but  could  establish  it  no 
where,  since  to  do  so  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  government  set  forth 
in  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  Whenever  those 
principles  are  not  altered  or  overruled  by  the  Consti 
tution  they  control  the  action  of  the  government. 

Then,  since  slavery  had  been  constantly  defended 
upon  the  floor  as  a  blessing  and  a  divine  institution, 
he  thought  it  proper  to  examine  again  into  its  char 
acter.  He  had  expected  to  be  assailed  by  the  de 
fenders  of  slavery  and,  now,  his  renewed  effort  would, 
of  course,  bring  down  upon  him  all  its  venom.  He 
found  consolation  in  the  career  of  John  Quincy 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  log 

Adams  who,  because  of  his  defending  human  rights 
and  denouncing  slavery  in  that  hall,  had  been  made 
the  object  of  the  bitterest  personal  abuse  in  the  House. 
"No  motives  were  too  foul  to  impute  to  him;  no 
crimes  too  atrocious  to  charge  upon  him."  Stevens 
disclaimed  the  vanity  of  expecting  "  to  be  touched  by 
any  of  the  rays  of  that  glory  which  will  forever  sur 
round  his  (Adams')  name  on  account  of  the  calumnies, 
the  insults,  and  the  persecutions,  which  he  endured  in 
this  high  and  holy  cause." 

Stevens  complained  that  the  attention  of  the  South 
ern  members  had  been  directed,  not  to  his  speech,  but 
to  him  personally.  No  one  had  attempted  to  deny 
his  facts  or  refute  his  arguments.  They  had  merely 
applied  personal  vituperation  and  the  filth  and  slime 
of  "  Billingsgate  ";  that  he  would  leave  to  fish-women 
and  to  their  coadjutors,  these  gentlemen  from  the 
South. 

Stevens  then  turned  his  attention  to  the  defense 
that  had  been  made  of  slavery,  that  it  was  a  blessing, 
moral,  political,  personal;  that  the  slaves  were  better 
off  than  the  laboring  freemen  in  the  North;  that,  in 
many  instances,  having  tried  freedom,  the  slaves  had 
voluntarily  returned  to  bondage.  "  Well,"  said  Ste 
vens,  "  if  this  be  so,  let  us  give  all  a  chance  to  enjoy 
this  blessing.  Let  the  slaves  who  choose,  go  free; 
and  the  free  who  choose,  become  slaves.  If  these 
gentlemen  believe  there  is  a  word  of  truth  in  what 
they  preach,  the  slaveholders  need  be  under  no  ap 
prehension  that  they  will  ever  lack  bondsmen.  Their 
slaves  would  remain  and  many  freemen  would  seek 
admission  to  this  happy  condition.  If  these  Southern 


io6      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

gentlemen  and  their  Northern  sycophants  are  sincere 
and  correct,  they  have  just  cause  of  complaint,  the 
only  aggression  the  North  has  ever  inflicted  upon  them, 
because  for  two  centuries  the  North  has  contributed 
to  secure  to  a  particular  race  the  whole  advantage  of 
this  blissful  condition  of  slavery,  imposing  on  the 
white  race  the  cares,  the  troubles,  the  lean  anxieties 
of  freedom.  This  inconsistent  monopoly  should  be 
corrected.  If  it  will  save  the  Union,  let  these  gen 
tlemen  introduce  a  '  compromise/  by  which  these 
races  may  change  conditions;  by  which  the  oppressed 
master  may  slide  into  that  happy  state  where  he  can 
stretch  his  sleek  limbs  on  the  sunny  ground  without 
fear  of  deranging  his  toilet,  and  with  no  care  for 
to-morrow,  when  another  will  be  bound  to  find  him 
meat  and  drink,  food  and  raiment,  and  provide  for 
the  infirmities  and  helplessness  of  old  age. 

"  A  few  short  years  of  apprenticeship  would  fit  the 
white  man  for  slavery.  True,  in  becoming  a  slave 
he  would  lose  half  the  man;  in  fact,  all  manhood 
might  be  expunged,  except  the  faint  glimmerings  of 
an  immortal  soul.  But  let  the  white  man  not  be 
discouraged.  He  may  attain  that  blissful  state  of 
slavery  if  he  will  go  courageously  to  the  swamp,  spade 
and  mattock  in  hand,  and  uncovered  and  half-naked, 
toil  beneath  the  broiling  sun.  If  he  will  go  to  his 
hut  at  night  and  sleep  on  the  bare  ground  and  go  forth 
in  the  morning  unwashed  to  his  daily  labor,  a  few 
short  years,  or  a  generation  or  two,  at  most,  will  give 
him  a  color  that  will  pass  muster  in  the  most  fastidious 
and  pious  slave  market  in  Christendom.  His  shape, 
through  parched  and  swollen  lips  and  with  his  feet 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  107 

unconfined  by  shoes,  will  also  gradually  conform  to 
his  condition ;  and  the  mind,  cut  off  from  all  ambitious 
aspirations,  will  soon  lose  all  foolish  and  perplexing 
desires  for  freedom,  and  the  whole  man  will  be  sunk 
into  slavery's  most  happy  and  contented  indifference." 
Stevens  vigorously  condemned  the  Southern  clergy 
men  who  were  using  their  talents  and  office  to  praise 
the  comforts  and  advantages  of  slavery.  He  would 
not  answer  their  "  absurd  and  blasphemous  position," 
but  this  he  would  say,  that  "  these  reverend  parasites 
do  more  to  make  infidels  than  all  the  writings  of 
Hume,  Voltaire  and  Paine.  If  it  were  once  shown 
that  the  Bible  authorized,  sanctioned,  and  enjoined 
slavery,  no  good  man  would  be  a  Christian.  It  con 
tains  no  such  horrible  doctrine.  But  if  it  did,  it 
would  be  conclusive  evidence,  to  my  mind,  that  it  is 
a  spurious  imposition,  and  not  the  word  of  the  God  who 
is  the  Father  of  all  men  and  no  respecter  of  persons. 
He  indeed  must  have  a  callous  heart  who  can  speak 
of  the  benevolence  of  slavery."  Comparing  slavery  to 
Dante's  Inferno,  where  those  in  the  innermost  circle, 
Lucifer  and  Judas  Iscariot,  suffered  the  greatest  torture 
while  those  in  the  outer  circles  suffered  less,  he  hoped 
that  in  the  next  edition  there  would  be  added  another 
inner  circle  for  the  Traitors  to  Liberty;  and  he  main 
tained  that,  notwithstanding  the  difference  in  degrees 
of  suffering  in  slavery,  the  whole  system  was  one 
cruel,  desolate,  horrible  hell.  "  These  reverend  per- 
verters  of  scripture  might  devote  their  subtlety  to 
locating  the  exact  spot  where  the  most  comfort  might 
be  enjoyed, —  the  coolest  corner  in  the  lake  that  burns 
with  fire  and  brimstone." 


io8      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

He  resented  the  charge  of  fanaticism.  "  There  can 
be  no  fanatics  in  the  cause  of  genuine  liberty.  Fanati 
cism  is  excessive  zeal.  There  may  be  fanatics  in  false 
religion,  in  superstition.  But  there  can  be  no  fanati 
cism,  however  high  the  enthusiasm,  however  warm  the 
zeal,  in  true  religion,  or  in  the  cause  of  national,  uni 
versal  liberty." 

He  noticed  the  claim  that  those  who  were  preaching 
freedom  were  the  slaves'  worst  enemies,  that  they  were 
merely  causing  their  burdens  to  be  made  heavier.  It 
had  been  so  with  tyrants  in  every  age.  Moses  and 
Aaron,  those  "  fanatical  abolitionists,"  when  they  agi 
tated  "  for  freedom  in  Egypt,"  found  it  so.  "  The 
nearer  the  oppressed  is  to  freedom,  the  more  hopeful 
the  struggle,  the  more  friends  that  are  raised  up  for 
him,  the  tighter  the  master  rivets  his  chains.  Pha 
raoh  had  hardened  his  heart.  But  did  the  Lord  regard 
Moses  as  the  worst  enemy  of  those  in  bondage  and 
command  him  to  desist?  No,  he  was  commanded  to 
agitate  again;  and  the  plagues  came,  though  the  great 
slaveholder  did  not  relax  his  grasp  on  his  victims 
until  there  was  wailing  throughout  the  land  over  the 
first  born  slain  in  every  household."  So,  he  feared, 
it  would  be  in  this  land  of  wicked  slavery.  He  warned 
the  Southern  people  to  write  Justice  on  their  door 
posts,  "  that  when  the  destroying  Angel  goes  forth,  as 
go  forth  he  will,  he  may  pass  you  by." 

He  would  never  consent  to  the  admission  of  another 
Slave  State,  nor  to  the  increase  of  slave  representation. 
He  considered  it  an  outrage  on  every  representative 
principle  that  there  should  be  "  twenty-five  representa- 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  109 

tives  in  Congress  who  were  virtually  the  representa 
tives  of  slaves  alone." 

He  expressed  his  abhorrence  of  the  word  "  compro 
mise  "  when  applied  to  human  rights.  It  was  known 
that  when  Congress  assembled,  a  large  majority  were 
in  favor  of  prohibiting  slavery  from  the  territories 
and  against  admitting  new  Slave  States.  But  terror, 
treason,  and  threats  had  been  used  to  compel  that 
majority  to  yield  to  a  turbulent  minority.  He  referred 
to  the  compromise  bill  as  a  "  monster,"  and  he  looked 
for  an  opportunity  of  "  knocking  it  in  the  head."  He 
denounced  the  "  ten  million  bribe  to  Texas  "  and  the 
proposal  to  appropriate  two  hundred  millions  in  order 
to  exile,  by  colonization  in  Africa,  Virginia's  free 
black  population.  When  asked  if  New  England  had 
not  sold  and  imported  slaves,  he  replied  that  she  had; 
"she  was  very  wicked;  she  has  long  since  repented. 
Go,  ye,  and  do  likewise." 

Stevens  disclaimed  a  desire  to  make  personal  re 
proaches  and  all  ill-will  toward  any  human  being. 
"  Least  of  all  would  I  reproach  the  South.  I  honor 
her  courage  and  fidelity.  Even  in  a  bad,  a  wicked 
cause,  she  shows  a  united  front.  All  her  sons  are 
faithful  to  the  cause  of  human  bondage,  because  it  is 
their  cause.  But  the  North  —  the  poor,  timid,  mer 
cenary,  driveling  North  —  has  no  such  united  defenders 
of  her  cause,  although  it  is  the  cause  of  human  liberty. 
Even  her  own  great  men  have  turned  her  accusers.  She 
is  the  victim  of  low  ambition  - —  an  ambition  which  pre 
fers  self  to  country,  personal  aggrandizement  to  the 
high  cause  of  human  liberty." 


no      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Stevens  denounced  as  odious  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law  of  1793,  which,  he  said,  should  be  repealed.  He 
would  have  the  remedy  for  fleeing  slaves  left  where 
the  Constitution  left  it,  without  any  legislation  what 
ever.  He  adduced  harsh  and  abusive  court  judgments 
under  the  Act  of  1793,  whereby  worthy  citizens  of 
Pennsylvania  had  been  heavily  fined  "  for  no  greater 
offense  than  giving  a  cup  of  water  and  a  crust  of  bread 
to  a  famishing  man  whom  they  knew  to  be  fleeing 
from  bondage."  The  new  law  now  proposed,  in  1850, 
doubled  these  penalties  and,  what  was  more  obnoxious, 
it  recognized  slavery  in  the  territories.  He  denounced 
in  unsparing  terms  these  new  provisions  for  the  re 
covery  of  escaping  slaves.  A  black  man  .might  prove 
that  he  was  born  free  and  had  resided  in  a  Free  State 
all  his  life,  but  he  would  not  be  permitted  to  do  it; 
the  conclusive  evidence  in  the  case  was  to  be  the  record 
or  affidavit,  made  up,  it  might  be,  a  thousand  miles 
from  the  party  whose  safety  was  involved  in  it.  His 
"  learned  judges,  these  tide  waiters  and  country 
postmasters,  who  make  no  pretensions  to  legal  learn 
ing, —  are  compelled  not  to  judge,  but  to  decide  with 
out  judging,  that  the  affidavit  of  a  distant  soul-dealer 
is  evidence  of  slavery  which  can  not  be  gainsaid.  Be 
hold  what  a  court  and  jury  are  to  pass  on  human  lib 
erty!  An  overseer,  with  a  power  of  attorney;  the 
affidavit  of  a  professional  slave-trader;  an  itinerant 
postmaster  from  Virginia  signing  judgment  in  a  bar 
room;  the  defendant  a  handcuffed  negro,  without 
counsel,  witness,  or  judge!  Verily  a  second  Daniel 
has  come  to  judgment! 

"The  distinguished  Senator  from  Kentucky   (Mr. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  in 

Clay)  wishes  further  to  make  it  the  duty  of  all  by 
standers  to  aid  in  the  capture  of  fugitives;  to  join 
the  chase  and  run  down  the  party.  This  is  asking 
more  than  my  constituents  will  ever  grant.  They  will 
strictly  abide  by  the  Constitution.  The  slaveholder 
may  pursue  his  slave  among  them  with  his  own  for 
eign  myrmidons,  unmolested,  except  by  their  frowning 
scorn.  But  no  law  that  tyranny  can  pass  will  ever 
induce  them  to  join  the  hue  and  cry  after  the  trembling 
wretch  who  has  escaped  from  unjust  bondage.  Their 
fair  land  shall  never  become  the  hunting-ground 
on  which  the  bloodhounds  of  slavery  shall  course  their 
prey  and  command  them  to  join  the  hunt." 

Stevens  said  that  he  was  aware  of  the  temerity  of 
his  remarks,  of  how  little  effect  they  would  have,  com 
ing  from  "  so  obscure  a  quarter."  He  believed  the 
"  compromise  "  bill  was  winning  favor  with  the  people, 
most  of  whom  had  never  read  it,  because  it  was  ad 
vocated  by  great  names  in  whom  they  were  accustomed 
to  confide.  These  great  overshadowing  names  have  a 
fictitious  force  given  to  their  views  and  are  leading 
captive  the  public  mind,  and  the  people  are  not  left 
free  to  decide  these  questions  on  their  intrinsic  merits. 
Thus  it  is  that  the  errors  of  the  great  are  fatal,  while 
the  errors  of  the  small  may  do  but  little  harm.  '  The 
errors  of  obscure  men  die  with  them  and  cast  no  shame 
on  their  posterity.  How  different  with  the  great! 

"  In  this  crisis  of  the  fate  of  liberty,  if  any  of  the 
renowned  men  of  this  nation  should  betray  her  cause, 
it  were  better  that  they  had  been  unknown  to  fame. 
It  need  not  be  hoped  that  the  brightness  of  their  past 
glory  will  dazzle  the  eyes  of  posterity,  or  illumine  the 


ii2      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

pages  of  impartial  history.  A  few  of  its  rays  may 
still  linger  on  a  fading  sky;  but  they  will  soon  be  over 
whelmed  in  the  blackness  of  darkness.  For,  unless 
progressive  civilization  and  the  increasing  love  of  free 
dom  throughout  the  Christian  and  civilized  world  are 
fallacious,  the  Sun  of  Liberty,  of  universal  liberty,  is 
already  above  the  horizon,  and  fast  coursing  to  his 
meridian  splendor,  when  no  apologist  of  slavery  can 
look  upon  his  face  and  live."  1 

These  speeches  show  Stevens'  deep-seated  and  in 
tense  hatred  of  slavery.  His  attitude  was  uncom 
promising,  his  speech  unsparing.  His  policy  was  to 
bring  not  peace  but  the  sword.  For  the  spirit  of 
strife  and  turbulence  that  existed  he  believed  that 
slavery  and  its  defenders  were  responsible,  and  that  the 
extension  of  slavery,  which  the  Southern  leaders  an 
nounced  themselves  to  be  ready  to  stand  for  at  the 
hazard  of  disunion,  should  be  firmly  resisted  with 
the  same  spirit  of  hazard;  and  he  was  firmly  of  the 
conviction  that  slave  extension  could  not  be  pre 
vented  by  the  soft  words  that  turneth  away  wrath.  He 
had  no  desire  to  maintain  peace  with  slavery.  Slavery 
extension  and  the  national  welfare  were  at  war,  and  if 
the  slave  system  asserted  its  right  to  the  national  do 
main,  Stevens  would  prosecute  war  against  that  claim 
with  all  the  force  he  could  command.  He  would  let 
the  Northern  doughfaces  prate  about  "  the  dove-like 

1  Globe,  June  10,  1850,  Append.,  pp.  765-769.  Stevens  ap 
pended  a  foot-note  to  this  speech,  in  which  he  criticized  the 
Reverend  Moses  Stuart,  professor  in  the  Andover  Theological 
Seminary,  for  his  defense  of  the  "  blessings  and  comforts "  of 
slavery,  in  a  work  that  "  contains,"  as  Stevens  said,  "  a  very 
glowing  eulogy  on  the  Honorable  Daniel  Webster  and  rather  a 
faint  one  on  the  Bible." 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS          '113 

messengers  that  will  bring  peace,  happiness  and  pros 
perity  to  our  devoted  and  glorious  confederacy."  As 
for  himself  he  would  not  yield  to  the  pro-slavery  de 
mands  in  the  vain  hope  of  thereby  securing  peace. 
Although  the  great  leaders  of  his  Whig  party,  Clay 
and  Webster,  sought  peace  at  the  expense  of  allaying 
all  opposition  to  slavery,  he  would  not  follow  them. 

It  was  Clay,  especially,  who  undertook,  as  his  cus 
tom  was,  the  office  of  the  peacemaker.  The  primary 
object  of  Clay's  political  career  was  to  promote  and 
preserve  the  American  Union.  He  did  not  share 
Stevens'  convictions  and  feelings  about  the  evils  of 
slavery.  He  had  a  keener  appreciation  of  the  danger 
to  the  Union,  and  to  him  the  first  duty  of  the  hour  was 
to  remove  that  danger.  Clay,  perhaps,  knew  better 
than  Stevens  the  purpose  and  temper  of  the  pro-slavery 
leaders,  and  therefore  he  was  ready  to  make  conces 
sions  for  the  sake  of  peace  and  conciliation.  In  his 
"  compromises  "  he  proposed  a  series  of  measures  cov 
ering  the  whole  field  in  dispute, —  the  admission  of 
California  as  a  Free  State;  a  more  effective  fugitive 
slave  law;  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade,  though  not 
of  slavery,  in  the  District  of  Columbia;  the  organiza 
tion  of  territorial  governments  in  New  Mexico  and 
Utah  without  the  Wilmot  Proviso;  immunity  for  the 
interstate  slave  trade;  and  a  payment  to  Texas  of 
$10,000,000  for  her  claim  to  New  Mexico.  This  com 
bination  of  measures  made  concessions  to  both  sides ; 
it  also  aroused  opposition  from  both  sides.  As  a  com 
bination  in  what  was  called  the  "  omnibus  bill  "  the 
measures  were  defeated,  but  separated  into  five  distinct 
bills  they  went  through  Congress  one  by  one.  Stevens 


ii4      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

voted  to  the  last  against  organizing  the  territories  with 
out  the  Wilmot  Proviso  and  against  the  new  fugitive 
slave  law.  The  compromisers  joined  with  the  anti- 
slavery  men  to  pass  the  anti-slavery  features  of  Clay's 
proposals,  and  they  joined  the  pro-slavery  men  to  pass 
the  pro-slavery  features,  and  thus,  all  five  of  Clay's 
measures  were  passed  and  the  "  five  gaping  wounds  " 
from  which  the  country  was  suffering  were  healed  for  a 
time. 

Stevens  was  reelected  to  Congress  in  1850.  Again, 
when  the  House  was  being  organized  in  the  Thirty- 
second  Congress,  he  received  support  for  the  speaker- 
ship,  among  the  sixteen  voting  for  him  being  Joshua 
R.  Giddings  and  Horace  Mann.  The  compromise 
measures  were  looked  upon  as  being  a  "  finality " ; 
there  was  to  be  no  more  legislation  or  agitation  on  the 
subject  of  slavery.  There  was  a  cessation  of  hostili 
ties  on  that  subject  during  most  of  the  Thirty-second 
Congress,  and  Stevens  had  but  little  occasion  to  speak 
on  the  vexed  question. 

On  June  n,  1852,  he  made  an  extended  speech  on 
the  "  Public  Lands  and  the  Tariff,"—  chiefly  on  the 
tariff.  Stevens  was  a  consistent  and  constant  pro 
tectionist,  a  true  Pennsylvanian  in  this  regard,  and 
his  speech  set  forth,  with  his  decisive  effectiveness, 
the  usual  protectionist  arguments.  He  asserted  that 
the  doctrine  of  free  trade  had  never  been  reduced  to 
practise  except  among  barbarian  tribes;  that  every 
highly  cultivated  nation  has  made  the  protection  of 
domestic  industry  the  special  care  of  government;  that 
twenty  centuries  of  history  had  shown  this  to  be  the 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  115 

wise  policy  of  nations, —  the  protection  of  domestic  in 
dustries  by  discriminating  duties. 

Stevens  illustrated  his  protective  contention  by  ex 
amples  in  history, —  of  Tyre,  Holland,  and  Great 
Britain.  England,  when  Holland  had  an  immense 
start  in  capital  and  skill,  could  not  afford  to  apply  the 
free  trade  doctrine.  That  doctrine  would  have  exactly 
suited  Holland ;  that  would  have  left  her  forever  with 
out  a  rival.  For  the  nation  which  is  far  above  all 
others  in  knowledge  and  means,  that  system  which  will 
keep  other  nations  from  starting  at  all  is  the  true  one. 
Just  so  surely  it  is  the  wrong  one  for  those  who  are 
behind.  "  The  statesmen  of  England  were  deluded  by 
no  such  folly  as  free  trade.  They  excluded  the 
manufactures  of  other  nations  and  gave  the  home 
market  exclusively  to  their  own  artisans,  so  as  to  in 
duce  them  to  invest  their  time,  capital  and  talents  in 
the  creation  of  domestic  fabrics.  She  admitted  free  the 
raw  material  which  she  could  not  produce,  prohibited 
the  importation  of  many  articles,  and  laid  heavy  dis 
criminating  duties  on  others."  He  cited  the  highly 
protective  features  of  the  English  Navigation  Acts. 
Her  manufactures  and  commercial  marine  have  in 
creased  until  she  has  become  "  the  most  manufacturing, 
commercial,  rich,  and  powerful  nation  the  world  ever 
saw."  ,  This  position  she  acquired  through  protection, 
—  and  now  she  is  preaching  free  trade  to  young  na 
tions  ! 

Stevens  denied  that  the  protective  tariff  was  for  the 
benefit  of  the  rich.  It  was  mainly  for  the  benefit  of 
the  laborer.  It  helped  capital  because  it  helped  labor, 


:n6     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

as  it  was  impossible  to  benefit  one  without  the  other. 
Labor  is  the  chief  factor  in  the  manufactured  product ; 
therefore  to  labor  comes  the  chief  benefit  of  protection. 

No  class  receives  greater  benefit  from  the  policy  of 
protection  than  the  farmers.  The  farmer's  wealth  is 
in  his  surplus  products,  whose  value  depends  upon  a 
ready,  handy,  constant  market.  The  nearer  to  his 
farm  you  bring  that  market,  the  better  for  him.  If 
his  products  are  sold  in  a  foreign  market  he  must  de 
duct  from  his  profits  the  cost  of  freight.  To  create 
that  market  at  home  it  is  necessary  to  build  up  manu 
facturing  villages,  towns  and  cities  in  your  own  land. 
Your  consumers  are  now  three  thousand  miles  distant. 
[We  should  build  flourishing  cities, —  Birminghams, 
Sheffields  and  Glasgows, —  within  our  own  borders, 
on  the  Great  Lakes  and  on  the  waters  that  feed  the 
Mississippi.  If  the  whole  West  were  to  be  given  up 
to  agriculture,  and  its  produce  were  to  go  to  the  Atlan 
tic  cities  for  a  market,  the  effect  would  be  to  depress 
and  destroy  the  farming  interests  of  the  Middle  and 
Eastern  States,  and  reduce  real  estate  to  half  its  value. 

Stevens  charged  upon  the  Democratic  party  that  un 
der  its  lead  and  administration,  British  interests  were 
being  protected  to  the  detriment  of  American  inter 
ests.  He  asserted  that  the  Walker  tariff  of  1846  was 
a  British  tariff;  that  during  its  progress  there  ^was  a 
British  agent  here,  with  rooms  assigned  at  the  capital, 
to  watch  over  its  progress  and  facilitate  its  advent ;  and 
now,  Her  Majesty  has  in  this  country  vigilant  friends 
guarding  its  safety.  Under  the  operation  of  this 
British  tariff  the  iron  masters  of  the  United  States 
are  not  only  doing  a  losing  business,  but  utter  and 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  117 

inevitable  ruin  stares  them  in  the  face  without  speedy 
relief  from  Congress. 

There  are  two  ways,  his  argument  continued,  by 
which  our  manufacturers  may  compete  with  those  of 
Europe.  The  one  is  to  lay  a  duty  on  foreign  im 
portations  equal  to  the  difference  between  the  cost 
of  producing  the  article  in  Europe  and  the  cost  of  pro 
ducing  it  here.  The  other  is  to  reduce  the  price  of 
labor  in  America  to  the  average  price  of  labor  in 
Europe.  The  Whig  policy  was  to  impose  a  duty  equal 
to  the  difference  in  the  cost  of  labor  in  the  two  coun 
tries.  The  Democratic  policy  was  to  reduce  the  price 
paid  to  the  laborer.  He  described  the  poor  fare  and 
the  mean  living  of  the  laborer  abroad  where  women  in 
collieries  were  harnessed  to  cars  to  draw  their  heavy 
loads.  There,  the  laborers  can  only  grow  up  in  igno 
rance,  and  remain  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of 
water.  Those  who  wish  to  degrade  labor  will  pursue 
this  Democratic  policy;  for  his  part,  he  preferred  the 
protective  policy  which  gives  to  laborers  the  dignity 
and  feelings  of  independent  freemen.  England's  re 
peal  of  her  corn  laws  only  gave  additional  protection 
to  her  manufacturers,  as  it  enabled  them  to  feed  their 
laboring  population  cheaper,  and  thus  they  could  re 
duce  the  price  of  her  goods.  He  urged  the  West  to 
stand  for  protection,  make  her  own  goods,  build  up  a 
market  for  agricultural  products  close  at  hand  and  be 
come  independent  of  New  England  and  Pennsylvania. 

It  will  be  seen  that  these  familiar  arguments,  which 
Stevens  set  forth  with  so  much  force,  had  an  appli 
cation  to  the  tariff  controversy  in  the  generation 
that  followed,  as  well  as  in  that  which  preceded,  the 


n8     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

time  in  which  Stevens  spoke.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  any  of  the  advocates  of  protection  ever  pre 
sented  the  cause  with  greater  clearness  and  force. 

Later  in  the  session,  on  August  12,  1852,  while  the 
House  was  in  the  committee  of  the  whole  on  the  state 
of  the  Union  considering  an  army  appropriation  bill, 
—  and  while  the  members  were  taking  advantage  of 
the  opportunity  to  discuss  in  a  very  general  way,  with 
wide  latitude,  party  platforms,  presidential  candidates 
and  political  issues, —  Stevens  made  a  speech  on  the 
"  Presidential  Question." 

He  discussed  the  relation  of  the  Whig  party  to 
slavery,  and  in  doing  so,  he  could  not  restrain  himself 
from  making  his  usual  vigorous  assaults  upon  the  "  pe 
culiar  institution "  and  its  promoters.  He  defined 
Whig  principles  as  consisting  of  obedience  to  the  Con 
stitution  and  the  laws,  a  protective  tariff,  an  equal 
participation  in  the  public  lands,  river  and  harbor  im 
provements,  a  sound  currency,  and  a  well  regulated 
commerce.  In  all  other  things,  Stevens  said,  Whigs 
were  permitted  to  differ  without  forfeiting  allegiance 
to  their  party.  Being  a  national  party,  Whigs  were 
permitted  to  differ  upon  slavery.  That  question  was 
not  incorporated  into  any  party  creed.  Emancipa 
tionists  and  slaveholders  were  in  both  parties.  On  that 
subject  opinion  in  the  North  was  by  no  means  uniform. 
Some  "  who  were  naturally  inclined  to  domination 
sincerely  believed  that  a  portion  of  the  human  race 
were  created  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  be  the  serv 
ants  of  others ;  that  a  part  of  mortal  clay  was  of  finer 
texture  and  nobler  mold  than  the  rest.  This  class 
was  more  numerous  in  large  commercial  cities  where 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  119 

men  are  more  mercenary,  and  where  princely  fortunes 
beget  kingly  appetites."  To  avoid  making  this  a  party 
issue,  which  "  could  lead  to  nothing  but  mere  sectional 
strife  has  been  the  honest,  sincere  and  constant  aim 
of  all  that  portion  of  the  Whig  party  that  favored 
freedom."  Whether  this  effort  succeeds  depends  on 
the  ensuing  election.  Slavery,  being  local,  was  not  suf 
fered  to  disturb  national  parties,  for  it  was  impossible 
to  incorporate  into  a  uniform  creed  for  any  party  what 
three- fourths  of  the  people  abhorred  and  one- fourth 
loved.  But  now  that  slavery  has  grown  stronger  and 
its  advocates  have  determined  to  extend  its  boundaries 
and  change  the  whole  current  of  public  thought  and 
action  in  regard  to  it,  it  may  turn  out  that  a  combined 
South,  with  a  modicum  of  Northern  parasites,  may  be 
sufficient  to  bend  the  proudest  ambition  and  sternest 
will  of  our  statesmen.  It  has  been  tried  in  more  than 
one  campaign  for  the  presidency,  and  it  is  to  be  seen 
whether  the  national  will  can  be  bent  to  their  ends. 
That  was  the  reason  for  the  furor  and  clamor  raised 
in  this  hall  three  years  ago, —  as  if  the  republic  were 
in  flame.  It  was  all  factitious  and  unreal.  Not  for  a 
moment  was  the  Union  in  danger.  The  object  of  all 
the  disgraceful  turmoil  and  false  clamor,  of  all  the 
national  disturbance,  was  to  compel  both  parties  to  put 
into  their  party  creeds  a  defense  and  propagation  of 
slavery. 

Southern  gentlemen  are  announcing  that  the  subject 
of  slavery  is  to  be  paramount  to  all  others ;  all  questions 
of  commerce,  agriculture,  manufactures,  are  to  be  re 
jected  and  slavery  is  to  become  the  idol  of  our  political 
adoration. 


120     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

The  Whig  resolutions  of  '52  did  not,  in  Stevens' 
opinion,  contain  very  good  Whig  doctrine.  They  are 
very  faint  on  internal  improvements,  and  they  entirely 
fritter  away  and  reduce  to  the  standard  of  Loco  Foco 
folly  the  question  of  a  protective  tariff,  reducing  it 
to  a  mere  incidental,  or  accidental,  protection,  depend 
ing  entirely  upon  the  accident  of  the  amount  of  revenue 
required.  The  compromise  resolutions  are  creatures  of 
modern  birth,  not  the  legitimate  children  of  Whiggery. 

Stevens  arraigned  Toombs,  a  Southern  Whig,  for 
abandoning  all  the  ancient  Whig  doctrines  —  a  protec 
tive  tariff,  river  and  harbor  improvements,  and  an  equal 
participation  in  the  public  domain, —  and  for  mounting 
the  Democratic  platform  merely  because  it  is  ultra  for 
the  protection  of  slavery.  For  that  purpose  Toombs 
was  preferring  Pierce  to  Scott,  as  slavery  would  be 
safer  in  Pierce's  hands.  As  to  Pierce,  no  word  or  act 
of  his  life,  as  he  had  said  of  himself,  was  ever  in  con 
flict  with  the  pro-slavery  Democratic  platform  of  '52. 
If  ever  he  "  fell  into  the  path  of  rectitude  on  slavery,  it 
was  momentary  and  accidental  for  which  he  was  not 
to  be  held  responsible,  for  all  his  votes  and  acts  pro 
claim  him  the  champion  of  slavery." 

Pro-slavery  Whigs  were  objecting  to  Scott  because 
he  had  not  declared  that  he  would  interpose  his  execu 
tive  veto  to  prevent  the  repeal  of  certain  laws  that  were 
held  to  be  final  and  irrepealable.  They  demanded  that 
he  declare  his  intention  of  using  the  whole  power  and 
patronage  of  his  office  to  prevent  discussion  on  the 
subject  of  slavery.  Stevens  denounced  this  attitude 
as  a  demand  for  "  unmitigated  tyranny."  He  de 
nounced  the  attempt  to  enforce  the  doctrine  of  finality 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  121 

"  as  arbitrary  and  despotic."  It  was  in  harmony  with 
efforts  lately  made  to  paralyze  the  free  action  of  Con 
gress  and  to  overawe  and  intimidate  public  opinion. 
"  Whenever  any  executive  or  any  statesman  shall  com 
mand  the  people  not  to  think,  or  to  utter  their  thoughts, 
and  it  does  not  cost  him  his  political  life,  I  shall  tremble 
for  the  liberties  of  the  nation.  Whenever  a  political 
party  attempts  it,  it  deserves  to  die.  Whoever  attempts 
to  enforce  such  principles  is  a  detestable  tyrant.  Sir, 
this  atrocious  attempt  must  fail  in  this  country."  Thus 
he  announced  his  disapproval  of  the  fashionable  doc 
trine  of  the  hour,  the  doctrine  of  "finality,"  in  refer 
ence  to  the  compromises  of  1850. 

Because  General  Scott  had  said,  in  a  letter  of  1843, 
that  he  believed  it  to  be  the  duty  of  slaveholding  states 
to  abolish  slavery,  voluntarily  and  gradually,  for  this, 
said  Stevens,  "  he  is  opposed  by  the  bigots  of  slavery. 
I  thank  God  that  he  has  such  a  cause  of  opposition." 

Stevens  charged  upon  the  Southern  slaveholders 
that  they  were  forcing  a  sectional  issue  upon  the  coun 
try.  If  for  these  reasons  Scott  should  be  defeated, 
how  could  they  expect  to  avoid  the  sectional  issue  in 
the  coming  elections  ?  "  Do  you  believe  that  the 
North,  tame  as  she  is,  when  so  often  trod  upon  will 
never  turn?  And  if  the  issue  shall  be  made,  the  result 
can  not  be  doubtful." 

He  warned  the  South  of  the  dangers  of  attempting 
a  separate  confederacy.  They  would  be  in  constant 
collisions  with  surrounding  nations;  no  state  would 
extradite  their  fugitives  from  slavery;  the  sympathies 
of  the  world  would  be  against  them;  the  dangers  of 
San  Domingo  confronted  them;  and  some  modern 


122     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Sparticus  might  arise  and  inflict  some  terrible  retribu 
tion  upon  his  former  masters.  "  May  the  sound  sense 
and  true  patriotism  of  the  American  people  arrest  the 
headlong  career  of  reckless  men!  " 

With  March  4,  1853,  Stevens'  second  term  in  Con 
gress  came  to  an  end.  He  retired  with  the  expecta 
tion  of  never  again  holding  office.1 

In  the  last  days  of  the  Thirty-second  Congress,  on 
March  3,  1853,  while  a  naval  appropriation  bill  was 
pending,  Stevens  protested  against  the  measure,  charg 
ing  that  it  carried  money  for  corrupt  purposes.  It 
was  not  the  time  nor  the  hour,  he  said,  "  in  the  expiring 
moments  of  Congress,  in  the  confusion  and  noise,  and 
surrounded  by  outside  pressure,  to  vote  away  your  mil 
lions,"  and  he  expressed  his  determination  to  vote 
against  the  bill. 

In  the  fall  of  1851,  during  the  recess  of  Congress, 
Stevens  was  engaged  for  the  defense  of  Castner  Han- 
way  in  the  celebrated  Gorsuch  case,  a  case  arising  in 
Lancaster  County,  Pennsylvania,  under  the  operation 
of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act  of  1850,  an  act  that  was 
odious  to  Stevens  and  which  he  had  given  his  best 
endeavors  to  defeat.  Now,  after  the  lapse  of  but  a 
few  months,  he  found  opportunity  to  defend  a  fellow- 
citizen  of  his  home  county  who  had  refused  to  help 
execute  that  act.  Gorsuch  and  his  son,  citizens  of 
Maryland,  came  to  Lancaster  County  in  search  of  two 
fugitive  slaves  who  had  escaped  three  years  before. 

1  In  a  personal  explanation  made  in  the  last  hours  of  the  ses 
sion,  while  disclaiming  any  intention  of  disparaging  the  personal 
conduct  of  a  colleague,  Stevens  said :  "  It  is  more  than  prob 
able  that  hereafter  I  shall  never  meet  any  member  here  or  else 
where  officially,  and  I  desire  to  part  with  no  unfriendly  feeling 
toward  any  of  them."  Globe,  March  3,  1853,  P-  "64. 


ANTI-SLAVERY  PHILIPPICS  123 

They  secured  from  the  United  States  Commissioner  in 
Philadelphia  the  proper  warrants  for  the  arrest  of  the 
fugitives,  and,  with  the  United  States  Deputy  Marshal, 
proceeded  to  break  into  the  houses  where  the  negroes, 
with  some  of  their  colored  supporters,  were  concealed. 
The  fugitives  said  they  would  die  rather  than  return 
to  slavery,  and  that  if  one  of  them  were  taken  it  would 
be  only  over  the  dead  bodies  of  the  others.  Barricaded 
in  the  upper  part  of  the  house,  the  fugitives  refused 
to  surrender  upon  the  demand  of  the  officer.  Instead, 
a  horn  was  sounded  as  a  signal  to  other  negroes  in 
the  neighborhood  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  their 
friends.  The  result  was  that  in  a  very  short  time  a 
band  of  from  fifty  to  one  hundred  negroes  had 
gathered,  armed  with  guns,  clubs,  axes,  and  corn- 
cutters,  and  it  became  obvious  that  it  would  be  a  dan 
gerous  proceeding  for  the  slave-catchers  to  insist  upon 
an  arrest.  Castner  Hanway,  a  Quaker  from  the 
neighborhood,  and  another  white  man  appeared  upon 
the  scene,  and  the  officer  summoned  these  men  to  as 
sist  in  the  arrest.  They  indignantly  refused  to  do  so, 
and  Hanway  said  that  "  the  negroes  had  a  right  to 
defend  themselves."  Hanway  warned  Gorsuch  that  it 
would  be  madness  to  insist  upon  the  arrest,  saying, 
'  The  sooner  you  leave  the  better,  if  you  would  pre 
vent  bloodshed."  An  angry  parley  followed,  resulting 
in  a  fight.  Gorsuch  was  killed,  his  son  was  severely 
wounded,  while  the  others  of  the  capturing  party  made 
off  as  best  they  could.1 

This  affair  caused  much  excitement  throughout  the 

1  Rhodes,  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  222-223.     Harris,  The 
'Political  Conflict  in  America,  pp.  146-150. 


124     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

country.  In  the  South,  there  was  exasperation,  and 
the  affair  was  cited  as  an  illustration  of  the  Northern 
anti-slavery  resistance  to  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act  that 
might  be  expected.  In  Pennsylvania,  some  excused 
the  negro  rioters  on  the  plea  that  a  man,  guilty  of  no 
crime,  had  a  right  to  defend  his  liberty,  while  others 
demanded  that  the  "  outraged  laws  of  the  common 
wealth  should  be  vindicated."  Hanway  was  indicted 
and  tried  for  treason.  The  trial  lasted  for  fifteen  days 
and  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  public  interest 
aroused,  it  was  one  of  the  most  notable  cases  in  that 
decade.  Stevens  was  the  brain  of  the  defense  in  this 
trial,  yet  for  prudential  reasons,  because  of  Stevens' 
well-known  anti-slavery  sentiments,  John  M.  Read,  a 
very  able  lawyer  and  afterward  the  Chief  Justice  of  the 
State,  became  the  manager  for  the  defense.  Justice 
Grier,  the  presiding  judge  in  the  United  States  Court, 
instructed  the  jury  that  the  transaction  did  not  rise 
to  the  dignity  of  treason  or  of  levying  war,  and  that 
there  was  no  evidence  of  previous  conspiracy  to  re 
sist  the  law.  Within  ten  minutes  after  the  case  went 
to  the  jury  a  verdict  of  "  not  guilty  "  was  returned. 

There  was  a  respectable  body  of  public  opinion  in 
the  North  opposed  to  the  enforcement  of  the  Fugitive 
Slave  Law,  and  while  the  majority  would  not  advise 
forcible  resistance  to  the  act,  the  Gorsuch  case,  with 
others,  illustrated  the  great  difficulty  of  securing  its 
peaceful  and  successful  operation.  Stevens  was  ever 
ready  to  use  his  talents  and  legal  ability  to  prevent 
escaping  slaves  and,  above  all,  any  free  negroes,  from 
becoming  the  victims  of  the  act. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ON   THE   EVE    OF    WAR 

AT  the  expiration  of  the  Thirty-second  Congress  in 
March,  1853,  Stevens  returned  to  his  law  practise 
in  Lancaster.  His  practise  extended  not  only  to  his 
own  but  also  to  adjacent  counties,  and  he  was  regarded 
by  his  contemporaries,  who  were  the  most  competent 
to  judge,  as  "  the  most  accomplished  all  round  lawyer 
in  the  state." 

At  the  opening  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  in  1853,  Stevens  gave  an  admirable  expression 
of  appreciation  of  a  worthy  judiciary.  The  occasion 
was  his  formal  announcement  to  the  court,  "  in  brief 
and  exquisite  terms,"  as  Judge  Woodward  afterward 
said,  of  the  death  of  Chief  Justice  John  B.  Gibson. 
Gibson  was  for  years  the  Nestor  of  the  Pennsylvania 
bench  and  one  of  the  great  legal  luminaries  of  his 
time.  Stevens  spoke  of  the  ability,  learning  and  im 
partiality  of  this  noble  justice,  who  in  1838,  in  times 
of  the  highest  and  bitterest  party  excitement,  was  re- 
appointed  as  Chief  Justice  of  his  State  by  Governor 
Ritner.  To  make  the  appointment  the  Governor  had 
to  subordinate  his  personal  and  party  feelings,  and 
Stevens,  partisan  through  and  through,  had  been  the 
head  and  front  of  the  Governor's  party.  But  Stev 
ens  had  readily  recognized  the  supreme  propriety  of 
this  appointment.  "  It  taught  in  significant  language," 

I25 


126     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

said  Stevens  in  announcing  the  death  of  Gibson,  "  that 
however  proper  it  may  be  to  fill  the  gubernatorial  chair 
and  other  executive  offices  with  politicians,  none  but 
able,  learned  and  upright  jurists  are  fit  to  be  indued 
with  judicial  robes.  It  was  an  example  which  will  be 
creditable  and  useful  to  the  people  and  their  rulers 
whenever  they  shall  occupy  a  like  elevated  position. 
Those  who  believe,  as  all  should  believe,  that  the  judi 
ciary  is  the  most  important  department  of  the  govern 
ment,  and  that  great,  wise  and  pure  judges  are  the 
chief  bulwark  and  protection  of  the  lives,  liberty,  and 
rights  of  the  people,  will  deeply  and  sincerely  regret 
the  loss  of  Judge  Gibson."  1 

In  this  period  of  his  retirement  from  public  life 
Stevens'  anti-slavery  zeal  was  not  abated.  He  was 
ready  to  help  on  in  the  agitation  against  the  dominance 
of  the  country  by  the  slave  power.  Oliver  Johnson, 
a  Peacham  boy  who  knew  Stevens'  people  in  Vermont, 
the  coadjutor  and  biographer  of  Garrison,  wrote  to 
him  from  the  anti-slavery  office  in  New  York  to 
invite  him  to  give  an  anti-slavery  lecture  in  that  city 
in  a  course  opened  by  Charles  Sumner  and  followed 
by  Joshua  R.  Giddings,  Cassius  M.  Clay,  Henry  Ward 
Beecher,  Horace  Greeley  and  R.  W.  Emerson.  He 
was  in  distinguished  and  honorable  company,  and  for 
his  address  he  was  to  receive  twenty-five  dollars  and  his 
expenses.  Evidently,  the  anti-slavery  cause  of  those 
days  was  promoted  without  much  money  reward  or  the 
hope  of  it. 

1  Harris'  Pennsylvania  State  Reports,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  ip.  An 
interesting  portrait  of  Gibson  in  a  group  of  Pennsylvania  jus 
tices  of  1852  may  be  seen  in  the  Cornell  University  Law  Library. 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  127 

The  tendency  of  the  Whig  party  to  compromise  with 
slavery  had  been  displeasing  to  Stevens,  and  he  left 
public  life,  after  the  defeat  of  Scott,  with  but  little 
disposition  to  take  part  in  politics.  But  the  repeal  of 
the  Missouri  Compromise  by  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Act 
of  1854,  bringing  the  threat  of  the  extension  of  slavery 
to  new  regions  in  the  West,  aroused  Stevens,  as  it 
did  Lincoln  and  other  anti-slavery  Whigs  in  the  North, 
to  renewed  interest  and  activity  in  the  political  struggles 
of  the  time. 

The  movement  for  a  new  party,  committed  to  the 
policy  of  resisting  the  further  spread  of  slavery  while 
holding  in  abeyance  all  previous  political  differences, 
was  more  progressive  in  the  West  than  in  the  East. 
This  new  Republican  party  was  getting  well  under  way 
in  Wisconsin,  Michigan,  Illinois  and  Indiana  in  the 
summer  and  fall  of  1854.  It  was  made  up  of  the 
more  pronounced  anti-slavery  Whigs,  the  Anti-Ne 
braska  Democrats,  and  the  former  Free-soilers  who 
had  already  severed  their  party  ties  in  order  to  resist 
the  extension  of  slavery.  But  even  in  1855  the  more 
conservative  spirits  in  the  East  w^ere  still  holding  back. 
A  mass  meeting  was  held  in  Lancaster  in  1855  for 
the  purpose  of  organizing  the  new  Republican  party  in 
that  county.  The  movement  received  but  little  en 
couragement,  Old-Line  Whiggery  and  Know-Noth- 
ingism  being  the  controlling  factors  in  political  circles 
that  were  not  Democratic.  Fewer  than  twenty  persons 
attended  this  initial  meeting,1  but  Stevens  was  one  of 
these.  The  party  was  organized,  and  the  next  year 
Stevens  was  chosen  as  a  delegate  to  the  first  Republican 
1  Me  Call,  PP-  93-94- 


128      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

National  Convention,  which  met  at  Philadelphia,  June 
17,  1856.  In  that  convention  he  earnestly  supported 
Justice  McLean  in  preference  to  General  Fremont  as 
a  candidate  for  the  presidency,  thus  showing  his  po 
litical  sense  and  acumen.  He  did  not  anticipate  success 
in  the  election  even  with  McLean,  but  with  any  one 
else  he  thought  it  impossible.  Of  his  impassioned  ap 
peal  to  his  fellow-delegates  from  Pennsylvania,  E.  B. 
Washburne  said  that  he  had  "  never  heard  a  man  speak 
with  more  feeling  or  in  more  persuasive  accents."  1 
As  a  member  of  this  new  party,  pledged  to  a  positive 
and  aggressive  stand  against  slavery  extension,  Stev 
ens  reentered  politics,  and  was  again  elected  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  in  1858. 

Now  at  the  age  of  sixty-eight,  an  age  when  most 
men  are  content  to  retire  from  the  active  and  onerous 
burdens  of  life,  Stevens  was  just  entering  upon  the 
great  work  of  his  life.  He  was  just  coming  to  be  an 
active  participant  in  a  Congress  that  was  destined  to 
confront  the  greatest  issues  that  were  ever  presented 
to  the  American  people,  the  issues  of  secession,  dis 
union,  and  civil  war.  Here  was  a  man  who  was  de 
stined  more  than  any  other  single  man  to  bear  the 
brunt  of  legislative  burdens  for  the  next  ten  years,  and 
that,  too,  in  an  era  of  great  change  and  revolution, 
and  of  the  fiercest  combat,  in  which  men  put  forth  their 
greatest  efforts  to  carry  their  ends.  Was  he  con 
scious  of  the  paralysis  of  age  or  the  impairment  of 
his  energies,  calculated  to  disqualify  him  for  the  tur 
bulent  and  boisterous  arena  of  public  life  in  which  he 
was  to  play  so  important  a  part?  Speaking  at  this 

1  Rhodes  II,  p,  183. 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  129 

time  upon  the  death  of  John  Schwarts,  an  aged  col 
league  from  Pennsylvania,  he  said,  "  It  were  perhaps 
more  graceful  for  those  who  are  conscious  that  age 
or  infirmity  has  impaired  their  mental  or  physical 
powers,  who  find  by  repeated  trials  that  they  can  no 
longer  bend  the  bow  of  Ulysses,  to  retire,  and  lay 
down  the  discus  which  they  have  not  the  strength  to 
hurl."  1  There  were  but  few  in  the  House  who  could 
appreciate  with  Stevens  the  full  force  of  this  sugges 
tion.  But  events  were  not  far  distant  that  were  to 
give  him  occasion  to  prove  that  his  vision  was  un- 
dimmed  and  his  natural  force  unabated. 

It  is  not  likely  that  a  man  at  such  an  age,  when  rest 
and  peace  are  a  man's  chief est  desire,  would  care  to 
endure  such  strife  and  labor  as  were  destined  to  fall 
to  the  lot  of  Stevens  unless  he  were  nerved  to  it  by 
sincere  purposes  and  convictions,  and  by  the  desire  to 
serve  what  he  considered  a  great  and  noble  cause. 

When  Stevens  came  to  Washington  to  take  his  seat 
in  the  House  in  December,  1859,  he  encountered  a 
situation  very  similar  to  that  which  he  had  faced  ten 
years  before.  Again  the  House  was  unable  to  or 
ganize  and  elect  a  Speaker  and  for  eight  weeks  there 
were  strife,  wrangling,  and  heated  controversy.  The 
party  situation  was  even  more  complicated  than  that  of 
ten  years  before  and  the  party  and  sectional  antago 
nism  was  more  bitter.  There  were  four  parties  in  the 
House.  First,  there  were  Republicans,  with  a  plurality 
of  the  members,  about  one  hundred  and  nine  in  all, 
with  a  few  others  of  Republican  leanings.  Second  in 
numbers,  came  the  Democrats,  whose  leaders  and  the 
1  June  21,  1860,  Globe,  p.  3223. 


130      THE  LIFE  OF.  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

bulk  of  whose  House  members  were  mostly  from  the 
South,  mustering  altogether  about  ninety  votes. 
Third,  the  "  South  Americans/'  or  the  "  Southern 
Opposition,"  made  up  the  next  group.  These  were 
former  "  Know-Nothings  "  and  Whigs  who  were  op 
posed  to  the  Buchanan  administration.  There  were 
from  twenty-three  to  twenty-six  of  these.  Lastly, 
there  were  the  Anti-Lecompton  Democrats  from  the 
North, —  ten  or  twelve  men  who  were  followers  of 
Douglas  in  opposing  the  Buchanan  administration  in 
its  policy  of  forcing  the  Lecompton  pro-slavery  consti 
tution  on  Kansas.  These  refused  to  be  bound  by  the 
caucus  action  of  the  Democratic  party.  They  may 
properly  be  called  Democratic  "  insurgents  "  of  the 
time.  Prominent  among  these  were  Hickman,  of 
Pennsylvania,  and  Horace  F.  Clark,  of  New  York, 
who,  like  most  of  their  Anti-Lecompton  colleagues, 
had  been  elected  by  the  aid  of  Republican  votes.  The 
great  body  of  the  Douglas  Democrats  in  the  North 
and  West  like  George  H.  Pendleton  and  Samuel  S. 
Cox,  of  Ohio,  John  A.  McClernand,  of  Illinois,  and 
Niblack  and  Holman,  of  Indiana,  supported  the  caucus 
nominee  of  the  Democratic  party. 

On  the  first  day  of  the  session,  Mr.  Bocock,  of  Vir 
ginia,  was  put  forward  as  the  Democratic  nominee  for 
Speaker.  Mr.  Corwin,  of  Ohio,  nominated  John  Sher 
man,  of  that  state,  while  Thaddeus  Stevens  named 
Galusha  A.  Crow,  of  Pennsylvania.  Thus,  at  first, 
two  Republican  candidates  were  put  forward,  while 
the  minor  parties  also  had  their  candidates.  The  bal 
lot  showed  no  choice,  whereupon  Mr.  Clark,  of  Mis 
souri,  offered  a  resolution  to  the  effect  that,  whereas 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  131 

certain  members  of  the  House  now  in  nomination  for 
the  speakership  had  endorsed  a  certain  book  called 
The  Impending  Crisis  of  the  South  by  one  Hinton 
R.  Helper,  whose  "  doctrines  are  insurrectionary  and 
hostile  to  the  domestic  peace  and  tranquillity  of  the 
country,"  therefore  resolved  that  no  member  who  had 
endorsed  this  book  was  "fit  to  be  Speaker  of  the 
House." 

On  the  following  day,  Clark  read  the  circular  letter 
recommending  Helper's  book,  with  the  names  of  more 
than  sixty  Republicans  who  had  signed  the  letter, 
among  them  being  Sherman  and  Crow,  the  Republican 
candidates  for  Speaker.  He  inserted  in  the  record, 
also,  long  extracts  from  the  objectionable  book,  con 
taining  what  he  regarded  as  revolutionary  appeals  to 
Southern  non-slaveholders,  and  setting  forth  a  program 
for  them  to  follow.  This  program,  as  announced  by 
Helper,  recommended  independent  political  action;  no 
more  voting  for  slaveholders ;  no  fellowship  with  them 
in  politics,  religion,  or  society;  no  patronage  to  pro- 
slavery  merchants,  lawyers,  physicians,  hotels,  or  news 
papers;  in  short,  a  union  of  non-slaveholders  in  a  de 
termined  class  war  to  the  bitter  end  on  the  slaveholders 
and  their  system.  In  a  speech  of  considerable  length 
Clark  sought  to  show  that  the  election  to  the  speaker- 
ship  of  a  man  who  had  recommended  such  a  book 
would  be  but  the  precursor  of  disunion.  If  such  senti 
ments  were  to  be  endorsed  and  the  endorser  elevated 
to  power,  how,  he  asked,  could  man  hope  to  see  the 
Union  continue? 

Mr.  Gilmer,  of  North  Carolina,  a  former  Whig,  now 
a  "  South  American,"  moved  a  substitute  for  the  Clark 


132      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

resolution.  This  recited  the  facts  that  a  great  com 
promise  had  been  brought  about  in  1850;  that  leading 
members  of  Congress  had  recommended  this  com 
promise  as  a  "  finality  "  and  that  no  one  should  be  voted 
for  for  President,  Vice-President,  Senator,  Representa 
tive  or  state  officer,  who  would  seek  to  unsettle  that 
agreement;  that  both  political  parties  had  endorsed 
that  compromise ;  and  therefore  let  it  be  resolved,  that 
"  fully  endorsing  these  national  sentiments,  it  is  the 
duty  of  every  good  citizen  of  this  Union  to  resist  all 
attempts  at  renewing  in  Congress  or  out  of  it  the 
slavery  agitation,  under  whatever  shape  or  color  the 
attempt  may  be  made." 

Later,  Gilmer  modified  this  so  as  to  assert  that  no 
member  should  be  elected  Speaker  whose  political 
opinions  were  not  known  to  conform  to  these  senti 
ments. 

In  the  guise  of  these  resolutions  offered  by  "  mod 
erate  "  men  from  Slave  States,  men  who  professed 
greatly  to  deplore  "  sectionalism  "  and  "  ultraism,"  the 
negro  was  thrust  into  the  deliberations  of  the  Thirty- 
sixth  Congress  in  the  very  first  days  of  its  session. 
For  eight  weeks,  while  the  House  was  unable  to  elect  a 
Speaker,  Congress  became  an  arena  for  controversy 
and  debate  about  slavery,  abolitionism,  and  disunion. 
The  speaking  was  indulged  in  chiefly  by  the  South 
ern  Democrats  who  sought  to  arouse  sentiment  against 
the  "  slavery  agitation  "  of  the  Republican  party,  and 
who  were  anxious  to  unite  all  parties  in  opposition  to 
prevent  the  election  of  a  Republican  Speaker.  On  the 
first  day  of  the  session,  before  the  flow  of  oratory  be 
gan,  Stevens  raised  the  point  of  order  that  there  were 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  133 

but  two  things  in  order, —  namely,  to  ballot  for  Speaker 
or  to  adjourn.  But  recent  events,  including  John 
Brown's  raid  and  the  publication  of  Helper's  book,  and 
the  tense  political  situation  of  the  country,  made  it  im 
possible  to  restrain  members  from  entering  upon  a 
heated  party  debate. '  Helper,  John  Brown,  Seward's 
"  irrepressible  conflict  "  speech,  were  all  made  the  texts 
of  many  speeches,  delivered  for  the  purpose  of  excoria 
ting  the  "  Black  Republicans  "  and  showing  how  noth 
ing  but  disaster  and  disunion  could  come  from 
elevating  a  representative  of  that  party  to  the  speaker- 
ship,  especially  if  he  be  a  "  Black  Republican  "  who 
had  endorsed  the  infamous  Helper.  The  Southern 
ers  wished  a  vote  directly  condemning  as  unfit  for 
Speaker  any  member  who  had  endorsed  "  incendiary 
sentiments  calculated  to  stir  up  servile  insurrection." 
They  did  not  fancy  Gilmer's  substitute,  which  was 
calculated  to  divert  the  House  from  that  expression. 
Millson,  of  Virginia,  speaking  for  the  offended  honor 
and  interests  of  the  South,  assumed  that  the  Republi 
cans  should  be  coming  forward  with  apologies  and  dis 
claimers  on  account  of  Helper  and  the  John  Brown 
raid.  He  spoke  with  much  heat,  saying  that  the  publi 
cation  and  distribution  of  inflammatory  and  seditious 
writings,  tending  to  incite  the  negro  population  of  the 
Southern  States  to  insurrection,  involved  very  grave 
responsibilities,  and  that  "  one  who  had  consciously, 
deliberately,  and  of  purpose,  lent  his  name  and  in 
fluence  to  the  propagation  of  such  writings  is  not  only 
not  fit  to  be  Speaker  but  is  not  fit  to  live."  1 

Mr.  Sherman  who  had  signed  the  Helper  circular, 
1  Globe,  Dec.  6,  1859,  p.  21. 


134     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

and  who  was  now  made  the  target  of  these  impas 
sioned  attacks,  asserted  that  he  had  not  read  Helper's 
book ;  and  having  been  called  upon  as  "  the  abolition 
candidate  for  Speaker  "  to  say  whether  he  was  opposed 
to  any  interference  with  the  subject  of  slavery,  inside 
or  outside  of  Congress,  Sherman  asserted  that  he  was 
"  opposed  to  any  interference  whatever  by  the  people  of 
the  Free  States  with  the  relations  of  master  and  slave  in 
the  Slave  States."  Other  Republicans  disavowed  and 
condemned  anything  like  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the 
North  to  interfere  with  the  relation  between  master 
and  slave  in  the  Slave  States,  or  any  effort  to  stir  up 
insurrection  and  bloodshed  in  the  South. 

But  the  public  mind  of  the  South  was  excited  and 
restless  and  many  Southern  members  believed  that  the 
North  was  in  sympathy  with,  if  not  responsible  for, 
John  Brown's  raid,  and  that  the  new  Republican  party 
had  entered  upon  an  "  irrepressible  conflict  "  to  ex 
tirpate  slavery  in  the  South,  peaceably,  if  they  could, 
but  forcibly,  if  they  must. 

These  disclaimers,  therefore,  did  not  pacify  Southern 
members.  Keitt,  of  South  Carolina,  lashing  the  Re 
publicans  and  charging  upon  them  again  responsibility 
for  Helper  and  Brown,  said  that  the  South  asked  noth 
ing  but  its  rights,  "  but  as  God  is  my  judge,  I  wrould 
shatter  this  republic  from  turret  to  foundation  stone 
before  I  would  take  one  tittle  less,"- -at  which  sally 
there  was  enthusiastic  applause  in  the  gallery. 

After  Keitt' s  fiery  speech,  Stevens  rose  to  urge  his 
point  of  order  that  the  House  should  either  vote  for 
Speaker  or  adjourn;  but  before  taking  his  seat,  he 
begged  to  say  that  he  did  not  blame  the  gentlemen 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  135 

from  the  South  for  the  language  of  intimidation,  for 
using  "  this  threat  of  rending  God's  creation  from  the 
turret  to  the  foundation.  [Laughter.]  All  this  is 
right  in  them,  for  they  have  tried  it  fifty  times  and 
fifty  times  they  have  found  weak  and  recreant  tremblers 
in  the  North  who  have  been  affected  by  it  and  who 
have  acted  from  those  intimidations.  [Applause.] 
They  are  right,  and  I  give  them  credit  for  repeating 
with  grave  countenances  that  which  they  have  so  often 
found  to  be  effective  when  operating  upon  timid  men." 

This  was  very  provoking,  but  instead  of  leading  to 
a  vote  and  allaying  the  disposition  to  speak,  it  tended 
further  to  arouse  Southern  ire  and  threatening  speech, 
as  it  was,  perhaps,  intended  to  do.  Crawford,  from 
Georgia,  demanded  to  know  whether  the  Black  Repub 
lican  party  intended  to  try  to  deceive  the  South  by  pre 
tended  friendship  and  by  Union  meetings  in  the  North, 
and  then,  when  apprehension  was  removed,  to  renew 
their  warfare  on  slavery.  If  the  Northern  people 
were  for  abolition  of  slavery,  the  South  wanted  no 
flinching,  no  lowering  of  the  flag  for  the  sake  of  policy ; 
if  they  would  but  sail  under  their  true  colors,  it  might 
be  seen  whether  the  South  were  in  earnest  or  not. 
"  All  we  want  is  a  square  and  manly  avowal  of  your 
sentiments  that  our  people  may  not  be  deceived.  Do 
this  and  my  life  upon  it,  you  will  see  no  cowardly 
shrinking  upon  our  part  from  the  maintenance  of  every 
constitutional  right  to  which  our  people  are  entitled." 

"  That  is  right,"  said  Stevens,  "  that  is  the  way  they 
frightened  us  before.  Now  you  see  exactly  what  it  is, 
and  what  it  has  always  been." 

During  this   colloquy,   members   from   the   benches 


136     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

crowded  into  the  area,  the  Clerk  could  not  maintain 
order,  and  there  was  for  a  time,  great  confusion  and 
excitement  in  the  hall.  When  order  was  restored, 
Stevens  remarked,  "  This  was  but  a  momentary  breeze, 
sir,  nothing  else,"  and  insisting  that  no  business  be 
considered  till  the  House  was  organized,  he  moved  to 
adjourn.1 

Of  this  incident,  Morris,  of  Illinois,  a  Douglas  Dem 
ocrat,  said  the  next  day  in  the  House,  "  A  few  more 
such  scenes  and  we  will  hear  the  crack  of  the  revolver 
and  see  the  gleam  of  the  brandished  blade."  He  ap 
pealed  for  a  more  conservative  tone  and  temper.  But 
Lucius  Q.  C.  Lamar,  of  Mississippi,  later  one  of  the 
most  honored  of  Southern  leaders,  followed  Morris  in 
a  fiery  and  reckless  speech.  He  referred  to  the  speech 
in  which  Millson  had  said  that  an  endorser  of  Helper 
"  was  not  fit  to  live  "  as  an  "  able  and  solemn  appeal," 
and  he  arraigned  the  Republicans  for  their  "  contemptu 
ous  silence,"  their  "  guffaws,  and  their  uncourteous  and 
indecent  laughter."  He  charged  that  the  Republicans 
were  not  "  guiltless  of  the  blood  of  John  Brown  and 
his  co-conspirators  and  the  innocent  men,  the  victims 
of  his  ruthless  vengeance,"  since  Brown  "  had  but 
crystallized  the  Republican  idea  into  action."  He 
charged  Senator  Seward  with  responsibility  for  the 
Brown  raid,  "  the  object  of  which  was  to  place  the 
South,  a  bleeding  mangled  victim,  at  the  foot  of  North 
ern  power."  He  asserted  that  the  "  fathers  had  put 
the  negro  into  the  Constitution  as  an  institution  of 
property,  of  society,  and  of  government,"  and  when 
that  Constitution  is  violated  "  I  war  upon  your  gov- 
.  6.  1859,  Globe. 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  137 

eminent;  I  am  against  it.  I  raise  the  banner  of  seces 
sion,  and  I  will  fight  under  it  as  long  as  the  blood  flows 
and  ebbs  in  my  veins."  l 

In,  this  speech,  Lamar  referred  to  Stevens  as  fol 
lows  :  "  I  almost  tremble  for  the  South  when  I  rec 
ollect  that  the  opposing  forces  will  be  led  by  the  dis 
tinguished  hero  of  the  Buckshot  War.  [Great 
laughter.]  However  gloomy  the  catastrophe,  his 
saltatory  accomplishments  will  enable  him  to  leap  out 
of  any  difficulties  in  which  he  may  be  involved.  I 
understand  that  he  gave  in  a  conspicuous  way  a  prac 
tical  illustration  of  peaceable  secession."  This  refers 
to  Stevens'  escape  by  leaping  through  a  state-house 
window  at  Harrisburg  during  the  Buckshot  War. 
The  day  was  soon  to  come  when  Stevens'"  leadership 
was  not  a  matter  for  joke  and  satire  to  the  South,— 
in  the  eventful  years  following  the  appeal  to  arms. 

Two  days  later,  Tom  Corwin,  of  Ohio,  applied  his 
wit  and  humor  in  a  way  calculated  to  bring  Southern 
wrath  into  ridicule  by  saying  that  if  the  Union  can  be 
rent  that  way  from  turret  to  foundation,  because  a  man 
from  North  Carolina  had  written  a  book  advising  a 
boycott  which  some  members  had  carelessly  endorsed, 
"  because  one  man  advised  another  not  to  eat  his  dinner 
at  a  particular  tavern, —  if  it  can  be  done  that  way, 
we  had  better  go  to  work  and  pull  it  down  ourselves 
and  go  home."  2 

On  one  of  the  many  ballots  for  Speaker,  some  of 
the  Republicans,  Stevens  among  them,  voted  for  Gil- 
mer,  the  "South  American"  from  North  Carolina, 

1  Globe,  Dec.  7,  1859,  pp.  44-45- 

2  Globe,  Dec.  8,  1859.  ' 


138     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

who  on  that  ballot  received  thirty-six  votes.  If  the 
Democrats  had  then  transferred  their  votes  to  him, 
Gilmer  could  have  been  elected.  Gilmer  was  an  Old- 
Line  Whig  which  some  one  defined  as  a  "  fossil  Whig 
varnished  over  with  Americanism."  His  Republican 
votes,  however,  tainted  his  candidacy;  Southern  Dem 
ocrats  refused  pointblank  to  accept  him  because  Re 
publicans  had  voted  for  him,  although  Gilmer  was 
recognized  as  a  "  national "  man  and  was  reputed  to 
be  the  largest  slaveholder  in  Congress. 

While  strenuous  efforts  were  being  made  to  com 
bine  all  the  opposition  to  the  Republicans  upon  Gil 
mer,  Stevens  excited  some  amusement  by  saying  that 
in  order  to  avoid  misapprehension  he  would  not  vote 
for  Mr.  Gilmer  any  more,  which  may  have  been  inter 
preted  as  an  intimation  that  he  would  not  have  voted 
for  him  before  if  he  had  thought  that  there  was  any 
danger  of  his  election.  Later,  Stevens  solemnly  rose  to 
explain  why,  "  departing  from  the  general  rule  of 
obeying  party  decrees,"  he  had  voted  for  Gilmer. 
"  This,"  he  said  solemnly,  "  requires  some  explanation 
as  I  see  from  a  paper  I  send  to  the  Clerk's  desk  to 
be  read."  "  The  paper  is  printed  in  German,"  said 
the  Clerk,  amid  laughter,  "  and  the  Clerk  can  not  read 
it."  "  Then,"  said  Stevens,  provoking  more  laughter, 
"  I  postpone  my  remarks,  till  the  Clerk  can  read  it." 

So  Stevens  has  very  provokingly  left  posterity  in 
doubt  as  to  his  motives  in  voting  for  a  "  South 
American."  Most  likely  it  was  because  he  was  con 
vinced  of  the  impossibility  of  Gilmer' s  election,  though 
it  is  not  impossible  that  it  was  because,  since  Gilmer 
had  been  an  Old-Line  Whig,  it  was  known  that  he  was 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  139 

sound  on  the  tariff  question.  The  iron  interests  of 
Pennsylvania  and  the  other  protected  industries  of  that 
state,  were  as  dear  to  the  hearts  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Republican  delegation  as  was  the  anti-slavery  cause,  as 
their  conduct  in  this  speakership  contest  goes  to  show.1 
With  the  Republicans  the  Southern  Democrats 
would  hold  no  terms,  no  parley.  They  might  seek  a 
combination  with  the  Americans  but  before  a  man 
identified  with  the  doctrines  of  the  Helper  book  should 
be  Speaker,  they  "  would  hold  the  House  up  till  it 
expired,  or  till  the  people  should  rise  in  their  wrath  and 
hurl  these  Black  Republicans  from  the  seats  of 
power."  Clark,  of  Missouri,  asserted  that  there 
should  be  no  vote  to  elect  by  a  plurality  until  the  House 
had  expressed  its  opinion  by  a  direct  vote  as  to  whe 
ther  an  endorser  of  Helper  was  fit  to  be  Speaker, — 
and  he  again  denounced  Helper's  pamphlet  as  recom 
mending  "  civil  war,  bloodshed,  rapine,  and  every  crime 
disgraceful  to  our  species  against  the  Southern  peo 
ple;  whose  property  is  sought  to  be  taken  and  their 
firesides  invaded  " —  sentiments  "  tending  to  ostracize 
and  put  in  jeopardy  the  lives,  liberty  and  safety  of 
half  of  my  constituents."  8  A  very,  of  Tennessee,  ex 
pressed  the  hope  that  nothing  would  be  done  to  aid  any 
one  to  shrink  from  the  responsibility  of  a  direct  vote 
upon  the  Clark  resolution,  or  to  divert  in  any  way  "  the 

1  See  the  withdrawal  of  votes  by  Morris,  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
others  from  N.  H.   Smith,  of  North   Carolina,  after   Smith  had 
enough  votes  to  elect  and  before  the  vote  was  announced,  be 
cause  acceptable  pledges  could  not  be  obtained  from  Smith  as  to 
the    composition    of    the    Ways    and    Means    Committee   of    the 
House. 

2  Garnett,  of  Virginia,  Jan.  7,  i8(x>,  Globe,  p.  370. 

3  Globe,  Jan.  7,  1860. 


140      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

just  lightning  that  was  about  to  fall  upon  the  guilty 
heads  of  those  who  signed  the  Helper  book." 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  such  per  fervid  speeches  1 
that  Mr.  Anderson,  of  Missouri,  claiming  independence 
of  all  parties,  made  a  "  patriotic  appeal "  to  members 
of  all  the  parties  in  opposition  to  the  Republicans  to  get 
together  and  organize  the  House.  The  members  of  the 
Democratic  party,  the  American  party,  a»d  the  Anti- 
Lecompton  party,  he  said,  should  meet  together,  ap 
point  a  committee  of  three  from  each,  and  see  if  they 
could  not  agree  upon  some  man  upon  whom  they  might 
unite  as  the  only  possible  means  of  defeating  the  Re 
publicans. 

Stevens  expressed  appreciation  of  the  compromising 
proposal  of  the  eloquent  gentleman  from  Missouri. 
He,  too,  was  anxious  to  do  everything  possible  to  or 
ganize  the  House.  Stevens  regretted  that  the  gentle 
men's  sweet-tempered  proposition  did  not  extend  to 
his  side  of  the  House.  "  The  gentleman,"  he  said, 
"  has  realized  what  I  thought  was  a  myth  before;  that 
is,  he  has  proposed  —  and  I  hope  they  may  have  a 
good  time  of  it  —  he  has  proposed  that  happy  family 
described  in  the  Prairie,  where  the  prairie  wolf,  the 
owl  and  the  rattlesnake  live  in  one  hole.  [Great 
laughter.]  When  they  get  together  in  this  hole  to 
night  I  trust  that  there  will  be  no  biting."  To  show  his 
own  earnest  desire  to  organize,  he  moved  an  immediate 
inve  voce  vote  for  Speaker,  which  was  objected  to  on 
the  Democratic  side.  Most  of  the  Southern  speakers 
denounced  the  Republican  party  and  its  doctrines  as  a 
menace  to  the  Union.  John  H.  Reagan,  of  Texas,  in 

1  January  3,  1860. 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  141 

a  notable  speech  denounced  these  doctrines  as  "  revolu 
tionary  in  character,  destructive  of  the  foundations  of 
the  Republic,  calculated  to  promote  sectional  hostilities 
and  to  subvert  the  Constitution."  He  charged  that  the 
Republicans  addressed  themselves  to  sectional  interests 
and  sectional  motives,  appealing  to  reckless  fanatics 
and  urging  aggression  upon  the  rights  of  the  South. 
He  attempted  to  identify  the  Republicans  with  the 
extreme  abolitionists  like  Garrison  and  Phillips  who 
had  denounced  the  Constitution  as  "  a  league  with  hell 
and  a  covenant  with  death."  .  "  That  party  has  en 
dorsed  a  book,"  said  Reagan,  "  as  vile,  as  incendiary, 
as  calumnious,  as  slanderous,  as  anything  that  ever 
came  from  Phillips  or  Garrison.  One  portion  of  these 
agitators  call  themselves  Republicans,  another  aboli 
tionists,  but  they  all  have  the  same  aim, —  keeping  up 
anti-slavery  agitation  and  excitement  and  aggression 
on  the  South."  1 

During  the  long  weeks  of  controversy,  Stevens  was 
not  disposed  to  take  much  part.  Once  in  a  while,  as 
we  have  seen,  he  briefly  interjected  a  little  ginger  into 
the  discussion  in  the  form  of  wit  and  satire.  What 
he  said  in  his  brief  sallies  tended  to  add  fuel  to  the 
flames  more  than  to  pour  oil  on  the  troubled  waters. 
But  on  January  25th,  toward  the  close  of  the  contest, 
he  spoke  more  at  length,  partly  to  protest  once  more 
against  Northern  Representatives  being  frightened  by 
Southern  menaces,  and  partly  to  set  forth  the  principles 
of  the  Republican  party,  which,  as  he  felt,  had  been 
very  greatly  misrepresented  by  Southern  speakers. 
He  proceeded  to  analyze  the  party  situation,  as  a  means 

1  Globe,  Jan.  4,  1860. 


142      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  explaining  why,  in  his  judgment,  the  House  had  not 
been  organized. 

First,  he  referred  to  the  Democrats,  "  which  means, 
of  course,  the  Democrats  of  the  South, —  the  others 
are  mere  parasites."  At  this,  Vallandigham,  of  Ohio, 
interrupted  and  sought  to  prevent  Stevens  from  speak 
ing,  but  consented  to  waive  his  objection  "  if  offensive 
language  were  not  employed,"  whereupon  Stevens,  re 
gretting  that  he  could  not  know  beforehand  what  Mr. 
Vallandigham  would  approve,  substituted  satellite  for 
parasite,  since  the  Northern  Democrats  "  revolved,  of 
course,  around  the  larger  body,  as  according  to  the 
laws  of  gravitation  they  must,  and  that  is  not  offen 
sive."  [Laughter.]  The  administration  Democratic 
party,  according  to  Stevens'  view,  had  no  claim  upon 
the  twenty  or  more  "  South  Americans,"  all  of  whom 
had  been  elected  in  direct  conflict  with  the  regular 
Democrats.  With  one  exception,  Republican  princi 
ples  were  almost  homogeneous  with  those  of  the 
Democratic  insurgents;  yet  Stevens  found  no  reason 
to  reproach  them  for  not  voting  for  a  Republican  for 
Speaker. 

He  referred  to  the  eight  Anti-Lecompton  men,  not 
as  a  faction,  as  they  had  been  called  by  Democratic 
speakers,  but  as  "  respectable  gentlemen  who  would 
not  agree  to  thrust  slavery  on  Kansas  against  her 
will,"  and  they,  too,  were  all  elected  in  hostility  ,to  the 
Democratic  administration.  What  mercenary  motives 
could  induce  them  now  to  vote  with  the  administration 
party?  It  would  be  a  reproach  to  them.  Many  Re 
publicans  had  helped  to  elect  them  to  Congress,  yet 
Stevens  would  not  reproach  them  because  they  had  not 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  143 

seen  fit  to  vote  for  a  Republican  for  Speaker.  These 
minor  parties,  with  the  Republicans,  made  up  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  members  of  the  House.  The  Democrats 
numbered  ninety.  Now,  why  has  the  House  not  been 
organized?  Stevens  answered  this  question  that  had 
confronted  the  House  for  weeks,  as  follows: 

"  I  have  learned  somewhere  in  the  old  books  that 
it  is  lawful  to  learn  wisdom  from  the  enemy;  but  I 
never  heard  any  wise  man  suggest  that  it  was  wisdom 
to  accept  their  counsel.  The  distinguished  gentleman 
who  occupies  the  executive  at  this  moment  is  a  poli 
tician  as  well  as  a  statesman.  He  has  long  believed 
and,  I  doubt  not,  still  believes,  that  the  true  way  to 
aid  the  increase  of  the  Democratic  party  North,  is  for 
the  South  to  frighten  them  into  the  belief  that  if  they 
venture  to  elect  a  Northern  man  with  Northern  prin 
ciples,  this  Union  is  to  be  dissolved  and  all  their  in 
dustrial  and  pecuniary  interests  sacrificed.  I  have  just 
as  firm  a  belief  as  that  I  live  that  this  whole  program 
was  drawn  up  at  the  White  House  and  is  carried  out 
in  pursuance  of  the  idea  that  the  old  women  and  the 
men  in  petticoats  and  the  misers  at  the  North  are  to 
be  frightened." 

Stevens  then  asserted  that  when  the  Democratic 
party  in  the  North  had  been  sufficiently  strengthened 
"  by  this  cry  of  '  disunion  '  and  the  epithets  of  '  traitor  ' 
that  have  been  launched  against  this  side,"  then  the 
administration  would  see  to  it  that  enough  Deniocrats 
would  be  ready  to  yield  to  enable  the  House  to  be 
organized  and  proceed  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the 
country.  In  the  face  of  the  threat  that  the  House 
should  be  disorganized  till  1861,  and  discord  should 


144      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

reign  perpetual  unless  the  Republicans  yielded,  he  as 
serted  that  he,  for  one,  would  stand  by  his  cause  and 
its  worthy  standard  bearer  "  if  the  House  were  not 
organized  till  the  crack  of  doom."  He  continued: 

"  For  many  weeks  past  we  have  listened  in  silence 
to  what,  I  think,  may  fairly  be  called  the  rantings  of 
the  South,  filled  with  groundless  accusations  against 
the  North,  and  threats  of  vengeance  and  dissolution  of 
the  Union.  Sir,  we  listened  without  reply  and  without 
fear;  for  whatever  effect  they  might  once  have  had, 
some  of  us  always,  and  all  of  us  now,  have  come  to 
regard  them  as  idle  menaces,  as  barren  thunders." 

Stevens  then  proceeded  to  give  "  an  answer,  plain, 
temperate,  and  true,"  to  all  these  allegations,  by  stating 
in  the  briefest  possible  manner  what  he  considered 
the  principles  of  the  Republican  party.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  there  can  be  found  in  print  a  clearer  and  better 
exposition  of  the  political  principles  of  the  Republican 
party  on  the  eve  of  the  Civil  War. 

"  I  would,"  said  Stevens,  "  have  no  man  vote  under 
false  pretenses.  In  my  judgment,  Republicanism  is 
founded  in  love  of  universal  liberty,  and  in  hostility 
to  slavery  and  oppression  throughout  the  world.  Un 
doubtedly,  had  we  the  legal  right  and  the  physical 
power,  we  would  abolish  human  servitude  and  over 
throw  despotism  in  every  land  that  the  sun  visits  in 
its  diurnal  course.  But  we  claim  no  right  to  interfere 
with  the  institutions  of  foreign  nations,  or  with  the 
institutions  of  the  sister  states  of  this  republic.  We 
would  wish  that  Russia  would  liberate  her  serfs,  Aus 
tria  her  oppressed  subjects,  Turkey  her  minions,  and 
the  South  her  slaves.  But  the  law  of  nations  gives  us 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  145 

no  authority  to  redress  foreign  grievances,  and  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  gives  us  no  power 
to  interfere  with  the  institutions  of  our  sister  states. 
And  we  do  deny  now,  as  we  have  ever  denied,  that 
there  is  any  desire  or  intention,  on  the  part  of  the 
Republican  party,  to  interfere  with  those  institutions. 
It  is  a  stern,  an  inflexible,  a  well-recognized  principle 
of  the  Republican  party,  that  every  law  must  be  obeyed 
till  it  is  either  repealed  or  becomes  so  intolerable  as 
to  justify  rebellion. 

"  But,  sir,  while  we  claim  no  power  to  interfere  be 
tween  foreign  sovereignties  and  their  subjects,  there  is 
no  law  to  prevent  our  sympathizing  with  the  oppressed 
of  Italy,  of  Turkey,  or  with  the  crushed  souls  of  Amer 
ica;  and,  as  we  shall  ever  vindicate  this  liberty  of 
speech,  no  earthly  power  shall  prevent  our  giving  utter 
ance  to  such  sentiments  and  denouncing  such  wrongs 
whenever  we  deem  it  proper.  Sir,  while  we  claim  no 
power  to  interfere  with  any  institution  in  the  states,  yet 
where  the  law  of  no  state  operates,  and  where  the  re 
sponsibility  of  government  is  thrown  on  Congress,  we 
do  claim  the  power  to  regulate  and  the  right  to  abolish 
slavery.  No  other  power  on  earth  exists  that  can  do 
it,  for  there  is  no  other  legislative  body;  and  it  would 
be  an  intolerable  shame  and  reproach  upon  this  re 
public  if  there  was  any  spot  within  its  wide  expanse 
where  no  such  power  existed. 

"  Now,  sir,  the  territories,  the  District  of  Columbia, 
the  navy  yards,  and  the  arsenals  have  no  legislative 
bodies  but  Congress;  and  it  is  our  purpose  to  provide 
in  the  exercise  of  our  legislative  duty  for  preventing 
the  extension  of  slavery  into  free  soil  under  the  juris- 


146     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

diction  of  the  general  government,  or  any  extension 
of  slavery  upon  this  continent.  I  do  not  in  this  remark 
desire  to  shun  the  question.  I  do  not  found  this  re 
mark  of  exclusion  by  climate,  or  latitude,  or  soil.  My 
hostility  to  slavery  is  of  a  higher  character,  I  trust, 
than  that.  If  it  was  not,  there  would  be  no  kind  of 
necessity  for  the  existence  of  the  Republican  party  at 
all.  If  I  believed  that  slavery  was  right  in  itself,  and 
it  might  be  permitted  in  places  where  certain  labor 
was  or  was  not  useful,  I  can  not  see  what  principle 
the  Republican  party  could  stand  upon.1  The  whole 
ground  is  yielded,  and  this  Republican '  party  is  a 
nuisance,  and  this  agitation  is  a  crime,  in  my  judg 
ment. 

"  Now,  sir,  we  agree  with  Clay  and  Webster  and  the 
other  fathers  of  our  earlier  day,  that  while  we  have 
the  power  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District  of  Colum 
bia,  the  time  for  its  exercise  is  a  question  of  expediency 
about  which,  I  have  no  doubt,  many  men  on  this  side 
of  the  House  differ.  ,  I  believe  that  most  of  us  agree 
that  that  time  has  not  yet  arrived,  nor  do  I  see  the 
period,  for  the  present,  when  it  will;  but  when  it  can 
be  safely  and  justly  abolished  it  is  the  purpose  of 
Republicanism  to  do  so. 

"  Now,  sir,  these  are  the  principles  of  the  Republican 
party.  Let  those  who  approve  them  aid  in  their  prop 
agation, —  not  here,  for  we  do  not  propose  to  propa 
gate  them  here,  but  elsewhere.  Let  those  w7ho 
condemn  these  principles  oppose  us.  For  ourselves, 

1  Corwin  had  said  that  in  climes  where  slave  labor  was  the 
only  profitable  kind  that  could  be  employed,  he  would  admit 
the  slave  system. 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  147 

we  have  resolved  to  stand  by  them  until  they  shall 
become  triumphant;  and  we  cheerfully  submit  them  to 
the  judgment  of  our  fellow  countrymen,  to  the  civil 
ized  nations  of  the  earth,  and  to  posterity."  * 

Mr.  Clemens,  of  Virginia,  commended  the  "  frank 
ness  and  manliness  "of  this  utterance,  but  he  wished 
to  know  more  specifically  as  to  the  attitude  of  Stevens 
and  his  party  on  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law.  In  reply, 
Stevens  recalled  his  own  vote  in  opposition  to  that 
law,  a  law  which  he  regarded  as  unconstitutional;  but 
he  said  that  he  had  no  objection  to  "  a  fair  law  giving 
to  the  South  the  opportunity  and  the  means  of  reclaim 
ing  their  slaves,"  and  that  so  long  as  the  court  decision 
holds  with  reference  to  the  law  of  1850,  he  would  not 
resist  its  execution.  Clemens  then  recalled  a  previous 
utterance  attributed  to  Stevens  in  which  the  latter  had 
announced  it  as  the  policy  of  his  party  "  to  encircle 
the  Slave  States  of  this  Union  with  Free  States  as  a 
cordon  of  fire,  and  that  then  slavery  like  a  scorpion, 
would  sting  itself  to  death."  Clemens  asked  if  Stevens 
had  ever  said  such  a  thing.  "  If  I  did,"  said  Stevens, 
"  it  is  in  the  books,"  though  it  might  be  that  the  gentle 
man  from  Virginia  was  thinking  of  a  remark  of  a 
New  York  friend  who  had  said  that  he  would  sur 
round  the  Free  States  "  with  an  atmosphere  of  freedom 
and  that  they  should  breathe  it  or  die."  Clemens  in 
sisted  that  it  was  the  genius  of  Stevens  that  had 
conceived  the  remark,  and  he  wished  to  know  if  it 
should  ever  come  to  pass  that  the  Republican  policy, 
as  Stevens  had  proclaimed  it,  should  prevail,  and 
slavery  were  abolished  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 

1  Globe,  Jan.  25,  1860,  p.  586. 


148      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

in  the  territories,  arsenals,  dockyards  and  forts;  and 
if,  in  addition,  that  party  should  have  the  power  and 
patronage  of  the  presidency,  and  the  prestige  of  the 
army  and  navy, —  whether  the  condition  described  in 
the  remark  would  not  then  be  realized  and  slavery 
would  be  forced  to  die  by  its  own  act,  like  the  pro 
verbial  scorpion  that  was  forced  to  sting  itself  to 
death  ? 

"  I  do  not  know,  not  being  a  prophet,"  retorted 
Stevens,  amid  laughter. 

Florence,  of  Penny slvania,  arose  to  submit  a  question 
of  figures,  "  because,"  he  said,  "  I  know  my  colleague 
was  once  a  schoolmaster."  "  Yes,"  said  Stevens,  "  I 
am  proud  to  say  that  I  have  taught  several  hopeful 
boys.  I  wish  I  had  taught  you,  too."  [Laughter.] 
Florence  begged  to  know  how  ninety  men  could  or 
ganize  the  House  when  one  hundred  and  nineteen  votes 
were  required  to  elect  the  Speaker,  and  he  referred  to 
the  intelligence  that  Stevens  had  pretended  to  have 
concerning  the  opinions  and  purposes  of  the  White 
House.  Stevens  replied  by  saying  that  if  a  few  Dem 
ocrats  would  "  step  out  some  day  during  the  voting, — 
get  a  little  sick,  or  go  out  to  get  something  to  eat,  or 
anything, —  we  could  then  elect  a  Speaker";  and  "as 
to  my  intelligence  of  White  House  affairs  the  gentle 
man  must  remember  that  the  President  is  one  of  my 
constituents."  [Renewed  laughter.]  To  this,  Flor 
ence  very  aptly  replied  that  "  if  the  gentleman  repre 
sents  his  other  constituents  no  better  than  he  does  the 
President,  there  is  little  hope  for  him." 

On  the  first  of  February,  the  long  contest  came  to  a 
close  by  the  election  of  Mr.  Pennington,  of  New  Jersey, 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  149 

whom  the  Republicans  substituted  for  Mr.  Sherman  as 
their  candidate.  Mr.  Pennington  was,  like  Mr.  Cor- 
win,  a  conservative  Old-Line  Whig,  who  did  not  think 
slavery  was  morally  wrong  in  itself,  who  as  Governor 
of  New  Jersey  had  recommended  the  enforcement  of 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  and  who,  as  Keitt,  of  South 
Carolina,  said,  was  "  taken  up  by  the  Republicans  to 
lure  over  floating  votes." 

After  the  organization  of  the  House,  Stevens  be 
came  a  member  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means, 
with  Mr.  Sherman,  of  Ohio,  as  chairman.  The  rest  A 
of  the  session  as  far  as  Stevens'  activities  were  con 
cerned,  was  chiefly  taken  up  with  his  work  on  tariff 
and  appropriation  bills,  and  with  some  discussion  of 
contested  elections. 

On  the  matter  of  contested  election,  he  recognized  the 
impossibility  of  the  members  of  the  House  wading 
through  the  testimony  and  passing  judicially  upon  a 
case.  Therefore,  members  could  act  only  on  the  find 
ings  of  the  committee  appointed  to  investigate.  The 
finding  of  a  partisan  House  was  apt  to  be  partisan. 
He  considered  it  a  great  misfortune  that  Congress  had 
not  adopted  the  system  of  Great  Britain,  that  of  having 
a  judicial  determination  of  such  cases,  permitting  a 
decision  to  be  final  when  made  by  a  judicial  committee 
sworn  to  try  the  case  on  the  law  and  the  evidence. 
This  had  worked  well  in  Great  Britain  and  in  some 
of  the  states  and  would  tend  to  avoid  partisan  un 
fairness.1 

/June  8,  1860,  Globe,  p.  2766.  This  enlightened  and  liberal 
view  does  not  harmonize  with  Stevens'  later  partisan  disposition 
in  contested  election  cases.  It  is  reported  that  upon  coming 
into  the  House  one  day  he  found  a  vote  in  progress  upon  an 


150     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  at  any  length  into  Stevens' 
repeated  pleas  for  a  protective  tariff.  Nothing  new 
could  be  offered  upon  the  subject,  but  the  old  argu 
ments  were  repeatedly  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
House  and  the  country  with  great  effect  by  Stevens. 
He  had  great  interest  in  the  protective  cause  and  deep 
convictions  as  to  its  wisdom.  He  held  that  the  ar 
gument  for  free  trade  was  always  metaphysical,  that 
for  protection  always  practical.  He  insisted  that  no 
nation  would  ever  reduce  free  trade  to  practise  until  all 
nations  were  of  one  size,  one  wealth,  one  skill,  one 
capital.  England  had  still  continued  protection  after 
her  corn  laws  were  repealed,  because  that  repeal  gave 
her  cheaper  food ;  and  cheaper  food  was  the  only  advan 
tage  that  American  manufacturers  had  ever  had  over 
the  English.  So,  also,  the  English  export  duty  on  coal 
had  a  protective  effect,  because  it  forced  her  neighbors, 
like  France,  to  pay  more  for  fuel  and  to  that  extent 
gave  the  English  manufacturer  the  advantage.  Ste 
vens  believed  it  to  be  the  true  policy  of  every  nation 
to  take  care  of  her  own  people  in  preference  to  the 
people  of  foreign  countries;  to  foster  and  promote 
domestic  industries  and  thus  give  employment  to  labor. 
His  motive  was  to  protect  the  labor  of  the  country 
and  let  the  idle  have  a  better  opportunity  to  work. 
He  would  not  mince  matters  by  declaring  himself  for 
a  tariff  "  with  incidental  protection."  The  bill  before 
the  House  was  nothing  more,  and  Stevens  asserted 
that  if  it  were  not  for  the  clause  repealing  the  ware- 
election  case,  and  when  he  inquired  as  to  the  merits  of  the  con 
testants  he  was  told  that  they  were  both  "  damned  rascals." 
"Well,"  said  Stevens,  "which  is  our  damned  rascal?"  Ac 
cordingly,  he  voted  for  his  own  party  rascal. 


ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR  151 

house  system,  he  would  not  support  it.1  '''  This  is  not 
a  tariff  for  protection,"  said  Stevens,  "  such  as  America 
ought  to  have;  but  it  is  the  best  we  can  get  in  these 
degenerate  days."  It  was  his  desire  to  pay  laborers  at 
home  instead  of  sending  the  money  across  the  water  to 
pay  the  laborers  and  keep  up  the  workshops  of  Europe. 

The  House  passed  the  revised  tariff  bill  which  was 
slightly  more  favorable  to  protection  than  the  tariff 
then  in  operation,  but  by  the  action  of  the  Senate,  the 
bill,  which  was  to  be  known  as  the  Morrill  Act,  went 
over  to  the  next  session. 

Before  the  Thirty-sixth  Congress  came  together  for 
its  second  session,  the  country  had  passed  through  one 
of  the  most  exciting  presidential  contests  in  its  history. 
Stevens,  as  one  of  the  delegates  from  Pennsylvania, 
attended  the  National  Convention  in  Chicago  in  which 
Lincoln  was  nominated.  As  in  1856,  he  again  pre 
ferred  Judge  McLean  as  the  candidate  of  his  party, 
though  his  state  delegation  supported  Simon  Cameron, 
whom  he  disliked.  The  Pennsylvania  delegation 
finally  came  to  the  support  of  Lincoln  in  preference  to 
Seward,  and  Stevens  voted  for  Lincoln  on  the  decisive 
ballot.  Now  that  the  Black  Republican  party  had 
succeeded  in  electing  a  President,  it  remained  to  be  seen 
what  effect  that  event  would  have  on  the  continuance 
of  the  Union. 

1  The  warehouse  system  provided  that  foreigners,  when  there 
was  slack  demand  for  the  supply  of  goods  which  they  had  at 
home,  might  send  their  goods  here  and  put  them  in  warehouses 
where  they  could  lie  three  years  without  paying  duty.  If  they 
kept  them  there  till  the  market  rose,  then  they  could  have  the 
articles  in  market  before  Americans  could  be  ready  to  com 
pete. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

DISUNION,   SECESSION,   AND    NO    COMPROMISE 

THE  issue  upon  which  Mr.  Lincoln  was  elected  to 
the  presidency  in  1860  was  the  restriction  of  slav 
ery  by  national  authority  to  the  area  of  the  Slave  States. 
As  Lincoln  himself  had  expressed  it,  the  question  was 
who  shall  control  the  national  government?  Shall  it 
be  controlled  by  those  who  believe  that  slavery  is  right 
and  ought  to  be  extended,  or  by  those  who  believe  that 
slavery  is  wrong  and  ought  to  be  restricted?  In  the 
minds  of  some  men  there  were  other  interests;  there 
may  have  been  side  issues,  eddies,  and  counter  currents, 
but  in  this  statement  of  Lincoln  is  found  the  gist  of 
the  great  controversy. 

But  upon  that  simple  issue  thus  so  clearly  stated, 
the  people  of  the  Free  States  were  by  no  means  united. 
To  thousands  of  Northern  people  who  loved  the  Union 
of  their  fathers,  the  anti-slavery  agitation  had  been 
only  a  hateful  source  of  discord  and  disunion.  Its 
very  existence  endangered  the  Union.  The  Pennsyl- 
vanian  who  was  then  President  of  the  United  States 
felt,  as  he  said  in  his  last  annual  message,  that  the 
continued  interference  of  the  Northern  people  with  the 
question  of  slavery  had  at  last  produced  its  natural 
results  in  disunion.  Buchanan  saw  no  blame  for  the 
then  sad  condition  of  the  country  except  in  the  "  fell 
spirit  of  fanaticism  "  as  represented  in  the  anti-slavery 

152 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE      153 

agitation.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  voters  in  the 
North  felt  that  the  Union  and  the  anti-slavery  cause 
could  not  abide  together.  They  looked  upon  the  Re 
publican  party  as  a  sectional  party  that  was  disturbing 
the  peace  of  the  country  and  threatening  the  Union. 
They  rather  sympathized  with  the  Southerners  whom 
they  considered  to  be  attacked  unfairly,  while  the 
Southerners  themselves,  unable  to  distinguish  between 
abolitionists  and  anti-slavery  men,  looked  upon  Lincoln 
and  his  party  as  hostile  to  their  section,  and  gave  him 
no  votes  worth  speaking  of.  Consequently  as  the  re 
sult  of  the  voting  in  1860,  the  Electoral  College  pre 
sented  the  country  with  a  President  who  was  the  choice 
of  only  a  popular  minority  in  the  states.  A  million 
more  votes  had  been  cast  against  Lincoln  than  had 
been  cast  for  him.  Even  in  the  states  of  the  solid 
North,  whose  electoral  votes  he  carried,  Lincoln's  pop 
ular  majority  against  the  combined  opposition  was 
very  meager.1  There  were  almost  as  many  against  him 
as  were  for  him.  And  many  thousands  of  those  who 
had  voted  for  Lincoln  did  so  in  the  feeling  that  the 
cry  of  disunion  was  but  an  idle  threat,  a  cry  of 
"Wolf!"  to  frighten  the  country,  a  false  alarm  to 
deter  men  from  voting  their  convictions  on  a  national 
policy  as  to  slavery. 

When,  therefore,  as  the  immediate  result  of  Lin 
coln's  election,  the  secession  of  the  cotton  states  went 
on  apace  and  the  Southern  Confederacy  was  formed, 
and  it  was  seen  that  the  Union  was  dissolving  and  the 
clouds  of  war  were  lowering  over  the  land,  many  of 
the  men  who  had  voted  for  Lincoln  were  affrighted  at 

1  About  230,000  in  all  the  Northern  States. 


154      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

what  they  had  done.  They  would  gladly  have  recalled 
their  ballots  and  would  have  made  such  concessions  to 
the  South  and  given  consent  to  such  adjustment  and 
compromises  as  would  have  guaranteed  immunity  and 
perpetuity  to  slavery.  Whatever  concession  was  found 
necessary  to  save  the  Union,  that  concession  should 
be  made,  and  the  disunion  seceders  themselves  were  to 
be  the  judges  of  the  necessity. 

One  of  the  most  astounding  revelations  in  our  history 
is  the  woful  lack  of  national  spirit  and  purpose,  the 
state  of  quaking  panic  and  fear,  which  seemed  to 
prostrate  the  country  before  the  determined  and  mili 
tant  spirit  of  the  South  in  the  secession  movement. 
Our  thirteenth  amendment,  decreeing  that  there  should 
be  no  slavery  within  the  United  States  nor  in  any  place 
subject  to  their  jurisdiction,  was  hailed  upon  its  pas 
sage  as  "  an  immortal  and  sublime  event."  But  the 
thirteenth  amendment  assented  to  in  1 86 1, -proposed  as 
a  compromising  means  of  saving  the  Union  and  passed 
by  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  the  national  Congress, 
was  an  event  of  quite  a  different  hue.  It  proposed 
to  make  slavery  perpetual,  beyond  the  power  of  the 
nation  to  repeal  or  to  recall.  The  feeling  seemed  to 
be  very  general  with  the  country  that  the  dissolution 
of  the  Union  would  be  the  greatest  calamity  that  could 
befall  civilization  in  America.  "  Rather  than  that," 
exclaimed  Charles  Francis  Adams,  "  let  the  heavens 
fall !  To  prevent  that,  let  every  other  cause  be  sacri 
ficed.  " 

It  was  this  feeling  that  was  behind  all  these  vain 
and  in  some  respects  humiliating  efforts  at  compromise. 
It  was  the  conviction  that  the  Union  must  be  saved  and 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE      155 

that  it  could  not  be  saved  by  a  resort  to  force,  but  only 
by  the  free  consent  of  the  individual  states.  A  resort 
to  the  sword  seemed  like  madness.  Senator  Stephen 
A.  Douglas,  who  sought  to  keep  his  finger  on  the  public 
pulse  as  much  as  any  man  in  public  life,  said  in  the 
Senate,  February  21,  1861,  "I  have  too  much  respect 
for  the  intelligence  of  Senators  to  believe  for  one 
moment  that  they  hope  to  preserve  the  Union  by  mili 
tary  force.  A  peaceful  settlement  is  a  perpetuation  of 
the  Union.  The  use  of  the  sword  is  war,  disunion, 
and  separation,  now  and  forever."  Wendell  Phillips 
had  said  that  the  South  had  a  perfect  right  to  form 
an  independent  government  of  its  own  if  it  chose, 
while  Horace  Greeley  in  his  historic  editorial  in  the 
New  York  Tribune  in  November,  1860,  under  the 
caption,  "  Let  the  Erring  Sisters  Depart  in  Peace," 
gave  a  piece  of  counsel  to  his  country  from  a  powerful 
organ  of  public  opinion  that  to-day  must  seem  only 
like  a  veritable  curiosity.  If  such  things  could  come 
from  the  anti-slavery  prophets  on  the  platform  and  in 
the  sanctum,  what  could  be  expected  from  common 
men  in  the  marts  of  trade  or  from  the  time-servers  in 
the  halls  of  legislation? 

Such  utterances  serve  to  illustrate  the  temper  of  the 
times.  They  were  times  of  indecision  and  uncertainty, 
of  doubt  and  dismay.  Men  hesitated  and  were  afraid, 
and  amid  the  multitude  of  counselors  the  dominant 
note  seemed  to  be  that  the  anti-slavery  case  that  had 
been  won  after  so  many  hard  years  of  struggle  should 
be  yielded  for  the  sake  of  peace.  Charles  Francis 
Adams  had  been  the  candidate  of  the  Free-soil  party 
for  Vice-President  in  1848,  a  party  that  had  been  re- 


156      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

garded  as  radical  and  positive  in  its  anti-slavery  pro 
gram.  It  was  no  other  anti-slavery  apostle  than  he 
who  now  proposed  the  amendment  perpetuating  slav 
ery.  He  proposed  that  no  future  amendment  propos 
ing  any  interference  with  slavery  "  shall  originate  with 
any  state  that  does  not  recognize  that  relation  within 
its  limits,  or  shall  be  valid  without  the  assent  of  every 
one  of  the  states  composing  the  Union."  "  This," 
says  Mr.  McCall,  "would  have  effectually  postponed 
until  the  millennium  the  peaceful  abolition  of  slavery 
under  law." 

Yet  this  proposal  received  nearly  the  unanimous 
support  of  the  committee  of  thirty-three  appointed 
by  the  House  to  consider  plans  of  compromise  and 
conciliation.  Hardly  a  proposition  was  made  in  favor 
of  slavery  that  the  committee  was  not  ready  to  en 
dorse.  Its  report  called  for  .the  enactment  of  Mr. 
Adams'  "  amendment,"  the  repeal  of  the  personal  lib 
erty  laws  in  the  Free  States;  the  admission  of  New 
Mexico  with  its  slave  laws ;  the  amendment  of  the  Fugi 
tive  Slave  Law  so  that  a  person  who  was  seized  by  a 
claimant  should  have  his  right  to  freedom  tried  by  a 
jury,  not  in  a  Free  State  where  he  was  seized,  and  of 
which  he  might  have  been  for  years  a  citizen,  but  in  the 
Slave  State  to  which  he  was  carried. 

The  compromise  proposals  made  in  the  Senate  were 
of  the  same  tenor.  The  plan  proposed  by  Senator 
Crittenden,  of  Kentucky,  known  as  the  "  Crittenden 
Compromise  "  was  the  most  prominent  and  compre 
hensive,  involving,  among  other  things,  the  extension 
of  the  Missouri  line  of  36°  30'  to  the  Pacific  and 
the  national  guarantee  and  protection  of  slavery  south 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE      157 

of  that  line;  that  further  guarantees  should  be  given 
concerning  the  return  of  fugitive  slaves;  that 
Congress  should  not  interfere  with  the  interstate 
slave-trade,  nor  abolish  slavery  in  the  District  of  Co 
lumbia  so  long  as  the  institution  existed  in  Virginia 
and  Maryland ;  and,  finally,  that  no  future  amendment 
to  the  Constitution  should  ever  affect  the  three-fifths 
allowance  of  slaves  in  Southern  representation,  or  the 
clause  for  the  rendition  of  fugitive  slaves,  nor  permit 
Congress  ever  to  interfere  with  slavery  in  the  states. 

Buchanan  in  his  weak  and  vacillating  message  had 
sought  to  demonstrate  several  distinct  propositions: 
that  the  anti-slavery  men  were  entirely  to  blame  for 
the  crisis;  that  South  Carolina  had  a  just  provocation; 
that  she  had  no  constitutional  right  to  secede,  but  that 
if  she  did  secede  there  was  no  power  in  the  national 
government  to  prevent  it.1  A  state  of  mind  like  that 
on  the  part  of  those  in  the  seats  of  power  would  allow 
the  Union  to  dissolve  by  inanition.  It  had  been  sup 
posed  that  Lincoln's  triumph  had  been  the  triumph  of 
freedom,  that  he  had  been  elected  to  oppose  slavery  in 
its  advance  across  the  continent.  It  was  thought  the 
nation  had  determined  to  tread  again  the  old  landmarks, 
—  in  the  footsteps  of  Washington,  of  Jefferson  and 
of  Mason, —  the  great  Virginians  who  had  in  their 
day  hoped  to  prevent  the  spread  of  slavery  and  to 
place  it  in  the  course  of  ultimate  extinction.  Were 
such  humiliating  concessions  —  they  could  not  be 
called  compromises  —  was  this  surrender  to  Southern 

1  Seward  satirized  this  attitude  by  saying  that  it  held  sub 
stantially  that  "  a  state  had  no  right  to  secede  unless  it  wished 
to  and  that  the  government  must  save  the  Union  unless  some 
body  opposes  it." 


158     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

demands  for  slavery  extension  to  be  the  result  of  the 
national  verdict  against  slavery,  merely  because  a  few 
Southern  States  had  passed  so-called  ordinances  of  se 
cession? 

It  was  most  fortunate  for  America  that  a  leader  had 
been  chosen  to  the  presidency  who  had  the  sagacity  to 
understand  and  the  courage  to  speak  the  truth  that 
the  people  then  needed  most  to  hear.  Lincoln's  vision 
was  clear  and  his  purpose  unhesitating  upon  the  vital 
issue.  On  the  point  of  extending  slavery  he  was  in 
flexible,  as  firm  as  a  chain  of  steel.  "  I  am  for  no 
compromise,"  he  said,  "  which  assists  or  permits  the 
extension  of  slavery  on  soil  owned  by  the  nation." 
He  asserted  that  the  instant  such  a  compromise  were 
agreed  to,  "  they  have  us  under  again.  All  our  labor 
is  lost,  and  sooner  or  later,  must  be  done  over.  The 
tug  has  to  come,  and  better  now  than  later.  .  .  .  Any 
trick  by  which  the  nation  is  to  acquire  territory  and 
then  allow  some  local  authority  to  spread  slavery  over 
it  is  as  obnoxious  as  any  other.  To  effect  some  such 
result  as  this  is  the  object  of  all  these  proposed  com 
promises." 

This  expressed  precisely  the  state  of  mind  of  Stevens 
upon  the  proposal  to  surrender  the  paramount  issue 
in  order  to  conciliate  the  South.  When  one  reads  the 
proposed  concessions  offered  to  the  South,  like  tearful 
pleadings  to  recall  the  wayward  sisters  from  their  illegal 
course  of  secession  and  dismemberment,  one  feels  that 
the  need  of  the  nation  and  of  the  hour  was  men,  men 
of  convictions,  men  of  nerves  and  spines,  such  men  as 
Oliver  Cromwell  or  Andrew  Jackson.  The  hour 
needed  steady  men,  with  vision  clear  enough  to  see 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE     159 

that  the  South  was  not  to  be  placated  by  compromise, 
men  who  knew  the  South  well  enough  to  know  that  the 
only  concession  that  would  satisfy  the  aggressive 
leaders  of  the  Slave  States  involved  the  complete  sur 
render  of  the  free-soil  principle  on  which  the  nation 
had  just  elected  to  live. 

There  were  a  few  such  men  in  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  boldest  and  ablest  of  all  was 
Thaddeus  Stevens.  The  attitude  of  Buchanan,  marked 
by  indecision  and  fear,  and  offering  official  apologies 
for  secession,  was  like  gall  and  wormwood  to  Stevens. 
He  had  a  stout  heart  and  he  was  not  disposed  to 
shrink  in  the  face  of  danger,  but  rather  to  stand  his 
ground  and  fight  for  his  cause.  He  heartily  disliked 
Buchanan,  whom  he  looked  upon  as  a  doctrinaire  and 
nerveless  dotard  whose  presidency  at  this  crisis  was 
nothing  short  of  a  calamity  to  his  country.  He  was 
disposed  to  look  upon  the  presidential  office  as  vacant 
while  James  Buchanan  was  drawing  the  salary.  He 
would  give  forth  no  uncertain  sound.  It  is,  therefore, 
something  of  a  relief,  like  a  breath  of  fresh  air  in  an 
atmosphere  of  depression,  in  those  days  of  weakness 
and  surrender,  of  hesitation  and  doubt  and  compro 
mise,  when  many  of  his  weak-kneed  colleagues  were 
ready  to  throw  over  the  very  cause  for  which  they  had 
won  their  political  victory, —  it  is  a  relief  to  read  such 
bold  and  ringing  utterances  for  the  vindication  of  the 
national  authority  as  Stevens  gave  forth.  A  few  years 
later  it  was  easy  to  see  that  the  times  called  for  just 
such  a  type  of  leader.  But  it  was  only  in  the  retrospect 
that  the  great  indecisive  majority,  looking  back  on 
those  times  that  tried  the  fibers  of  men,  could  applaud 


160     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  sentiment  that  Stevens  then  uttered  when  he  ex 
claimed,  "  Oh !  for  an  hour  of  Andrew  Jackson !  " 

Stevens  believed  that  if  a  state  had  no  power  to 
secede,  then  the  nation  had  a  right  to  its  remaining  in 
the  Union,  and  if  the  nation  had  this  right  then  it 
must  have  the  power  to  defend  it.  On  December  31, 
1860,  he  introduced  a  resolution  calling  upon  Buchanan 
to  inform  the  House  as  to  the  situation  of  the  forts, 
arsenals  and  public  property  about  Charleston.  He 
desired  that  the  administration  should  not  hesitate  to 
defend  this  property.  Stevens  was  ready  to  live  up 
to  the  compromises  of  the  Constitution  as  they  had 
been  originally  made  and  to  abide  by  the  compromises 
on  slavery  that  had  been  made  since  the  Constitution 
had  gone  into  operation.  But  he  believed  that  the  time 
for  compromise  and  conciliation  had  gone  by.  He  saw 
no  spirit  of  concession  and  conciliation  in  the  Southern 
leaders,  and  he  had  no  patience  whatever  with  the 
weak,  do-nothing  character  of  President  Buchanan's 
message ;  and  when  a  routine  motion  was  made  that  so 
much  of  the  President's  message  as  relates  to  the 
present  perilous  condition  of  the  country  be  referred 
to  a  special  committee  of  thirty-three,  one  from  each 
state,  Stevens  voted  against  it.  The  futility  of 
further  compromise  was  obvious  to  him.  He  held  that 
negotiation  was  ended  by  the  solemn  declaration  of 
the  seceding  party  that  they  will  not  listen  to  conces 
sion  or  compromise.  He  called  the  committee  of 
thirty-three  the  "  Committee  on  Incubation."  "  This 
committee,"  says  Mr.. Elaine,  "arrived  at  a  series  of 
conclusions  which  tended  only  to  lower  the  tone  of 
Northern  opinion  without  in  any  degree  appeasing  the 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE      161 

wrath  of  the  South.  The  record  of  the  committee  is 
one  which  can  not  be  reviewed  with  pride  or  satisfac 
tion  by  any  citizen  of  a  loyal  state.  Every  form  of 
compromise  which  could  be  suggested,  every  conces 
sion  of  Northern  prejudice  and  every  surrender  of 
Northern  pride,  was  urged  upon  the  committee." 

Stevens  would  have  no  part  nor  lot  in  any  such 
work.  To  him  it  was  all  a  craven-hearted  or  chicken- 
hearted  procedure.  When  the  report  of  the  committee 
came  in,  he  spoke  with  vigor  in  denunciation  of  it. 
He  characterized  the  report,  which  assumed  to  give  an 
estimate  of  Southern  grievances,  as  a  delicate  bit  of 
satire.  He  felt  that  the  only  manly  way  to  meet  the 
South  in  the  crisis  was  in  the  same  spirit  of  resolute 
purpose  and  determination  that  the  Southern  leaders 
themselves  had  shown.  And  the  sequel  shows  that 
he  knew  better  than  his  colleagues  the  temper  of  the 
South.  "  No  compromise,"  he  said,  "  can  be  made 
which  will  have  any  effect  in  averting  the  present  diffi 
culty.  I  regret  the  fact.  But  when  I  see  these  states 
in  open  rebellion,  seizing  forts,  arsenals  and  millions  \ 
of  public  property,  when  I  see  the  batteries  of  seceding  i 
states  blockading  the  highways  of  the  nation  and  their 
armies  in  battle  array  against  the  flag  of  the  Union; 
when  I  see  our  flag  insulted  and  that  insult  submitted 
to,  I  have  no  hope  that  concession,  humiliation,  and 
compromise  can  have  any  effect  whatever."  1 

News  from  the  South  confirmed  this  conviction  of 
Stevens.     A   Virginia   embassy   had   gone   to    South 
Carolina  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  that  state  to  ap 
point  commissioners  to  propose  amendments  to  the 
1Jan.  29,  1861,  Globe,  p.  621. 


1 62  THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

United  States  Constitution  in  order  to  retain  South 
Carolina  within  the  Union  and  to  secure  her  rights. 
South  Carolina  peremptorily  refused  to  appoint  such 
commissioners.  She  formally  resolved,  in  answer  to 
the  Virginia  embassy,  that  her  separation  was  final; 
that  she  had  no  further  interest  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  and  that  she  would  negotiate  with 
the  United  States  only  as  a  foreign  power. 

Under  such  conditions  Stevens  thought  that  homilies 
upon  the  Union  and  jeremiads  over  its  destruction 
could  be  of  no  use  except  to  display  fine  rhetoric  and 
eloquence.  He  was  convinced  that  the  Southern 
States  would  not  be  turned  from  their  deliberate  and 
stern  purpose  by  soft  words  and  touching  lamentations. 
It  would  do  them  no  credit ;  in  that  case  condemnation 
of  them  would  degenerate  into  contempt. 

Stevens  denounced  Buchanan's  message  as  contain 
ing  some  wholesome  truths  mixed  with  atrocious 
calumnies.  He  denied  what  Buchanan  affirmed,  that 
Northern  interference  with  slavery  was  responsible  for 
disunion.  "  The  President  knew,"  said  Stevens,  "  that 
the  anti-slavery  party  of  the  North  never  interfered, 
or  claimed  the  right  to  interfere,  or  expressed  a  desire 
to  intermeddle  with  slavery  in  the  states."  Stevens 
denounced  Buchanan,  because  after  denouncing  seces 
sion  as  a  great  wrong  he  had  come  to  the  impotent  con 
clusion  that  there  is  no  power  in  the  government  to 
prevent  or  punish  it.  He  thought  it  was  time  this 
question  were  solved,  time  to  decide  whether  this 
Union  exists  by  the  sufferance  of  individual  states. 
If  it  should  be  determined  that  secession  is  a  rightful 
act  or  there  is  no  power  to  prevent  it,  then  the  Union 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE     163 

is  not  worth  preserving  for  a  single  day.  Whatever 
disposition  we  may  make  of  the  present  difficulty, 
fancied  wrong  will  constantly  arise  and  induce  state 
after  state  to  withdraw  from  the  confederacy.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  decided  that  we  are  one 
people  and  the  government  possesses  sufficient  power 
to  coerce  obedience,  the  public  mind  will  be  quieted, 
plotters  of  disunion  will  be  regarded  as  traitors,  and 
we  shall  long  remain  a  happy  and  united  people. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Stevens  was  not  disposed  to 
resort  to  soft  words  as  a  means  of  turning  away  South 
ern  wrath.  He  was  accustomed  rather  to  defy  that 
wrrath  and  to  stir  it  to  hotter  flame.  '  The  real  ag 
gression,"  he  said,  "  which  one  of  the  states  frankly 
assigns  as  the  reason  of  secession,  is  that  the  North  \ 
has  taken  from  them  the  power  of  government  which  \ 
they  have  held  so  long.  They  have  elected  the  man 
of  their  choice  President  of  the  United  States.  The 
American  people  have  used  no  violence  or  malpractise, 
but  they  have  dared  to  disobey  the  commands  of  slav 
ery,  and  this  is  proclaimed  as  just  cause  for  secession 
and  civil  war.  Can  not  the  people  of  the  United  States 
elect  whom  they  will  for  President  without  stirring 
up  rebellion  and  requiring  humiliating  concessions  to 
appease  the  insurgents?  I  would  take  no  steps  to  , 
propitiate  such  a  feeling.  Rather  than  show  repent 
ance  for  the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln  with  all  its  con 
sequences  I  would  see  this  government  crumble  into 
a  thousand  atoms.  If  I  can  not  be  a  freeman  let  me 
cease  to  exist." 

It  was  in  this  spirit  that  Stevens  faced  the  crisis  of 
disunion  and  secession.     Stevens,  in  common  with  the 


1 64      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

great  majority  of  his  countrymen  at  this  time,  did  not 
believe  there  would  be  a  serious  struggle.  He  would 
reduce  South  Carolina  by  peaceful  means.  He  would 
send  no  armies  there  to  wage  war.  But  he  would  an 
nul  all  postal  laws  within  her  territory  and  stop  the 
mails  at  the  border  of  the  state;  he  would  abolish 
all  laws  establishing  ports  of  entry  and  collection  dis 
tricts  within  the  state  and  prevent  all  vessels,  foreign 
or  domestic,  from  entering  or  leaving  any  of  her  ports. 
She  could  not  then  send  her  cotton  or  her  surplus 
products  abroad.  No  vessel  could  load  within  her 
harbors;  she  would  be  without  officers  to  give  her  a 
clearance,  without  papers,  without  nationality,  and  she 
would  be  a  prize  to  the  first  captors.  Southern  sea 
ports  would  then  be  a  barren  waste,  without  commerce, 
and  without  industry. 

Stevens  had  no  sympathy  with  the  impulsive  emo 
tional  sentiment  of  letting  "the  erring  sisters  go  in 
peace."  "  Those  who  counsel  the  government,"  he 
said,  "  to  let  them  go  and  destroy  the  national  Union 
are  preaching  moral  treason.  I  can  understand  such 
doctrine  from  those  who  conscientiously  dislike  a  part 
nership  in  slaveholding,  who  desire  to  see  this  em 
pire  severed  along  the  black  line  so  they  could  live  in 
a  free  republic."  Such  might  have  been  the  voice  of 
Garrison  and  the  radical  abolitionists,  but  it  was  not 
the  voice  nor  temper  of  Stevens. 

It  was  often  said  in  the  beginnings  of  secession  that 
it  was  the  purpose  of  the  Southern  leaders  to  take  their 
states  out  of  the  Union  as  a  means  of  imposing  con 
ditions, —  in  the  belief  that  better  terms  could  be  made 
out  of  the  Union  than  in  it.  They  would  then  come 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE      165 

back  masters  of  the  situation.  Stevens  warned  the 
South  against  this  error,  a  warning  to  which  subse 
quent  years  added  a  forceful  emphasis. 

"  Let  no  Slave  State  flatter  itself  that  it  can  dissolve 
the  Union  now  and  then  reconstruct  it  upon  better 
terms.  The  present  Constitution  was  formed  in  our 
weakness.  Some  of  its  compromises  were  odious  and 
have  become  more  so  by  the  unexpected  increase  of 
slaves.  Now  in  our  strength  the  conscience  of  the 
North  would  not  allow  them  to  enter  into  such  a  part 
nership  with  slavery.  If  this  Union  should  be  dis 
solved  its  reconstruction  would  embrace  one  empire 
wholly  slave  and  one  republic  wholly  free.  While  we 
will  religiously  observe  the  present  compact  nor  at 
tempt  to  be  absolved  from  it,  yet  if  it  should  be  torn  to 
pieces  by  rebels  our  next  United  States  will  contain 
no  foot  of  ground  on  which  a  slave  can  tread,  no 
breath  of  air  which  a  slave  can  breathe.  Then  we  can 
boast  of  liberty.  Then  we  can  rise  and  expand  to 
the  full  stature  of  untrammeled  freemen  and  hope 
for  God's  blessing.  Then  the  bondmen  who  break 
their  chain  will  find  a  city  of  refuge." 

Stevens  held  that  the  pretexts  used  to  justify  se 
cession  were  trivial.  The  Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  gen 
erally  executed;  its  violation  was  the  exception. 
Southern  people  could  visit  the  North  freely  and  in 
safety  and  enjoy  full  liberty  to  defend  and  propagate 
the  doctrine  of  slavery.  On  the  other  hand,  for 
twenty  years  it  had  been  unsafe  for  Northern  men  to 
travel  or  settle  in  the  South  "  unless  they  would  avow 
their  belief  that  slavery  was  a  good  institution." 
"  They  can  not  expect,"  he  said,  "  to  make  us  love 


1 66     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

slavery  or  withhold  the  utterance  of  our  just  abhor 
rence  of  it.  They  can  not  hope  to  make  the  honest 
masses  of  the  people  adopt  the  blasphemy  of  some  of 
their  clergymen  and  call  it  a  divine  institution.  They 
have  too  much  respect  for  their  temporal  character  and 
their  eternal  salvation."  1 

Stevens'  purpose  was  to  administer  a  tonic,  to  brace 
his  colleagues  and  the  country  to  resist  cowardly 
counsels  calculated  to  unnerve  the  people.  He  was 
reminded  that  his  language  was  not  that  of  Penn 
sylvania  as  represented  by  the  united  voice  of  her 
two  Senators.  He  denied  that  the  Senators  repre 
sented  the  principles  of  the  people  of  his  state. 
"  Pennsylvania  would  go,  as  I  would,"  he  said,  "  to 
the  verge  of  the  Constitution  and  of  her  principles 
to  maintain  peace.  But  it  is  a  libel  on  the  good  name 
of  her  virtuous  people  to  say  that  she  would  sacrifice 
her  principles  to  obtain  the  favor  of  rebels.  I  be 
lieve  it  to  be  a  libel  on  her  manhood  to  say  that  she 
will  purchase  peace  by  concessions  to  insurgents  with 
arms  in  their  hands.  If  I  thought  such  was  her  char 
acter,  I  would  expatriate  myself.  I  would  leave  the 
land  where  I  have  spent  my  life  from  early  manhood 
to  declining  age  and  would  seek  some  spot  untainted 
by  the  coward  breath  of  servility  and  meanness." 

It  was  the  guns  at  Sumter  that  aroused  the  people 
of  the  North  from  their  fear.  When  the  flag  of  the 
Union  was  fired  on  at  Sumter,  the  latent  national 
spirit  in  the  North  seemed  to  find  expression.  The 
lowering  of  the  flag  before  hostile  guns  raised  a  new 
issue.  It  was  not  now  a  question  whether  slavery 

1  Globe,  Jan.  29,  1861. 


DISUNION  AND  NO  COMPROMISE      167 

should  be  extended  or  the  South  conciliated.  It  was 
now  a  question  of  national  unity  and  the  enforcement 
of  the  national  authority  against  secession  and  dis 
memberment.  Upon  that  issue  the  North  united. 

No  public  man  of  the  time  recognized  more  clearly 
than  Stevens  that  the  country  was  in  the  greatest 
danger  that  it  had  faced  since  the  inauguration  of 
Washington.  He  also  recognized  that  the  virtue  most 
needed  in  such  a  time  of  peril  was  "  courage,  calm  un 
wavering  courage, —  a  courage  wrhich  no  danger  could 
appall."  *  Amid  the  trials  and  doubts  and  darkness  of 
the  great  civil  struggle  upon  which  the  country  had 
entered  Stevens  more  than  any  other  man  in  the  halls  of 
Congress  exemplified  in  his  course  the  prime  quality 
most  needed  in  such  a  period, —  unhesitating  political 
courage. 

1  Speech  in  House  of  Representatives,  January  29,  1861. 


CHAPTER  IX 

SLAVERY  AND   THE   WAR 

T  INCOLN'S  election  had  been  carried  upon  the  re- 
•*— '  striction  of  slavery.  His  first  purpose  on  coming 
into  power  was  the  restriction  of  secession.  It  was 
clearly  wise  for  him  to  recognize  the  obvious  fact, — 
that  the  Union  cause  was  much  stronger  than  the 
anti-slavery  cause.  There  were  still  thousands  of 
Union  men,  especially  in  the  Border  States,  as  well 
as  among  Mr.  Lincoln's  party  opponents  in  the  North, 
in  whose  opinions  the  anti-slavery  agitation  was  the 
cause  that  had  produced  disunion  and  war;  to  whom 
"  coercion "  was  odious ;  who  thought  that  military 
force  as  a  means  of  holding  the  states  together  was 
not  only  useless  but  pernicious;  who  believed,  or  pro 
fessed  to  believe,  that  the  national  authority  could 
never  be  successfully  asserted  by  the  bayonet  and  the 
sword  against  such  a  powerful  revolution  as  that  rep 
resented  by  the  Confederated  Slave  States;  that  com 
promise  and  conciliation  were  still  the  only  hope  of  the 
Union.  Some  of  this  unionism  may  have  been  mere 
pretense, —  a  mere  cloak  to  cover  purposes  of  aid  and 
comfort  to  the  secessionists  of  the  South.  Some  of 
it  certainly  was  pretty  weak  and  unstable.  But  what 
ever  of  weight  there  was  in  it  Lincoln  wished  to  make 
use  of  against  the  cause  of  secession.  He  would  bring 
every  possible  man,  every  ounce  of  opinion,  to  the  sup- 

1 68 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  169 

port  of  the  Union.  To  this  end  he  was  ready  to  hold 
in  check  anti-slavery  purposes  and  tendencies.  His 
first  desire  was  to  unite  the  North,  divide  the  South, 
save  the  Border  States,  and  preserve  the  Union. 

For  this  reason  Mr.  Lincoln's  inaugural  address  was 
quite  conciliatory  in  its  attitude  toward  slavery  and  the 
South.  He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  plat 
form  of  his  party  committed  him  both  to  "  the 
preservation  of  the  Union  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
right  of  each  state  to  order  and  control  its  own  do 
mestic  institutions  according  to  its  own  judgment." 
He  reiterated  this  sentiment  of  his  party  platform,  and 
quoting  one  of  his  former  speeches  he  said,  "  I  have 
no  purpose  either  directly  or  indirectly  to  interfere 
with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  states  where  it 
exists.  I  believe  I  have  no  lawful  right  to  do  so, 
and  I  have  no  inclination  to  do  so."  Lincoln  thus 
sought  with  earnest  purpose  to  convince  the  South 
that  his  intentions  were  not  hostile,  and  that  the  in 
stitution  of  slavery  had  no  cause  to  fear  interference 
from  the  executive  authority  of  the  nation. 

His  efforts  were  in  vain.  The  South  believed  that 
the  dominance  of  a  party  that  was  anti-slavery  in  its 
antecedents  and  purposes,  under  the  administration  of 
a  leader  who  had  declared  that  the  Union  could  not  ex 
ist  "  half  slave  and  half  free,"  meant  the  ultimate 
doom  of  slavery.  No  doubt  they  were  right  in  this 
opinion.  If  slavery  were  prevented  from  extending  it 
would  be  "  placed  in  the  course  of  ultimate  extinction." 
The  tree  of  slavery  would  be  girdled  and  left  to  die. 
Time,  public  opinion,  material  interests,  would  have 
made  slavery  impossible  within  another  generation. 


i ;o  THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

But  the  South  was  wrong  in  supposing  that  there  was 
any  purpose  of  political  interference  with  slavery  in 
the  states  on  the  part  either  of  Mr.  Lincoln  or  of  his 
party.  As  Thaddeus  Stevens  later  said,  when  Sumter 
was  fired  on  there  were  probably  not  three  thousand 
abolitionists  in  the  whole  country  who  were  disposed  to 
disregard  the  Constitution  or  violate  interstate  comity 
in  order  to  destroy  Southern  slavery.  But  the  South 
seceded  to  escape  from  a  government  that  they  thought 
was  hostile,  and  to  form  a  government  that  they 
thought  would  be  friendly  to  that  institution.  In  this 
feeling  and  action  there  were  many  men  in  the  North 
wrho  felt  that  the  South  had,  if  not  justification,  at  least 
serious  provocation,  and  that  the  Southern  States 
ought  to  be  given  ample  assurance  within  the  Union, 
even  more  than  they  already  had,  that  Southern  slav 
ery  would  never  be  endangered  from  Northern  aggres 
sion. 

On  these  issues  there  were  political  divisions  in  the 
North.  The  bombardment  of  Sumter  wrought  a 
change.  All  parties  then  merged,  in  the  great  national 
uprising,  into  the  party  of  the  Union.  Controversies 
over  abolitionism  and  slavery  ceased.  The  voice  of 
faction  and  party  contention  was  stilled,  and  the  leaders 
of  all  parties  called  upon  their  followers  to  rally  round 
the  flag  and  to  stand  for  the  Union  and  the  integrity 
of  their  nation.  The  people  responded  with  practical 
unanimity.  They  rallied  to  the  support  of  the  gov 
ernment,  not  to  prevent  the  spread  of  slavery,  nor  to 
interfere  with  slavery  in  the  states, —  a  proposal  which 
all  parties  since  the  foundation  of  the  government  had 
recognized  as  being  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Consti- 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  171 

tution, —  but  to  save  the  Union  and  the  Constitution 
of  their  fathers. 

This  primary  purpose  was  clearly  expressed  by  Con 
gress  at  the  opening  of  the  war.  In  the  famous  Crit- 
tenden  Resolutions  of  July  22,  1861,  immediately  after 
the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  Congress  gave  official  defini 
tion  to  the  object  of  the  war.  These  resolutions 
recited,  in  substance,  that  the  war  was  prosecuted  on 
the  part  of  the  national  government  not  to  conquer  or 
subjugate  the  Southern  States,  that  is,  not  to  reduce 
them  to  provinces,  nor  to  interfere  with  slavery  in 
those  states;  but  to  preserve  the  Union  and  to  defend 
and  maintain  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  "  with  all 
the  dignity,  equality,  and  rights  of  the  several  states 
unimpaired,  and  that  as  soon  as  these  objects  are 
accomplished  the  war  ought  to  cease."  1  The  evidence 
is  conclusive  that  it  was  not  the  original  purpose  of  the 
nation  in  the  Civil  War  to  interfere  with  slavery.  If 
it  had  been  but  a  hundred  days'  war  it  would  prob 
ably  have  ended  with  slavery  intact.  There  is  no  doubt 
but  that  the  Crittenden  Resolutions,  at  the  time  they 
were  offered,  voiced  the  public  opinion  of  the  country 
and  almost  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  Republican 
party.  President  Lincoln  accepted  this  policy  and  was 
ready  to  make  it  his  own.  In  a  conservative  spirit 
he  attempted  at  first  to  conduct  the  war  without  inter 
fering  with  slavery,  on  the  assumption  that  the  status 
of  the  states  and  their  relation  to  the  Union  had  not 
changed. 

But  there  were  a  few  men  in  the  country  —  probably 
one  in  ten  thousand  —  of  the  more  pronounced  and 

1  Congressional  Globe,  July  22,   1861, 


172     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

radical  anti-slavery  type,  who  believed  at  the  outset 
that  the  Rebellion  must  result  in  the  destruction  of 
slavery.  Stevens  was  one  of  these.  He  had  opinions 
of  his  own,  with  no  disposition  to  wait  upon  a  conven 
tional  majority.  When  the  Crittenden  Resolutions 
were  offered,  he  objected  to  them  and  withheld  his  vote. 
He  was  one  of  four  in  the  House  who  were  not  ready  to 
subscribe  to  its  doctrines.  He  would  not  embarrass 
the  government  nor  prevent  its  dealing  a  blow  in  op 
position  to  slavery  when  occasion  should  arise.  He 
wished  the  government  to  have  a  free  hand,  an  un 
restricted  liberty  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  he 
did  not  wish  Congress  to  commit  the  country  to  a  doc 
trine  from  which,  as  he  believed,  it  would  soon  have 
to  recede.  He  believed  at  the  start  what  Lincoln  came 
to  believe  later  in  the  war,  that  in  such  a  crisis,  Con 
gress  and  the  President,  representing  a  sovereign  na 
tion  in  the  conduct  of  war,  had  a  right  to  take  "  any 
steps  which  might  best  subdue  the  enemy."  1 

Time  was  soon  to  vindicate  Stevens'  opinion  in  re 
spect  to  the  effect  of  the  war  upon  the  attitude  of  the 
government  toward  slavery.  A  few  short  months  of 
war  made  all  the  difference  in  the  world  and  wrought 
a  decided  change  in  the  purpose  and  temper  of  Con 
gress  and  the  country.  It  was  seen  that  slavery  was 
a  source  of  strength  to  the  Rebellion.  Conservative 
Union  men  were  being  rapidly  and  radically  convinced 
that  if  the  national  government  did  not  interfere  with 
slavery,  slavery  would  seriously  interfere  with  the  na 
tional  government,  and  the  success  of  its  arms.  This 
change  in  policy  and  purpose  is  indicated  by  the  fact 

1  Life  and  Writings  of  B.  R.  Curtis,  I,  p.  348. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  173 

that  when  the  Thirty-seventh  Congress  came  together 
again  in  its  regular  session  in  December,  1861,  and  an 
attempt  was  made  to  reaffirm  the  Crittenden  Resolu 
tions,  which  had  received  such  universal  approval  but  a 
few  months  before,  they  were  decisively  rejected. 
They  were  rejected  by  a  party  vote  upon  the  motion  of 
Stevens,  who  had  thus  considerable  satisfaction  in  see 
ing  that  at  least  his  own  party  had  now  come  to  his 
position  in  asserting  its  freedom  from  a  doctrinaire  im 
pediment  to  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  that  the  nation 
was  now  to  feel  free  to  strike  at  slavery,  or  to  do  what 
ever  else  might  seem  best  calculated  to  promote  the  suc 
cess  of  the  national  cause. 

A  fortnight  had  not  gone  by  after  the  Crittenden 
Resolutions  were  offered,  defining -the  objects  of  the 
war  and  giving  an  implied  promise  that  slavery  would 
not  be  interfered  with,  before  slavery  had  become  a 
subject  of  sore  discussion  in  Congress.  It  came  up 
in  connection  with  the  first  Confiscation  Act  of  August 
3,  1 86 1.  To  this  measure  Stevens  gave  his  earnest 
support.  This  was  the  beginning  of  war  legislation 
concerning  slavery.  It  aroused  opposition,  because  a 
section  of  the  law  required  that  owners  should  forfeit 
the  slaves  whom  they  allowed  to  be  used  in  arms 
against  the  United  States  or  to  labor  in  forts  or  in- 
trenchments,  or  whom  they  should  employ  in  any  naval 
or  military  capacity  against  the  national  government. 

In  the  debate  on  confiscation,  August  2,  1861,  Stev 
ens  voiced  his  deep  opposition  to  slavery  and  his  pur 
pose  to  strike  at  that  institution  whenever  occasion 
offered.  He  said :  "  God  forbid  that  I  should  ever 
agree  that  the  slaves  should  be  returned  again  to  their 


i/4   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

masters  and  that  you  should  rivet  again  the  chains 
which  you  have  once  broken.  I  do  not  say  that  this 
war  is  made  for  that  purpose.  Ask  those  who  made 
the  war  what  its  object  is.  Do  not  ask  us.  I  did  not 
like  the  Crittenden  Resolutions  because  they  looked  like 
an  apology  from  us  in  saying  what  were  the  objects 
of  the  Avar.  Those  who  made  the  war  should  explain 
its  objects.  Our  object  is  to  subdue  the  rebels." 

In  this  first  discussion  of  the  war  touching  slavery, 
Stevens  predicted  the  arming  of  the  blacks  in  defense 
of  the  Union. 

"  If  this  war  continues  and  is  bloody,"  he  said,  "  I 
do  not  believe  that  the  free  people  of  the  North  will 
stand  by  and  see  their  sons  and  neighbors  slaughtered 
by  thousands  and  tens  of  thousands  by  rebels  with 
arms  in  their  hands,  and  forbear  to  call  their  enemies 
to  be  our  friends.  I  for  one  shall  be  ready  to  go  for 
it  —  arming  the  blacks  —  horrifying  to  gentlemen  as 
it  may  appear.  That  is  my  doctrine  and  that  will  be 
the  doctrine  of  the  whole  people  of  the  North  before 
two  years  roll  round." 

After  the  rejection  of  the  Crittenden  Resolutions  in 
December,  1861,  Stevens  wished  to  bring  his  party 
and  the  administration  to  higher  and  more  aggressive 
ground  upon  slavery  and  emancipation.  He  would 
speak  out  the  whole  truth  whether  his  colleagues  would 
hear  or  forbear.  On  December  3,  1861,  the  first  day 
of  the  regular  session  of  the  Thirty-seventh  Congress, 
Stevens  introduced  a  joint  resolution  for  enactment  into 
law  containing  two  propositions :  The  first  was  to 
strike  for  general  emancipation  as  the  best  means  of 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  175 

crushing  the  Rebellion;  the  second,  to  make  full  pay 
ment  for  losses  to  loyal  owners  by  this  policy.  His  res 
olution  asserted  that  slavery  had  caused  the  Rebellion 
and  that  there  could  be  no  peace  and  union  while  that 
institution  existed.  As  slaves  are  used  by  the  rebels 
for  supporting  the  war,  and  as  by  the  law  of  nations  it 
is  right  to  liberate  the  slaves  of  an  enemy  to  weaken  his 
power;  therefore  the  President  should  be  directed  to 
declare  free,  and  direct  our  generals  in  command  to 
order  freedom  to,  all  slaves  who  shall  leave  their  mas 
ters  or  aid  in  quelling  the  Rebellion. 

He  thus  urged  boldly,  at  the  very  outset  of  the  wrar, 
a  policy  of  nation-wide  emancipation.  He  would 
emancipate  all  slaves,  whether  of  loyal  or  rebel  masters, 
believing  that  if  slavery  were  left  anywhere  in  the 
South  it  would  go  everywhere.  He  urged  this  policy 
not  in  the  hope  of  getting  it  adopted  immediately,  but 
as  a  means  of  educating  public  sentiment  in  and  out  of 
Congress.  "  I  have  no  hope,"  he  wrrote  to  a  friend. 
"  Republicans  are  cowards,  and  Democrats  will  soon 
be  in  power  again,  as  pro-slavery  as  ever."  But  as 
for  himself  he  was  determined  that  he  would,  at  any 
rate,  speak  forth  the  truth  that  was  in  him  and  which 
he  thought  the  country  needed. 

Stevens'  notable  speech  of  January  22,  1862,  on 
these  resolutions  shows  him  to  be  one  of  the  earliest, 
boldest,  most  outspoken,  and  most  -influential,  of  the 
anti-slavery  advocates  who  were  seeking  to  direct  the 
war  to  anti-slavery  ends.  The  House  was  in  the  com 
mittee  of  the  whole  on  the  state  of  the  Union  and  the 
debate  was  taking  a  wide  range.  Because  Stevens  did 


1 76     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

not  expect  to  secure  the  adoption  of  this  policy  at  that 
time,  he  was  accused  by  the  New  York  Times  1  of  in 
dulging  in  talk  that  was  irrelevant,  wasting  the  time 
of  the  House  in  talking  about  what  was  not  before  it. 
Stevens  knew  that  Congress  and  his  party  were  not 
yet  ready  to  follow  in  the  line  of  his  proposals  and 
that  the  public  sentiment  of  the  country  did  not  sus 
tain  his  radical  policy.  But  he  wished  to  educate  that 
sentiment  and  to  lead  his  party  in  the  direction  that 
he  clearly  saw  would  ultimately  be  found  to  be  es 
sential.  He  felt  that  the  national  government  in  the 
conduct  of  the  war  so  far  had  been  weak,  timid,  vacil 
lating,  ineffective,  without  appreciation  of  the  formid 
able  task  before  it.  The  country  needed  a  tonic;  the 
administration  needed  nerve  and  a  stiffened  spine. 
Stevens  would  infuse  more  energy  into  the  prosecution 
of  the  war,  and  he  was  not  afraid  to  employ  the  means 
at  hand.  He  did  not  think  it  a  time "  for  honeyed 
words  and  conciliation.  There  was  no  sense  in  using 
the  words  of  conciliation  and  peace  where  there  was 
no  peace.  Speech  that  would  nerve  the  country  for 
war  was  the  message  that  was  needed.  The  business 
of  war  was  to  conquer,  and  in  the  war  now  forced 
upon  the  nation,  he  stood  for  firm,  unyielding,  un 
compromising,  conquering  force. 

It  seems  reasonable  to  say  that  in  energizing  the  war 
power  of  the  nation  and  leading  it  to  lay  hold  of  every 
possible  weapon  for  overcoming  resistance  to  the  na 
tional  authority  there  was  in  the  national  forum  no 
stronger  personal  force  than  Thaddeus  Stevens.  A 
review  of  his  speeches  will  give  one  a  high  apprecia- 

1  January  25,  1862. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  17; 

tion  of  their  educational  influence  in  this  direction. 
He  was  a  masterful  leader,  and  it  was  a  most  fortunate 
thing  for  the  national  cause  that  he  stood  in  a  place 
of  such  power  and  influence  in  such  a  crisis.  He  was 
bitter  and  unsparing  in  his  denunciation  of  the  South 
ern  leaders  for  their  course,  and  he  sought  to  arouse 
the  vigor  and  war  spirit  of  the  nation  to  crush  the 
South.  Men  of  power  were  needed  for  that  hour,  not 
men  of  soft  and  honeyed  words,  and  Stevens  wished 
the  nation  to  arouse  itself  and  assert  its  strength.  He 
brought  the  accusation  against  the  Southerners  of  hav 
ing  prepared  for  this  crisis  for  thirty  years  past. 
Secession  and  war  were  not  accidents  of  an  hour. 
While  these  Southern  leaders  held  the  reins  of  govern 
ment  and  could  perpetuate  and  extend  human  bondage 
they  deemed  it  prudent  to  stay  in  the  Union,  receive 
its  benefits,  and  hold  its  offices ;  but  when  they  saw  the 
growth  of  population  giving  power  to  the  North  they 
prepared  for  rebellion  against  the  Constitution  when 
they  could  no  longer  rule  under  it.1 

Though  this  represents  partisan  and  bitter  crimina 
tion  in  which  Stevens  frequently  indulged,  yet  it  is 
manifest  that  in  certain  ways  he  showed  a  better  con 
ception  of  the  Southern  spirit  and  character  and  of 
the  consequent  nature  of  the  task  before  the  country 
than  that  possessed  by  his  opponents  and  critics.  Dis 
missing  all  hope  of  reunion  by  voluntary  concession 
from  the  South,  he  wished  to  have  it  clearly  recognized, 

1  In  order  to  avoid  excessive  length  of  quotation  I  have  re 
duced  passages  from  Stevens,  and  have  in  some  cases  used 
abridged  phrases  without  sign  of  omission.  I  think  I  have  not 
misrepresented  his  meaning  in  any  degree.  When  he  spoke  for 
himself,  no  one  could  misunderstand  him. 


178      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

as  it  should  have  been,  that  from  the  Southern  stand 
point  the  separation  of  the  states  was  final,  and  that 
the  Confederate  States  would  consent  to  reunion  only 
through  the  exhaustion  of  war.  This  was  exactly  the 
message  that  the  nation  needed  to  hear,  to  enable  it 
to  escape  from  a  weak,  dawdling  and  indecisive  policy, 
as  if  the  "  little  unpleasantries  "  were  to  end  in  another 
summer  campaign.1  The  disaster  resulting  from  this 
delusion  was  beyond  estimate,  but  it  was  a  delusion 
from  which  Stevens  never  suffered  and  against  which 
he  repeatedly  warned  his  countrymen  and  those  re 
sponsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  war.  The  war  would 
end  only  when  the  South  could  no  longer  resist,  only 
when  her  resources  were  exhausted.  "  How,  then," 
he  asked,  "  can  the  South  be  wholly  exhausted  ?  Let 
us  not  be  deceived.  Those  who  talk  about  peace  in 
sixty  days  are  shallow  statesmen.  The  war  will  not 
end  until  the  government  shall  more  fully  recognize 
the  magnitude  of  the  crisis;  until  they  have  discovered 
that  this  is  an  internecine  war  in  which  one  party  or 
the  other  must  be  reduced  to  hopeless  feebleness  and 
the  power  of  further  effort  shall  be  utterly  annihilated. 
It  is  a  sad  but  true  alternative.  The  South  can  never 
be  reduced  to  that  condition  so  long  as  the  war  is 
prosecuted  on  its  present  principles.  The  North  with 
all  its  millions  of  people  and  its  countless  wealth  can 
never  conquer  the  South  until  a  new  mode  of  warfare 
is  adopted.  So  long  as  these  states  are  left  the  means 

1  The  country  was  suffering  from  the  delusion  that  the  South 
,  would  in  a  short  time  repent  and  turn  from  her  course ;  or  that 
if  the  government  would  but  act  tenderly  and  kindly,  overtures 
of  peace  might  be  extended,  and  reconciliation  would  be  brought 
about  in  the  same  old  happy  Union ;  and  that,  at  any  rate,  con 
quest  and  subjugation  could  never  succeed. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  179 

of  cultivating  their  fields  through  forced  labor,  you 
may  expend  the  blood  of  thousands  and  billions  of 
money  year  by  year,  without  being  any  nearer  the  end, 
unless  you  reach  it  by  your  own  submission  and  the 
ruin  of  the  nation.  Slavery  gives  the  South  a  great 
advantage  in  time  of  war.  They  need  not,  and  do 
not,  withdraw  a  single  hand  from  the  cultivation  of 
the  soil.  Every  able-bodied  white  man  can  be  spared 
for  the  army.  The  black  man,  without  lifting  a  j 
weapon,  is  the  mainstay  of  the  war.  How,  then,  can 
the  war  be  carried  on  so  as  to  save  the  Union  and  con 
stitutional  liberty?  Prejudices  may  be  shocked,  weak 
minds  startled,  weak  nerves  may  tremble,  but  they  must 
hear  and  adopt  it.  Universal  emancipation  must  bo 
proclaimed  to  all.  Those  who  now  furnish  the  means 
of  war,  but  who  are  the  natural  enemies  of  slaveholders, 
must  be  made  our  allies.  If  the  slaves  no  longer  raised 
cotton  and  rice,  tobacco  and  grain  for  the  rebels,  this 
war  would  cease  in  six  months,  even  though  the  liber 
ated  slaves  would  not  raise  a  hand  against  their  mas 
ters.  They  would  no  longer  produce  the  means  by 
which  they  sustain  the  war."  1 

Stevens  saw  that  the  task  before  the  country  could 
be  accomplished  only  by  the  sacrifice  of  thousands  of 
lives  and  millions  of  money.  He  recognized  that  the 
Southerners  were  proud,  haughty,  forceful  and  master 
ful  for  war,  and  that  their  training  had  led  them  to  be 
lieve  that  they  were  born  to  command.  They  had 
declared  that  they  would  suffer  their  country  to  become 
a  smoking  ruin  before  they  would  submit.  Stevens 
would  accept  the  issue,  and  he  said  it  were  better  "  to 

1  Congressional  Globe,  January  22,  1862. 


iSo      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

lay  waste  the  whole  South  than  to  suffer  the  nation 
to  be  murdered,  better  to  depopulate  the  country  and 
plant  it  with  a  new  race  of  freemen,  than  to  suffer 
rebellion  to  triumph.  There  should  be  no  negotia 
tion,  no  parley,  no  truce  until  every  rebel  shall  have 
laid  down  his  arms  and  submitted  to  the  government." 
Stevens  had  little  regard  for  the  "  sympathizer  with 
treason,"  who  would  "  raise  an  outcry  about  a  servile 
insurrection  or  prate  learnedly  about  the  Constitu 
tion."  He  thought  a  rebellion  of  slaves  fighting  for 
their  freedom  was  not  so  abhorrent  as  a  rebellion  of 
freemen  fighting  to  murder  the  nation.  He  wished 
the  Northern  people  to  be  possessed  and  impelled  by 
the  inspiration  that  comes  from  the  glorious  principle 
of  freedom.  He  thought  the  North  had  not  shown 
"  the  fiery  zeal  that  impelled  the  South;  nothing  of 
that  determined  and  invincible  courage  that  was  in 
spired  in  the  Revolution  by  the  grand  idea  of  liberty, 
equality,  and  the  rights  of  man." 

"  Our  statesmen  do  not  seem  to  know  how  to  touch  the 
hearts  of  freemen  and  rouse  them  to  battle.  No  sound  of 
universal  liberty  has  gone  forth  from  the  capitol.  Our 
generals  have  a  sword  in  one  hand  and  shackles  in  the 
other.  Let  it  be  known  that  this  government  is  fighting  to 
carry  out  the  great  principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence  and  the  blood  of  every  freeman  would  boil  with 
enthusiasm  and  his  nerves  be  strengthened  for  a  holy  war 
fare.  Give  him  the  sword  in  one  hand  and  the  book  of 
freedom  in  the  other,  and  he  will  soon  sweep  despotism  and 
rebellion  from  every  corner  of  this  continent.  The  occa 
sion  is  forced  upon  us  and  the  invitation  presented  to  strike 
the  chains  from  four  millions  of  human  beings  and  create 
them  men;  to  extinguish  slavery  on  this  whole  continent; 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  181 

to  wipe  out  so  far  as  we  are  concerned  the  most  hateful 
and  infernal  blot  that  ever  disgraced  the  escutcheon  of  man ; 
to  write  a  page  in  the  history  of  the  world  whose  bright 
ness  shall  eclipse  all  the  records  of  heroes  and  sages."  1 

4 

This  was  effective  oratory,  the  oratory  of  convic 
tion  and  action.  It  was  spoken  at  a  time  in  the  early 
part  of,  1862  when  slavery  still  seemed  rooted  and 
grounded  in  the  policy  of  the  President  and  of  Con 
gress  and  in  the  public  sentiment  of  the  country.  Who 
will  say  that  the  voice  of  Stevens  was  not  a  power 
ful  influence  in  bringing  the  country  and  its  rulers 
to  the  higher  plane  of  emancipation,  to  a  readiness  to 
direct  the  war  for  liberty  as  well  as  for  union  ? 

When  this  speech  went  to  the  country  it  was  re 
ceived  with  joy  and  approval  by  the  radical  anti-slav 
ery  spirits  that  had  been  awaiting  in  patience  and  dis 
appointment  for  a  more  positive  and  aggressive  policy 
toward  slavery  on  the  part  of  the  administration. 
Stevens  received  many  approving  letters,  not  only  from 
his  own  constituents  but  from  distant  states. 

His  radical  anti-slavery  constituents  were  every 
where,  and  he  was  written  to  as  a  man  who,  amid 
wavering  and  doubt  and  dalliance,  was  bold  to  speak 
the  truth  and  who  dared  to  stand  up  for  his  convic 
tions.  Men  who  had  never  seen  him  and  of  whom  he 
had  never  heard,  sent  him  warm  greeting  and  blessing. 
It  is  evident  that  the  speech  had  a  resounding  effect 
and  that  it  was  a  potent  influence  toward  strengthening 
the  anti-slavery  cause  and  arousing  a  public  opinion 
that  subsequently  became  effective  in  controlling  the 
ruling  councils  of  the  country.  "  Every  true  patriot 

1  Globe,  January  22,  1862. 


1 82   THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

throughout  the  North,"  wrote  one,  "  nay,  in  the  wide 
world,  as  he  rises  from  the  reading  of  that  speech, 
ejaculates  from  the  holy  of  holies  of  his  heart,  '  God 
bless  you,  Thaddeus  Stevens/  Amid  all  the  obloquy 
and  insults  of  pro-slavers  and  devils  you  have  dared 
to  stand  up  a  man.  In  the  good  time  coming  you  will 
be  honored  for  it.  God  grant  that  it  may  be  during 
your  lifetime.  I  have  never  seen  you,  may  never  have 
the  pleasure,  yet  I  see  you  standing  grandly,  nay, 
proudly  magnificent,  while  the  burning  words  of  truth 
leap  from  your  lips  and  are  sped  on  the  wings  of  the 
lightning  to  gladden  the  souls  of  freemen  and  slaves. 
God  bless  you !  God  bless  Thaddeus  Stevens !  "  T 

A  gentle  God-fearing  Quaker  in  Pennsylvania  wrote 
him  that  "  all  lovers  of  freedom  have  been  made 
to  rejoice  in  thy  conduct.  I  have  been  wrought  be 
tween  hope  and  despair.  When  thee  offered  the  bill 
liberating  all  the  slaves  I  said,  '  That  is  noble,'  and  I 
truly  rejoiced;  but  it  \vas  not  long  before  I  found  the 
fools  and  sinners  among  you  were  so  many  that  the 
result  was  doubtful."  2 

Another  urged  that  no  compromise  should  be  per 
mitted  by  which  slavery  would  be  saved.  "  I  would 
fight  to  the  bitter  end.  I  am  truly  thankful  for  the 
course  you  have  taken  in  this  death  struggle.  I  hope 
and  pray  that  God  will  protect  and  preserve  you  to  the 
end  of  this  contest."  3 

It  was  perfectly  clear  to  Stevens  that  slavery  was 

1  Stevens'    Papers,   Library   of   Congress,   Letter   of   Wm.   W. 
Keith,  Wyoming,   N.  Y.,  Feb.  8,   1862. 

2  Stevens'  Papers,  Thomas  Whitson,  Willow  Glen,  Pa.,  March 
20,  1862. 

3  Stevens'  Papers,  Frederick  Miles,  Sugar-Grove,  Pa. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  183 

the  cause  of  the  war.  Without  that  institution,  in  his 
opinion,  America  might  have  continued  to  be  a  united 
and  happy  people,  and  so  long  as  slavery  existed  there 
could  be  no  solid  Union.  If  a  compromise  were 
patched  up  and  this  germ  of  evil  remained,  the  ex 
penditure  of  life  and  treasure  would  be  in  vain,  and 
the  peace  secured  would  be  but  a  delusion  and  a  snare. 
If  future  generations  are  to  live  in  peace  this  cause 
of  strife  must  be  removed.  Stevens  held  that  the 
principles  of  the  republic  and  slavery  were -wholly  in 
compatible,  that  the  two  could  not  live  together.  His 
unyielding  militant  purpose,  the  supreme  desire  that 
most  of  all  governed  his  public  life  in  the  period  of 
war,  was  to  bring  slavery  to  an  end  as  a  means  of 
crushing  the  Rebellion. 

Stevens  was  much  displeased  with  the  conservative 
policy  of  Lincoln  in  overruling  military  emancipation 
by  General  Fremont  in  Missouri,  in  August,  1861, 
and  by  General  Hunter  in  the  Department  of  the  South 
in  the  spring  of  1862.  He  became  a  sharp  critic  of 
the  administration  from  the  anti-slavery  point  of  view. 
As  the  war  continued  and  the  administration  still 
seemed  conservative  and  reluctant  to  pursue  an  anti- 
slavery  policy,  Stevens  repeatedly  expressed  his  dis 
satisfaction.  Lincoln's  message,  proposing  compen 
sated  emancipation,  he  characterized  as  "  the  most 
diluted  milk-and-water  gruel  proposition  that  was 
ever  given  to  the  American  nation."  He  urged  the 
passage  of  the  act 1  forbidding  the  return  of  fugitives, 
and  he  favored  every  act  looking  toward  anti-slavery 
ends.  He  said  he  could  not  approve  putting  generals 
1  March  13,  1862. 


184     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

who  sympathized  with  slavery  at  the  head  of  our 
armies  with  orders  to  pursue  and  return  fugitive  slaves, 
nor  did  he  like  it  to  have  our  forces  set  to  guard  the 
property  of  rebel  soldiers.  When  asked  if  he  intended 
his  charges  against  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
War  or  only  against  the  generals  in  the  field,  he  said 
his  remarks  should  "  apply  where  they  belong.  I  am 
no  sycophant,  no  parasite.  What  I  think  I  say.  These 
acts  have  been  perpetrated  without  rebuke.  Let  the 
world  determine  where  the  responsibility  rests.  I 
believe  the  President  is  as  honest  a  man  as  there  is  in 
the  world;  but  I  believe  him  to  be  too  easy  and  ami 
able,  and  to  be  misled  by  the  malign  influence  of  the 
Kentucky  counselors,  and  the  Border  State  men."  x 

For  rebuking  General  Hunter,  who  had  declared 
emancipation  within  his  military  district  on  the  ground 
that  slavery  and  martial  law  were  incompatible,  Stev 
ens  thought  the  administration  deserved  to  be  driven 
out,  and  he  denounced  its  policy  of  refusing  the  libera 
tion  and  employment  of  the  slaves.  He  would  seize  all 
property  of  disloyal  men  as  our  armies  advanced  and 
plant  the  South  with  a  military  colony,  if  the  Southern 
ers  would  not  otherwise  submit.  His  was  a  policy  of 
"  thorough  "  and  he  would  go  directly  to  the  end  in 
view, —  the  subjugation  of  the  rebels,  without  scruple 
or  hesitation.  It  was  Stevens'  opinion  that  the  "  trai 
tors  "  deserved  their  doom  and  in  the  face  of  such  a 
crisis  and  of  the  momentous  task  confronting  the  na 
tion,  he  felt  that  he  "  who  dallies  is  a  dastard  and  he 
who  doubts  is  damned."  He  would  allow  the  sol 
diers,  as  he  said,  to  occupy  the  heritage  of  traitors  and 

1  Globe,  July  5,  1862. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  185 

build  up  there  a  land  of  freemen  and  of  freedom, 
which  fifty  years  hence  would  swarm  with  its  millions 
without  a  slave  upon  its  soil.  He  urged  the  admin 
istration  not  to  be  afraid  of  the  cry  of  abolitionism, 
but  to  follow  out  the  policy  of  military  emancipation 
that  had  already  been  suggested  by  the  order  of  Gen 
eral  Hunter.  He  had  no  hope  of  success  in  the  war 
until  that  policy  was  adopted.  He  viewed  the  matter 
not  only  as  a  question  of  emancipation,  or  abolition, 
but  as  the  only  means  of  putting  down  the  Rebellion. 
To  this  policy  he  was  convinced  the  nation  would 
have  to  come  at  last,  and  to  delay  would  be  but  to 
lose.  Within  a  year's  time  he  had  the  satisfaction  of 
seeing  his  more  conservative  colleagues,  as  well  as  the 
administration  and  the  nation  at  large,  come  to  this 
doctrine  which  he  so  early  and  boldly  proclaimed. 

He  spoke  boldly  and  repeatedly  for  the  employ 
ment  of  negro  troops,  startling  and  shocking  as  the 
proposition  seemed  to  those  whom  he  considered  the 
craven  and  cowardly  conservatives.  He  was  not 
averse  to  shocking  those  who  were  constantly  urging 
gentle  processes  toward  the  "  erring  brothers  "  of  the 
South  and  who  demanded  that  the  war  be  conducted  in 
such  a  way  as  to  leave  slavery  intact.  "If  men  are 
to  be  shot  in  this  war,"  said  Stevens,  "  let  it  not  be  our 
cousins,  relatives  and  friends.  Let  it  be  the  slaves 
of  the  traitors  who  have  caused  the  war.  Would  that 
100,000  of  them  had  been  at  Richmond  to  receive  the 
first  fire  of  their  villainous  masters.  Am  I  to  stand 
here  and  be  told  that  it  will  not  do  to  let  black  men 
shoot  and  be  shot  at  instead  of  white  men !  I  abhor  the 
doctrine  and  despise  the  policy.  The  blood  of  thou- 


1 86  THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

sands  moldering  in  untimely  graves  is  upon  the  souls 
of  this  Congress  and  Cabinet.  I  no  longer  agree  that 
this  administration  is  pursuing  a  wise  policy.  Its 
policy  should  be  to  free  the  slaves,  enlist  and  drill  them, 
and  set  them  to  shooting  their  masters  if  they  do  not 
submit." 

Speaking  again  in  the  early  part  of  the  following 
year  for  the  enlistment  of  negro  troops  he  denounced 
an  opponent,1  for  saying  that  he  would  fight  only  for 
the  freedom  of  his  own  race.  "  That  patriotism,"  he 
said,  "  that  is  wholly  absorbed  in  one's  own  country 
is  narrow  and  selfish.  That  philanthropy  which  em 
braces  only  one's  own  race  and  leaves  the  other  numer 
ous  races  of  mankind  to  bondage  and  to  misery  is  cruel 
and  detestable."  2 

At  this  time,  in  February,  1863,  Stevens  recalled  his 
conviction  and  his  warning  that  neither  the  admin 
istration  nor  the  people  realized  the  magnitude  of  the 
war;  that  if  it  continued  every  bondman  belong 
ing  to  a  rebel  might  be  called  on  to  aid  in  the  restora 
tion  of  the  Union;  and  that  the  Union  would  not  be 
restored  until  the  Southerners  were  deprived  of  their 
main  support,  the  slaves.  Two  years  of  bloody  war, 
accumulating  debt,  bleeding  hearts  and  weeping  homes 
had  given  him  no  cause  to  change  his  opinion.  The 
Rebellion  was  still  in  the  field  with  as  brave  men  and 
better  generals  than  our  own,  and  unless  we  "  put 
more  energy  into  the  commanding  generals  and  gain 
victories,  all  I  predicted  will  happen, —  the  next  Con 
gress  will  be  in  other  than  Republican  hands."  Such 
a  result,  he  thought,  would  be  a  triumph  of  the  Re- 

1  May,  of  Maryland.  2  Globe,  Feb.  2,  1863. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  187 

hellion,  doing  more  to  divide  the  Union  than  twenty 
rebel  victories,  and  yet  "  we  are  told  that  we  must 
not  employ  the  oppressed  slave  against  his  oppressors." 
He  maintained  that  the  blacks  should  be  allowed  to 
bear  their  share  in  a  war  of  liberation.  He  defended 
them  against  the  charge  of  cowardice  and  he  expressed 
his  contempt  for  the  Northern  men  who  would  save 
the  property  of  rebels  and  fill  Southern  graves  "  with 
our  relatives  rather  than  the  property  of  traitors."  "  I 
do  not  expect  to  live  to  see  the  day/'  he  said,  "  when 
merit  shall  counterbalance  the  crime  of  color."  1 

During  the  summer  and  fall  of  1862,  Stevens  con 
tinued  his  criticisms  of  what  seemed  to  him  the  fatally 
conservative  policy  of  the  administration. 

Before  the  policy  of  emancipation  had  been  an 
nounced  to  the  country  by  President  Lincoln,  and  while 
the  country  was  amid  the  gloom  of  continued  military 
defeats,  the  outlook  was  decidedly  dark,  both  for  the 
Union  and  for  the  anti-slavery  cause.  Stevens  kept 
urging  Lincoln  to  break  away  from  the  influence  of 
timid  counselors;  to  reconstitute  his  Cabinet;  to  cut 
out  the  Blairs;  to  assert  himself  against  the  Border 
State  politicians ;  to  reanimate  the  country  with  a  zeal 
for  liberty  as  well  as  a  love  for  the  Union ;  and  to  lay 
hold  boldly  upon  every  weapon  of  attack,  political  and 
military,  with  which  he  might  prosecute  the  war  and 
defeat  the  enemy.  He  had  no  faith  in  Border  State 
Unionism. 

His  purpose  was  to  stir  up  the  people  that  a  proper 
public  sentiment  might  be  brought  to  bear  upon  those 
in  power.  Unless  a  change  of  policy  could  be  brought 
1  Globe,  Feb.  2,  1863. 


i88      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

about,  he  had  no  hope.  Unless  Lincoln  could  be 
forced  to  commit  himself  boldly  to  the  anti-slavery 
cause,  and  to  fight  the  Rebellion  in  such  a  way  as  to 
bring  the  greatest  possible  injury  to  its  promoters, 
he  feared  that  a  base  peace  would  have  to  be  negotiated. 
To  avoid  that  Stevens  was  ready  to  resort  to  any 
extreme. 

"  It  seems  to  me,"  he  wrote,  on  August  10,  1862, 
"  that  we  are  just  as  far  from  the  true  course  as  ever. 
Unless  the  people  speak  in  their  primary  assemblies  no 
good  will  come,  and  there  seems  little  chance  of  that. 
A  change  of  Cabinet  is  our  only  hope." 

Again,  writing  from  Lancaster,  September  5,  1862, 
he  expressed  the  dark  and  pessimistic  view  which  had 
been  forced  upon  him  by  the  circumstances  and  defeats 
from  which  the  country  and  the  anti-slavery  cause  were 
suffering.  "  The  symptoms  give  me  no  promise  of 
good.  The  removal  of  Hunter  and  Butler  and  the  con 
tinued  refusal  to  receive  negro  soldiers,  convince  me 
that  the  administration  are  preparing  the  people  to  re 
ceive  an  ignominious  surrender  to  the  South.  It  is 
plain  that  nothing  approaching  the  present  policy  will 
subdue  the  rebels.  Whether  we  shall  find  anybody 
with  a  sufficient  grasp  of  mind  and  sufficient  moral 
courage  to  treat  this  as  a  radical  revolution  and  remodel 
our  institutions,  I  doubt.  It  would  involve  the  desola 
tion  of  the  South  as  well  as  emancipation,  and  a  re- 
peopling  of  half  the  continent.  This  ought  to  be  done, 
but  it  startles  most  mew."  1 

The  fall  elections,  indicating  a  reaction  that  meant 
rebuke  and  defeat  for  the  Republican  party  and  Mr. 

1  Stevens'  Correspondence. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  189 

Lincoln's  administration,  did  nothing  to  daunt  the  ag 
gressive  spirit  of  Stevens.  These  political  defeats 
seemed  rather  to  fan  the  flame  of  his  radicalism  and 
to  lead  him  to  insist  all  the  more  that  the  Cabinet 
should  be  reorganized  and  a  more  pronounced  policy 
against  slavery  should  be  adopted.  "  Nothing  seems 
to  go  right,"  he  wrote.  "  I  am  almost  despairing. 
Without  a  new  Cabinet  there  is  no  hope.  It  were  a 
great  blessing  if  Seward  could  be  removed.  It  would 
revive  hope,  though  I  fear  it  can  not  be  done.  But 
Fessenden  is  not  the  man  for  his  successor.  He  has 
too  much  of  the  vile  ingredient  called  conservatism, 
which  is  worse  than  secession.  He  is  not  so  great  as 
at  one  time  I  hoped  he  would  prove.  Bancroft  would 
be  better.  But  no  one  will  succeed.  Things  go  by 
a  wild  chance."  x 

He  drew  a  darker  picture  than  the  outlook  justified, 
as  we  now  know.  But  his  motive  was  clear  and  true. 
It  was  to  arouse,  by  repeated  speeches  and  letters,  the 
anti-slavery  forces  in  the  North  to  demand  a  more  posi 
tive  and  aggressive  policy. 

It  has  been  said  that  this  radicalism  of  men  like 
Stevens,  this  impatience  to  strike  at  slavery,  at  what 
ever  cost,  was  one  of  the  greatest  causes  of  worry  and 
embarrassment  to  President  Lincoln  in  his  devoted  ef 
fort  to  save  the  Union;  that  Stevens  was  to  Lincoln, 
not  a  help,  but  only  a  painful  "  thorn  in  the  flesh." 
It  is  said  that  Lincoln  could  not  go  faster  nor  further 
in  opposition  to  slavery  than  public  sentiment  per 
mitted;  that  if  he  had  committed  himself  to  the  radi 
calism  of  the  anti-slavery  leaders  he  would  have  lost 
1  Stevens'  Papers,  Oct.  and  Nov.,  1862. 


190      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  slaveholding  Unionists  in  the  Border  States;  he 
would  have  lost  wavering  Republican  voters  in  the 
North  to  the  Democratic  party;  he  would  have  lost 
volunteer  soldiers  to  the  army  who  had  no  thought 
nor  intention  of  fighting  in  an  abolition  war;  and  thus 
he  might  have  lost  the  cause  of  the  Union  itself. 

If  it  be  said  that  such  anti-slavery  criticisms  as  Stev 
ens  indulged  in  embarrassed  an  ever- faithful  and  over 
burdened  President  who  was  merely  biding  his  time 
while  waiting  on  public  opinion,  it  may  be  asked,  upon 
the  other  hand,  how  public  opinion  was  ever  to  be 
brought  to  a  higher  plane,  so  that  the  great  emanci 
pator  might  be  enabled  to  do  what  he  desired.  His 
desire  was  to  lead  on  to  that  good  time  when  all  men 
might  be  in  the  enjoyment  of  freedom.  Could  that 
good  time  have  come  at  all  if  the  insurgent  and  radical 
anti-slavery  men  had  all  kept  still,  or  had  uttered  noth 
ing  but  pleasant  and  honeyed  words  for  Lincoln  and 
his  Cabinet?  If  Stevens  and  his  kind  had  consented 
to  leave  the  administration  in  peace  under  the  control 
of  the  "  timid  conservative  counselors  "  who,  in  both 
field  and  forum,  were  ready  to  conduct  the  war  with 
polite  and  fraternal  consideration  for  the  Southern 
whites  and  with  utter  indifference  to  the  cause  of  the 
slave;  if  they  had  not  boldly  fought  and  spoken  for 
their  cause,  it  is  not  likely  that  either  liberty  or  union 
could  have  been  preserved  in  the  great  civil  struggle. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  a  tremendous  struggle 
was  going  on  within  the  councils  of  those  friendly  to 
the  cause  of  the  Union  for  the  control  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  of  the  presidential  powers.  The  radical  anti- 
slavery  men,  the  "  progressive  insurgents  "  of  their 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  191 

day,  won  out,  but  they  never  could  have  won  by  a 
policy  of  silence  and  fear.  It  is  equally  clear  that  they 
could  not  have  won  by  a  disposition  to  conciliation  and 
compromise.  It  was  not  a  species  of  lese-majeste  to 
criticize  Lincoln.  He  was  fairly  open  to  criticism  and 
no  one  knew  better  than  himself  the  value  of  honest 
censure.  He  sought  no  such  pinnacle  of  exclusion 
above  his  fellow  men,  and  his  course  shows  how  wisely 
and  well  he  profited  by  the  honest  and  patriotic  censure 
that  was  visited  upon  him.  He  candidly  and  modestly 
acknowledged  that  he  did  not  control  events  but  that 
events  controlled  him.  He  yielded  where  he  ought  to 
have  yielded,  he  resisted  where  resistance  was  de 
manded.  One  of  the  events  that  controlled  him  was 
the  persistent  purpose  of  the  Rebellion  and  its  formid 
able  character,  which  Stevens  had  so  early  and  so  ear 
nestly  attempted  to  demonstrate;  while  another  stub 
born  and  controlling  event  was  the  unbending  purpose 
of  anti-slavery  radicals  like  Stevens  to  see  to  it  that 
the  restoration  of  the  Union  should  carry  with  it  the 
abolition  of  slavery. 

It  is  now  quite  clear,  and  it  was  clear  to  men  of 
foresight  and  vision  then,  that  the  nation  had  to  choose 
between  the  Union  and  slavery.  They  could  not  both 
be  preserved  together.  After  the  first  year  of  war  it 
was  only  the  dull  unseeing  persons  who  thought  other 
wise,  those  who  had  no  moral  purpose  or  who  were 
very  easy  of  conscience  on  the  subject  of  slavery. 
The  loyal  citizen  had  no  alternative ;  he  had  to  choose 
which  he  would  cling  to  and  which  he  would  give  up. 
It  was  blind  and  fatuous  to  talk  of  keeping  slavery  and 
the  Union  together.  The  old  Union  of  guilty  com- 


192      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

plicity  with  slavery  was  dead  and  it  should  never  be 
revived.  This  was  the  whole  of  Stevens'  view, —  all 
he  insisted  upon;  and  who  will  say  that  he  and  the 
men  of  his  kind  did  not  help  Lincoln  to  realize  it? 
The  men  who  preferred  to  "  let  the  Union  slide  "  if 
its  preservation  by  war  threatened  slave  property  were 
a  poor  reliance,  in  Stevens'  judgment,  for  the  support 
of  the  vigorous  measures  that  were  necessary  to  crush 
ing  the  Rebellion.  A  progressive  policy  on  slavery  was 
what  Stevens  demanded,  and  there  was  no  power  so 
great  nor  name  so  high  as  to  restrain  the  utterance 
of  his  conviction  that  it  was  futile,  not  to  say  criminal, 
to  continue  the  conduct  of  the  war  on  the  "  stand  pat  " 
policy  of  the  "  Union  as  it  was  and  the  Constitution 
as  it  is." 

"  '  The  Union  as  it  was  and  the  Constitution  as  it 
is  '  is  an  atrocious  idea;  it  is  man  stealing,"  he  said. 
"  Those  who  wish  to  reestablish  the  Union  on  that 
basis  can  not  escape  the  guilt  of  attempting  to  enslave 
their  fellow  men.  The  Southern  States  have  forfeited 
all  rights  under  the  Constitution  which  they  have  re 
nounced.  They  are  forever  estopped  from  claiming 
the  Constitution  as  it  was.  The  United  States  may 
give  them  those  rights  if  it  choose,  but  they  can  not 
claim  them"  The  Slave  States  had  voluntarily  thrown 
off  the  protection  of  the  Constitution,  and  "  under  the 
law  of  nations  it  is  not  only  our  right  but  our  duty 
to  knock  off  every  shackle  from  every  limb."  With 
a  deep  and  intense  hatred  of  slavery  and  a  withering 
.contempt  for  all  who  would  sustain  it  he  exclaimed: 
"  If  a  disgraceful  peace  were  made  leaving  the  cause 
of  this  Rebellion  and  the  cause  of  future  wars  un- 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  193 

touched  and  living,  its  authors  would  be  the  objects  of 
the  deepest  execration  and  of  the  blackest  infamy.  .  .  . 
All  this  clamor  against  radicals,  all  this  cry  of  the 
'  Union  as  it  was/  is  but  a  persistent  effort  to  reestab 
lish  slavery  on  the  limbs  of  immortal  beings.  May 
the  God  of  Justice  thwart  their  designs  and  paralyze 
their  wicked  efforts."  1 

It  was  not  the  persistent  utterance  of  such  noble 
convictions  that  embarrassed  Lincoln  and  made  the 
issue  doubtful.  "  Faithful  are  the  wounds  of  a  friend, 
while  the  kisses  of  an  enemy  are  deceitful."  The  anti- 
slavery  men  were  faithful  friends  to  every  effective 
measure  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union.  Lincoln 
knew  full  well  that  he  could  confidently  rely  upon  them. 
It  was  not  the  wounds  from  this  source  that  most 
worried  the  suffering  President.  It  was  the  Copper 
heads;  the  weak-kneed  and  thin-skinned  Unionists, 
who  were  half  secessionists;  men  who  were  willing  to 
stand  by  the  Union  only  if  it  protected  slavery,  and 
who  were  ever  ready  to  denounce  the  administration 
for  every  forward  step, —  these  were  the  men  who 
made  Lincoln's  life  a  burden  in  his  conduct  of  the 
war  for  the  Union.  At  every  suggestion  of  inter 
ference  with  slavery,  these  men  —  the  Border  State 
slaveholders  and  the  Northern  Copperheads  —  were 
constantly  shouting  "Abolitionist!"  "Unconstitu 
tional  !  "  which,  Stevens  said,  were  "  favorite  terms  of 
reproach  in  the  mouths  of  tyrants  and  blackguards." 
Stevens  wished  to  brace  up  some  of  his  Northern  col 
leagues  against  their  quaking  fear  of  being  dubbed  with 
this  once  odious  epithet.  He  recognized  in  Lincoln 
1  Globe,  Jan.  22,  1864. 


i94     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

"  the  best  meaning  of  living  men,"  but  he  regretted  ex 
ceedingly  that  the  President  "  had  not  shown  the  stern 
ness  of  purpose  and  the  Jacksonian  resolution  to  save 
the  life  of  the  nation  by  cutting  the  Gordian  knot,  in 
stead  of  nibbling  at  its  fibers."  He  said  that  "  Lincoln 
had  been  restrained  in  his  free  action  by  the  subtle 
metaphysics  of  the  Massachusetts  Whigs  and  by  the 
perverts  of  the  New  York  school,  who  have  sought  to 
forget  and  to  make  others  forget  that  there  was  ever 
such  a  question  as  Liberty  and  Slavery  and  who  have 
sought  to  end  the  war  in  sixty  days  by  not  hurting  or 
provoking  the  rebels." 

While  Stevens  had  chanty  for  the  President,  though 
hesitating  not  to  criticize  his  slowness  and  denounce 
the  false  advisers  around  him,  he  had  no  charity  for 
"  the  bold  and  defiant  Democrats  "  who,  as  he  thought, 
were  seeking  power  and  "  were  fighting  the  battles  of 
the  rebels  under  the  guise  of  the  Constitution."  These 
men  were  ready  to  capitulate  even  though  to  do  so 
would  be  to  perpetuate  and  extend  human  slavery. 
"  Those  who  prate  for  peace  propose  now  to  offer 
the  South  new  constitutional  guarantees,  and  yet  they 
talk  of  the  *  Constitution  as  it  is/  These  traitor  Dem 
ocrats  propose  to  amend  the  Constitution  so  as  to  pro 
hibit  liberty  in  the  South,  but  will  not  agree  to  amend 
it  so  as  to  prohibit  slavery  in  the  North." 

It  was  upon  these  men  that  Stevens  visited  his  hot 
test  anathemas.  "  Can  the  imagination,"  he  asked, 
"  picture  a  class  of  men  from  the  king  of  Dahomey 
to  the  rebel  Copperheads  of  New  York  and  Pennsyl 
vania  whose  hearts  are  blacker,  or  whose  thirst  for 
despotism  is  more  hateful?  Neither  of  the  parties 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  195 

could  consent  to  '  the  Union  as  it  was.'  No  great 
war  ever  left  the  parties  at  its  close  as  they  were  at 
its  beginning."  He  referred  to  the  "  brutal  resolu 
tion  "  of  a  late  Democratic  convention  in  Lancaster 
County,  recommending  to  the  legislature  "  to  deprive 
a  whole  race  of  innocent  men  from  breathing  the  air 
of  Pennsylvania."  '  The  advocates  of  the  measure/' 
said  Stevens,  "  whether  in  the  convention  or  in  the 
Legislature,  are  moral  monsters,  outlaws  from  every 
principle  of  humanity,  and  of  Christian  civilization." 

"  These  base  Copperheads  would  change  the  Constitution 
to  conciliate  the  South,  but  not  to  hurt  slavery.  Before 
this  Rebellion  began  the  Constitution  bound  us  hand  and 
foot  to  the  car  of  human  bondage.  Now  when  an  all-wise 
Providence  has  caused  this  wicked  treason  to  break  those 
obligations  and  enable  us  to  strike  off  their  shackles  and 
guarantee  universal  freedom  throughout  this  grand  conti 
nent,  these  vipers,  instead  of  glorying  in  the  opportunity, 
insist  with  one  voice  on  reimposing  their  chains  and  doom 
ing  this  fair  land,  and  generation  upon  generation  of  human 
beings,  to  its  blighting  curse. 

"  Of  what  stuff  are  such  things  made?  Have  they  human 
souls?  I  doubt  if  there  can  be  found  in  the  hottest  corner 
of  pandemonium  cinders  black  enough  and  hard  enough  to 
make  hearts  for  such  inhuman  wretches."  x 

A  year  later  Stevens  was  able  to  speak  with  a  more 
hopeful,  not  to  say  triumphant  note.  He  then  saw 
the  beginning  of  the  end  of  slavery  in  America.  He 
warmly  supported  Lincoln's  reelection  to  the  presi 
dency,  and  in  a  notable  campaign  speech  in  the  Union 
League  Hall  in  Philadelphia,  Oct.  4,  1864,  he  sought  to 
encourage  the  people  in  the  contest  and  to  interpret 

1  Speech  before  the  Union  League  in  Lancaster,  1863. 


196     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  deep  significance  of  the  issue  involved.  "  From 
this  Rebellion,"  he  said,  "  this  republic  will  emerge 
reunited,  purified,  strengthened,  and  glorious  through 
out  all  time,  or  it  will  sink  into  profound  despotism, 
slavery,  and  infamy.  On  the  result  of  the  ensuing 
election  depends  one  or  the  other  condition.  Let  no 
one  beguile  the  people  at  such  a  time  with  false  and 
flattering  tongue.  Let  none  dare  to  daub  with  un- 
tempered  mortar." 

It  is  not  now  easy  to  realize  the  spirit  of  weakness 
and  surrender,  not  to  speak  of  craven  disloyalty,  which 
.Stevens  and  the  strong  Unionists  had  to  encounter  in 
those  trying  times.  There  were  those  "  half  traitors 
and  half  cowards "  who  were  urging  the  Northern 
people  to  withdraw  their  armies  and  sue  for  peace. 
Honorable  W.  B.  Reed,  a  Pennsylvania  Copperhead, 
bearing  a  name  distinguished  in  Revolutionary  annals, 
had  ventured  to  stand  in  Philadelphia  in  the  midst  of 
the  Civil  War  and  urge  assent  to  the  dismemberment  of 
the  Union  and  the  perpetuity  of  slavery,  and  he  urged 
that  Pennsylvania  should  cast  her  lot  with  the  South. 
He  drew  a  dreary  picture  of  the  sacrifices  of  the  war, — 
"  a  quarter  of  a  million  dead,  millions  of  hopeless  debt, 
industry  paralyzed,  private  fortunes  shattered,  the  tax- 
gatherer  and  the  press-gang  ever  ready  to  start  on 
their  relentless  errand.  Every  day  dissipates  the  the 
ory  of  conquest  and  widens  the  chasm  which  separates 
us  from  our  brethren  of  the  South.  The  great  Middle 
States  must  speak  and  act  in  self-defense.  If  it  be 
a  choice  between  the  subjugation  of  the  Southern 
States  and  their  tenure  as  military  provinces  and  peace 
able  recognition,  I  am  for  recognition.  If  the  choice 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  197 

lie  between  a  continuance  of  the  war  and  the  recog 
nition  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  I  am  in  favor 
of  recognition,  of  course  making  the  abolition  party 
responsible  for  the  dread  necessity.  The  blood  of  the 
Union  is  on  them.  " 1 

This  is  a  fair  sample  of  the  Democratic  political 
literature  of  the  time  which  Stevens  was  called  upon 
to  combat.  No  word  of  reproach  for  slaveholders  in 
arms  against  the  nation;  all  reproaches  were  for  the 
lovers  of  freedom  who  had  stirred  up  opposition  to 
slavery.  The  Constitution  was  constantly  quoted  in 
favor  of  those  who  had  thrown  it  overboard.  If  you 
touch  slavery  you  violate  the  blessed  Constitution  and 
it  will  irritate  the  rebel  masters  and  make  them  still 
more  angry,  and,  in  any  case,  it  is  better  to  let  them 
have  their  way  than  to  fight. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  a  political  party  avow 
ing  such  principles  and  recognizing  such  men  as  lead 
ers  had  almost  carried  a  majority  of  Congress  in  1862 
and  were  now  contesting  for  the  presidency  with  such 
peace  purposes  in  view,  we  may  see  how  near  the 
nation  was  to  surrender  and  how  imminent  was  peace 
ful  dissolution  in  the  dark  days  of  the  Civil  War.  It 
was  no  time  for  half-hearted  men  and  half-hearted 
speech.  If  ever  there  was  a  time  in  the  history  of 
America  that  called  for  men  of  fighting  courage,  for 
men  like  Pym  and  Cromwell,  it  was  then.  It  was  not 
a  time  to  load  Union  muskets  with  sawdust  nor  Union 
speech  with  tender  words  of  "  fraternal  regard  for  our 
brethren  of  the  South."  It  was  a  time  for  courageous 

1W.  B.  Reed,  Vindication  of  Certain  Political  Opinions,  Phil 
adelphia,  1862. 


198     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

fighting  men, —  for  men  like  Thaddeus  Stevens  whose 
words  always  had  in  them  a  tonic  for  the  nerves  of 
loyal  men.  Facing  the  Copperhead  leaders  of  Penn 
sylvania  in  the  bitter  political  conflicts  for  the  presi 
dency  in  the  Civil  War,  he  sought  to  recall  to  his 
countrymen  the  origin  of  the  conflict ;  how  unprovoked 
the  Rebellion  had  been;  how  timid  men  had  humbled 
themselves  in  the  dust  before  Southern  insolence ;  how 
they  had  proposed  so  to  amend  the  Constitution  as  to 
make  the  abolition  of  slavery  impossible  in  a  con 
stitutional  way. 

"  The  slaveholding  madmen  rejected  the  offers  and 
spurned  the  prostrate  suppliants  with  scorn  while  yet  kneel 
ing  in  the  dust.  Their  folly  was  the  salvation  of  freedom. 
Had  not  the  gods  made  them  mad  we  should  this  day  have 
been  in  shackles  instead  of  having  stricken  them  from 
others.  Now  that  there  is  not  a  slave  in  the  American 
continent,  shall  we  agree  for  the  sake  of  a  disgraceful  and 
precarious  peace  to  reenslave  four  million  human  beings? 
Shall  we  aid  to  rivet  the  chains  on  a  whole  race  of  God's 
children  that  we  may  purchase  the  poor  boon  of  a  temporary 
peace  from  triumphant  traitors?  If  we  are  men  wre  will 
resist  it  to  the  death.  If  we  are  Christians  we  will  sooner 
suffer  martyrdom.  Furthermore  let  us  consent  to  no  peace 
merely  on  the  simple  condition  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
Union.  That  would  be  a  weak  betrayal  of  noble  men  who 
have  fought  our  battles.  Men  who  make  such  suggestions, 
in  the  Cabinet  or  out,  can  be  naught  else  than  miserable 
cowards  or  moral  traitors.  Men  who  aspire  to  march  at 
the  head  of  a  nation  or  to  be  foremost  in  the  party  of 
progress,  have  no  right  to  tremble  or  despair  when  danger 
threatens.  My  young  friends,  I  know  not  how  such  pol 
troonery  stirs  your  warm  blood,  but,  old  as  I  am,  it  makes 
the  blood  boil  in  my  thin  worn  veins.  It  is  not  by  such 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  199 

trembling  and  trimming  in  compromises  that  great  nations 
are  established  or  sustained."  1 

He  rejoiced  that  Lincoln  had  now  risen  above 
Border  State  seductions,  above  Republican  cowardice, 
had  elevated  himself  to  the  full  height  of  his  moral 
nature,  and  had  declared  for  both  the  integrity  of  the 
Union  and  the  abandonment  of  slavery.  "  Well  may 
every  honest  man,  well  may  every  man  who  loves  God 
and  loves  liberty  exclaim,  '  Thank  God  for  Abraham 
Lincoln.'  Wiser  and  firmer  than  his  official  or  officious 
admirers,  he  has  saved  the  nation  from  disgrace;  he 
has  rescued  liberty  from  destruction.  I  would  not 
bestow  indiscriminate  praise  upon  every  act  of  the 
President.  Whoever  heaps  fulsome  eulogy  on  those 
in  power  is  a  parasite  and  a  sycophant  and  not  an 
honest  counselor.  '  He  crooks  the  pregnant  hinges  of 
the  knee  that  thrift  may  follow  fawning.'  An  hon 
est  critic  who  points  out  the  errors  of  his  friends  may 
be  believed  when  he  speaks  of  their  virtues.  He  who 
denies  any  errors  to  his  idol  makes  him  more  than  hu 
man  and  is  entitled  to  no  credit." 

In  the  glad  prospect  before  his  country  Stevens 
thought  Lincoln's  countrymen  might  well  forget  that 
he  had  erred  in  too  long  listening  to  false  and  timid 
counselors. 

The  party  of  the  Union  was  now  united  in  an  ag 
gressive  and  positive  policy.  The  political  contest  in 
Congress  now  was  only  with  the  apologists  of  the  Re 
bellion  and  the  friends  and  defenders  of  slavery  who 
claimed  to  be  also  friends  of  the  Union.  The  final 

1  Speech,  Phila.,  Oct.  4,  1864,  Union  League  Gazette. 


200      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

contest  with  these  persistent  opponents  of  a  true  Union, 
with  universal  liberty  as  its  basis,  was  to  be  over  the 
first  of  the  great  war  amendments.  ' 

After  the  reelection  of  Lincoln  in  the  fall  of  1864, 
it  was  seen  that  in  the  new  Congress  just  elected  there 
would  be  a  sufficient  majority  to  pass  the  thirteenth 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  forever  abolishing 
slavery  throughout  the  United  States.  This  amend 
ment  had  been  introduced  into  the  House  by  Mr.  Ashley, 
of  Ohio,  and  into  the  Senate  by  Mr.  Wilson,  of  Iowa, 
as  early  as  December,  1863.  It  had  passed  the  Senate 
by  the  necessary  two-thirds  majority  on  April  8,  1864. 
Stevens  was  quick  to  bring  it  up  in  the  House,  but 
on  June  15,  1864,  it  failed  there  of  the  necessary  two- 
thirds  vote.1 

It  was  opposed  in  debate  by  the  most  absurd,  strict- 
construction  and  obstructive  views.  Pendleton,  of 
Ohio,  asserted  that  there  were  parts  of  the  Constitu 
tion  that  could  not  be  amended,  not  even  by  the  con 
sent  of  all  the  states,  save  one.  The  right  of  any 
state  to  regulate  its  own  "  domestic  institutions  "  was 
one  of  these.  In  our  system  of  federal  government 
slavery  was  a  "  domestic  institution,"  a  cowardly 
euphemism  for  slavery.  Its  abolition  or  retention  be 
longed  entirely  to  the  state.  It  was,  therefore,  be 
yond  the  amending  power.  If  all  the  states  but  one 
should  vote  for  the  proposed  amendment  abolishing 
slavery,  it  could  not  be  abolished  in  that  one  save  by 
unconstitutional  usurpation  and  lawless  force.  "  If," 
said  Pendleton,  ".  you  propose  that  amendment  on  the 
dissenting  states  by  force  it  will  be  their  right  to 

1  The  vote  stood,  yeas,  93 ;  nays,  65 ;  not  voting,  23. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  201 

resist  you  by  force  and  to  call  to  their  aid  all  the  pow 
ers  which  God  and  nature  have  given  them  to  make 
that  force  effective.  If  you  propose  to  establish 
over  them  by  force  a  constitution  which  you  have  just 
amended  by  force  of  arms,  I  warn  you  that  you  will 
destroy  the  last  lingering  hope,  faint  and  small  as  it 
now  is,  that  you  will  ever  be  able  to  restore  this  Union, 
or  even  to  maintain  the  jurisdiction  of  the  federal 
government  over  those  states."  1 

This  meant,  it  would  seem  quite  fair  to  say,  that 
Pendleton  did  not  wish  to  see  the  Union  restored  by 
successful  war.  He  wanted,  rather,  that  the  war 
should  cease  and  the  Southerners  be  allowed  to  have 
their  way,  vainly  hoping  that  they  would  choose,  of 
their  own  good  will,  to  be  reconciled  to  the  Union  on 
terms  not  utterly  degrading  to  the  national  honor.2 

1  See  the  Cong.  Globe  for  June  15,   1864,  and  Jan.   u,   1865. 
In  this  discussion  Stevens  forced   Pendleton  to  the  reductio  ad 
absurdum    of    asserting   that    if    three-fourths    of   the   states    at 
tempted    such   an    amendment    they    would    thereby    take    them 
selves    out   of   the    Union,   while   the   minority    of   the    resisting 
states  would   compose   the   only  true   constitutional   union.     The 
record  is  punctuated  with  laughter  at  this  point,  indicating  that 
there  were  at  least  some  members  who  had  a  reasonable  sense 
of  the  ridiculous.     Globe,  p.  223,  Jan.  n,  1865. 

2  Pendleton    warmly    disclaimed    any    sympathy   with    rebellion 
and  slavery.     He  was  an  honest  man,  but  whatever  his   inten 
tion,  he  should  be  held  responsible  for  the  effect  of  his  words. 
And  it  is  impossible^  to  see  how  his  argument  could  have  any 
other  effect  than  to  give  aid  and  comfort  to  slavery  and  rebellion. 
He  was  giving,  as  he  said,  "  the  highest  admiration  of  his  intel 
lect  and  the  profound  homage  of  his  heart "  to  a  blessed  docu 
ment,  called  the  Constitution,  forgetting  his  country,  the  nation, 
and  the  welfare  of  millions  for  whom  the  Constitution  existed. 
It   was   government  by  parchment  that  he   was   contending  for. 
He  predicted  that  if  the  majority  of  the  House  forced  the  final 
emancipation   of  the   slaves,   the    South   "will    liberate   and   arm 
its  negroes,  and  aided  by  the  moral   force,   if  not  the  material 
power  of  Europe,  will  establish  its  independence,  and  your  Union 
President  will  sign  the  treaty  of  dissolution."     Globe.  Jan.   n, 
1865. 


202      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

The  vanity  of  such  a  hope  (if  it  were  not  a  mere 
deceitful  and  partisan  pretense,  as  Thaddeus  Stevens 
was  disposed  to  believe)  was  proved  by  every  voice 
and  sign  of  public  opinion  that  came  up  from  the  South. 

Stevens  combated  Pendleton  and  he  contended  for 
the  unlimited  power  of  amendment.  He  held  very 
logically  that  slavery  was  as  suitable  a  subject  for  the 
exercise  of  the  amending  power  as  was  religion,  to 
which  one  of  the  early  amendments  related.  No 
power  had  been  granted  to  Congress  to  legislate  on 
the  subject  of  religion,  but  the  absence  of  such  dele 
gated  power  did  not  restrain  the  First  Congress  from 
passing  an  amendment  touching  that  subject.  A  like 
exercise  of  power  could  be  had  with  reference  to 
slavery. 

After  his  reelection  Lincoln,  in  his  annual  message 
in  December,  urged  Congress  again  to  take  up  the 
amendment  and  press  it  to  passage.  He  asserted  that 
it  was  sure  to  pass  sooner  or  later.  The  people  had 
spoken  for  it  and  the  majority  in  the  next  Congress 
would  pass  it,  and  the  sooner  it  were  done  the  better. 
It"  would  be  worth  thousands  of  armed  men  to  the 
Union  cause  and,  as  Lincoln  urged,  it  might  now  be 
reasonably  voted  for  by  those  who  had  opposed  it 
before  merely  in  deference  to  the  expressed  will  of 
the  majority. 

When  the  amendment  came  up  again  it  still  met 
with  Democratic  opposition.  On  January  n,  1865, 
Pendleton,  closing  a  long  and  labored  speech  in  oppo 
sition,  referred  to  Stevens'  constitutional  argument 
which  was  so  abhorrent  to  the  strict-construction, 
states-rights,  Democratic  school.  Pendleton  recog- 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  203 

nized  Stevens'  fame  "  for  his  sledge-hammer  power 
of  logic,"  but  he  warned  Stevens  "to  be  careful  how 
he  asserts  too  far  his  doctrine "  that  the  war  had 
abrogated  the  Constitution.  "  Let  him  be  careful  lest 
he  may  find  that  it  will  dissolve  the  ties  which  bind 
the  Northern  States  one  to  the  other,  and, they  be  re 
mitted  to  their  original  position  of  independence.  Let 
him  be  careful  lest  when  the  passions  of  these  times 
be  passed  away  and  the  historian  shall  go  back  to 
discover  where  was  the  original  infraction  of  the  Con 
stitution  he  may  find  that  sin  lies  at  the  door  of 
others  than  the  people  now  in  arms." 

This  was  equivalent  to  charging  Stevens  and  those 
who  acted  with  him  with  responsibility  for  the  war. 
Stevens  replied  with  spirit  to  so  grave  a  charge.  It 
was  during  the  last  days  in  the  discussions  of  the 
thirteenth  amendment,  whose  passage  by  the  House  on 
January  31,  1865,  was  hailed  as  "  an  immortal  and  sub 
lime  event."  Up  to  this  time  in  the  history  of  the 
amendment,  Stevens,  though  constantly  pressing  the 
amendment  for  passage,  had  spoken  but  little  upon  it/ 
The  passage  from  Pendleton  quoted  above  seems  to  \ 
have  been  the  occasion  of  calling  from  Stevens  a  brief 
and  valuable  summary  of  his  life's  course  toward  slav 
ery  in  the  last  speech  he  made  on  that  subject  during  the 
Civil  War.  A  brief  extract  of  that  speech  seems  a 
fitting  close  to  this  chapter,  summarizing,  as  it  does, 
Stevens'  attitude  toward  slavery  and  the  war. 

If  it  be  true,  as  charged,  that  he  and  his  anti-slavery 
associates  had  first  "  infracted  "  the  Constitution  and 
caused  the  war,   it  should   induce  them  not  only  to 
1  Globe,  Jan.  13,  1865. 


204      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

great  regret  but  to  deep  remorse.  What,  then,  up  to 
the  time  of  the  breaking  out  of  this  Rebellion,  was  their 
position  upon  the  subject  of  slavery  that  caused  this 
war?  He  begged  but  a  few  moments  to  state  it. 

"  From  my  earliest  youth  I  was  taught  to  read  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  to  revere  its  sublime 
principles.  I  have  found  in  the  great  men  of  antiquity, 
in  all  their  works  which  have  survived  the  ravages  of 
time,  one  unanimous  denunciation  of  tyranny  and 
slavery  and  eulogy  of  liberty.  And  my  hatred  of  this 
infernal  institution  and  my  love  of  liberty  were  further 
inflamed  as  I  saw  the  inspired  teachings  of  Socrates 
and  the  divine  inspirations  of  Jesus. 

"  Being  immovably  fixed  in  these  principles  I  took 
my  stand  among  my  fellow-citizens,  and  on  all  oc 
casions,  whether  in  public  or  in  private,  in  season,  and, 
if  there  could  be  such  a  time,  out  of  season,  I  never 
hesitated  to  express  those  ideas  and  sentiments,  and 
when  I  first  went  into  public  assemblies,  I  uttered  this 
language.  I  have  done  it  among  the  pelting  and  hoot 
ing  of  mobs,  and  I  never  quailed  before  the  infernal 
spirit,  and  I  hope  I  never  shrank  from  the  responsi 
bility  of  my  language.  This  feeling  grew  with  my 
growth  and  strengthened  with  my  strength  and  I 
thank  God  it  has  not  decayed  with  enfeebling  age. 

"  When,  fifteen  years  ago,  I  was  honored  with  a 
seat  in  this  body,  it  was  dangerous  to  talk  against 
this  institution,  a  danger  which  gentlemen  now  here 
will  never  be  able  to  appreciate.  Some  of  us,  however, 
have  experienced  it;  my  friend  from  Illinois  on  my 
right  (Mr.  Washburne)  has.  And  yet,  sir,  I  did 
not  hesitate,  in  the  midst  of  bowie-knives  and  revolvers 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  WAR  205 

and  howling  demons  upon  the  other  side  of  the  House, 
to  stand  here  and  denounce  this  infamous  institution  in 
language  which  possibly  now,  on  looking  at  it,  I  might 
deem  intemperate,  but  which  I  then  deemed  necessary 
to"  rouse  the  public  attention  and  cast  odium  upon  the 
worst  institution  upon  earth,  one  which  is  a  disgrace 
to  man  and  would  be  an  annoyance  to  the  infernal 
spirits. 

"  Mr.  Speaker,  while  I  thus  denounced  it  and  ut 
tered  my  sentiments  in  favor  of  universal  freedom 
everywhere,  I  found  in  the  Constitution  of  my  country 
what  I  construed,  whatever  others  may  think,  as  a 
prohibition  from  touching  slavery  where  it  existed; 
and  through  all  my  course  I  recognized  and  bowed  to 
a  provision  in  that  Constitution  which  I  always  re 
garded  as  its  only  blot;  and  I  challenge  the  scrutiny 
of  my  respected  colleague  on  the  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means,  or  any  other  gentleman,  through  all  the 
records  of  utterances  in  this  House,  to  find  one  single 
motion  or  one  single  word  which  claimed  on  our  part 
to  touch  slavery  in  the  states  where  it  existed.  We 
admitted  that  it  was  there,  protected  by  that  instrument. 
We  claimed  that  in  the  territories  we  had  full  power 
over  it,  and  in  the  District  of  Columbia;  and  I,  with 
those  who  acted  with  me,  could  not  hesitate  as  to  what 
our  duty  required  in  excluding  it  from  the  free  soil 
of  the  country  and  confining  it  to  the  spots  it  already 
polluted. 

"  Such  was  our  position,  not  disturbing  slavery 
where  the  Constitution  protected  it,  but  abolishing  it 
wherever  we  had  the  constitutional  power  and  pro 
hibiting  its  further  extension.  I  claimed  the  right 


206     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

then  as  I  claim  it  now,  to  denounce  it  everywhere, 
even  in  foreign  lands,  so  that  if  such  language  could 
anywhere  affect  public  opinion  it  might  do  so.  I 
claimed  the  right  to  hedge  it  into  the  smallest  space; 
but  no  man  with  whom  I  acted  ever  proposed  to  violate 
the  Constitution  for  the  purpose  of  touching  slavery." 

He  then  stated  the  well-known  position  of  his  party 
in  favor  of  the  exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  terri 
tories  and  its  abolition  in  the  District  of  Columbia. 
He  endorsed  the  opinion  of  "  the  great  man  of  the 
West  that  it  was  a  sin  and  a  shame  to  believe  that  there 
was  no  power  on  earth  that  could  abolish  slavery  over 
every  inch  of  ground  in  the  world."  Referring  to 
Pendleton's  pleas  and  efforts  to  ward  off  attacks  upon 
slavery,  Stevens  concluded  :  "  I  will  be  willing  to  take 
my  chance,  when  we  all  molder  in  the  dust.  He  may 
have  his  epitaph  written,  if  it  be  truly  written,  '  Here 
rests  the  ablest  and  most  pertinacious  defender  of 
slavery  and  opponent  of  liberty/  and  I  will  be  satisfied 
if  my  epitaph  shall  be  written  thus:  'Here  lies  one 
who  never  rose  to  any  eminence,  and  who  only  courted 
the  low  ambition  to  have  it  said  that  he  had  striven 
to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  poor,  the  lowly,  the 
downtrodden  of  every  race  and  language  and  color/ 
[Applause.] 

"  I  shall  be  content,  with  such  a  eulogy  on  his  lofty 
tomb  and  such  an  inscription  on  my  humble  grave,  to 
trust  our  memories  to  the  judgment  of  after  ages."  1 
•>• 

1  Globe,  Jan.  13,  1865. 

' 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   CONSTITUTION   AND   THE   WAR 

come  now  to  inquire  into  the  attitude  of  Ste- 
vens  toward  the  Constitution,  the  constitution 
ality  of  war  measures,  and  the  effect  of  secession  and 
war  on  the  constitutional  status  of  the  seceded  states. 

Much  that  has  been  said  upon  slavery  bears  directly 
or  indirectly  upon  this  inquiry;  but  this  important 
aspect  of  Stevens'  career  and  opinions  in  time  of  war, 
calls  for  further  notice  and  elaboration.  It  has  an 
important  bearing  on  his  later  course  in  reconstruc 
tion,  and  it  is  important  to  notice  that  his  constitu 
tional  opinions  after  the  war  were  merely  those  that 
he  announced  and  defended  during  the  war. 

The  anti-slavery  policy  advocated  by  Stevens  and 
men  like  him  was  one  of  the  apologies  for  opposition 
to  the  war.  The  anti-slavery  men  were  accused  of 
wishing  to  make  the  war  entirely  subservient  to  aboli 
tion,  and  of  being  unwilling  to  see  the  Union  restored 
with  slavery  as  it  was.  They  would  not  be  quiet,  and 
they  were  charged  with  obtruding  their  opinions  every 
where,  with  the  result  that,  while  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  the  nation  was  united,  the  Union  forces  were 
soon  divided,  since  those  who  wished  to  prosecute  the 
war  solely  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  Union  were 
alienated  and  estranged.1 

1  Diven,  of  N.  Y.,  Cong.  Globe,  Jan.  22,  1862. 

207 


208      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

A  large  body  of  conservative  men  in  the  North, 
chiefly  among  those  who  had  opposed  the  Republican 
party  and  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  looked  upon  the  anti- 
slavery  program  both  as  a  perversion  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  an  entire  departure  from  the  original  and 
legitimate  objects  of  the  war.  Under  the  leadership 
of  adroit  and  able  men,  these  conservative  Democrats 
and  constitutional  Unionists  became  a  compact  party 
of  opposition  whose  opinions  and  purposes  may  be 
summarized  as  follows : 

In  the  first  place  they  accepted  the  Crittenden  Reso 
lutions  l  as  their  war  platform,  and  they  would  have 
it  clearly  recognized  that  the  primary  and  sole  object 
of  the  war  was  to  save  the  Union.  It  was  not  to  in 
terfere  in  any  way  with  slavery.  Any  act  or  policy 
tending  to  turn  the  military  forces  of  the  government 
from  mere  Union-saving  to  abolitionism,  or  toward 
emancipation  as  a  means  of  Union-saving,  was  uncon 
stitutional  and  a  perversion  of  the  object  of  war,  and 
it  ought  to  be  restricted. 

In  the  second  place,  according  to  the  policy  of  this 
anti-war  party,  the  war  must  be  so  conducted  and 
ended  as  to  preserve  the  equality  of  the  states.  The 
Union  was  based  on  this  equality  and  it  must  be  pre 
served  as  it  was  made.  There  must  be  no  conquest, 
nor  subjugation,  nor  interference  with  statehood  or 
with  the  rights  of  the  states,  their  governments,  or 
their  domestic  laws.  Whoever  should  attempt  by 
federal  authority  to  destroy  any  of  the  states  or  to  set 
up  any  federal  authority  within  them  not  allowed  under 
conditions  of  peace,  was  guilty  of  a  high  crime  against 
1  See  p.  171. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     209 

the  Union;  and  any  person  proposing  peace  on  any 
other  basis  than  the  integrity  of  the  states  was  as 
guilty  a  criminal  as  he  who  would  propose  peace  on 
the  basis  of  a  dismembered  Union.  The  Southern 
States  must  not  be  reduced  to  provinces  or  territories, 
nor  the  Southern  people  regarded  as  alien  enemies; 
but  the  constitutional  relation  of  the  states  to  the 
Union  was  to  be  recognized  as  being  undisturbed  and 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  Southern  people  should 
be  fully  maintained.  To  prosecute  hostilities  beyond 
these  limits,  or  in  a  spirit  of  conquest  in  violation  of 
these  principles  would  destroy  state  equality,  subvert 
the  Constitution  and  prevent  the  Union.1 

This  meant  that  the  constitutional  limits  set  to  con 
gressional  and  executive  power  must  be  the  same  in 
war  as  in  peace.  Secession,  rebellion,  and  war  had 
made  no  change  as  to  the  powers  that  Congress  could 
exercise  within  the  states,  be  they  the  states  of  the 
Confederacy  or  the  states  of  the  Union.  The  Presi 
dent's  powers  were  not  increased.  Therefore  his 
executive  orders,  his  proclamations,  his  military 
suspension  of  habeas  corpus,  his  arbitrary  arrests,  must 
all  be  tested  by  the  terms  and  restrictions  of  the  Con 
stitution  as  in  time  of  peace.  "  The  Union  as  it  was, 
the  Constitution  as  it  is,"  was  the  maxim  of  the  party. 
In  the  view  of  these  constitutionalists,  the  Union 
was  to  be  saved  only  by,  through  and  under  the 
Constitution, —  nothing  more  nor  less.  They  idealized 
the  Constitution.  To  them  the  Constitution  was 
identical  with  the  nation.  Without  it  there  could  be 
no  Union.  The  Constitution  gone,  the  republic  is 

1  Pendleton's  Resolutions,  July  31,   1861,  Globe. 


210     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

dead.  The  war  was  for  the  preservation  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  for  that  alone ;  it  was  against  the  Consti 
tution  and  because  it  was  binding  on  all,  that  the 
Southerners  were  rebels.  These  conservatives  de 
nounced  the  anti-slavery  advocates  as  I  sing  indifferent 
as  to  whether  or  not  their  policies  were  in  harmony 
with  the  Constitution,  and  this  fact  made  the  hated 
abolitionists,  as  they  called  all  anti-slavery  men,  as 
guilty  criminals  as  the  secessionists  themselves. 

In  the  view  of  this  party  almost  everything  that 
the  President  or  Congress  proposed  or  did,  for  the 
effective  and  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  was 
unconstitutional.  Confiscation  of  slave  property  was 
unconstitutional;  retaining  fugitive  slaves  within  our 
lines  was  unconstitutional;  the  military  emancipation 
of  Fremont  and  Hunter  was  unconstitutional;  the  use 
of  slaves  as  contraband  wras  unconstitutional;  Lin 
coln's  plan  of  compensated  emancipation  was 
unconstitutional;  enlistment  of  negro  troops  was  un 
constitutional;  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of 
Columbia  was  unconstitutional;  the  prohibition  of 
slavery  in  the  territories  (with  the  Dred  Scott  decision 
still  unreversed)  was  unconstitutional;  the  Emancipa 
tion  Proclamation  was  unconstitutional ;  the  draft  was 
unconstitutional;  the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  was  unconstitutional ;  military  arrests  were  un 
constitutional ;  suspending,  or  in  any  way  reinstating 
state  governments  in  the  South  under  Federal  authority 
was  unconstitutional;  Lincoln's  appointment  of  mili 
tary  governors  and  his  beginnings  of  reconstruction 
were  unconstitutional.  Almost  everything  that  was 
done  or  attempted  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  from 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     211 

Lincoln's  first  call  for  troops  to  the  final  scene  at  Ap- 
pomattox  was  denounced  as  unconstitutional.  No 
exercise  of  power  was  constitutional  except  what  was 
unmistakably  granted  by  a  strict  construction  of  the 
Constitution  interpreted  as  in  times  of  peace.  The 
sacred  and  revered  Constitution  was  to  be  the  standard 
for  measuring  all  acts  and  policies  of  war.  The  war 
had  made  no  difference  in  the  rights  and  immunities 
due  to  the  seceded  states.  The  Constitution  protected 
them  still.  They  were  not  bound  by  its  provisions  in 
the  conduct  of  the  war,  but  their  opponents  were  to 
be  restrained  from  every  aggressive  act  of  power  not 
clearly  within  its  specific  limits. 

This  was  a  fearful  handicap  for  the  national  gov 
ernment.  Such  a  policy  would  have  led  to  a  passive 
and  harmless  war,  almost  purely  defensive  in  its 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  national  government. 
Carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  no  invasion  of  the 
Southern  States  nor  subduing  of  the  Southern  people 
would  have  been  possible  under  it,  and  it  is  very 
problematical  whether  the  Constitution  and  the  Union 
could  have  been  saved  for  the  South  under  its  opera 
tion.  It  would  have  left  the  government  inefficient, 
if  not  absolutely  helpless  in  the  face  of  the  Rebellion. 

To  this  party,  to  its  constitutional  views  and  to  all 
of  its  ways,  Thaddeus  Stevens  was  diametrically  op 
posed.  He  was  its  constant  and  stout  antagonist.  He 
derided  these  sticklers  for  the  Constitution  and  de 
nounced  them  in  unsparing  terms,  speaking  of  them 
as  "  traitors  in  disguise  "  or  as  "  sympathizers  with  the 
rebels,"  their  "  apologists  and  abetters."  Against  its 
advocates  he  used  all  his  powers  of  ridicule,  satire, 


212      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

invective,  and  anathema.  He  sought  not  to  fondle  nor 
conciliate  them  nor  to  sue  for  their  support.  He  would 
ride  over  them  and  trample  them  under  foot.  To 
him  they  were  merely  obstacles  to  the  accomplishment 
of  the  great  end  in  view, —  the  triumph  of  the  Union 
arms  in  war.  They  and  he  were  at  the  antipodes  of 
the  political  world,  and  they  were  not  by  any  means 
tender  in  their  words  for  one  another. 

In  opposition  to  this  theoretical  and  nerveless  con 
stitutionalism,  Stevens  sought  early  to  establish  a  legal 
basis  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  that  would  give  the 
nation  a  chance  to  fight,  and  in  the  first  discussion  on 
slavery  and  the  war 1  he  laid  down  the  legal  and 
proper  premises  for  the  fighting  at  hand.  He  brushed 
theories  aside,  looked  at  the  facts  and  saw  them  as 
they  were;  and  he  sought  a  basis  of  action  best  calcu 
lated  to  bring  the  result  desired.  He  took  the  bold 
ground  that  in  the  contest  for  its  life  the  nation  was 
not  bound  by  the  limitations  of  the  Constitution.  The 
war  had  abrogated  the  Constitution,  not  where  it  was 
respected  and  could  be  enforced  by  ordinary  civil 
processes,  but  with  respect  to  hostile  confederated 
states  that  had  rejected  and  repudiated  the  Constitu 
tion,  trampled  it  under  foot,  and  were  resisting  its 
restoration  by  organized  armies.  The  people  of  the 
Confederate  States  were  public  belligerent  enemies 
and  the  nation  in  its  effort  to  overcome  them  was 
bound  only  by  the  laws  of  war  and  the  law  of  nations. 
This  was  the  sum  and  substance  of  Stevens'  legal  po 
sition,  and  it  seemed  to  be  dictated  by  the  plain  common 
sense  of  the  situation. 

*Aug.  2,  1861. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     213 

To  this  principle,  of  acting  toward  the  South  as  a 
belligerent  in  war,  bound  only  by  the  laws  of  war  and 
not  by  the  hampering  restrictions  of  the  Constitution, 
Stevens  adhered  strictly  and  consistently  throughout 
the  struggle.  As  a  principle  of  public  law  for  the 
crisis  it  was  the  most  reasonable,  effective,  and  con 
sistent  position  of  any  public  man  of  his  time.  It  was 
calculated  to  free  the  nation  from  embarrassment  and 
to  give  it  efficiency  in  war.  The  way  was  open  for 
the  application  of  this  principle  when  Southern  bel 
ligerency  was  recognized  by  the  declaration  of  block 
ade.  Stevens  did  not  approve  of  President  Lincoln's 
proclamation  of  April,  1861,  declaring  the  blockade 
of  the  Southern  ports.  He  held  it  to  be  a  mistake. 
He  would  have  repealed  the  laws  making  these  ports 
ports  of  entry  and  then  there  would  have  been  no  need 
of  a  blockade.  A  nation  has  a  right  to  close  its  own 
ports,  but  that  is  not  a  blockade.  If  we  had  thus 
closed  our  own  ports,  no  nation  would  then  have  had 
a  right  to  send  vessels  there,  even  though  we  might 
not  have  had  a  ship  of  war  within  a  hundred  miles. 
If  the  Confederate  States  created  ports  of  entry,  for 
eign  nations  could  not  recognize  these  ports  without 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  Confederacy,  and 
that  would  be  a  cause  of  war. 

Whether  foreign  nations  would  have  respected  such 
a  policy  is  doubtful.  At  any  rate,  by  our  blockade  and 
by  the  acknowledgment  of  European  powers  belliger 
ency  was  recognized  and  the  South  had  become  entitled 
to  all  the  rights  of  war.  They  were  also  subject  to 
all  the  rules  of  war,  with  no  other  rights  due  from 
their  belligerent  antagonists  than  these  rules  accord 


214     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

them.  The  Constitution  had  no  longer  the  least  effect 
upon  them.  "  It  is  idle  to  tell  me,"  said  Stevens,  "  that 
the  obligations  of  an  instrument  are  binding  on  one 
party  while  they  are  repudiated  by  the  other.  Obliga 
tions  to  be  binding  in  war  must  be  mutual,  equally 
acknowledged,  and  admitted  by  all  parties.  There  is 
another  principle  just  as  universal :  —  when  parties  be 
come  belligerent  the  war  between  them  abrogates  all 
compacts,  treaties,  and  constitutions  which  may  have 
existed  between  them  before  the  war  commenced." 

Such  was  Stevens'  legal  basis  for  the  conduct  of 
the  war.  It  was  announced  in  the  beginning  1  in  re 
sponse  to  the  argument  of  George  H.  Pendleton,  of 
Ohio,  that  only  two  alternatives  were  open, —  either 
the  men  now  in  rebellion  are  public  enemies  subject  to 
the  laws  of  war  or  they  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States  subject  to  the  penalties  of  the  law  of  the  Consti 
tution  and  likewise  entitled  to  all  the  benefits  and 
guarantees  which  that  instrument  prescribes  for  every 
citizen.  If  we  regard  them  as  in  one  capacity  we 
can  not  regard  them  as  in  the  other.  We  should  not 
hold  them  to  be  public  enemies  for  one  purpose,  that  is, 
to  deprive  them  of  the  guarantees  which  the  Consti 
tution  gives  them,  and  still  hold  them  to  be  citizens  in 
order  to  inflict  upon  them  the  penalties  of  treason, 
which  the  law  prescribes  for  a  citizen.  We  should 
choose  one  or  the  other  of  these  alternatives,  and  fol 
low  it  to  its  logical  and  legitimate  conclusion.  Such 
was  Pendleton's  argument. 

Stevens  did  not  shrink  from  the  alternatives  sug 
gested.  He  had  no  scruples  over  these  distinctions  in 

1  August  2,  1861. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     215 

law.  He  saw  clearly  the  public  law  in  the  case.  To 
his  mind  the  people  of  the  Confederate  States  were 
rebels  who  had  incurred  the  penalties  of  treason  under 
the  Constitution,  after  the  success  of  the  war  in  sub 
duing  them;  but  during  the  process  of  the  war  for 
their  subjection,  they  were  public  enemies  outside  the 
pale  of  the  Constitution.  The  position  was  clear  and 
logical  and  Stevens  did  not  hesitate  to  follow  it  to 
its  conclusion. 

It  was  a  pity  that  so  many  men  of  respectability 
and  standing  failed  to  see  the  folly  and  absurdity  of 
attempting  to  apply  the  Constitution  to  the  state  of 
war  then  existing  between  North  and  South. 

"  I  thought  the  time  had  come,"  said  Stevens,  wrhen 
pleading  for  the  first  act  of  confiscation,  "  when  the 
laws  of  war  were  to  govern  our  action ;  when  constitu 
tions,  if  they  stood  in  the  way  of  the  laws  of  war  in 
dealing  with  the  enemy,  had  no  right  to  intervene. 
Who  pleads  the  Constitution  against  our  proposed 
action?  Who  says  the  Constitution  must  come  in  in 
bar  of  our  action?  It  is  the  advocates  of  rebels  who 
have  sought  to  overthrow  the  Constitution,  who  repu 
diate  the  Constitution  and  trample  it  in  the  dust.  Sir, 
these  rebels,  who  have  disregarded  and  set  at  defiance 
that  instrument,  are  by  every  rule  of  municipal  and 
international  law,  estopped  from  pleading  it  against  our 
action.  Who,  then,  is  it  that  comes  to  us  and  says, 
'  You  can  not  do  this  thing  because  your  Constitution 
does  not  permit  it '  ?  The  Constitution !  Our  Consti 
tution  which  you  repudiate  and  trample  under  foot,  for 
bids  it !  Sir,  it  is  an  absurdity.  There  must  be  a 
party  in  court  to  plead  it,  and  that  party  to  be  entitled 


2i6     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

to  plead  it  in  court,  must  first  acknowledge  its  su 
premacy  or  he  has  no  business  to  be  in  court  at  all. 
I  repeat,  then,  that  those  who  bring  in  this  plea  here, 
in  bar  of  our  action,  are  the  advocates  of  rebels. 
They  are  nothing  else,  whatever  they  intend.  I  mean 
it,  of  course,  in  a  legal  sense.  I  mean  they  are  acting 
in  the  capacity  of  counselors-at-law  for  the  rebels, 
speaking  for  them,  not  for  us  who  are  the  plaintiffs 
in  this  transaction.  I  deny  that  they  have  any  right 
to  plead  at  all.  I  deny  that  they  have  any  standing  in 
court.  ...  I  deny  that  they  can  be  permitted  to  come 
here  and  tell  us  that  we  must  be  loyal  to  the  Consti 
tution."  1 

When  he  was  asked  how  members  of  Congress  who 
had  taken  an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution  could 
violate  it  in  their  action,  whether  rebels  complain  of 
it  or  not,  he  replied  that  they  do  not  violate  it  when 
they  are  operating  against  men  who  have  no  rights 
to  the  benefits  of  the  Constitution.  It  was  interna 
tional  law,  not  the  law  of  the  Constitution  that  applied 
to  the  war. — "  In  the  midst  of  arms  laws  are  silent," 
a  law  that  has  been  in  force  from  the  days  of  Cicero; 
and  "any  nation  that  disregards  that  law  is  a  poor, 
pusillanimous  nation  which  submits  its  neck  to  be 
struck  off  by  the  enemy." 

A  member2  interposed  an  objection.  "I  under 
stand,"  he  said,  "  the  gentleman  to  admit  that  this  bill  3 
is  unconstitutional  but  to  defend  it  and  to  urge  its 
passage  on  the  ground  that  during  the  existence  of 

1  Cong.  Globe,  Aug.  2,  1861,  p.  414. 

2  Mr.  Mallory,  of  Kentucky. 

3  The  Confiscation  Act  of  Aug.  6,  1861. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     217 

rebellion  Congress  has  a  right  to  do  an  unconstitutional 
act."  "  I  say  that  it  is  constitutional,"  replied  Stevens, 
"  and  according  to  the  law  of  nations  in  time  of  war. 
[Laughter.]  I  admit  that  if  you  were  in  a  state  of 
peace  you  could  not  confiscate  the  property  of  any 
citizen,  but  in  time  of  war  you  have  the  right  to 
confiscate  the  property  of  every  rebel.  Every  measure 
which  will  enable  you  to  subdue  your  enemy  and  tri 
umph  over  him  is  justifiable  on  your  part.  If  by  tak 
ing  from  him  every  dollar  of  property  which  he  has 
on  earth  you  will  weaken  his  hands  you  are  at  liberty 
to  fight  him  in  that  way." 

This  is  the  identical  principle  that  President  Lin 
coln  finally  adopted  in  the  exercise  of  his  war  powers, 
and  which  he  announced  a  little  more  than  a  year  later 
as  the  basis  of  his  right  to  make  arbitrary  arrests  and 
to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  Lincoln's  course 
in  pursuance  of  this  principle,  in  the  matter  of  arbi 
trary  arrests,  may  be  even  more  open  to  criticism  and 
objection  than  was  the  attitude  of  Stevens.  The  latter 
did  not  hold  that  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  might 
be  abrogated  and  disregarded  by  executive  power  in 
the  Northern  States  where  the  laws  could  be  peaceably 
enforced  without  process  of  arms.  There  Stevens' 
war  doctrine  did  not  apply.  But  it  applied  against 
those  who  were  making  war  on  the  Constitution  to 
overthrow  it.  In  the  Rebel  States  the  Constitution,  for 
the  period  of  the  war,  had  ceased  to  operate,  but  it  was 
in  operation  and  must  be  respected  where  no  war  had 
been  made  upon  it. 

The  confiscation,  which  he  favored  from  the  begin 
ning,  followed,  not  under  the  Constitution  after  con- 


2i8     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

viction  for  treason,  but  by  virtue  of  the  laws  of  war. 
"  No  individual  crime  need  be  proved  against  the 
owners.  The  fact  of  being  a  belligerent  enemy  carries 
the  forfeiture.  This  might  work  a  hardship  on  loyal 
men  in  the  South.  But  to  escape  the  condition  of 
enemies  they  must  change  their  domicile  and  leave 
the  hostile  state."  1 

This  doctrine  that  the  Constitution,  with  regard  to 
the  states  in  rebellion,  had  no  binding  influence  and 
no  application,  Stevens  maintained  on  repeated  occa 
sions  during  the  war.  It  was  not  an  utterance  ex 
pressed  in  the  heat  of  partisan  debate  or  on  the  spur 
of  an  occasion,  but  it  was  his  deliberate  opinion  ex 
pressed  after  a  careful  examination  of  the  law  of  the 
United  States  and  of  nations.  When  a  state  of  war 
came  to  be  admitted,  every  obligation  previously  ex 
isting  between  the  government  and  the  rebellious 
states,  "  every  treaty,  compact,  contract,  or  anything 
else  is  wholly  abrogated  and  from  that  moment  the 
belligerents  act  toward  each  other  according  to  the 
laws  of  war."  The  following  dialogue  brings  forth 
clearly  Stevens'  position : 

Mr.  Dunlap :  "  Are  not  those  seceded  states  still 
members  of  this  Union,  and  under  the  laws  of  the 
government  ?  " 

Mr.  Stevens :     "  In  my  opinion  they  are  not." 

Mr.  Dunlap :  "  Then  I  would  ask,  did  the  ordi 
nances  of  secession  take  them  out  of  the  Union  ?  " 

Mr.  Stevens :  '  The  ordinances  of  secession, 
backed  by  the  armed  power  which  made  them  a  bel 
ligerent  nation,  did  take  them,  so  far  as  present 

1  Cong,  Globe,  Jan.  22,  1864. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     219 

operations  are  concerned,  from  under  the  laws  of  the 
nation." 

Mr.  Dunlap:  "Are  they,  then,  members  of  the 
Union?" 

Mr.  Stevens:     "  They  are  not,  in  my  judgment." 

Mr.  Yeaman :  "  Does  the  gentleman  hold  that  the 
ordinance  of  secession  passed  in  South  Carolina  was 
legal,  and  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States?" 

Mr.  Stevens :  "  I  hold  that  it  was  an  act  of  treason 
and  rebellion." 

Mr.  Yeaman :  "  Did  the  backing  up  of  these  ordi 
nances  of  secession  by  armed  force  impart  to  them 
any  validity?  " 

Mr.  Stevens :  "  I  hold  that  so  long  as  they  remain 
in  force  against  us  as  a  belligerent  power,  and  until 
they  are  conquered,  it  is  in  fact  an  existing  opera 
tion;  I  will  not  say  anything  about  its  legality. 
[Laughter.]  I  hold  that  it  is  an  existing  fact  and  that 
so  far  from  enforcing  any  laws,  you  have  not  the 
power."  1 

His  opponents  sought  to  restrict  him  to  a  theory  of 
the  Constitution  and  of  the  law  as  if  the  wrar  had  no 
existence.  His  mind  was  too  vigorous  and  assertive 
for  such  a  straight-jacket.  Stevens  was  guided  by 
the  facts.  He  was  a  practical  statesman,  not  a  doc 
trinaire  particularist.  He  had  the  great  qualities  of 
the  lawyer  —  not  the  pettifogging  qualities  —  that  en 
abled  him  to  announce  the  law  that  was  suitable  to  the 
momentous  and  overruling  fact  of  war,  and  that  made 
him  impatient  with  questions  of  law  that  were  purely 
1  Cong.  Globe,  Jan.  8,  1863,  Vol.  63,  pp.  239-240. 


220     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

theoretical  and  abstract.  To  him  it  was  utterly  absurd 
to  say  —  as  it  will  seem  absurd  to  the  ordinary  reader 
to-day  —  that  men  in  arms  might  claim  the  protection 
of  the  Constitution  and  laws  that  were  made  for  loyal 
men,  \vhile  these  armed  rebels  refuse  to  obey  one  of 
those  laws  or  acknowledge  their  binding  effect.,  He 
wanted  a  reciprocity  of  obligation  under  the  Constitu 
tion,  or  there  should  be  none  acknowledged  as  binding 
on  the  part  of  the  national  government. 

He  assumed  the  same  consistent  attitude  toward  the 
constitutionality  of  all  the  anti-slavery  measures  that 
arose  during  the  progress  of  the  war.  While  he  was 
urging  emancipation  he  referred  to  the  claim  that  the 
Constitution  did  not  authorize  Congress  to  interfere 
with  slavery  in  the  states.  That  was  true  only  before 
the  Constitution  had  been  abrogated  by  the  fact  of 
war.  But  when  the  Constitution  is  "  repudiated  and 
set  at  defiance  by  an  armed  rebellion  too  powerful  to 
be  quelled  by  peaceable  means,  the  Constitution  itself 
grants  to  the  President  and  Congress  a  supplemental 
power  which  it  is  impossible  to  define  because  it  must 
increase  and  vary  according  to  the  necessity  of  the 
nation."  If  it  were  necessary  as  a  means  of  saving 
the  republic,  there  was  power  under  the  Constitution 
to  declare  a  dictator.  Only  necessity  would  justify 
this  fearful  power, —  to  snatch  the  nation  from  the 
jaws  of  death.  But  as  the  safety  of  the  people  was  the 
supreme  law,  rather  than  that  the  nation  should  perish 
he  would  use  it.  "  Rather  than  see  the  nation  dis 
honored  by  compromise,  concession,  and  submission; 
rather  than  see  the  Union  dissevered  I  would  do  it 
now.  Oh,  for  six  months  of  stern  old  Jackson !  " 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     221 

It  will  be  seen  that  Stevens'  constitutional  position, 
or  extra-constitutional  position,  was  consistent, 
straightforward,  and  outspoken.  He  blinked  at  noth 
ing,  but  he  always  looked  the  constitutional  issue 
squarely  in  the  face.  He  made  no  pretenses  and  would 
resort  to  no  subterfuges  or  forced  constructions  to  jus 
tify  a  course  already  predetermined.  This  is  seen  still 
more  clearly  in  his  attitude  toward  the  admission  of 
West  Virginia. 

The  Constitution  clearly  provides  that  no  state  shall 
be  divided  without  its  consent.  When  Virginia  se 
ceded  the  people  in  the  western  counties  of  the  state, 
wishing  to  remain  loyal  to  the  Union,  assumed  to 
form  a  state  government  and  choose  state  officers, 
and  a  state  legislature.  They  elected  Senators  and 
Representatives  to  Congress  who  were  admitted  to 
their  seats.  They  claimed  to  be  the  people  of  Virginia, 
constitutionally  competent  to  give  the  consent  of  the 
state  to  the  formation  of  a  new  state  within  the 
borders  of  the  "Old  Dominion."  This  people,  having 
given  its  consent  to  the  division  of  the  old  state  of 
Virginia,  immediately  erected  itself  into  the  new  state 
of  West  Virginia.  Nobody  consented  except  those 
within  the  limits  of  the  new  state.  That  is,  the  new 
state  consented  to  the  division  of  the  old,  and  when 
the  new  state  had  been  admitted  according  to  pre- 
arrangement,  Mr.  Pierpont,  pretending  to  be  the  Gov 
ernor  of  the  state  that  pretended  to  be  Virginia,  moved 
over  to  Alexandria  and  kept  up  the  pretense  of  being 
gubernatorial  head  of  old  Virginia, —  with  an  official 
body  that  Sumner  afterward  called  the  "  common 
council  of  Alexandria."  As  Stevens  said  after  the 


222      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

war,  "  All  the  archives,  property  and  effects  of  the 
Pierpont  government  were  taken  to  Richmond  in  an 
ambulance."  This  was  the  government  recognized 
during  the  war  as  the  legitimate,  constitutional  gov 
ernment  of  Virginia,  so  bound  were  public  men  to 
constitutional  forms. 

There  were  distinguished  members  of  Congress  who 
sought  to  find  ground  in  the  Constitution  for  the  recog 
nition  of  the  Pierpont  government,  and  for  the  process 
by  which  Virginia  was  divided  and  West  Virginia 
admitted.  But  to  Stevens,  the  proceedings,  and  argu 
ments  based  upon  them,  wrere  all  ridiculous  and  absurd. 
He  scorned  these  fine-spun  legal  fictions  and  it  was  not 
his  style  to  "  beat  the  devil  about  the  bush  "  in  any 
such  way.  He  was  opposed  to  giving  seats  in  the 
House  to  members  from  Virginia  after  the  secession 
of  that  state,  a  policy  that  was  urged  on  the  plea  that 
the  little  handful  of  loyal  men  left  there  after  secession 
were  the  state  of  Virginia.  "  We  know,"  he  said, 
"  that  members  have  been  elected  to  this  House  by  only 
twenty  votes  and  those  cast  under  the  guns  of  a  fort. 
To  say  that  those  gentlemen  represent  any  district  is 
mere  mockery."  1  Much  less  did  they  represent  a  part 
of  an  organized  state. 

Stevens  was  willing  to  accomplish  the  end  in  view, 
— 'the  dismemberment  of  Virginia  and  the  admission 
of  the  new  state, —  the  sufficient  ground  for  the  act 
being  that  it  would  weaken  the  enemy  and  help  the 
national  cause.  However,  he  recognized  but  one  legal 
ground  for  the  proceeding.  Some  of  his  colleagues 
voted  against  the  admission  of  West  Virginia  because 

1  Globe,  Dec.  2,  1861. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     223 

they  thought  its  formation  was  unconstitutional. 
Others  attempted  to  defend  it  on  constitutional  ground. 
Either  position  Stevens  looked  upon  as  weak  and  inane 
in  a  Union  war  man.  Stevens  was  ready  to  vote  for 
the  admission  of  West  Virginia  because  he  did  not 
think  the  Constitution  applied  to  a  state  in  arms 
against  the  government  of  the  Union.  He  was  not 
afraid  nor  ashamed  to  ignore  the  Constitution  which 
the  rebels  were  ignoring,  in  order  to  do  what  was 
best  for  his  cause  and  for  their  defeat. 

"  We  may  admit  West  Virginia,"  he  said,  "  not  by 
any  provisions  of  the  Constitution  but  under  our  ab 
solute  power  which  the  laws  of  war  give  us.  I  shall 
vote  for  this  bill  upon  that  theory  and  that  alone ;  for 
I  will  not  stultify  myself  by  supposing  that  we  have 
any  warrant  in  the  Constitution  for  this  proceeding. 

"  Sir,  it  is  but  mockery,  in  my  judgment,  to  tell  me 
that  the  Legislature  of  Virginia  has  ever  consented  to 
this  division.  About  200,000  out  of  1,250,000  people 
have  held  a  convention  and  elected  a  legislature  which 
has  assented  to  the  division.  But  before  all  this  was 
done  the  state  had  a  regular  organization  and  a  con 
stitution  under  which  it  acted.  By  a  convention  of 
a  large  majority  of  the  people  of  that  state  they 
changed  their  constitution  and  changed  their  relation 
to  the  federal  government  from  that  of  one  of  its 
members  to  that  of  secession.  This  is  treason,  but 
so  far  as  the  state  corporation  was  concerned,  it  was 
a  valid  act  and  governed  the  state.  The  majority  of 
the  people  of  Virginia  was  the  state  of  Virginia,  al 
though  individuals  had  committed  treason.  Their 
legislature  which  called  the  seceding  convention  was 


224     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  legislature  of  the  state.  The  legislature  was 
disloyal  and  traitorous,  but  the  state  as  a  state  was 
bound  by  their  acts.  Not  so  individuals.  They  are  re 
sponsible  to  the  general  government,  whether  the  state 
decrees  treason  or  not.  Governor  Letcher,  elected  by 
a  majority  of  the  votes  of  Virginia,  is  the  Governor 
of  Virginia, —  a  traitorous  Governor  of  a  traitorous 
state.  A  small  number  of  the  citizens  of  Virginia  — 
the  people  in  West  Virginia  —  assembled  together,  dis 
approved  of  the  acts  of  Virginia,  and  with  the  utmost 
self-complacency  called  themselves  Virginia.  Is  it  not 
ridiculous  ?  "  * 

This  seemed  more  straightforward  than  to  stretch 
the  Constitution  by  a  forced  and  fictitious  construc 
tion  while  claiming  to  respect  its  provisions.  To  a 
layman  it  seemed  like  better  law,  better  sense,  sounder 
morality  and  sounder  political  science. 

This  view  of  the  character  of  the  state  and  the  effect 
of  secession  Stevens  maintained  consistently  on  all  oc 
casions.  It  was  on  this  ground  that  he  would  apply 
confiscation,  that  is,  as  against  enemies  in  war.  If  the 
Rebel  States  were  still  in  the  Union  and  under  the 
Constitution,  as  some  theorists  contended,  he  saw  no 
reason  why  they  should  not  elect  the  next  President 
of  the  United  States.  If  the  rebels  decline  to  vote, 
then  one  hundred  loyal  men  who,  as  his  legal  oppo 
nents  contended,  still  continue  to  be  "  the  state," 
"  might  meet  and  choose  the  state's  share  of  electors. 
The  few  loyal  men  around  Fortress  Monroe  or  Nor 
folk,  or  Alexandria,  and  a  few  '  cleansed  patches  '  in 
Louisiana,  being  one  thousandth  part  of  the  state, 

1Cong.  Globe,  Dec.  9,  1862. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     225 

might  choose  electors  for  the  whole  state."  It  was 
such  reasoning  that  seemed  to  Stevens  like  a  mockery 
of  constitutional  law  and  political  science.  Will  any 
reputable  authority  on  the  political  science  and  the 
Constitution  of  the  American  commonwealth  deny  the 
soundness  of  his  position? 

"  It  is  idle  to  say  that  townships  and  counties  and 
parishes  within  such  states  are  at  peace  while  the 
states  by  acknowledged  majorities  have  declared  for 
war.  It  is  still  more  idle  to  say  that  individuals  within 
the  belligerent  territory,  because  they  were  opposed  to 
secession  and  were  loyal  to  the  parent  government,  arc 
the  stake,  though  only  five  per  cent,  of  the  people,  and 
hence  that  the  "  states  "  are  not  at  war.  This  is  ig 
noring  the  fundamental  principle  of  democratic  re 
publics,  which  is  that  majorities  must  rule,  that  the 
voice  of  the  majority,  however  abandoned  and  wicked, 
is  the  voice  of  the  state.  If  the  minority  choose  to 
stay  with  the  misgoverned  territory  they  are  its  citizens 
and  subject  to  its  conditions.  True,  in  dealing  per 
sonally  great  difference  is  made  between  the  innocent 
and  the  guilty.  But  how  can  it  be  said  that  the  states 
are  not  at  war? 

"  The  idea  that  a  few  loyal  citizens  are  the  state 
and  may  override  and  govern  the  disloyal  millions,  I 
am  not  able  to  comprehend.  If  ten  men  fit  to  save 
Sodom  can  elect  a  Governor  and  other  state  officers 
against  more  than  a  million  Sodomites  in  Virginia, 
then  the  democratic  doctrine  that  the  majority  shall 
rule  is  discarded  and  ignored.  Not  the  quality  but 
the  number  of  votes  have  the  right  to  govern.  In 
South  Carolina  a  rebel's  vote  weighs  just  as  much  as 


226      THE  LIFE  OF.  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

a  loyal  voter's.  It  is  mere  mockery  to  say  that,  ac 
cording  to  any  principle  of  popular  government,  a 
tithe  of  the  resident  inhabitants  of  an  organized  state 
can  change  its  form  and  carry  on  government  because 
they  are  more  holy  or  loyal."  1 

In  an  arraignment  of  Stevens'  position,  Honorable 
Francis  P.  Blair,  of  Missouri,  contended  that  state 
hood  in  the  South  was  indestructible,  that  the  Con 
federate  States  were  like  Missouri  whose  territory 
had  been  overrun  by  rebel  armies  but  whose  state 
organization,  with  the  majority  of  votes  and  coercive 
power  behind  it,  had  remained  loyal  to  the  Union. 
According  to  Blair  the  Southern  States  were  merely 
under  duress.  All  that  was  necessary  was  to  drive 
out  the  rebel  power  that  was  holding  their  governments 
in  restraint,  and  recognize  and  sustain  the  loyal  ele 
ment  as  the  state.  This  duress  had  not  extinguished 
the  legitimate  local  sovereignty  nor  the  supreme  sov 
ereignty  of  the  general  government.  Blair  claimed 
that  Stevens  in  recognizing  the  Southern  States  as 
subsisting  states,  as  perfect  now  as  before  the  Rebel 
lion,  and  that  in  regarding  the  Confederate  States  as 
a  separate  belligerent  power  carrying  on  a  legitimate 
war, —  in  holding  this  position  Blair  contended  that 
Stevens  had  recognized  secession  as  "  absolutely  and 
with  more  distinctness  than  ever  Calhoun  had  ven 
tured  to  urge  it."  "  In  this  position,"  said  Blair,  "  no 
man  North  or  South  ever  asserted  the  secession  cause 
so  boldly  in  the  forum  as  the  gentleman  from  Pennsyl 
vania,"  and  he  asserted  that  Stevens  had  treated  with 
scorn  the  idea  that  states  held  in  duress  by  the  rebel 

1  Globe,  Jan.  22,  1864. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     227 

power  have  a  right  to  look  to  our  laws  and  Constitu 
tion  for  protection.  This  "  secession-abolition-abso 
lute-conquest  doctrine,"  said  Blair,  wras  "  in  defiance 
of  national  and  state  constitutions,  the  law  of  the  civ 
ilized  world  and  of  all  humanity." 

Stevens  replied  with  vigor  to  Blair,  whose  speech, 
he  said,  "  contained  the  distilled  virus  of  the  Copper 
head."  Blair  had  made  a  false  statement  of  Stevens' 
position.  "  If  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States 
should  overrun  a  loyal  state  and  hold  it  in  duress,  that 
state  would  have  a  right  to  appeal  to  the  Constitution 
for  protection.  But  a  state  which  by  a  free  majority 
of  its  voters  has  thrown  off  its  allegiance  to  the  Con 
stitution  and  holds  itself  in  duress  by  its  own  armies, 
is  estopped  from  claiming  any  protection  under  the 
Constitution.  To  say  that  such  a  state  is  within  the 
pale  of  the  Union  so  as  to  claim  protection  under  its 
constitution  and  laws  is  but  the  raving  of  a  madman." 

:{  To  escape  the  consequence  of  my  argument  he 
[Blair]  denies  that  the  Confederate  States  have  been 
acknowledged  as  belligerents  or  have  established  and 
maintained  independent  government  de  facto.  Such 
assurance  would  deny  that  there  is  a  sun  in  heaven. 
They  have  a  Congress  in  which  eleven  states  are  repre 
sented  ;  they  have  at  least  300,000  soldiers  in  the  field ; 
their  pickets  are  almost  within  sight  of  Washington. 
They  have  ships  of  war  on  the  ocean  destroying  hun 
dreds  of  our  ships,  and  our  government  and  the  gov 
ernments  of  Europe  acknowledge  and  treat  them  as 
privateers,  not  as  pirates.  There  is  no  reasoning 
against  such  impudent  denials. 

"  But  it  is  said  the  Constitution  does  not  allow  them 


228     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

to  go  out  of  the  Union.  True,  and  in  going  out  they 
committed  a  crime  for  which  we  are  now  warring 
against  them.  The  law  forbids  a  man  to  rob  or  mur 
der,  yet  robbery  and  murder  exist  de  facto.  Blair 
had  said  that  those  who  declare  the  states  outlawed 
to  the  Union  preach  the  doctrine  of  secession  as  much 
as  Jefferson  Davis.  Does  the  man,"  asked  Stevens, 
"  who  declares  that  murder  and  larceny  exist  give 
countenance  to  those  crimes  ?  The  one  is  as  reasonable 
as  the  other.  If  the  fiction  of  equity  courts  that  what 
ever  ought  to  be  shall  be  considered  as  existing, —  if 
this  is  true,  then  the  rebel  states  are  in  the  Union. 
If  the  naked  facts,  palpable  to  every  eye,  attested  by 
many  a  bloody  battle-field,  and  recorded  by  every  day's 
hostile  legislation,  both  in  Washington  and  Richmond, 
are  to  prevail,  then  the  rebellious  states  are  no  more 
in  the  Union,  in  fact,  than  the  loyal  states  are  in  the 
Confederate  States.  Nor  should  they  ever  be  treated 
so  until  they  repent  and  are  rebaptized  into  the  na 
tional  Union."  * 

The  seceded  states  had,  de  facto,  committed  the 
crime  of  secession.  That  no  one  could  deny.  They, 
therefore,  stood  in  that  attitude  as  outlaws  and  aliens 
from  the  protection  of  the  Constitution.  They  were 
a  belligerent,  occupying  the  position  of  a  foreign  na 
tion,  as  far  as  their  rights  under  the  Constitution  were 
concerned.  But,  when  conquered,  they  would  be  in  a 
worse  condition  than  a  foreign  nation,  since  they  were 
traitors  to  their  government,  and,  as  such,  they  must 
be  pursued  and  punished  to  their  utter  subjugation.2 

1  Globe,  May  2,  1864,  p.  2042. 

2  Stevens'  critics  sought  to  make  it  appear  that  his  position 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     229 

Such  was  Stevens'  constitutional  position  in  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  This  position  he  assumed  at  the 
start  when  he  was  called  on  to  meet  the  problem  of 
war,  and  he  maintained  it  to  the  close  when  he  had 
to  meet  the  problem  of  reconstruction.  In  maintaining 
his  ground  he  never  wavered  nor  doubted;  and,  year 
by  year,  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  his  party 
advancing  steadily  to  his  position.  On  May  2,  1864, 
Stevens  congratulated  the  country  that  the  House  had 
recently  passed  a  resolution  recognizing  that  "  the  war 
had  been  brought  on  by  a  wicked  and  wholly  unjusti 
fiable  rebellion,  and  those  engaged  in  aiding  or  en 
couraging  it  are  public  enemies  and  should  be  treated 
as  such/'  In  this  the  House  had  asserted  the  funda 
mental  principle  for  which  Stevens  had  contended. 
The  consequences  which  he  sought  to  establish  would 
follow  as  a  corollary. 

Stevens  knew  full  well  that,  in  voicing  the  doctrine 
that  the  Constitution  was  suspended  by  the  fact  of  war, 
he  had  not  been  all  the  while  speaking  the  sentiment  of 
his  party  or  of  the  administration.  His  position  had 
been  too  radical  for  his  party.  But  Stevens  was  sat 
isfied  to  go  ahead  and  point  out  the  way.  He  was 
content  and  brave  enough  to  stand  out  boldly  and  alone 

was  similar  to  that  of  those  who  were  so  friendly  to  the  South 
that  they  would  recognize  the  Confederacy  as  an  independent 
power,  de  jure;  that,  as  Stevens  expressed  it,  "these  states  be 
permitted  to  remain  a  de  facto  secession  power  without  punish 
ment;  that  this  government  should  extend  to  them  the  right 
hand  of  fellowship  in  the  shape  of  negotiation,  withdraw  its 
armies  and  allow  them  to  maintain  the  attitude  which,  through 
their  great  crime,  they  had  acquired."  Globe,  April  n,  1864,  p. 
1534.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  it  was  only  by  the  pretenses  of 
partisanship  that  attempt  could  be  made  to  assimilate  these  two 
positions.  They  were  as  wide  apart  as  the  poles. 


230     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

for  a  doctrine  which,  as  he  believed,  was  the  only 
sound  and  consistent  position  on  which  the  war  could 
be  successfully  conducted,  and  which,  as  he  predicted, 
his  colleagues  and  colaborers  for  the  Union  would, 
in  time,  find  it  necessary  to  adopt.  He  now  had  the 
grim  satisfaction  of  seeing  this  very  thing  come  about, 
and  he  might  very  properly  and  reasonably  have  re 
called  his  personal  vaunt  of  the  year  before  when  he 
reminded  his  party  associates  that  he  had  been  merely 
going  a  few  steps  ahead  of  them  in  this  matter. 

"  But,"  he  said,  "  I  have  never  been  so  far  ahead,  with 
the  exception  of  the  principles  I  now  enunciate,  but  that  the 
members  of  the  party  have  overtaken  me  and  gone  ahead; 
and  they  will  overtake  me  again  and  go  with  me  before  this 
infamous  and  bloody  rebellion  is  ended.  They  will  find  that 
they  can  not  execute  the  Constitution  in  the  seceding  states: 
that  it  is  a  total  nullity  there,  and  that  this  war  must  be  car 
ried  on  upon  principles  wholly  independent  of  it.  They 
will  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  adoption  of  the  meas 
ures  I  advocated  at  the  outset  of  the  war  (the  arming  of 
the  negroes)  is  the  only  way  left  on  earth  in  which  these 
rebels  can  be  exterminated.  I  do  not  now  ask  gentlemen 
to  endorse  my  views,  nor  do  I  speak  for  anybody  but  myself ; 
but  in  order  that  I  may  have  some  credit  for  sagacity  I 
ask  that  gentlemen  will  write  this  down  in  their  memories. 
It  will  not  be  two  years  before  they  call  it  up,  or  before 
they  will  adopt  my  views,  or  adopt  the  other  alternative  of  a 
disgraceful  submission  by  this  side  of  the  country."  1 

Stevens  was  right.  Congress  and  the  country  had 
adopted  his  views.  The  object  of  the  war  was  to 
subdue  the  Rebellion.  Whatever  means  the  nation 
deemed  wise  and  effective  in  promoting  that  end  were 

1  Globe,  May  2,  1864. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     231 

justifiable,  if  they  were  not  contrary  to  the  laws  of 
war  and  of  humanity.  This  was  the  sum  total  of 
Stevens'  teaching  on  the  government's  power  in  war. 

A  writer  in  the  London  Times  1  held  that  all  the 
acts  of  President  Lincoln,  in  suspending  the  habeas 
corpus,  in  committing  arbitrary  arrests,  in  emanci 
pating  the  slaves,  in  declaring  a  blockade  of  Southern 
ports  —  all  these  acts,  and  many  others,  in  letter  and 
in  spirit,  were  excusable  on  one  ground  alone,  ground 
which  the  Democrats  rejected  and  which  the  Republi 
cans  were  not  bold  enough  to  stand  upon,  namely, 
"  that  the  states  of  the  South  were  an  alien  enemy  and 
that  those  citizens  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States  who  aid  and  abet  them  are  amenable  to  the 
customs  and  usages  of  all  governments  toward  treason 
able  subjects." 

It  would  have  been  only  fair  in  this  writer  to  admit 
that  there  was  at  least  one  Republican  leader  who  was 
bold  enough  to  occupy  that  ground,  the  ground  on 
which  alone  the  war  powers  exercised  by  President 
Lincoln  are  to  be  defended  and  justified.  That  ad 
vanced  leader  was  Stevens.  He  saw  clearly,  from 
the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  weakness  and  the  fallacy 
of  the  assumption  put  forward  by  certain  legalists 
and  doctrinaire  constitutionalists  that  the  Constitution 
was  the  criterion  by  which  to  conduct  the  war.  He 
saw  how  utterly  vain  it  was  to  try  to  reconcile  the  uses 
of  martial  law  with  the  principles  of  the  Constitution. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  rational  men 
prompted  by  patriotic  motives  could  hold  to  the  doc 
trine  announced  by  the  Peace  Democrats,  namely, 

1  November  13,  1862. 


232      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

that  the  nation  could  use  no  powers  in  the  war  except 
those  specifically  enumerated  in  the  Constitution.  It 
was  the  height  of  absurdity.  Either  such  men  were 
arrant  fools  or  they  were  unwilling  to  see  the  Union 
preserved  by  war.  Certain  it  is,  that  the  application 
of  their  doctrine  would  have  made  it  impossible  to 
prosecute  the  war  with  any  effect,  and  the  burden  of 
evidence  tends  to  prove  that  that  was  what  they  really 
desired. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  doctrine  of  Stevens  gave 
the  nation  fighting  strength  and  renewed  life,  and  it 
came  to  be  the  doctrine  of  all  who  were  really  desirous 
of  prosecuting  the  war  in  earnest.  The  doctrine  was 
that  the  Southern  States  in  the  war  were  outside  the 
pale  of  the  Constitution  from  first  to  last.  Neither 
combatant  in  the  struggle,  in  its  conduct  toward  the 
other,  was  bound  by  its  restrictions.  The  Constitution 
could  not  operate  in  the  rebel  states.  Yet  the  acts 
authorized  by  martial  law  were  not  to  be  regarded  as 
unconstitutional.  The  Constitution  recognized  martial 
law  and  all  the  laws  of  war,  but  the  laws  of  war  never 
operate  while  the  Constitution  and  municipal  laws  pre 
vail.  Nor  do  the  Constitution  and  civil  laws  operate 
when  the  laws  of  war  prevail.  The  Constitution  calls 
for  the  laws  of  war  and  leads  them  forth  to  take  its 
place  when  and  where  it  can  no  longer  maintain  its 
power ;  then  it  retires  and  leaves  the  theater  of  war  to 
the  laws  of  nations.  They  are  exclusive  in  their  em 
pire.  There  can  be  no  mixed  reign  of  the  laws  of  war 
and  of  the  Constitution.1 

While  this  doctrine  was  finally  accepted   for  war 
1  Speech  of  Stevens  in  Lancaster,   Pennsylvania,   1863. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     233 

purposes  by  all  wings  of  the  war  party  who  were  sin 
cerely  desirous  of  seeing  the  war  successful,  yet,  with 
strange  inconsistency  and  lack  of  boldness,  when  it 
came  to  a  question  of  amending  the  Constitution  or 
of  reconstructing  the  Union,  an  effort,  or  pretense,  was 
made  to  apply  the  Constitution  in  states  where  seces 
sion  and  war  had  abrogated  it  and  made  it  a  nullity. 
I  do  not  refer  to  the  laudable  effort  to  restore  the  Con 
stitution  to  local  state  governments  wherein  war  had 
stricken  it  down;  but  to  the  pretense  that  it  was  in 
force  where,  by  reason  of  actual  conditions,  it  could 
not  be  enforced.  Lincoln  and  many  of  the  Union 
party  seemed  strangely  possessed  with  the  idea  that 
with  reference  to  certain  civil  and  constitutional  rights 
and  privileges,  the  states  that  were  at  war  with  the 
Union  were  to  be  treated  as  if  secession  and  war  had 
not  occurred.  They  proposed  still  to  regard  the  states 
of  the  Confederacy  as  states  of  the  Union.  They 
were  to  be  like  all  the  other  states  for  voting  purposes 
when  it  came  to  the  fundamental  act  of  remodeling  the 
organic  law  of  the  nation.  If  this  premise  were  to 
be  conceded,  that  the  Constitution  was  in  force  every 
where  and  in  all  respects  just  as  if  war  had  not  oc 
curred,  then  there  was  no  way  to  break  the  force  of 
the  argument  of  the  Peace  Democrats  voiced  by  Pen- 
dleton.  There  were  thirty-five  states.  Twenty- 
seven  were  necessary  to  ratify  the  liberty  amendment. 
There  were  nineteen  Free  States.  "  Suppose,"  asked 
Pendleton,  "  you  get  them  all, —  where  do  you  get 
the  others  ?  Count,  also,  Maryland,  Missouri,  West 
Virginia,  even  Delaware,  and  you  have  but  twenty- 
three.  Where  do  you  get  the  other  four?  If  you 


234      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

intend  to  make  up  this  number  by  the  addition  of  new 
states  you  will  have  to  add  sixteen,  three-fourths  of 
which,  twelve,  will  be  the  proper  proportion  for  the 
number  added.  Will  the  gentlemen  call  on  the  South 
ern  States  to  furnish  the  requisite  number  ?  There  the 
military  authorities  were  already  well  ashamed  of  the 
farce  enacted  a  short  time  since  and  were  about  to 
get  rid  of  the  pretense  of  a  government  which  a  little 
Avhile  ago  had  been  set  up.  If  these  states  are  to  vote 
in  their  present  condition  it  would  be  a  broad  farce 
if  it  were  not  a  wicked  fraud." 

It  was  exactly  so.  It  partook  of  the  nature  both 
of  a  farce  and  a  fraud  to  regard  the  states  of  the 
belligerent  Confederacy  as  constitutional  states  of  the 
Union.  Yet  those  who  were  responsible  for  the  con 
duct  of  the  government  were  so  wedded  to  this  mis 
chievous  abstraction;  they  consented  to  be  so 
handicapped  by  this  useless  and  embarrassing  theory, 
that  they  would  not  consent  to  proclaim  liberty  through 
out  the  land  to  all  the  inhabitants  thereof  without 
acting  as  if  it  were  first  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the 
amendment  to  obtain  the  consent  of  a  number  of  the 
Confederate  States,  the  same  as  if  they  had  never 
broken  with  the  Union  and  made  war  on  the  Con 
stitution.  Their  process  was  but  an  empty  form. 
The  Confederate  States  necessary  to  the  amendment 
were  to  be  made  to  act  under  pretended  civil  govern 
ments  set  up  and  entirely  supported,  if  not  directed, 
by  the  military  arm  of  the  national  power.1 

1  The  eight  Confederate  States  that  were  finally  counted  for 
the  ratification  of  the  amendment  were  the  presidential  states 
that  were  set  up  by  the  military  power  of  Lincoln  and  Johnson. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     235 

Furthermore  in  order  to  secure  the  necessary 
twenty-seven  states  a  new  state  had  to  be  admitted  to 
the  Union  for  the  express  purpose  of  ratifying  the 
amendment.  Nevada  was  admitted  for  no  other  rea 
son,  a  state  which,  even  after  the  lapse  of  half  a  cen 
tury,  has  not,  and  may  never  have,  one- fourth  of 
the  population  deemed  essential  to  statehood.  And 
this  ^unnecessary  admission  of  a  "  rotten  borough," 
with  a  power  in  the  United  States  Senate  equal  to  that 
of  the  most  populous  state,  was  brought  about  only  by 
recourse  to  a  most  questionable  political  morality, 
namely,  the  purchase  of  congressional  support  by  of 
ficial  patronage.  Mr.  Charles  A.  Dana,  the  distin 
guished  journalist,  is  authority  for  the  statement  that 
President  Lincoln  authorized  the  offer  of  twenty  thou 
sand  dollars  (or  patronage  to  that  amount),  to  a  Dem 
ocratic  Congressman,  to  secure  his  vote  for  the  bill  ad 
mitting  Nevada,  so  anxious  was  the  President  to  pro 
mote  the  passage  and  ratification  of  the  thirteenth 
amendment.1 

No  one  supposes  that  Stevens  was  more  scrupulous 
than  Lincoln  in  the  employment  of  means  to  reach  his 
end.  But  his  doctrine  on  the  war  and  the  Constitu 
tion  obviated  the  alleged  necessity  of  a  resort  to  such 
embarrassing,  not  to  say  immoral,  indirection.  It  en 
abled  him  to  go  more  directly  and  more  honestly  to  his 
end.  How  much  simpler  and  easier,  how  much 
sounder  in  common  sense,  law,  and  political  morality 
was  Stevens'  method  of  bringing  about  the  adoption  of 
the  thirteenth  amendment!  Indeed,  it  may  be  said 
that  there  was  no  answer  to  the  constitutional  doctrine 
1  Chas.  A.  Dana,  Recollections  of  the  Civil  War,  pp.  175-178. 


236     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  Pendleton  except  the  answer  of  Stevens.  But 
Stevens'  answer  was  convincing  and  sufficient.  It  was 
that  the  Constitution  was  not  in  force  for  those  states 
that  had  consented  to  its  overthrow;  that  the  states 
that  had  rejected  the  Constitution  and  were  making 
war  upon  it  were  no  part  of  the  amending  power. 
There  was  not  the  slightest  obligation  to  consult  them 
in  determining  the  organic  law  of  the  nation, —  there 
was  no  more  reason  for  consulting  them  than  for  con 
sulting  the  states  of  the  German  Empire.  Though  the 
national  authority  might  rightfully  be  asserted  over 
them,  yet  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  rights  and 
privileges  or  of  their  powers  in  the  Union,  they  were 
non-existent  as  states.  They  ought  not  to  have  been 
consulted,  and  three-fourths  of  the  states  then  loyal 
to  the  Union  and  represented  in  Congress  were  suffi 
cient  to  ratify  and  legalize  the  new  amendment. 

If  that  doctrine  had  been  assented  to  in  the  first  place 
the  way  out  in  rebuilding  the  Union  and  the  Constitu 
tion  would  have  been  easy  and  direct. 

Better  than  any  other  man  of  his  time,  Thaddeus 
Stevens  saw  the  proper  relation  of  the  war  to  this  con 
tention  about  the  Constitution.  Toward  those  who 
forced,  or  accepted,  the  gage  of  battle  and  who  appealed 
to  the  issue  of  war,  the  law  and  fate  of  war  should 
have  been  applied.  Their  civil  and  political  rights 
guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  no  longer  existed.  It 
was  a  simple  and  natural  conclusion,  and  Stevens  was 
determined  that  the  Constitution  should  not  be  ap 
pealed  to,  as  some  sought  continually  to  do,  merely  to 
embarrass,  to  obstruct,  and  to  defeat  the  successful 
prosecution  of  the  war. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  WAR     237 

But  the  ordinary  minds  in  Congress  were  so  con 
ventional,  so  unoriginal,  so  bound  by  conservatism 
and  tradition,  that  they  could  not  break  away  from 
the  "  Constitution  and  the  Union  "  as  they  had  always 
known  them  in  years  gone  by.  A  statesman  is  gov 
erned  by  his  circumstances,  and  the  mighty  changes 
that  had  come  in  the  circumstances  of  the  states,  which 
smaller  men  were  unwilling  to  take  note  of,  were  the 
controlling  and  decisive  factor  in  the  mind  of  Stevens. 
He  was  a  leader  in  a  revolutionary  period  where  men 
of  boldness  were  needed  to  lead  against  prevailing 
opinions  that  brought  the  people  to  a  supine  and  help 
less  constitutionalism.  His  disregard  of  the  Constitu 
tion  was  a  statesmanlike  and  noble  contempt  for  the 
restrictions  of  a  parchment  that  stood  in  the  way  of  his 
country's  realizing  its  highest  moral  ideals, —  liberty, 
equality,  union.  He  was  dealing  with  living  forces  and 
facts,  not  with  abstract  questions  of  law  or  speculative 
constitutional  phrases.  The  nation  could  neither  go 
back  to  the  old  paths  nor  stand  still  amid  the  dangers 
confronting  it,  and  in  such  a  crisis  it  was  the  part 
of  a  real  leader  to  press  forward  without  regard  to 
squeamish  scruples  about  the  Constitution.  The  Con 
stitution  was  a  means,  not  an  end,  and  Stevens  was 
large  enough  and  bold  enough  to  put  the  Constitution 
in  its  place,  and  to  keep  it  from  being  lugged  in  out 
of  place  by  a  set  of  sentimental  theorizers  whose  leader 
ship  would  have  brought  the  nation  to  impotency  and 
defeat.  He  rightly  insisted  that  the  Constitution  be 
kept  out  of  the  way  of  the  nation  in  its  struggle  at 
arms  for  the  national  life.  Whether  the  Union  came 
to  a  dictatorship  or  the  rebels  were  brought  to  exile  and 


238     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

extermination,  he  would  stand  to  the  end  for  the  life 
of  the  nation  in  the  triumph  of  the  Union,  and  to  him, 
in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  the  Constitution  was  but  a 
lifeless  and  worthless  parchment  until  the  issue  of  war 
was  determined. 

But  for  such  men  in  times  of  great  political  crises 
there  would  be  no  political  triumphs  and  achievements 
worth  commemorating  in  history.  It  was  in  real  noble 
ness  of  soul  that  he  could  say,  a  year  before  the  strug 
gle  ended  and  before  Congress  and  the  country  were 
ready  to  accept  the  immortal  amendment  that  guaran 
teed  freedom  to  all  beneath  the  flag,  "  I  have  lived  to 
see  the  triumph  of  principles  which,  although  I  had  full 
faith  in  their  ultimate  success,  I  did  not  expect  to  wit 
ness.  If  Providence  will  spare  me  a  little  longer,  until 
this  government  shall  be  so  reconstructed  that  the  foot 
of  a  slave  can  never  again  tread  upon  the  soil  of  the 
republic,  I  shall  be  content  to  accept  any  lot  that  may 
await  me."  1 

*  Globe,  May  2,  1864. 


CHAPTER  XI 

WAYS   AND   MEANS  IN   THE   WAR;    THE   GREENBACK 

TT 7"HEN  Lincoln  as  President-elect  was  engaged  in 
*  V  making  up  his  Cabinet,  Stevens  was  prominently 
considered  for  the  position  of  Attorney-General. 
Simon  Cameron,  also  of  Pennsylvania,  was  a  candidate 
for  a  Cabinet  appointment,  and  when  Lincoln  invited 
Cameron  to  the  head  of  the  War  Department,  Stev 
ens'  ambition  was  disappointed.  Stevens  was  not 
pleased  at  being  set  aside  for  a  man  with  whom  he  was 
not  friendly,  and  he  indulged  in  some  caustic  criticism 
of  the  Cabinet,  by  saying  that  it  was  composed  of  "  an 
assortment  of  rivals  whom  the  President  appointed 
from  courtesy,  one  stump-speaker  from  Indiana,  and 
two  representatives  of  the  Blair  family."  1 

Stevens  was  destined  to  play  a  larger  role  in  the 
course  of  the  war  than  he  would  have  done  as  Attor 
ney-General.  On  July  4,  1861,  the  new  Congress  (the 
Thirty-seventh)  met  in  extraordinary  session  at  the 
call  of  President  Lincoln.  Stevens  became  the  recog 
nized  leader  of  the  House  on  the  floor,  as  Chairman  of 
the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means.  This  committee 
then  performed  the  combined  functions  now  belonging 
to  the  two  most  important  committees  of  the  House, 
the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  and  the  Commit- 

1  Elaine's  Twenty  Years  in  Congress,  Vol.  I,  p.  286. 

239 


240      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tee  on  Appropriations.  On  this  committee  rested  the 
burdens  and  duties  of  providing  the  funds  for  carrying 
on  the  war  and  of  appropriating  these  funds  to  the 
various  needs.  To  it  were  referred  all  measures  of 
public  finance,  all  appropriations  for  the  army  and 
navy  and  for  all  departments  of  the  government,  all 
tax  bills,  all  loan  bills,  all  coinage  bills.  No  greater 
task  ever  devolved  on  a  Committee  of  the  House.  It 
embraced  some  of  the  weightiest  considerations  ever 
brought  into  discussion  within  the  councils  of  the  gov 
ernment,  including  matters  of  great  moment  and  peril 
in  the  crisis  through  which  the  country  was  passing, 
for  it  was  quite  true  that  the  problem  of  success  in  the 
war  was  a  problem  of  money. 

The  financial  history  of  the  Civil  War  is  a  subject  so 
large  that  only  its  prominent  features  can  be  con 
sidered  here.  It  divides  itself  for  the  most  part  into 
four  heads, —  taxation,  loans,  currency,  and  banking. 

Taxation  and  banking  may  be  left  on  one  side  for 
the  present,  for  the  sake  of  continuity  of  attention  to 
the  important  and  greatly  controverted  subjects  of 
loans  and  currency. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  in  the  history  of  any  people, 
a  national  debt  was  ever  contracted  so  rapidly  as  was 
that  of  the  United  States  during  the  Civil  War.  On 
July,  i,  1860,  a  few  months  before  secession  began, 
the  debt  of  the  United  States  was  about  $64,000,000, 
two  years  later  it  was  $524,000,000;  within  three 
years  it  was  $1,100,000,000;  within  four  years  (July 
I,  1864)  it  was  $1,800,000,000,  while  by  August  31, 
1865,  the  national  debt  of  the  United  States  stood 
at  the  enormous  aggregate  of  $2,845,000,000.  The 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     241 

cost  of  the  war  was  scarcely  at  any  time  under  $30,- 
000,000  a  month ;  at  times  it  was  as  high  as  $90,000,- 
ooo  a  month,  and  on  the  average  for  the  four  years  of 
the  war  it  was  $60,000,000  a  month,  or  $2,000,000  a 
day.  The  expenditures  of  the  government  during  the 
fiscal  years  1863  to  1865  were  more  than  the  entire 
expenditures  of  the  national  government  from  the 
foundation  of  the  nation  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil 
War.  In  the  space  of  four  years  it  was  necessary  for 
the  government  to  increase  its  revenue  by  loans  and 
taxes  from  $65,000,000  to  $960,000,000,  from  2  per 
cent,  of  the  gross  product  of  the  nation  to  26  per  cent, 
of  that  product.1  During  the  last  year  of  the  war  the 
government  raised  more  than  $1,000,000,000,  half 
by  loans  and  half  by  taxes,  "  one  of  the  greatest 
achievements  in  finance  that  history  records."  2  By 
July  i,  1865,  the  treasury  had  raised  in  war  loans  $2,- 
000,000,000  more  than  the  national  treasury  had  ever 
received  from  loans  and  revenues  combined  in  all  the 
previous  years  of  its  history.  By  the  end  of  the  war 
the  annual  interest  charge  on  the  national  debt  for 
which  provision  had  to  be  made  in  annual  revenue, 
had  reached  the  enormous  sum  of  $150,000,000,  an 
annual  burden  of  interest  payment  that  was  almost 
twice  as  large  as  the  whole  original  debt  of  the  nation, 
a  burden  that  had  almost  staggered  America  and  caused 
threats  of  repudiation  when  Alexander  Hamilton  was 
called  on  to  grapple  with  the  problem  of  establishing 
the  public  credit. 

These  figures  and  comparisons  may  serve  to  give  one 

1  Adams,  D.  C,  Public  Finance,  p.  535. 
2E.  H.  Derby,  Atlantic  Monthly,  Oct.  1868. 


242     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

some  idea  of  the  stupendous  character  of  our  civil  con 
flict  and  of  the  fiscal  problems  of  Congress  in  this  pe 
riod.  Such  financial  burdens  had  never  been  heard  of 
or  dreamed  of  before.  Men  were  altogether  unused  to 
thinking  in  such  terms  or  facing  such  trials  of  the  na 
tional  faith.  If  the  burdens  had  been  foreseen  at  the 
beginning  of  the  conflict,  the  prospect  might  have  ap 
palled  the  stoutest  heart. 

At  the  opening  of  the  struggle,  July  4,  1861,  Secre 
tary  Chase  submitted  his  financial  plan.  Lincoln's  ad 
ministration  inherited  an  empty  treasury  and  an  im 
paired  credit.  When,  during  the  closing  years  of 
Buchanan's  administration,  the  United  States  was  com 
pelled  to  borrow  to  meet  an  approaching  deficit,  its 
securities  were  bought  in  the  market  at  eighty-nine 
cents  on  the  dollar.  When  Congress  met  in  extra  ses 
sion  there  was  not  money  enough  in  the  treasury  to  pay 
members  for  their  services. 

In  submitting  his  financial  plan  to  Congress  in  July, 
1 86 1,  Secretary  Chase  stated  that  the  financial  problem 
to  be  solved  was  "  that  of  apportioning  loans  and  taxes 
in  a  proper  manner."  This  proposition  was  sound 
enough,  but  the  prime  financial  mistake  of  the  war  came 
here  at  the  outset  in  not  starting  in  with  positive  and 
ample  measures  of  taxation.  Credit  is  based  on 
revenue,  and  it  is  one  of  the  maxims  of  public  finance 
that  the  increased  use  of  credit  in  meeting  war  emer 
gencies  should  always  be  accompanied  by  correspond 
ingly  increased  taxation.  Chase  proposed  to  raise 
from  taxes  only  enough  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  public 
debt  and  the  ordinary  expenses  of  the  government  in 
time  of  peace.  No  war  taxes  were  proposed ;  the  extra 


ROBERT   COSTER 


SALMON  P.  CHASE,  1808-1873. 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  1S61-1S64. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     243 

expenses  of  the  war  were  to  be  met  by  loans.  Thus, 
the  government  started  out  to  rely  on  borrowing  to 
provide  ways  and  means  of  waging  war.  Secretary 
Chase  estimated  that  $320,000,000  would  be  needed 
for  the  ensuing  fiscal  year,  only  $80,000,000  of  which 
was  to  be  provided  by  taxation,  merely  enough 
for  the  peace  expenses  and  the  interest  on  the  increas 
ing  loans.  On  July  i/th,  Stevens'  committee  reported 
a  loan  bill  authorizing  the  Secretary  to  use  the  credit 
of  the  government  in  borrowing  $250,000,000,  and 
his  bill  passed  the  House  without  more  than  an  hour's 
consideration,  so  prompt  and  ready  were  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  people  to  respond  to  the  call  of  the 
treasury  and  to  furnish  the  sinews  of  war. 

Secretary  Chase  appealed  to  the  associated  banks  of 
New  York,  Boston,  and  Philadelphia  for  loans.  A 
loan  arrangement  was  speedily  effected  by  which  the 
banks  were  to  advance  to  the  treasury  $50,000,000 
immediately  in  exchange  for  treasury  notes  bearing  7.3 
per  cent,  interest,  running  for  three  years.  The  banks 
were  given  the  option  of  taking  a  second  $50,000,000 
of  the  loan  by  October  I5th  and  a  third  fifty  by  Decem 
ber  1 5th.  When  the  loan  was  arranged  for,  the  banks 
had  a  specie  reserve  of  only  $63,000,000,  barely 
enough  to  meet  the  first  instalment.  They  hoped  to 
replenish  their  coin  reserve  by  selling  to  the  public 
the  government  securities  for  cash  and  by  the  govern 
ment's  disbursements  for  war  supplies.  It  was 
supposed  that  the  coin  restored  to  the  channels  of  trade 
by  government  payments  would  flow  naturally  and 
steadily  back  into  the  banks.  The  public  should  buy 
the  treasury  notes  through  the  banks,  the  government 


244      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

should  keep  paying  out  specie  from  the  subtreasury, 
and  the  people  should  keep  on  depositing  their  coin  in 
the  banks.  If  this  chain  worked  smoothly  and  the 
banks  could  collect  specie  as  rapidly  as  they  paid  it  over 
to  the  government,  they  could  continue  to  supply  the 
treasury  indefinitely  with  funds.  This  was  the  plan, 
but  if  a  link  in  the  operation  broke,  if  for  any  reason 
the  coin  did  not  return  to  the  banks,  suspension  of 
specie  payments  would  be  inevitable,  and  the  Secre 
tary's  loan  policy  would  collapse. 

The  scheme  rested  on  mutual  confidence  among  the 
people,  the  banks,  and  the  government.  If  distrust  set 
in;  or  if  the  burden  of  demand  from  increasing  debt 
and  credit  mounted  too  suddenly  and  too  high  to  be 
sustained  on  the  narrow  basis  of  the  little  specie  that 
was  in  the  country;  if  the  government  failed  to  pursue 
a  policy  in  the  interest  of  the  banks;  or  if  the  banks 
doubted,  or  sought  to  discount,  the  guarantees  of  the 
government, —  failure  of  the  plan  was  certain  to  fol 
low.  When  the  banks  came  to  take  the  third  loan  in 
stalment  of  $50,000,000  and  the  Secretary  had  to  sub 
stitute  for  short  time  treasury  notes  6  per  cent,  bonds  at 
a  discount  of  more  than  10  per  cent.,  realizing  less  than 
$45,000,000  on  the  $50,000,000  loan,  ultimate  failure 
of  the  plan  should  have  been  apparent.  Confidence 
was  waning,  seemingly  on  the  part  of  the  banks,  and 
with  waning  confidence  in  public  credit  it  was  only  a 
question  of  time  when  specie  payment  would  have 
to  be  suspended. 

Critics  of  Secretary  Chase  have  charged  him  with 
raising  the  first  obstacle  to  the  maintenance  of  this 
circle  of  specie  payments  because  of  his  strict  interpre- 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     245 

tation  of  the  law  of  August  5,  1861,  amending  the 
Loan  Act  of  July  i/th.  This  law,  it  is  claimed,  was  in 
tended  to  relax  the  subtreasury  system  by  permitting 
the  Secretary  to  deposit  the  money  obtained  on  the 
loans  "  in  solvent  specie-paying  banks,"  instead  of  with 
drawing  the  whole  amount  of  the  loan  from  the  banks 
to  be  locked  up  in  the  subtreasury.  The  banks  de 
sired  the  Secretary  to  permit  them  to  credit  the  United 
States  with  a  deposit  equal  to  the  amount  of  their 
loan,  against  which  the  treasury  might  draw  as  it  had 
occasion.  But  Secretary  Chase  thought  that  the  law 
required  him  not  to  leave  the  government  specie  with 
the  banks  and  accept  bank  bills  or  book  credit  instead. 
In  addition  to  this  embarrassment  to  the  banks,  the 
Secretary  used  demand  notes  in  making  public  pay 
ments.  Fifty  million  of  these  notes  had  been  issued 
and  they  were  receivable  for  public  dues,  and  they, 
therefore,  never  depreciated.  Since  these  notes  were 
in  circulation  the  banks  would  receive  less  gold  in 
deposits,  having  to  receive  to  a  certain  extent  the  de 
mand  notes  instead,  and  thus  they  would  be  less  able 
to  keep  their  loan  agreement  with  the  government. 

The  real  causes  of  the  outcome  are  not  difficult  to 
see.  One  was  the  fact  that  in  his  first  annual  report  in 
December,  1861,  Secretary  Chase  still  failed  to  pro 
pose  adequate  war  taxation.  That  important  policy, 
so  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the  public  credit 
in  the  face  of  increasing  obligations,  was  neglected. 
The  Secretary  still  seemed  to  be  under  the  delusion 
that  the  war  would  end  before  the  lapse  of  another 
year  and  that  temporary  provisions  and  makeshifts 
might  be  relied  upon.  In  addition  to  this  the  Trent 


246      THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Affair  had  produced  a  serious  situation  in  our  foreign 
relations,  and  war  was  threatened  with  England.  The 
formidable  character  of  the  Rebellion  was  apparent  to 
wise  observers,  and  both  at  home  and  abroad  the  war 
situation  was  alarming.  The  effect  of  the  increased 
uncertainty  and  scare  upon  the  sensitive  financial  nerve 
of  the  country  became  quickly  apparent.  The  banks 
could  not  sell  the  government  securities,  on  a  declin 
ing  public  credit,  which  they  held  in  large  quantities, 
except  at  a  sacrifice;  the  public  not  only  failed  to  de 
posit  its  coin  in  the  banks,  but  began  a  positive  and 
alarming  withdrawal  of  deposits;  and  the  specie  re 
serve  in  the  banks  dwindled  at  the  rate  of  nearly  a 
million  a  day.1 

It  was  all  outgo  and  no  income.  The  inevitable  re 
sult  followed, —  an  -event  of  prime  importance  in  the 
financial  .history  of  the  war  —  namely,  the  suspension 
of  specie  payments  by  the  banks,  on  December  30,  1861. 
The  government,  too,  as  a  matter  of  course,  suspended 
coin  payments.  The  financial  prop  had  given  way  and 
by  January  i,  1862,  the  fiscal  system  established  be 
tween  the  treasury  and  the  banks  had  collapsed  and 
Secretary  Chase  was  at  a  loss  what  to  do  or  in  what 
direction  to  turn  in  the  crisis.  It  is  doubtful  if  any 
minister  of  finance  ever  faced  a  graver  dilemma.2 

1  The  coin  reserve  in  the  banks  fell  from  $50,000,000  to  $43,- 
000,000  from  December  I4th  to  28th. 

2  The  holders  of  the  "  convertible  bank  currency,"  which  the 
banks   had  been  so   accustomed  to  applaud,   could  not  now   get 
the  gold  which  they  had  deposited  and  which  of  right  belonged 
to  them.     Nor  could  the  government  get  the  gold,  according  to 
the  arrangement  previously  made  with   the  banks,   for  then,  as 
Mr.   James    Gallatin,    one    of   their    leading   spokesmen,    said,    it 
would  all  "be  expended  and  hoarded  by  a  few  people."     So  the 
banks  coolly  kept  the  gold  in  their  vaults.     See  address  of  James 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     247 

The  situation  came  about,  not  for  the  trivial  reasons 
alleged  by  the  critics  of  Secretary  Chase;  that  is,  not 
because  of  minor  errors  or  incidental  rulings  of  the 
Secretary,  but  rather  because  of  unexpected  military 
reverses,  foreign  complications,  appalling  increase  in 
expenditures,  and  grave  doubt  as  to  the  outcome  of 
the  war.  Even  failure  to  resort  to  adequate  taxation, 
serious  as  the  error  was,  was  a  minor  circumstance  in 
causing  diminished  confidence  in  public  securities,  in 
the  face  of  the  expenses,  failures,  disasters  and  uncer 
tainties  of  the  war. 

In  the  financial  crisis  that  faced  the  country  in  Jan 
uary,  1862,  there  was  need  of  bold  and  intelligent  lead 
ership.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  not  been 
trained  to  grapple  with  the  problems  that  now  con 
fronted  him.  The  stupendous  nature  of  the  task  was 
enough  to  cause  dismay.  Still  under  the  delusion  that 
the  war  would  last  but  a  few  more  months,  Chase  pre 
ferred  to  rely  on  short  loans  at  a  high  rate  rather  than 
resort  to  heavy  taxes,  which  he  thought  would  be  sure 
to  excite  popular  discontent.  He  had  calculated  that 
the  meager  increase  of  taxes  that  he  proposed  would 
produce  $90,000,000,  but  now  his  revised  estimate  of 
expenditures  called  for  $214,000,000  more  than  he  had 
estimated  six  months  before,  and  to  meet  the  pressing 
need  he  urged  another  immediate  loan  of  $200,000,000. 

The  Secretary,  thus  facing  a  deficit  of  $214,000,000, 
had  also  to  reckon  with  the  need  of  the  coming  year, 
estimated  at  $475,000,000.  Gold  and  silver  were  no 
longer  money.  They  were  out  of  circulation  and  could 

Gallatin,  Bankers'  Magazine,  February,  1862,  cited  in  The  Cur~ 
rency  Question,  by  George  B.  Butler,  New  York,  1864. 


248      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

not  be  depended  on  as  currency.  They  were  commodi 
ties  of  trade,  articles  of  export  and  import.  The  coun 
try  was  without  a  national  currency.  The  only 
currency  of  the  country  was  the  uncertain,  vacillating, 
and  discredited  currency  of  the  state  banks.  These 
banks  could  not  pay  coin  on  their  paper.  The  hoard 
ing  of  the  precious  metals,  or  the  export  of  them  in  the 
course  of  foreign  exchanges,  had  utterly  destroyed  the 
state  bank  currency  for  government  uses, —  it  being 
illegal,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  for  the  government  to  re 
ceive  them.  There  was  confusion  in  business  ex 
changes;  war  demands  against  the  government  were 
mounting  up  to  more  than  $2,000,000  a  day ;  the  treas 
ury  resources  were  exhausted;  and  the  government  in 
the  midst  of  bankruptcy  stood  in  immediate  need  of  im 
mense  sums  of  money.  Claims  were  instantly  pressing, 
and  if  they  could  not  be  met  the  firms  that  had  fur 
nished  supplies  could  furnish  no  more,  while  the  sol 
diers  and  sailors  in  the  service  had  gone  unpaid  until 
their  forbearance  could  no  longer  be  expected.  The 
country  wjas  facing  a  condition  of  affairs  of  which  it 
may  reasonably  be  said  that  none  more  perilous  ever 
confronted  a  nation. 

In  this  period  of  great  financial  need  it  may  be 
fairly  said  of  the  public  men  of  the  time,  as  Fessenden 
said  in  the  Senate,  that  "  nobody  knew  much  about  the 
question  of  finance."  l 

1  Francis  Fessenden,  Life  of  William  Pitt  Fessenden,  Vol. 
I>  P-  !95.  .  Fessenden  said  in  the  Senate:  "I  declare  here  to 
day,  that  in  the  whole  number  of  learned  financial  men  that  I 
have  consulted,  I  never  have  found  any  two  of  them  who  agree ; 
and  therefore  it  is  hardly  worth  while  for  us  to  plead  any  very 
remarkable  degree  of  ignorance  when  nobody  is  competent  to 
instruct  us;  and  yet  such  is  the  fact.  I  can  state  to  you,  Mr. 


.WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     249 

It  is  not  strange  that  in  such  a  time  leadership  fell 
into  the  hands  of  men,  who,  if  less  discreet  and  less 
trained  in  finance  than  the  times  called  for,  were  at 
any  rate  bold,  patriotic,  honest,  straightforward,  and 
aggressive  in  action. 

Stevens  and  his  committee,  with  the  Finance  Com 
mittee  of  the  Senate  headed  by  Fessenden,  now  took 
the  lead  in  directing  the  financial  policy  of  the  country. 
Stevens  recognized,  as  he  said  in  the  debates  that  fol 
lowed,  that  he  was  "  but  poorly  qualified  for  anything 
of  the  kind."  He  and  his  colleagues  came  nowhere 
near  infallibility.  But  they  gave  anxious  and  patriotic 
consideration  to  the  situation,  and  taking  counsel  from 
those  whom  they  believed  best  qualified  to  advise,  they 
acted  up  to  the  best  light  they  had.  Facing  a  neces 
sitous  situation  that  would  not  permit  of  delay,  they 
resolved  upon  a  policy  that  marks  a  turning  point  and 
has  become  the  most  notable  landmark  in  American 
financial  history.  This  policy  resulted  not  in  what 
Stevens  wanted  and  sought  strenuously  to  obtain,  but 
in  a  complex  result  that  was  a  composite,  or  compro 
mise,  between  conflicting  interests  and  forces.  This 
compromise  outcome  was  the  famous  Legal  Tender 

President,  that  on  one  day  I  was  advised  very  strongly  by  a 
leading  financial  man  at  all  events  to  oppose  this  legal  tender 
clause;  he  exclaimed  against  it  with  all  the  bitterness  in  the 
world.  On  the  very  same  day  I  received  a  note  from  a  friend 
of  his  telling  me  that  we  could  not  get  along  without  it.  I 
showed  it  to  him  and  he  expressed  his  utter  surprise.  He  went 
home  and  next  day  telegraphed  to  me  that  he  had  changed  his 
mind,  and  now  thought  it  was  absolutely  necessary ;  and  his 
friend  who  wrote  to  me  wrote  again  that  he  had  changed  his 
[laughter],  and  they  were  two  of  the  most  eminent  financial 
men  in  the  country."  Globe,  Feb.  12,  1862,  p.  766.  Such  were 
the  opinions  of  the  "  financial  experts "  by  whom  Stevens  and 
his  committee  were  expected  to  be  directed. 


250     THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Act  of  February  25,  1862,  authorizing  a  loan  of  $500,- 
000,000  of  6  per  cent,  twenty-year  bonds  known  as 
the  "  Five  Twenties/'  due  in  twenty  years  and  payable 
in  five,  and  providing  for  the  issue  of  $150,000,000 
of  treasury  notes  commonly  called  "  greenbacks,"  the 
notes  to  be  exchangeable  for  the  bonds  and  made  a 
legal  tender  for  all  debts  public  and  private,  except 
customs  dues  and  interest  on  the  public  debt. 

No  piece  of  legislation  in  American  history  has  ever 
aroused  more  enduring  controversy,  and  after  the  lapse 
of  more  than  a  generation,  honest  and  intelligent  men 
are  still  in  conflict  of  opinion  as  to  its  merits. 

The  facts  in  the  origin  of  this  important  measure 
may  be  summarized  briefly. 

Mr.  Chase  in  his  December  report,  with  the  idea  of 
making  it  easier  to  borrow,  suggested  a  national  bank 
ing  system  requiring  all  banks  to  purchase  United 
States  stocks  to  hold  as  security  for  their  circulating 
notes.1  Out  of  this  proposal  came  our  national  bank 
ing  system  two  years  later.  Such  heavy  labors  were 
coming  upon  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  in 
charge  of  this  report,  that  a  division  of  labor  was  re 
sorted  to.  Mr.  Stevens,  the  chairman  of  the  com 
mittee,  gave  his  chief  attention  to  the  preparation  and 
pushing  of  the  great  and  numerous  appropriation  bills 
which  required  a  great  expenditure  of  time  and  energy ; 
Justin  S.  Morrill,  of  Vermont,  father  of  the  war  tariff, 

1  This  plan  was  probably  inspired  by  Eleazar  Lord's  letter  to 
Secretary  Chase  in  November,  1861,  though  the  essential  virtue 
of  Lord's  plan  for  a  national  currency  was  eliminated, —  namely, 
that  the  notes  to  be  issued  by  the  banks  should  be  full  legal 
tender  for  all  debts,  public  and  private,  and  that  the  so-called 
specie  basis  should  be  abandoned.  The  notes  were  to  be  exclu 
sive  and  inconvertible. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     251 

became  chairman  of  a  subcommittee,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  frame  war  taxation;  while  Elbridge  G.  Spaul- 
ding,  of  New  York,  was  chairman  of  a  subcommittee 
assigned  to  consider  matters  of  currency  and  loans. 
To  the  latter  subcommittee  Secretary  Chase's  currency 
scheme  was  submitted.  Samuel  Hooper,  a  retired  and 
wealthy  merchant  of  Boston,  and  Erastus  Corning,  a 
New  York  millionaire  Democratic  opponent  of  the 
war  administration,  were  Spaulding's  coworkers  on 
this  committee.  These  three  men  took  up  the  Secre 
tary's  plan  and  began  to  draft  a  bill  for  a  national 
currency  to  be  secured  by  government  bonds. 

When,  on  December  28,  1861,  the  New  York  banks 
suspended  specie  payments,  gold  was  withdrawn  from 
circulation  and  the  country,  as  wre  have  noticed,  was 
left  with  no  other  currency  than  the  notes  of  suspended 
banks, —  notes  issued  by  sixteen  hundred  different  in 
stitutions  and  varying  widely  in  value.  Was  it  possi 
ble  for  the  government  to  rely  on  such  a  currency  as 
that,  or  to  authorize  its  use  by  the  people  ?  Under  the 
subtreasury  law,  as  has  been  indicated,  these  notes  could 
not  be  legally  accepted  and  paid  out  by  the  federal 
treasury.  It  was  known  that  the  new  national  banking 
system  would  meet  with  stout  opposition  from  friends 
of  the  state  banks,  and,  at  best,  it  would  not  be  matured 
and  put  into  operation  for  months  and  perhaps  for 
more  than  a  year  to  come.  Adequate  tax  bills  could 
not  be  passed  and  begin  to  produce  revenues  for  an 
equal  length  of  time,  and  internal  taxes  could  not  be 
collected  at  all  until  the  government  furnished  an 
adequate  legal  currency  in  which  they  could  be  paid. 

To   Stevens   and  his   committee  the  issue   seemed 


252      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

clear :  Shall  the  government  break  and  the  war  stop, 
or  shall  the  nation  declare  its  independence  of  specie, 
rely  upon  its  credit  and  its  own  resources,  and  issue 
its  notes  to  be  used  as  currency ?  "A  delay,"  says 
Mr.  Spaulding,  "  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  Union 
cause,"  and  accordingly  he  changed  the  legal  tender 
section,  intended  originally  to  accompany  the  bank 
bill,  into  a  separate  bill,  and  on  his  own  motion  he 
introduced  it  into  the  House,  December  30,  1861. 

The  bill  was  referred  to  the  full  committee,  whose 
members  were  about  equally  divided  in  opinion  upon 
its  merits.  Spaulding  and  Hooper  favored  the  bill. 
Morrill,  of  Vermont,  Horton,  Democrat,  of  Ohio,  and 
Corning,  of  New  York,  were  decided  in  their  oppo 
sition.  Stevens  at  first  doubted  the  constitutionality 
of  the  legal  tender  clause, —  a  strange  doubt  for  a 
man  of  his  habits  and  temper.  But  he  soon  overcame 
his  scruples  and  decided  to  support  the  bill:  The 
bill  had  a  narrow  escape  from  defeat  in  the  committee, 
but  a  wavering  member  came  to  its  support  and  con 
sented  to  allow  the  bill  to  come  before  the  House  for 
consideration,  January  7,  1862. 

The  measure  was  regarded,  according  to  its  advo 
cates,  as  a  matter  of  necessity,  not  of  choice.  It 
was  expected  that  the  government  would  be  out  of 
means  to  pay  its  daily  expenses  in  thirty  days.  A 
hundred  million  dollars  were  necessary  within  the  next 
three  months  or  the  government  must  stop  payment, 
and  the  committee  saw  no  way  to  get  along  till  the  tax 
bills  could  be  got  ready  except  by  a  temporary  issue 
of  these  treasury  notes.1 

1  Spaulding,  History  of  the  Legal   Tender  Paper  Money,  pp. 
17,  18.     Mitchell,  W.  C,  History  of  the  Greenbacks,  p.  47. 


.WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     253 

It  was  clear  to  all  that  government  notes  of  some 
kind  had  to  be  issued,  and  the  question  arose  as  to 
whether  they  should  be  short  time  interest-bearing 
notes  offered  for  investments,  or  non-interest-bearing 
notes  that  could  be  used  by  the  government  and  the 
people  for  all  the  purposes  of  money.  The  latter 
policy  was  decided  upon  by  Stevens  and  his  com 
mittee. 

This  policy  was  in  harmony  with  the  recommenda 
tions  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  who  was  now 
urging  haste  in  its  adoption.  Mr.  Chase  was  most 
reluctant  to  accept  the  provision  making  United  States 
notes  a  legal  tender,  and  he  anxiously  wished  to  avoid 
the  necessity  for  such  legislation.  He,  however,  re 
garded  it  as  "  impossible  in  consequence  of  the  large 
expenditures  entailed  by  the  war  and  the  suspension 
of  the  banks,  to  procure  sufficient  coin  for  disburse 
ments  " ;  and  he  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  it  had 
"  become  indispensably  necessary  that  we  should  re 
sort  to  the  issue  of  United  States  notes."  Chase 
urged  that  all  discrimination  should  be  prevented  in 
the  legal  tender  provision  and  that  "  all  citizens  in 
this  respect  should  be  put  upon  the  same  level,  both 
of  rights  and  duties."  1 

Though  Chase  came  with  reluctance  to  this  con 
clusion,  he  came  to  it  with  decision,  and  he  gave  the 
great  weight  of  his  influence  to  the  support  of  the 
Legal  Tender  Bill.  Whatever  his  scruples  were  as  to 
the  constitutionality  of  the  measure,  he  yielded  these 
to  what  he  considered  the  pressure  of  the  necessities 

1  Chase,  Letter  to  Ways  and  Means  Committee,  cited  in  Sher 
man's  Recollections,  p.  220. 


254      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  the  treasury,  and  he  expressed  no  dissent  on  that 
point  until  as  Chief  Justice  he  gave  a  decision  adverse 
to  the  greenback  legislation.1 

In  the  conflict  of  proposals  and  opinions  produced 
by  the  money  crisis  of  1862,  it  appears  that  there  were 
substantially  two  alternatives  open  to  the  govern 
ment. 

It  could  issue  interest-bearing  bonds  and  notes,  go 
into  the  market  with  these  securities  and  sell  them 
for  what  they  would  bring  in  gold;  and  thus,  in  the 
way  that  was  usual  for  governments,  borrow  money 
and  pay  the  nation's  obligations.  This  should  be  ac 
companied  with  adequate  taxation  which  would  give 
the  assurance  that  the  treasury  would  have  ample  rev 
enue  to  meet  accruing  interest  upon  its  loans,  and,  in 
consequence,  lead  to  the  sale  of  the  government  secu 
rities  on  better  terms.  It  was  contended  then,  as  it 
has  been  ever  since,  that  this  would  be  the  safe,  honest, 
businesslike  way,  and  in  the  end  the  most  economical. 
In  the  opinion  of  the  advocates  of  this  plan  it  was  the 
only  honest  way,  the  way  that  all  tradition  pointed 
out.  At  any  rate,  it  was  the  way  in  which  money 
lenders  and  bankers  were  accustomed  to  have  gov 
ernments  proceed.  It  was  in  harmony  with  the  stand 
ard  maxim  of  the  so-called  classical  writers  on  public 
finance,  who  assert  that  only  coin  can  be  real  money 
and  that  there  are  but  two  ways  for  governments  to 
obtain  it, —  one  is  to  take  by  taxation,  and  the  other 
to  borrow  upon  its  notes  and  bonds. 

This  plan  involved  the  conduct  of  the  war  and  all 
the  business  of  the  country  upon  a  specie  basis.  No 

1  In  Hepburn  vs.  Griswold. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     255 

matter  at  what  a  ruinous  price  the  government  was 
compelled  to  sell  its  bonds,  it  was  contended  that  the 
gold  could  be  obtained,  if  not  in  Wall  Street  and 
through  the  associated  banks  in  America,  then  on 
Lombard  Street  or  through  the  gold  dealers  in  Europe. 
The  national  honor  and  good  faith,  it  was  contended, 
required  this  policy.  To  resort  to  paper  money  would 
be  to  violate  the  obligation  of  all  contracts,  cheat 
creditors,  increase  prices,  disarrange  all  business  and 
multiply  the  cost  of  the  war. 

Those  who  proposed  and  defended  this  plan  were 
not  at  all  able  to  show  that  a  sufficient  quantity  of 
gold  would  have  been  forthcoming.  It  was  held  that 
if  the  treasury  should  demand  the  gold  and  offer  its 
bonds  on  sufficient  terms,  the  demand  would  beget  the 
supply.  If  this  did  not  come  immediately,  then  the 
consequences  must  follow:  government  must  make  a 
higher  bid  —  offer  its  bonds  at  a  lower  rate  —  and 
wait  till  the  supply  came.  Whether  it  would  finally 
come  no  one  knew.  At  this  time  of  dire  emergency, 
when  the  life  of  the  nation  was  assailed,  if  the  govern 
ment  needed  $2,000,000,000,  let  it  offer  its  bonds 
for  what  they  would  bring  and  trust  that  a  sufficient 
supply  of  gold  would  flow  into  the  treasury.  No 
device,  expedient,  or  legislation  of  the  government 
should  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  "  lawrs  of  trade  " ; 
that  is,  with  the  "  natural  operation  of  the  specie 
standard."  l 

Whether  this  would  have  been  possible  in  the  face 

1 1  am  indebted  in  this  discussion  to  a  pamphlet  on  "  A 
National  Currency,"  by  Eleazar  Lord,  published  by  A.  D.  F. 
Randolph,  New  York,  1863. 


256      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  mounting  debts  and  expenses  of  the  war  is,  at  best, 
only  a  matter  of  speculation.  Upon  that  financial  au 
thorities  are  by  no  means  agreed.  The  burden  of 
argument  in  that  day,  and  of  expert  financial  opinion 
since,  appears  to  favor  the  view  that  it  would  have 
been  impossible;  that  an  increase  of  the  currency  by 
some  means  was  an  absolute  necessity.  Gold  writers 
have  never  successfully  dealt  with  the  stubborn  fact 
that  the  quantity  of  coin  was  wholly  inadequate  to 
the  purposes  of  war;  there  was  not  enough  in  all 
the  banks  to  furnish  the  government  with  a  month's 
supply.  "On  January  i,  1862,"  says  Professor 
Dewey,  "  the  banks  had  but  $87,000,000  to  meet  $459,- 
000,000  of  indebtedness.  It  would  have  been  impos 
sible  to  go  through  a  war  on  the  basis  of  a  currency 
so  inadequate."  1  A  month  later  the  situation  was 
worse  and  it  was  growing  worse  week  by  week.  It 
is  clear  that  the  idea  of  attempting  to  retain,  or  rather 
to  restore,  specie  payments  on  so  vast  a  scale  of  ex 
penditure  should  have  been  abandoned  without  delay 
and  instead  of  trusting  to  the  suspended  state  banks 
and  the  dealers  in  gold  to  furnish  a  currency  —  the 
life-blood  of  the  imperiled  nation  —  the  nation  should 
have  trusted  itself  and  relied  upon  its  own  resources. 

This  was  the  alternative  policy.  It  was  bolder, 
more  original,  quite  unusual,  not  to  say  revolutionary. 
Its  design  was  to  make  the  treasury  of  the  nation  in 
dependent  of  the  holders  of  gold;  to  prevent  "shin 
ning  "  in  the  marts  of  the  money  dealers,  and  the  con 
sequent  sale  of  government  bonds  at  discreditable 
prices;  to  avoid  affording  these  gold  dealers  a  "  corner  " 

1  Financial  History  of  the  United  States,  p.  283. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     257 

in  their  commodity,  giving  them  the  whip-hand  in  de 
termining  at  what  cost  the  government  might  obtain 
money  to  conduct  the  struggle  for  its  life.  The  plan 
was  to  be  independent  of  gold,  to  let  its  holders  keep 
their  gold,  or  sell  it  where  they  would;  to  abandon 
specie  as  money;  to  use  the  sovereign  power  of  the 
nation  to  create  a  currency  of  its  own,  based  on  the  re 
sources  and  property  of  the  nation,  the  faith  of  the 
people,  and  the  power  of  taxation, —  a  currency  which 
the  government  would  accept  for  taxes  and  take  in 
exchange  for  its  bonds,  and  use  in  its  payments,  and 
which  all  classes  of  people  without  discrimination, 
could  use  as  current  money  of  the  realm  and  as  a  legal 
tender  for  all  their  exchanges,  debts,  and  taxes.  In 
the  absence  of  gold  and  silver,  which  had  now  sought 
their  hiding-places  and  were  failing  to  do  the  money 
work  of  the  country,  this  plan  would  furnish  the 
people  with  a  uniform  national  currency,  enable  the 
government  to  meet  its  obligations,  and  save  the  busi 
ness  of  the  country  from  paralysis.  This  alternative, 
regarded  as  a  temporary  expedient,  was  deemed  to  be 
rendered  imperative  by  the  necessities  of  the  hour. 

Stevens  favored  the  latter  alternative, —  the  aban 
donment  of  gold,  and  the  abandonment  of  a  paper 
currency  issued  by  banks  that  had  already  shown  their 
inability  to  redeem  their  paper  promises  at  their  face 
value  in  gold.  He  stood  for  the  establishment  of  a 
uniform  nation-wide  paper  currency  for  all,  a  cur 
rency  issued  directly  by  the  United  States  government 
.without  the  mediation  of  banks.  This  currency  would 
do  the  work  of  money  for  the  people.  It  would  not 
be  a  commodity  of  foreign  commerce  nor  an  article 


258      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  export.  It  was  to  be  interchangeable  with  six  per 
cent.  United  States  bonds,  based  upon  the  good  faith 
and  property  of  the  whole  people.  If  the  bonds  were 
safe  the  notes  would  be  safe.  He  believed  that  this 
would  give  the  country  a  safe,  ample,  uniform  national 
currency  for  all  the  trade  and  business  of  the  country 
and  prove  an  effective  means  in  promoting  the  sale 
of  government  bonds.  And  thus  "  every  note-holder 
and  every  bondholder,  as  creditors  of  the  government, 
would  be  directly  interested  in  maintaining  the  na 
tional  unity,  prosperity,  honor,  and  good  faith,  while 
the  interests  of  the  people  would  prove  a  guarantee 
against  excessive  and  dangerous  issues  of  currency."  1 
It  is  pertinent  to  observe  that  those  who  were  con 
stantly  crying  out  from  fear  of  an  over-issue  of  such 
notes  never  seemed  to  have  any  fear  of  an  over-issue 
of  interest-bearing  bonds.2 

This  scheme,  as  we  shall  see,  was  so  modified  and 
mutilated  by  its  opponents  that  Stevens  subsequently 
refused  to  recognize  it  as  his  own.  Those  interested  in 
the  gold  policy,  while  they  could  not  accomplish  out 
right  the  defeat  of  the  Legal  Tender  Act,  accomplished 
their  purpose  by  another  process,  the  purpose  of  com 
pelling  the  government  to  sell  its  bonds  for  what  they 

1  Eleazar  Lord,  National  Currency. 

2  If  Stevens'  idea  of  a  single  uniform  national  currency  had 
been  carried  to  its  completion  it  would  have  involved,  of  course, 
the  prohibition  of  the  notes  of  the  state  banks,  and  this  source 
of   the   paper    inflation   that   subsequently    followed    would    have 
been  prevented.     If  the   United   States   Treasury  notes   were   to 
be  made  the  basis  of  state  bank  issues   at  the  ratio  of  two  or 
three  to  one,  the  whole  currency  would  become  redundant  and 
depreciated.     The  bullionist  proposed  the  wrong  remedy  for  pre 
venting    inflation.     He    would    have     allowed    the    note-issuing 
function   to   the   state  banks,   while   denying   it  to  the  national 
government. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     259 

would  command  in  the  open  market,  at  a  ruinous  dis 
count  in  gold.  This  was  not  a  failure,  as  Stevens 
always  believed,  of  the  greenback  legislation,  but  a 
design  of  a  creditor  ^nd  money-lending  class  who  had 
gold  to  offer  in  considerable  quantities. 

Very  few  men  of  the  time  dared  to  think  for  them 
selves  upon  the  subject  of  the  currency.  Among  the 
men  then  in  public  life  Stevens  was  one  of  the  very 
few  bold  minds  that  ventured  to  accept  suggestions 
calculated  to  lead  the  people  away  from  the  beaten 
paths  of  habit  and  tradition;  and  even  Stevens,  with 
all  his  boldness  of  thought  and  leadership,  still  clung 
to  the  idea  that  gold  and  silver  were  to  be  looked  to 
as  a  basis  for  future  money.  Resuming  specie  pay 
ments  was  still  in  his  mind.  Stevens  may  have  been 
partly  influenced  by  Eleazer  Lord,  a  financial  pam 
phleteer  of  the  time,  who  was  making  repeated  public 
pleas  for  a  credit  currency  wholly  disconnected  from 
the  precious  metals  and  based  upon  the  bonded  pledge 
of  the  nation.  "  The  existing  theory  on  the  subject," 
said  Lord,  "  is  too  firmly  fixed  by  education,  pre 
scription,  prejudice,  and  interest,  to  be  overthrown  by 
common  sense,  by  reasoning,  or  by  anything  but  irre 
sistible  necessity.  Such  words  as  safe,  secured,  na 
tional,  uniform  (sound),  when  predicated  of  anything 
but  gold  as  currency,  are  to  the  specie-paying  theorist 
mere  sounds  devoid  of  significance.  He  even  thinks 
it  a  virtue  to  suffer  and  die  a  martyr  to  his  idea  of 
gold  rather  than  yield  it  and  cast  loose  on  the  sea  of 
credit  bereft  of  this  ideal  anchor.  When  that  pure 
extract  and  quintessence  of  wealth,  the  solvent  of  all 
earthly  wants,  the  object  of  life's  weary  toil,  is  with- 


260     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

drawn  from  sight  by  export  to  other  climes,  his  love 
of  it,  his  sense  of  bereavement,  desolation,  and  peril 
without  it,  his  desire  to  see  its  yellow  face  once  more, 
are  intensified  to  an  agonizing  extreme." 

Lord  was  looking  to  the  triumph  of  credit.  He  saw 
that  specie  payments  could  not  on  any  system  be  uni- 
formally  maintained;  "that  crises,  panics,  emergen 
cies,  would  arise  when  banks  ought  not  to  be  required 
to  pay  specie,  when  desolation  and  ruin  must  follow 
any  attempt  to  pay  specie."  Very  recent  experience 
had  shown  this.  The  banker,  like  the  rest  of  the 
community,  had  recognized  that  the  obligation  to  pay 
specie  was  suspended,  and  this  was  but  an  admission 
that  "  to  regard  specie  as  the  basis  of  the  currency 
and  as  the  element  and  ground  of  its  safety  and 
soundness  was  but  a  delusion  and  a  humbug."  l 

1 "  The  idea  of  specie  payments,  even  in  ordinary  times  of 
peace,  blindly  assumes  what  in  reality  and  practise  never  was 
and  never  could  possibly  be  true,  namely,  the  possession  in  the 
country  and  within  the  control  of  the  banks  of  coin  sufficient  to 
redeem  the  notes  issued  by  them  and  necessary  to  the  business 
and  convenience  of  the  people.  The  proportion  of  coin  held  by 
the  banks  is  rarely  ten  per  cent,  of  the  amount  of  notes  issued 
by  them;  it  is  greatly  less  than  the  amount  held  subject  to 
deposit. 

"  This  so-called  specie  basis,  whenever  there  is  a  foreign  de 
mand  for  coin,  proves  to  be  a  mere  fiction,  a  practical  humbug; 
and  whenever,  by  an  excess  of  imports,  this  pretended  basis  is 
exported  to  pay  foreign  debts,  the  bank-notes  are  withdrawn  or 
become  worthless,  the  currency  for  the  time  is  annihilated,  prices 
fall,  business  is  suspended,  debts  remain  unpaid,  panic  and  dis 
tress  ensue,  men  in  active  business  fail,  bankruptcy,  ruin,  and 
disgrace  reign.  When  thousands  of  the  most  industrious  and 
useful  men  have  been  sacrificed,  their  families  reduced  to  pov 
erty,  their  credit  and  character  ruined  and  their  energies  para 
lyzed, —  then  a  new  set  of  merchants,  manufacturers,  etc.,  come 
forward  to  go  through  the  same  experience.  The  demoralizing 
effects  of  this  course  of  operations  on  the  whole  ^population  of 
the  country  and  in  every  department  of  social,  industrial  and 
political  affairs  are  beyond  description.  They  can  be  compared 
only  to  the  effects  on  the  health  of  a  community  of  a  constant 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     261 

The  conflicts  of  opinion  and  interests  were  waged 
primarily  between  these  two  alternatives,  and  the  mixed 
result  was  satisfactory  to  neither  party,  though  the 
brunt  of  blame  for  all  the  evils,  or  supposed  evils,  of 
the  greenback  legislation  has  been  assiduously,  not  to 
say  insidiously,  imputed  to  its  original  proposers. 

When  the  plan  of  the  committee  to  issue  legal  tender 
notes  was  made  known  to  the  country,  bankers  who 
were  opposed  to  the  measure  came  to  Washington  and 
endeavored  to  persuade  the  Secretary  and  committee 
that  there  was  a  better  remedy  for  the  situation  of  the 
treasury  than  the  issue  of  government  paper  money. 
They  proposed  through  their  spokesman,  Mr.  James 
Gallatin,  President  of  the  Gallatin  Bank  of  New  York, 
essentially  the  alternative  plan  that  I  have  described, — 
the  sale  of  long  time  bonds  at  the  market  price  "  ac 
companied  with  heavy  taxation."  Gallatin's  plan  also 
involved  the  retirement  of  the  demand  notes,  the  issue 
of  $100,000,000  of  interest-bearing  treasury  notes,  and 

and  incurable  epidemic,  an  intensified  fever  and  ague,  a  perma 
nent  tantalism. 

"When  specie  is  not  wanted  by  the  people,  and  there  is  no 
foreign  or  unusual  demand  for  it,  and  the  banks,  though  promis 
ing  to  pay  it  on  demand  for  all  their  circulating  notes  and  de 
posits,  study  only  to  keep  as  little  of  it  as  possible  on  hand ;  their 
notes  freely  circulate  on  the  credit  of  the  promise  which  they 
bear,  and  things  go  on  till  the  delusion  becomes  manifest.  The 
moment  the  note-holders  want  the  pretended  basis,  they  dis 
cover  that  it  exists  only  in  theory  and  imagination,  that  they 
have  been  deluded  by  corporate  promises  which  can  not  be,  and 
which  were  never  expected  to  be  fulfilled.  What  then?  Why, 
the  promises  ought  to  be  suspended  until  a  state  of  things  is 
brought  about  when  there  is  no  longer  any  demand  for  specie; 
and  then,  forsooth,  the  bankers  may  safely  resume  specie  pay 
ments  and  receive  credit  for  renewing  the  issue  of  their  paper 
promises.  In  fine,  they  should  be  required  to  pay  specie  when 
nobody  wants  it;  but  to  require  them  to  pay  specie  when  it  is 
wanted  and  they  have  not  got  it,  and  can  not  possibly  get  it, 
would  be  absurd  and  fruitful  only  of  desolation  and  ruin." 
(Eleazar  Lord,  National  Currency,  1863.) 


262     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  suspension  of  the  subtreasury  act  so  as  to  permit 
the  banks  to  become  the  depositories  of  the  government 
funds.  It  was  to  let  the  government  take  care  of 
the  banks;  the  banks  could  take  care  of  the  currency 
and  the  money  of  the  people.  The  government  should 
then  go  into  the  "  market "  and  borrow  this  money 
as  best  it  could,  through  the  banks. 

There  are  those  who  call  this  a  patriotic  effort  of 
the  masters  of  finance  to  aid  the  government  in  its 
emergency,  but  there  are  others  so  obtuse  as  still  to 
believe  that  the  bankers'  plan  was  primarily  in  their 
own  interests.  By  this  plan  the  state  banks  were  to 
be  made  the  sole  agents  of  the  government  throughout 
the  crisis;  their  irredeemable  notes,  even  after  their 
suspension  of  specie  payments,  were  to  be  received  by 
the  government  for  loans, —  notes  whose  gold  basis 
had  just  been  proved  but  a  fiction,  or  a  figment  of  the 
imagination;  these  local  banks,  more  than  fifteen  hun- 
dren  in  number,  were  to  continue  to  usurp  the  impor 
tant  franchise  of  supplying  the  circulating  medium  of 
the  country, —  a  medium  to  be  used  as  the  money  of 
commerce  without  any  guarantee  whatever  of  its  uni 
formity  or  stability !  The  essential  national  power  of 
controlling  the  currency  was  to  be  left  to  these  state 
agencies.  To  the  national  government,  not  to  the 
banks  nor  to  the  states,  had  been  given  the  power  to 
coin  money  and  to  regulate  its  value.  That  was  an 
exclusive  national  power.  The  state  was  not  to  issue 
money  nor  to  authorize  its  issue.1  Yet  Stevens  was 

1  See  "  Review  of  Our  Finances,"  by  R.  J-  Walker,  December 
19,  1862,  in  Continental  Monthly,  an  argument  for  an  exclusive 
National  currency.  Walker,  however,  was  arguing  for  a  bank 
currency. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     263 

roundly  denounced  as  stupid  and  ignorant  because  he 
would  not  advise  his  committee  and  the  House  blindly 
to  accept  this  plan  of  the  associated  banks. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  the  committee 
rejected  this  alternative  proposed  by  the  bankers,  and 
under  the  advice  of  Chase  there  was  added  to  the  bill 
the  provision  permitting  the  exchange  of  the  legal  ten 
der  notes  for  6  per  cent.,  twenty  year  bonds,  and  au 
thorizing  the  treasury  to  issue  $500,000,000  of  these 
bonds. 

It  was  on  the  Legal  Tender  Act,  with  this  bond  pro 
posal,  that  the  House  went  into  debate,  January  28, 
1862.  After  four  weeks  of  earnest  discussion  the  bill 
became  a  law  on  February  25th,  but  not  until  the  Sen 
ate  had  succeeded  in  attaching  such  amendments  to  the 
measure  as  led  its  authors  to  disclaim  responsibility 
for  its  results. 

Nothing  can  be  attempted  here  toward  a  study  of 
these  debates  beyond  presenting  the  attitude  of  Ste 
vens  on  the  merits  of  the  various  arguments  and  issues 
involved.  In  his  principal  speech  on  the  subject  on 
February  6,  1862,  Stevens  admitted  that  it  was  not 
desirable  to  depart  from  the  circulating  medium 
"  which  by  the  common  consent  of  civilized  nations 
had  formed  the  standard  of  value."  It  was  a  matter 
of  necessity  not  of  choice,  and  of  that  necessity  Con 
gress  alone  should  be  the  judge.  He  anticipated  a 
treasury  need  to  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  1863  °^ 
$1,000,000,000  with  a  corresponding  enlargement  of 
the  public  debt.  Where  were  these  vast  sums  to  be 
obtained?  The  Secretary  had  not  been  able  to  nego 
tiate  the  loans  already  authorized.  If  $700,000,000 


264     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

were  offered  in  bonds,  he  had  no  doubt  they  would 
sell  as  low  as  60  per  cent,  and  even  then  it  would  be 
found  to  be  impossible  to  find  payment  in  coin.  Pay 
ment  would  have  to  be  accepted  in  the  depreciated 
notes  of  non-specie-paying  banks,  for  he  supposed  no 
one  expected  the  resumption  of  specie  payments  till 
the  war  was  over.  The  least  discount  on  the  bonds 
that  any  reasonable  man  had  a  right  to  expect  was 
25  per  cent,  and  at  that  rate  it  would  require  at  least 
$1,500,000,000  in  bonds  to  produce  the  required  cur 
rency  of  $1,100,000,000  needed  to  the  end  of  the  next 
fiscal  year.  It  was  a  sum  too  frightful  to  be  tolerated. 
He  held  out  stoutly  for  the  legal  tender  clause  and  he 
preferred  the  greenbacks  to  the  bank-notes  under  the 
Secretary's  bank  currency  plan.  The  security  of  the 
government  was  as  good  as  that  of  the  banks  and 
would  give  as  much  currency.  The  whole  benefit  of 
the  bank  currency  plan  would  accrue  to  the  banks,  as 
they  would  receive  the  circulation  without  interest  and 
at  the  same  time  draw  interest  on  the  government 
bonds,  while  it  was  plain  to  be  seen  that  if  the  United 
States  issued  these  notes  the  benefit  of  the  whole  cir 
culation  would  accrue  to  the  people, —  an  argument 
for  greenbacks  over  bank-notes  that  has  ever  since 
been  effectively  used,  and  which  has  hardly  been  suc 
cessfully  refuted.  The  government  issue  would  be 
equal  to  a  loan  without  interest  to  the  full  amount  of 
the  circulation.  The  proposed  new  banking  system 
could,  at  best,  afford  no  immediate  relief. 

Having  shown,  as  he  thought,  that  there  was  no 
other  possible  mode  for  the  relief  of  the  treasury  in 
the  emergency,  Stevens  proceeded  to  examine  the  ob- 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     265 

jections  that  had  been  raised  to  the  legal  tender  plan 
proposed  by  his  committee. 

He  quickly  disposed  of  the  constitutional  argument 
that  the  power  to  issue  legal  tender  notes  was  nowhere 
expressly  granted  to  Congress.  "  But  few  acts  which 
government  can  perform  are  specified  in  that  instru 
ment.  It  would  require  a  volume  larger  than  the 
Pandects  of  Justinian  or  the  Code  Napoleon  to  make 
such  enumeration.  Everything  necessary  to  carry 
out  the  granted  powers  is  clearly  implied.  If  nothing- 
could  be  done  by  Congress  except  what  is  enumerated 
the  government  could  not  live  a  week."  He  thought 
little  of  the  argument  based  on  the  intention  of  the 
Convention  of  1787.  '''  The  right  to  emit  bills  of 
credit  which  the  convention  expressly  refused  to  grant, 
has  for  fifty  years,  by  the  common  consent  of  the 
nation,  been  practised  and  is  now  conceded  by  every 
opponent  of  this  bill.  With  what  grace  can  the  con 
comitant  power  to  make  them  a  legal  tender  be  ob 
jected  to?  The  Supreme  Court  has  settled  the  prin 
ciple  upon  which  this  bill  is  based,  that  when  anything 
is  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  the  granted  power,  it 
is  constitutional." 

Stevens  here  stood  upon  the  constitutional  ground 
occupied  by  Hamilton  in  the  infancy  of  the  Union  in 
his  fundamental  doctrine  of  implied  powers,  by  which 
Hamilton  laid  the  cornerstone  for  the  powers  of  the 
federal  government.  In  his  famous  opinion  fur 
nished  to  Washington  in  advocating  the  validity  of 
the  First  United  States  Bank,  Hamilton  laid  down 
the  principle  that  was  afterward  affirmed  by  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  in  the  famous  case  of  McCulloch  vs. 


266     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Maryland.  This  principle  was  now  drawn  into  use 
by  Stevens.  He  stood  upon  the  impregnable  ground 
that  if  any  law  is  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  into 
execution  any  delegated  power,  such  law  is  valid. 
The  test  of  constitutionality  was  in  the  end  sought; 
the  discretion  of  Congress  was  absolute  and  sovereign 
as  to  the  means  to  be  employed.  Stevens  held,  as 
Hamilton  did,  that  the  necessity  need  not  be  absolute, 
inevitable,  and  overwhelming;  "if  it  be  useful,  expe 
dient,  profitable,  the  necessity  is  within  the  consti 
tutional  meaning,  and  whether  such  necessity  exists  is 
solely  for  the  decision  of  Congress.  If  Congress 
should  decide  this  measure  to  be  necessary  to  a  granted 
power,  no  department  of  the  government  can  re  judge 
it.  The  Supreme  Court  might  think  the  judgment  of 
Congress  erroneous,  but  they  could  not  review  it." 
This  view,  which  Stevens  was  then  advocating  and 
reasserting,  has  now  passed  into  history  with  the 
sanction  of  the  Supreme  Court  itself  and  with  the  gen 
eral  acceptance  of  the  nation,  and  it  will  be  the  final 
judgment  of  history  on  the  legal  tender  legislation  of 
that  day. 

Having  established  its  constitutionality,  Stevens  pro 
ceeded  to  defend  the  measure  on  the  ground  of  expe 
diency.  He  wished  the  notes  to  be  made  full  legal 
tender  money.  All  admitted  the  necessity  of  some 
issue,  and  he  did  not  see  how  the  notes  would  be 
made  worse  by  being  made  legal  tender.  It  would 
not  impair  the  obligations  of  contracts  —  though  Con 
gress  had  power  to  do  even  that  —  as  all  contracts  are 
made  not  only  with  a  view  to  present  laws  but  subject 
to  the  future  legislation  of  the  country.  The  value 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     267 

of  coin  had  been  repeatedly  changed  by  legislation, 
neither  our  gold  nor  silver  coin  being  as  valuable  as 
it  was  fifty  years  before.  In  1853  Congress  debased 
the  coin  over  7  per  cent.,  and  made  it  a  legal  tender. 
The  ex  post  facto  laws  prohibited  by  the  Constitution 
refer  only  to  crimes  and  misdemeanors,  not  to  civil 
contracts. 

As  to  the  inflation  of  the  currency  and  the  rise  of 
prices,  he  did  not  see  how  the  same  amount  of  notes 
without  the  legal  tender  quality  would  be  better.  Ste 
vens  expected  the  notes  to  be  issued  only  in  limited 
quantities,  and  that  limitation  upon  their  issue  he  relied 
upon  as  the  chief  factor  in  keeping  the  notes  at  par 
with  gold.  He  was  not  thinking  of  a  currency  entirely 
independent  of  specie.  He  believed  that  the  value  of 
these  notes  would  depend  entirely  upon  two  factors :  in 
the  first  place,  that  the  notes  should  be  made  to  perform 
all  the  functions  of  money  —  that  all  men  without  ex 
ception  might  use  them  to  pay  their  debts  and  their 
taxes,  and  that  the  government  would  do  so,  too; 
and,  in  the  second  place,  upon  the  quantity  issued  as 
compared  with  the  business  of  the  country.  That 
belief  was  founded  upon  the  best  economic  authority 
of  his  day.  No  experience  or  new  economic  argument 
has  since  been  brought  forward  to  disprove  it.  These 
two  factors :  namely,  reasonable  limitation  in  quantity, 
and  universal  money  use,  will  maintain  the  parity  of 
government  paper.  Such  was  Stevens'  opinion,  and 
in  that  opinion  who  will  say  that  he  was  not  standing 
on  sound  economic  ground  ? 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  notes  that  Stevens 
proposed  were  not  the  notes  that  were  issued.  The 


268     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

notes  that  he  favored  were  the  notes  of  the  Green- 
backer, —  full  legal  tender  money,  limited  in  amount, 
and  convertible  into  interest-bearing  bonds.  The  dif 
ference  between  Stevens  and  the  later  Greenbacker 
was  that  he  looked  upon  these  notes,  as  all  their  pro 
moters  did  at  the  time,  as  a  temporary  expedient,  and 
he  expected  the  bonds  which  they  might  be  used  to 
buy  not  to  be  continually  exchangeable  for  greenbacks 
at  the  option  of  the  holder,  but  to  be  paid  in  gold  at 
the  end  of  twenty  years,  if  they  had  not  been  redeemed 
in  lawful  money  before  that  time;  that  is,  in  the  same 
notes  the  purchaser  should  use  in  buying  the  bonds. 
United  States  notes,  lawful  money  for  all  alike,  based 
on  an  ultimate  gold  security  (since  Stevens  expected  to 
return  to  specie  payments),  that  he  thought  to  be  "  nec 
essary  and  proper,"  and  the  best  that  could  be  devised 
in  the  hour  of  uncertainty  and  distress.1 

XA  government  currency  based  on  national  bonds,  to  be 
issued  as  bank-notes  through  the  then  existing  banks,  a  legal 
tender  for  all  debts,  public  and  private,  with  the  understanding 
that  the  notes  ^should  never  be  redeemable  in  specie, —  this 
alternative  proposal  was  made  at  the  time.  This  would  have 
been  essentially  the  same  kind  of  currency  that  Stevens  soug'ht 
to  obtain,  except  that  it  was  more  radical  in  that  it  was  proposed 
as  a  permanent  system  and  not  as  a  temporary  expedient  prompted 
by  necessity.  Lord's  banking  experience,  his  altruistic  principles 
and  long  study  of  the  currency  problem  had  brought  him  to  his 
convictions  as  to  what  the  nation  should  do  for  a  currency  in 
the  crisis  of  the  war.  He  would  establish  a  national  paper  cur 
rency  independent  of  specie,  that  would  answer  for  either  war  or 
peace.  This  was  the  scheme  of  Eleazar  Lord.  Lord,  whose  con 
tributions  to  the  literature  of  our  financial  controversies  entitle 
him  to  recognition  and  to  a  worthy  place  in^  the  financial  his 
tory  of  the  country,  was  born  in  Connecticut  in  1788-  He 
studied  theology  in  Andover  and  Princeton,  but  the  failure 
of  his  eyesight  compelled  him>  to  give  up  his  profession  of  the 
ministry.  In  1815  he  settled  in  New  York  City  and  engaged 
in  commercial  pursuits  and  later  in  banking.  He  founded  the 
Manhattan  Insurance  Company  in  1821,  and  was  for  twelve 
years  its  President.  He  proposed  the  free  banking  system  for 


.WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     269 

Stevens  was  original  and  bold  enough  to  venture 
•nly  so  far  in  that  direction  as  he  thought  the  neces 
sities  of  the  war  compelled.  He  was  less  theoretical, 
more  of  an  opportunist.  He  looked  to  the  restoration 
of  the  old  system  in  the  resumption  of  specie  payments 
after  the  war,  not  by  the  retirement  and  disuse  of 
the  greenbacks,  but  in  their  being  brought  to  a  parity 
with  gold  and  silver. 

The  national  paper  currency  that  Stevens  proposed 
was  not  given  a  trial.  Evidence  that  there  could  have 
been  a  better  currency  for  the  time  has  by  no  means 
been  convincing,  an  opinion  which  a  lay  citizen  may 
be  so  bold  as  to  entertain  in  spite  of  the  traditional 
and  conventional  arguments  of  gold  standard  writers 
from  that  day  to  this. 

To  adopt  these  notes,  it  is  true,  was  to  cut  loose  from 
the  gold  standard  as  a  basis  for  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
and,  temporarily,  as  a  measure  of  debts  and  a  stand 
ard  of  deferred  payments.  This  was  bound  to  happen 
to  a  greater  degree  than  Stevens  appreciated  or  un- 

New  York  which  was  adopted  by  that  state  in  1838.  He  was 
a  successful,  banker,  the  organizer  of  the  National  Institution 
for  the  Promotion  of  Industry,  and  by  personal  influence  and 
argument  helped  to  induce  Henry  Clay  to  declare  himself  in 
opposition  to  free  trade.  Lord  became  one  of  the  founders  of 
the  University  of  New  York  City,  and  he  was  for  many  years 
one  of  its  trustees.  He  was  a  philanthropist  and,  like  Peter 
Cooper,  he  became  the  public  spirited  projector  of  many 
schemes  for  the  public  good.  In  1861  he  originated  and  drew  in 
his  own  handwriting  what  he  claimed  as  the  draft  of  the  first 
greenback  that  was  ever  issued  in  the  United  States.  Thou 
sands  of  Americans  will  rise  up  to  bless  or  to  blame  him  for 
that!  Lord  published,  among  other  essays,  an  extensive  work 
on  Credit,  Currency  and  Banking  (1828)  ;  A  letter  on  the  Na 
tional  Currency  (1861)  ;  Six  letters  on  the  Necessity  and  Prac 
ticability  of  a  National  Currency  (1862).  My  information  on 
the  facts  in  Lord's  life  is  derived  from  Appleton's  Cyclopedia  of 
American  Biography. 


270     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

derstood.  But  the  gold  standard  for  war  payments 
and  emergencies  had  already  proved  inadequate.  No 
one  claimed  that  the  emergency  could  be  met  without 
a  paper  currency.  The  only  question  was  whether 
there  should  be  a  government  currency  or  a  currency 
of  a  number  of  irresponsible  state  banks. 

The  value  of  the  proposed  notes  in  terms  of  gold 
coin,  gold  bullion,  or  any  other  commodity,  would 
chiefly,  if  not  entirely,  depend  upon  the  factors  that 
Stevens  named, —  the  limited  quantity,  the  growing 
demand,  and  the  full  money  function.  He  thought 
that  the  limited  amount  proposed  would  float  at  par 
with  gold,  and  when  he  was  asked  by  Judge  Thomas, 
of  Massachusetts,  whether  he  expected  to  limit  the 
amount  to  the  $150,000,000  proposed,  Stevens  an 
swered  emphatically  that  he  did;  he  expected  to  call 
for  no  more.  Four  months  later  1  when  Stevens,  as 
spokesman  of  his  committee,  was  calling  upon  the 
House  to  vote  another  $150,000,000,  Judge  Thomas 
again  inquired  whether  that  would  be  the  last  $150,- 
000,000  they  would  be  called  upon  to  vote.  Stevens 
replied :  "  I  said  before  that  $150,000,000  was  all  that 
I  would  ask  and  if  they  had  passed  the  bill  as  I  wanted 
it,  it  is  all  I  would  have  asked;  but  they  spoiled  the 
bill  and  I  don't  know  how  long  it  will  go  on." 

He  recognized  in  the  first  discussion  the  danger  of 
over  issue,  but  he  expected  the  government  paper  to 
displace  the  bank  circulation  of  $200,000,000,  and  that 
the  increasing  business  of  the  country  would  bring 
coin  into  use;  it  would  come  out  of  hiding  for  invest 
ment.  He  regarded  the  notes  as  inconvertible  (into 

ijune  18,  1862. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     271 

coin),  and  he  understood  perfectly  that  the  value  of 
the  paper  would  depend  upon  the  quantity  issued,  and 
the  demand  placed  upon  it.  He  expected  rapid  circu 
lation  of  the  money,  $100  in  notes  buying  ten  times  its 
value  in  a  year.  The  money  would  soon  find  lodgment 
in  the  banks,  and  these  could  not  find  a  better  invest 
ment  than  a  twenty-year  bond  that  would  ultimately  be 
redeemed  in  gold.  He  had  no  doubt  that  the  $500,- 
000,000  of  bonds  would  be  absorbed  in  less  time  than 
would  be  needed  by  the  government;  and  "  thus  $150,- 
000,000  would  do  the  work  of  $500,000,000  of  bonds." 
He  was  not  much  in  sympathy  with  "  the  unfortunate 
money  lenders  who  were  clamorous  lest  the  debtor 
should  the  more  easily  pay  his  debt."  He  met  with 
his  usual  sneer  —  he  was  rich  in  sneers  —  the  counter 
proposals  before  the  House.  Roscoe  Conkling's  pro 
posal  to  issue  7  per  cent,  bonds  payable  in  thirty-one 
years  to  be  sold  for  the  currency  of  the  banks  of 
Boston,  New  York,  or  Philadelphia,  seemed  to  Ste 
vens  to  lack  every  element  of  wise  legislation.  To 
receive  "  irredeemable  currency  and  pay  that  in  its 
depreciated  condition  to  our  contractors,  soldiers,  and 
creditors  generally !  The  banks  would  issue  unlimited 
amounts  of  what  would  become  trash  and  buy  good 
hard  money  bonds  of  the  nation.  Was  there  ever  such 
a  temptation  to  swindle  ?  " 

He  denounced  the  substitute  of  the  minority  of  the 
committee  as  a  curiosity.  It  proposed  notes,  not  a 
legal  tender,  bearing  3.65  per  cent.,1  not  payable  on  de 
mand  but  at  the  pleasure  of  the  United  States.  Here 
was  a  kind  of  currency  never  before  known, —  a  circu- 

1And  fundable  into  7.3  per  cent,  bonds. 


272     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

lation  bearing  interest.  "  Suppose  a  tailor,  shoemaker, 
or  laborer  were  to  take  one  of  these  bills,  and  in  a 
week  he  should  wish  to  use  it  in  market,  or  store,  or 
elsewhere,  he  must  sit  down  and  calculate  the  in 
terest  on  the  days  he  has  had  it  to  find  its  value.  This 
would  be  rather  inconvenient  on  a  frosty  day.  This 
currency  would  make  it  necessary  for  every  man  to 
carry  an  arithmetic  or  interest  table  with  which  to 
gage  the  value  of  the  circulating  medium."  l 

In  conclusion,  Stevens  expressed  the  earnest  hope 
that  the  bill  might  pass,  but  not  without  the  legal 
tender  clause.  If  it  did  not  pass,  then  he  would  that 
the  members  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means 
might  have  the  power  to  resign  their  places  to  let 
the  opponents  of  the  bill  mature  some  other  plan.  He 
would  attempt  no  other.  "  The  Committee  on  Ways 
and  Means  have  labored  in  the  preparation  of  this 
measure  anxiously  and  to  the  best  of  their  poor  abili 
ties.  ...  If  this  bill  pass,  I  shall  hail  it  as  the  most 
auspicious  measure  of  this  Congress;  if  it  should  fail, 
the  result  will  be  more  deplorable  than  any  disaster 
which  could  befall  us."  2 

The  bill  passed  the  House  as  Stevens  favored  it, 
with  no  exception  clause.  The  notes  were  to  be  a 
legal  tender  for  all  debts,  public  and  private.  The 
discriminating  exceptions  were  imposed  by  the  Sen 
ate.  When  the  bill  came  back  to  the  House  it  con 
tained,  among  other  amendments,  two  provisions  that 
were  calculated  to  defeat  the  chief  objects  of  the  bill. 
These  objects  were  to  prevent  all  forcing  of  the  £ov- 

1  Globe,  February  6,  1862,  p.  688. 

2  Globe,  February  6,  1862,  p.  689. 


.WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     273 

ernment  to  sell  its  bonds  in  the  market  to  the  highest 
bidder,  and  to  induce  bankers  and  capitalists  to  ex 
change  the  legal  tender  notes  for  6  per  cent,  bonds  at 
par  or  lose  their  interest,  thus  furnishing  a  continually 
recurring  currency  by  the  sale  of  the  bonds.  "  A 
dollar  in  a  miser's  safe  unproductive  is  a  sore  dis 
turbance,"  as  Stevens  had  said. 

One  of  the  objectionable  amendments  provided  that 
the  greenbacks  might  be  deposited  at  the  subtreasury 
for  treasury  notes  bearing  7.3  per  cent,  and  payable  in 
two  years.  This  "  vicious  deposit  system  upon  inter 
est,"  as  Stevens  called  it,  would  prevent  the  legal  ten 
ders  from  being  converted  into  bonds,  and  as  there 
could  be  no  reasonable  expectation  that  the  government 
would  be  able  to  pay  its  interest-bearing  notes  in  two 
years,  the  treasury  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  its 
creditors,  and  would  be  compelled  to  submit  to  any 
hard  bargain  they  chose  to  drive  unless  the  govern 
ment  should  consent  to  become  dishonored  by  refusal 
to  redeem  its  notes. 

The  other  Senate  provision  was  still  more  objec 
tionable  :  namely,  that  the  interest  on  the  bonds  should 
be  paid  in  coin,  and  that  in  order  to  secure  the  coin 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  should  go  into  the 
market  and  sell  his  bonds  for  what  they  would  bring. 
The  bill  was  thus  weighted  down  with  a  proposed 
absurdity  of  two  inconsistent  and  conflicting  cur 
rencies, —  one  money  for  ordinary  commercial  trans 
actions  among  the  people,  with  "  the  preposterous 
provision  that  the  government  dues  to  a  particular  class 
should  be  paid  in  another  and  wholly  different  legal 
tender."  This  was  gold,  the  want  of  which  had  made 


274     THE  LIFE  OF]  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  treasury  notes  necessary  and  which  must  yet  be 
purchased  at  any  sacrifice.  So,  after  all,  the  treasury 
was  not  to  escape  from  its  shackles,  but  must  be  forced 
to  hawk  its  bonds  to  the  gold  brokers  in  Wall  Street 
for  gold ;  and  the  plan  for  a  new  national  currency  was 
to  be  brought  to  naught. 

Within  a  few  months  the  "  financiers  "  who  were 
responsible  for  these  Senate  amendments  began  to 
complain  of  the  evils  arising  from  the  disparity  be 
tween  specie  and  greenback  notes,  and  with  an  assump 
tion  of  superior  virtue  and  wisdom,  they  attributed  all 
these  evils  to  the  legal  tender  legislation.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Greenbackers  attributed  those  evils  to 
the  legislation  promoted  by  the  advocates  of  specie  that 
made  one  currency  for  the  government  and  another 
for  the  people, —  the  amendment  that  bound  the  gov 
ernment  to  pay  its  bond  interest  in  gold.  The  gov 
ernment  thus  came  forth  and  proclaimed  itself  a 
constant  and  permanent  customer  for  gold  at  what 
ever  price,  as  an  exportable  article  of  commercial 
traffic,  in  competition  with  its  foreign  rivals  and  with 
the  whole  money  power  of  the  world.  That  gold 
would  rise  was  certain  and  was  as  clearly  foreseen  by 
others,  if  not  by  the  "financiers,"  as  the  law  of 
gravitation.  Yet  the  Senate  had  hastily  allowed  this 
"  expert  opinion "  to  dictate  an  "  invidious  and  un 
heard  of  preference  among  creditors  of  the  govern 
ment."  1 

It  was  exactly  this  that  Stevens  and  his  coadjutors 
sought  to  avoid.     They  wanted  no  partial  half-way 
measure,  no  exceptions,  no  evasions,  no  equivocations, 
1  Eleazar  Lord,  Letters  on  a  National  Currency,  p.  41. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     275 

no  class  legislation.  If  these  notes  were  to  be  made 
money,  they  should  be  money  for  all  classes  and  con 
ditions  of  men.  There  should  be  one  currency  for 
all  sections  and  classes  alike,  and  not  one  kind  of 
money  for  the  poor  and  another  for  the  rich,  or  one 
kind  for  the  debtor  and  another  for  the  creditor.  If 
a  forced  loan  were  to  be  laid  on  the  business  of  the 
country,  it  should  be  laid  upon  all  businesses  alike,  the 
money-lending  business  as  well  as  upon  every  other. 
If  these  notes  were  a  means  of  making  the  people  pay 
for  the  support  of  the  war,  all  should  be  made  to  pay ; 
and  Stevens  saw  no  reason  why  the  government  should 
make  an  exception  and  provide  special  legislation  to 
safeguard  the  interests  of  a  class  of  men  represent 
ing  accumulated  wealth.  If  by  long  continuance  of 
the  war  the  public  debt  should  reach  $2,000,000,000, 

—  and  Stevens'  vision  upon  that  score  was  not  be 
clouded  as  was  that  of  so  many  public  men  of  the  time 

—  it  would  require  $120,000,000  of  gold  annually  to 
meet  the  interest,  requiring  a  semi-annual  payment  of 
more  gold  than  the  combined  banks  of  the  country 
contained.1     This  would  enhance  the  price  of  gold, 
and  bankers  and  brokers  would  horde  it  for  sale  to 
the  government  at  ruinous  prices;  gold  and  treasury 
notes  would  part  company  and  speculations  in  gold 
would  follow.     This  hazardous  outcome  Stevens  saw 
clearly  from  the  beginning  and  he  sought  to  do  his 
best  to  prevent  it. 

Consequently,  when  the  bill  came  back   from  the 
Senate    with    these    obstructing    and    discriminating 

1  In    fact   the    annual    interest   payment   became    much    larger 
than  this. 


276     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

clauses,  Stevens  was  ready  to  abandon  the  whole  legal 
tender  feature  of  the  bill  rather  than  accept  the 
"  pernicious  amendments."  He  denounced  the 
amended  measure  as  "  an  incongruous  monster,"  as 
SL  bill  with  "  many  uncouth  features,"  and  "  no  won 
der,  for  it  had  a  vast  number  of  progenitors  and  must 
partake  of  the  lineaments  of  all."  As  a  means  of 
breaking  down  the  amendments  he  contended  with 
reference  to  the  exception  that  it  was  proposed  to  make 
to  the  legal  tender  provision  of  the  bill,  either  that 
the  whole  legal  tender  provision  should  be  abandoned 
or  the  exception  should  be  extended.  He,  therefore, 
in  order  to  make  the  exception  odious  and  defeat  it, 
moved  to  extend  it,  so  that  if  the  treasury  notes  were 
not  to  be  legal  tender  for  dues  to  the  bondholder, 
neither  should  they  be  in  payments  due  to  soldiers, 
sailors,  contractors,  farmers,  and  producers.  These, 
too,  were  creditors  of  the  government.  Many  of 
them  were  risking  their  lives  in  defense  of  their  coun 
try,  and  they  were  certainly  as  deserving  of  the  con 
sideration  of  the  government  as  were  those  who 
staked  only  their  money  upon  the  issue, —  and  that, 
too,  only  on  special  security.  This,  says  Mr.  White, 
"  put  the  House  to  the  severest  possible  test."  l  It 
did,  indeed,  test  the  spirit  and  motive  of  some  of  the 
members  of  Congress.  It  appears  that  Stevens  was 
putting  it  up  to  the  House  to  decide  whether  it  would 
stand  for  privilege  or  equality,  whether  it  would  or 
dain  and  establish  "  one  currency  for  the  bondholder, 
another  for  the  plow-holder " ;  a  dear  money  to  re 
pay  those  who  had  quantities  of  capital  to  lend  to  the 
1  Horace  White,  Money  and  Banking,  p.  155. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     277 

government,  but  a  cheap  money  to  pay  the  producers 
who  were  furnishing  supplies  for  the  armies  in  the 
field  and  the  men  in  the  trenches  who  were  shoulder 
ing  their  muskets  for  the  sake  of  the  Union. 

This  has  been  denounced  as  the  scheme  of  the  dem 
agogue.  It  was  not.  It  was  rather  the  plea  of  a 
great  commoner  whose  sympathies  were  with  the  com 
mon  people  who  were  bearing  the  nation's  burdens,  and 
of  an  honest  public  servant  who  had  sufficient  nerve 
and  insight  to  withstand  the  demands  of  interested 
and  powerful  moneyed  classes.  It  was,  also,  the  plea 
of  an  astute  political  manager  who  sought  to  compass 
the  rejection  of  amendments  that  he  honestly  thought 
would  be  injurious  to  the  interests  of  his  country 
men.  Stevens  said,  as  he  approached  this  second  dis 
cussion  of  the  legal  tender  bill,  that  he  did  so  with 
more  depression  of  spirit  than  he  had  ever  approached 
a  public  question,  having  as  he  said,  "  a  melancholy 
foreboding  that  we  are  about  to  consummate  a  cun 
ningly  devised  scheme  which  will  carry  great  injury 
and  great  loss  to  all  classes  of  the  people  throughout 
the  Union,  except  one."  1 

The  original  bill  had  been  hailed  with  delight 
throughout  the  country.  Congratulations  had  come 

1  Peter  Cooper,  in  accepting  the  nomination  of  the  Greenback 
party  for  the  presidency  in  1876  (Indianapolis,  May  17),  said: 
"The  introduction  of  that  little  word  except  into  the  original 
law  drew  tears  from  the  eyes  of  Thaddeus  Stevens  when  he 
looked  down  the  current  of  events  and  saw  our  bonds  in  the 
hands  of  foreigners  who  would  be  receiving  a  gold  interest  on 
every  hundred  dollars  of  bonds  that  cost  them  but  fifty  or  sixty 
dollars  in  gold. 

"  But  for  the  introduction  of  that  word  except  into  that 
original  law  our  bonds  would  have  been  taken  at  par  by  our 
own  people,  and  the  interest  would  have  been  paid  at  home  in 
currency  instead  of  being  paid  to  foreigners  in  gold." 


278     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

in  from  all  classes  of  people, —  merchants,  traders, 
manufacturers,  mechanics,  laborers,  and  from  the 
Boards  of  Trade  of  the  principal  cities.1 

"  It  is  true,"  said  Stevens,  "  a  doleful  sound  came 
up  from  the  caverns  of  bullion  brokers,  and  from  the 
saloons  of  the  associated  banks.  Their  cashiers  and 
agents  were  soon  on  the  ground,  and  persuaded  the 
Senate  with  but  little  deliberation,  to  mangle  and 
destroy  what  it  had  cost  the  House  months  to  digest, 
consider,  and  pass.  They  fell  upon  the  bill  in  hot 
haste  and  so  disfigured  and  deformed  it  that  its  very 
father  would  not  know  it.  Instead  of  being  a  benef 
icent  and  invigorating  measure,  it  is  now  positively 
mischievous.  It  has  all  the  bad  qualities  that  its  ene 
mies  charged  on  the  original  bill  and  none  of  its  bene 
fits.  It  now  creates  money,  and  by  its  very  terms  de 
clares  it  a  depreciated  currency.  It  makes  two  classes 
of  money  —  one  for  the  banks  and  brokers,  and  an 
other  for  the  people.  It  discriminates  between  the 
rights  of  different  classes  of  creditors,  allowing  the  rich 
capitalist  to  demand  gold,  and  compelling  the  ordinary 
lender  of  money  to  receive  notes  which  the  govern 
ment  had  purposely  discredited." 

Other  minor  amendments  were  also  objectionable  as 
tending  toward  favoritism  and  class  legislation.  Stev- 

1  Senator  Henry  Wilson,  of  Massachusetts,  said  in  the  Senate 
that  not  a  thousand  people  in  his  state  opposed  the  legal  tender 
clause,  that  ninety-nine  in  a  hundred  of  the  loyal  people  favored 
it,   that   the   sentiment   of  the  nation   "  approaches   unanimity  in 
its  favor."     He  had  letters  from  several  large  commercial  houses 
representing  millions  of  capital,  and  "  they  say  that  they  do  not 
know  a  merchant  in  the  city  of  Boston  engaged  in  active  busi 
ness  who  is  not  for  this  legal  tender."     Globe,  26.  Session,  Thirty- 
seventh   Congress,  Vol.  59,  pp.  788-789,  February   13,  1862. 

2  Globe,  Feb.  20,  1862,  p.  900. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     279 

ens  pleaded  for  equity  and  fair  play  to  all  classes 
alike  and  in  his  conclusion  he  earnestly  urged  his 
amendment  enlarging  the  exceptions  in  order,  as  he 
said,  that  "  if  this  pernicious  system  is  to  be  adopted, 
if  the  beauty  of  the  original  bill  is  to  be  impaired  en 
tirely,  those  who  are  fighting  our  battles  and  the 
widows  and  orphans  of  those  who  are  lying  in  their 
graves  in  every  part  of  the  country,  killed  in  defense 
of  the  government,  may  not  be  placed  upon  a  worse 
footing  than  those  who  hold  the  bonds  of  the  gov 
ernment  and  the  coin  of  the  country."  1  He  dis 
claimed  responsibility  for  the  result  of  the  bill,  and 
he  looked  upon  its  passage  in  its  amended  form  as 
deplorable  and  permanently  injurious  to  all  classes  of 
the  community  except  the  class  that  he  had  excepted, 
- —  bankers,  bond  buyers,  and  bullionists. 

The  House  agreed  to  the  Senate  amendment  pro 
viding  for  the  payment  of  bond  interest  in  coin,  but 
it  disagreed  to  some  other  amendments.  The  result 
was  a  conference  committee  between  the  two  houses. 
Messrs.  Fessenden,  Sherman  and  Carlisle  represented 
the  Senate  and  Messrs.  Stevens,  Sedgwick,  and  Horton 
represented  the  House,  and  after  some  days  of  dis 
cussion  the  outcome  was  an  agreement  to  resort  to 
customs  dues  instead  of  bond  sales  as  a  means  of 
securing  the  coin  for  interest  payment.2 

1  Cong.  Globe,  2cl  Session,  Thirty-seventh  Cong.,  Vol.  59,  p.  900, 
Feb.  20,  1862.    , 

2  Mr.  Horace  White  asserts  that  Stevens  "  afterward  claimed 
the  credit"  of  substituting  import  duties  instead  of  bond  sales 
as  a  means  of  getting  the  coin  for  the  government,  but  that  he 
did  this  as  a  means  of  increasing  the  duties  on  imports  for  the 
sake  of  higher  protection  and  not  for  the  sake  of  getting  the 
gold  for  which  "he  had  intense  scorn."    Money  and  Banking, 
P.  155- 


280     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

-'gift- 

The  bill  then  passed  providing  for  the  issue  of 
$150,000,000  of  legal  tender  treasury  notes  with  the 
exception  clauses;  stipulating  that  customs  dues  and 
the  government's  interest  payments  should  be  in  coin; 
that  these  notes  might  be  exchanged  for  bonds  at 
6  per  cent,  or  deposited  on  interest  at  5  per  cent,  and 
the  issue  of  $500,000,000  five-twenty  bonds  was  au 
thorized.1 

Attempt  has  here  been  made  to  present  fairly  and 
with  as  much  fulness  as  the  limits  of  space  make  pos 
sible  the  position  of  Stevens  on  this  most  important 
single  act  of  legislation  during  the  Civil  War.  For 
what  he  then  did  and  said  in  the  legal  tender  con 
troversy  Stevens  has  been  severely  criticized  by  writers 
who  condemn  the  greenback  policy.  Because  he  said 
that  these  notes  which  he  proposed  would  not  depre 
ciate  as  compared  with  gold,  that  they  would  be 
rapidly  exchanged  for  five-twenty  bonds,  and  that 
no  further  issues  would  be  called  for, —  these  expres 
sions  have  been  held  up  as  glaring  examples  of  his 
wild  and  untrained  opinions  and  errors  in  finance, 
and  as  an  indication  of  his  readiness  to  "  cast  to  the 
winds  the  teaching  of  experience." 2  A  standard 
writer  in  American  financial  history  refers,  with  some 
flavor  of  satire,  to  the  "  magic "  by  which  Stevens 
expected  that  $150,000,000  of  treasury  notes  would 
do  the  work  of  $500,000,000  in  bonds."  3  Another 
writer  refers  to  the  expectation  of  Stevens  that  the 

1  There    were    two    subsequent    issues    of   the    greenbacks    on 
July  u,  1862,  and  March,  1863.     These  increased  the  amount  of 
the  greenback  currency  to  the  final  total  of  $450,000,000. 

2  Oberholtzer,  E.  P.,  Jay  Cooke,  Financier  of  the  Civil  War, 
Vol.  I,  p.  171. 

3  Dewey,  D.  R.,  Financial  History  of  the  United  States. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  .WAR     281 

notes  would  be  readily  offered  for  bonds  as  a  "  vain 
reliance  "  and  as  "  far  too  sanguine."  1 

These  criticisms  are,  no  doubt,  fair  in  intent,  but 
they  are  hardly  fair  in  fact.  The  full  truth  puts 
Stevens  in  a  different  light.  Complete  justice  to  the 
merits  of  the  controversy,  not  to  speak  of  common 
fairness  to  Stevens  and  his  coadjutors,  would  seem  to 
1  require  that  the  reader  should  be  reminded  of  the  fact 
that  these  utterances  of  Stevens  were  not  made  with 
reference  to  the  notes  that  were  issued  and  with  which 
experience  was  had,  but  with  reference  to  the  notes 
that  he  originally  favored.  There  was  a  difference. 
The  original  greenbacks  of  which  Stevens  was  ever 
the  ready  defender  would  certainly  have  had  a  greater 
value,  in  comparison  with  gold,  than  the  ones  the  gold 
advocates  finally  succeeded  in  writing  into  the  law. 
The  notes  that  were  issued,  which  Stevens  so  stoutly 
opposed,  had  denied  to  them  two  great  and  important 
functions  of  money, —  customs  taxes  to  government 
and  government  payment  of  interest.  In  these  two 
important  aspects  the  government  dishonored  its  own 
notes.  To  the  extent  of  these  vital  exceptions  the 
greater  pressure  of  money  demand  was  placed  upon 
gold ;  it  was  made  preferred  money  and  was  required 
for  a  large  money  work  that  the  greenbacks  were 
by  law  prevented  from  doing,  and,  consequently,  the 
notes  that  were  finally  enacted  took  exactly  the  course 
with  reference  to  gold  that  Stevens  predicted  for  them. 
Instead  of  saying,  as  quoted,  that  the  greenbacks  as 
issued  would  pass  at  par  with  gold,  he  specifically 
predicted  that  they  would  depreciate.  He  did  not 
1  Mitchell,  W.  C,  A  History  of  the  Greenbacks. 


282     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

expect  depreciation  under  the  original  bill,  but  under 
the  amended  bill  he  did  expect  it. 

On  the  eve  of  the  final  enactment  of  the  Legal  Tender  Act, 
in  speaking  of  the  "  exception  clause,"  which  he  denounced 
as  one  of  the  "  uncouth  features "  of  the  bill  imposed  by 
the  Senate  amendments,  Stevens  said :  "  After  we  had 
made  a  currency  for  all,  declaring  it  to  be  equal  with  gold, 
we  made  an  exception  and  declared  that  it  was  not  equal 
to  gold  and  should  be  a  currency  only  for  some,  thereby 
depreciating  our  bonds  and  bringing  our  currency  below  par 
v  which  we  declared  was  par." 

Herein  I  give  not  quite  the  form  of  Stevens'  utter 
ance  but  the  exact  meaning  of  it.  When  Stevens 
spoke  of  declaring  paper  money  "  at  par  "  and  making 
it  "  equal  with  gold  "  he  must  have  meant  only  that  the 
government  and  the  people  would  treat  the  legal  ten 
ders  without  discrimination,  that  they  should  be  recog 
nized  as  equal  with  gold  in  the  equal  power  of  per 
forming  all  the  functions  of  money.  Whether,  if  no 
legal  discriminations  had  been  made  in  favor  of  gold, 
and  equal  money  functions  "had  been  given  to  paper 
and  gold  alike,  the  greenbacks  and  the  gold  would  have 
exchanged  at  a  parity,  can  be  neither  proved  nor  dis 
proved.  That  would  have  depended  on  the  quantity 
issued  and  the  demand  for  money.  Stevens  thought 
such  notes  would  be  at  parity  with  gold.  The  experi 
ence  with  an  issue,  in  1861,  of  $60,000,000  in  demand 
notes  which,  being  made  receivable  for  customs  but  not 
a  legal  tender,  did  not  depreciate,  appears  to  sustain  his 
view;  and  with  such  a  limited  supply  as  he  first  pro 
posed  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  conclude  that  the  law 
of  probabilities  was  in  favor  of  Stevens'  opinion. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     283 

Men  who  speak  flippantly  about  his  "  wild-eyed  no 
tions  of  finance  "  give  little  evidence  that  they  them 
selves  are  either  fair  judges  of  sound  opinion,  or  care 
ful  students  of  the  paper  money  problem.  Stevens 
should  be  allowed  to  stand  upon  his  record.  If  the 
notes  had  been  allowed  to  retain  the  full  money  quali 
ties  with  which  he  so  earnestly  desired  to  clothe  them, 
those  qualities  would  certainly  have  added  to  their  use ; 
the  larger  use  would  have  added  to  the  demand  for 
them;  and  the  larger  demand  would  have  increased 
their  value.  What  their  gold  value  would  actually 
have  been  is  a  matter  of  speculative  opinion,  but  it  is 
quite  obvious  that  the  criticisms  here  referred  to  do  not 
apply  with  fairness  to  Stevens'  real  opinions  and 
prophecies. 

In  another  respect  the  criticism  of  Stevens  by  fi 
nancial  writers  is  equally  unfair.  I  refer  to  that  "  too 
sanguine  expectation "  and  the  "  magical  process " 
by  which,  it  is  said,  he  expected  the  legal  tender 
notes  to  be  turned  over  rapidly  and  repeatedly  for  the 
five-twenty  bonds.  The  record  reveals  Stevens'  clear 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  these  notes  as  they  were 
finally  issued  would  not  be  so  exchanged  for  the 
five-twenties.  Yet  his  words  are  misused  to  make  him 
say  the  opposite  of  what  he  believed, —  the  words  he 
applied  to  the  legal  tender  notes  before  they  were 
vitiated  by  the  Senate  amendments.  He  openly  as 
serted  that  the  notes  as  they  were  made  by  the  Senate 
amendments  would  not  be  funded  into  bonds.  "  I  do 
not,1'  he  said,  "  expect  one  dollar  of  the  $150,000,000 
of  legal  tender  notes  ever  to  be  invested  in  the  twenty 
years  bonds,  as  no  bonds  would  be  sold  until  the  cur- 


284     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

rency  became  frightfully  inflated."  All  classes  were 
required  to  take  these  notes  "  unless  they  had  money 
enough  to  buy  the  United  States  bonds,  and  then  they 
shall  be  paid  in  gold,  and  that  favored  class  is  nobody 
but  bankers  and  brokers."  1  "  Does  anybody  suppose 
that  they  are  going  to  give  their  coin  at  par  for  such 
notes  as  we  are  about  to  issue?  They  will  sell  the 
gold  for  what  their  consciences  will  allow.  Was 
ever  before  such  a  machine  got  up  for  swindling  the 
government  and  making  the  fortune  of  the  gold  bul- 
lionists  in  one  single  year  ?  "  2  It  was  because  he  saw 
that  the  easy  convertibility  which  he  claimed  for  the 
original  notes  had  been  destroyed  that  he  so  vigorously 
denounced  the  "  vicious  deposit  system  upon  interest " 
which  was  imposed  by  one  of  the  Senate  amendments. 
Under  that  system  the  holders  of  the  legal  tenders 
could  deposit  them  in  the  subtreasuries  and  receive  5 
per  cent,  interest  on  them.  This  put  the  government 
into  the  position  of  receiving  its  currency  on  deposit 
and  withholding  it  from  use,  and  it  effectually  pre 
vented,  as  Stevens  said,  all  conversion  of  the  legal  ten 
ders  into  the  bonded  debt.  To  Stevens  this  seemed 
like  a  cunning  device  to  prevent  the  greenbacks  from 
having  a  rapid  and  constant  circulation  and  from  do 
ing  the  very  work  for  which  they  were  designed.  He 
distinctly  said  so  in  the  open  House.  He  believed  the 
gold  money  brokers  were  using  every  means  which 
their  ingenuity  could  devise  to  prevent  the  greenbacks 
from  doing  the  work  of  money.  What  these  gold  men 

1  Stevens  disregards  the  clients  of  the  bankers,  the  small  in 
vestors  who  merely  wished  to  use  the  banks  as  agencies  for  the 
investment  of  their  savings  and  capital  funds. 

-  Globe,  Feb.  20,  1862. 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     285 

most  feared,  according  to  Stevens,  was  not  that  the  le 
gal  tenders  could  not  do  the  money  work,  but  that  they 
could  do  it,,  and  he  repeatedly  denounced  the  proposal 
to  lock  them  up  on  deposit  as  an  adroit  scheme  by 
which  the  enemies  of  the  greenbacks  were  accomplish 
ing  their  purpose, —  to  prevent  a  soundly  secured  paper 
money  from  coming  into  use  as  well  as  to  prevent  their 
being  offered  for  bonds.  A  year  later  he  reiterated 
this  opinion,  which  experience  had  vindicated,  by  call 
ing  attention  to  the  fact  that  only  $23,000,000  of  bonds 
had  been  sold,  since  the  passage  of  the  law.1  The 
full  record  of  the  case  does  not  show  that  in  this 
respect  Stevens  was  either  deceived  or  that  he  was 
obtuse,  or  over-sanguine.  Many  men  in  his  day  de 
nounced  Stevens  as  a  vindictive  political  tyrant;  some 
men,  since  his  death,  have  accused  him  of  being  a 
knave;  but  no  one  ever  took  him  for  a  fool.  The 
record  will  show  that  he  penetrated  the  problem  of 
paper  money  in  relation  to  the  war  with  as  keen  an 
intelligence  as  any  man  of  his  time. 

One  may  reasonably  believe,  in  harmony  with  tra 
ditional  opinion  and  the  dicta  of  eminent  writers 
(though  they  have  assumed  rather  than  proved  their 
case),  that  the  legal  tender  legislation  was  not  wise 
nor  economical.  There  is  reasonable  ground,  also, 
for  an  opposite  opinion.  It  is  repeatedly  asserted  that 
that  legislation  added  greatly  to  the  cost  of  the  war.2 
The  sum  of  $870,000,000  has  been  given  as  the  un 
necessary  cost  to  the  taxpayers  caused  by  the  use  of  a 
depreciated  currency.3  But  the  case  is  by  no  means 

1  House,  January  20,  1863. 

2  Rhodes,  III,  pp.  566,  567. 

3  Horace  White,  Money  and  Banking,  p.  162. 


286     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

clear  against  the  greenback.  Not  to  speak  of  the 
claim,  which  may  reasonably  be  made,  that  a  consider 
able  part  of  the  increased  expenses  of  the  war  came 
directly  from  the  mutilation  of  the  greenbacks  by  its 
enemies,  by  which  they  were  prevented  from  being  re 
ceived  for  all  forms  of  taxes,  duties,  and  debts,1  yet  it 
will  be  accepted  as  a  matter  of  common  agreement  that 
the  greenback  issue  gave  to  the  government  an  immedi 
ate  relief,  by  affording  a  means  of  making  payments 
that  taxes  could  not  possibly  have  afforded ;  that,  in  so 
far  as  they  were  in  the  nature  of  a  loan  or  government 
obligation,  they  were  "  a  loan  without  interest "  and 
saved  an  interest  payment  on  a  nominal  capital  equal 
to  the  amount  of  the  issue;  that  their  issue  was  fol 
lowed  by  a  notable  commercial  and  industrial  pros 
perity;  that  production  and  exchange  were  greatly 
facilitated,  and,  therefore,  government  revenues  were 
increased;  and  that  this  prosperity  and  the  rising  prices 
were  a  potent  factor  in  making  the  people  both  able 
and  willing  to  meet  the  heavy  taxes  that  became  neces 
sary  later  for  the  conduct  of  the  war.  This  productive 
and  commercial  prosperity  was  so  pronounced  during 
the  years  from  1862  to  1865  that  our  exports  of  sta 
ples  to  foreign  markets  were  so  unprecedented  as  to 
exceed  by  from  two  to  four  times  the  average  of  the 
years  just  prior  to  the  war, —  and  this,  too,  at  a  time 
when  a  million  of  men  were  drawn  from  the  field  of 

1  In  a  later  financial  discussion  in  the  House,  Feb.  28,  1865, 
Stevens  said :  "  To  this  unwise  discrimination,  creating  two 
kinds  of  currency,  and  pronouncing  one  kind  of  lawful  money 
inferior  to  the  other  kind  of  lawful  money,  I  attribute  most  of 
the  trouble  which  has  arisen  from  the  high  price  of  everything, 
the  enormous  and  unnecessary  expense  of  the  war  and  the  con 
stant  fluctuation  in  the  market" 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     287 

productive  labor  and  when  it  was  feared  that  the  waste 
of  war  would  take  all  our  national  surplus  and  call  for 
the  importation  of  supplies  from  abroad. 

I  think  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  the  gold 
standard  had,  of  necessity,  to  be  abandoned.  But  if 
there  are  those  who  think  otherwise,  they  are  under 
obligations  to  adduce  some  reasonable  ground  for  be 
lieving  that  upon  the  gold  standard  and  without  the 
greenback,  the  country  could  have  sent  such  an  un 
precedented  volume  of  products  to  foreign  markets; 
that  it  could  have  supplied  with  such  ease  and  ability 
the  sinews  for  a  war  of  such  gigantic  magnitude ;  and 
that  the  nation  could  have  raised  for  its  treasury  within 
a  single  year,  as  it  did,  a  thousand  millions  of  money 
in  loans  and  taxes.  This  does  not  seem  credible,  and 
it  was,  therefore,  not  unreasonable  to  say,  as  was  said 
repeatedly  by  public  men  after  the  war  was  over,  that 
the  greenback  money,  after  gold  had  become  a  com 
modity  to  be  bought  and  sold,  was  one  of  the  most 
potent  factors  in  promoting  the  success  of  the  national 
arms. 

Nor  are  the  usual  assertions  of  the  gold  standard 
advocates,  and  of  the  historians  who  assume  without 
knowledge  the  correctness  of  their  view,  at  all  con 
vincing  to  show  that  the  paper  currency  added  greatly 
to  the  cost  of  the  war.  Undoubtedly  the  prices  which 
the  government  had  to  pay  for  commodities  were 
raised  by  the  use  of  the  paper  dollar.  But  this  was 
an  increased  expense  only  in  name.  What  the  war 
cost  was  the  amount  of  labor  and  wealth  consumed 
in  waging  it.1  That  could  not  have  been  increased  by 

1  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  V,  p.    143. 


288     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

any  change  of  the  money  standard.  The  number  of 
soldiers  required  for  the  army  and  sailors  for  the 
navy,  and  the  amount  of  supplies  required  to  arm  and 
feed  them, —  these  were  just  the  same  as  if  the  gold 
dollar  had  been  used  instead  of  the  greenback.  The 
number  of  dollars  were  increased,  but  the  consumed 
wealth  that  these  dollars  represented  was  exactly  the 
same.  The  increased  cost  of  the  war  came,  not  in 
the  use  of  the  greenbacks  to  conduct  the  war,  but  in 
their  disuse  after  the  war  was  over, —  that  is,  in  the 
policy  of  paying  the  creditors  of  the  government 
dollars  of  higher  value  than  they  had  loaned.1  The 
capital  that  was  borrowed  represented  so  much  wealth, 
but  the  capital  that  was  returned  represented  nearly 
twice  as  much  wealth.  But  that  policy  of  adding  to 
the  cost  of  the  war  was  not  the  policy  of  Stevens 
and  the  Greenbacker,  nor  were  they  responsible  for  it. 
It  was  the  policy  of  those  who  combated  and  defeated 
Stevens'  greenback  legislation.  If  only  the  values  that 
were  borrowed  had  been  returned  to  the  lenders,  the 
war  would  have  cost  essentially  the  same  on  either 
money  standard, —  if  it  had  been  possible  to  conduct 
it  at  all  on  the  specie  basis. 

In  view  of  the  whole  controversy  and  of  Stevens' 
persistent  and  consistent  efforts  to  prevent  the  gold 
legislation  that  was  here  secured  by  the  "  interests," 
—  those  that  were  working  in  favor  of  the  gold  dealers 
and  bankers  —  it  is  slightly  ironical  for  the  gold  advo- 

1 "  The  depreciation  of  the  currency  then  made  no  difference 
in  the  amount  of  wealth  consumed  during  the  war.  The  only 
way  in  which  it  did  make  a  real  increase  in  its  cost  came  in  the 
repayment  of  the  debt."  Mitchell,  "  The  Greenbacks  and  the 
Cost  of  the  War,"  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  V,  p. 
144  (1897). 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     289 

cates  to  attribute  to  Stevens  and  other  original  friends 
of  the  Legal  Tender  Act  the  failures  and  shortcomings 
of  that  measure.  Those  interested  in  money  lending 
and  gold  holdings,  while  they  could  not  defeat  the  Legal 
Tender  Act,  accomplished  their  principal  purpose  by 
another  process, —  the  purpose  of  compelling  the  gov 
ernment  to  sell  its  bonds  in  the  open  market  for  what 
they  would  command  in  gold.  They  were  permitted 
to  accomplish  this  purpose  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
Stevens  had  made  it  perfectly  obvious  that  the  bond 
sale  was  certain  to  result  in  a  discount  ruinous  to 
the  public  interest.  The  capitalist  opposition  to  the 
greenback  legislation  was  not  at  all  marked  nor  strenu 
ous  after  the  interests  of  their  particular  class  had 
been  safeguarded  by  the  Senate  amendments.  With 
more  recent  history  before  us  of  the  ways  by  which 
moneyed  interests  control  legislation  at  Washington, 
we  may  conclude  that  Stevens  was  not  far  from  wrong 
when  he  attributed  this  particular  "  failure  "  of  the 
Greenback  Act  to  a  "  cunningly  devised  scheme  "  of  a 
creditor  and  bondholding  class  who  had  gold  in  con 
siderable  quantities  to  offer  the  government,  under  con 
ditions  that  would  enable  them  to  dictate  the  terms  of 
its  sale. 

What  would  have  resulted  in  financial  conditions  if 
the  original  Greenback  Act  had  gone  through;  what 
the  expenses  of  the  war,  measured  in  money,  would 
have  been;  how  a  real  Stevens  greenback  without  any 
exception  clause  would  have  been  rated  in  terms  of 
gold, —  all  this  is  entirely  a  matter  of  speculation.  It 
is  certainly  not  to  be  settled  by  the  dogmatic  assertion 
of  those  who  choose  to  flatter  themselves  as  the  only 


290     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

"  advocates  of  sound  money,"  or  by  the  epithet  of 
ridicule  and  denunciation  against  greenbacks  and 
Greenbackers  usually  indulged  in  by  the  orthodox  ad 
vocates  of  the  gold  standard.  After  the  experience  of 
recent  years,  the  advocates  of  gold  as  the  only  stable 
measure  of  value  can  not  much  longer  perpetrate  the 
absurd  farce  of  calling  it  a  "  standard."  Happily  that 
ever-shifting,  not  to  say  ever-cheating,  "  standard  "  is 
not  now  in  the  minds  of  the  creditor  and  salaried 
classes  quite  so  sacred  a  thing  as  it  was  a  half -century, 
or  even  two  decades,  ago.  More  than  a  thousand  mil 
lions  of  new  gold  within  a  decade  and  the  consequent 
fall  in  its  value  (or  the  rise  of  gold  prices,  which  is 
the  same  thing)  are  leading  "  classical  writers,"  and 
perhaps  even  the  intolerant  dogmatists  of  the  gold 
standard  school,  to  question  whether  the  yellow  metal 
was  really  designed  in  the  original  councils  of  the 
Almighty  as  the  one  standard  of  honest  money  for 
the  realm.1  The  ax  is  being  laid  at  the  root  of  the 

1  The  director  of  the  mint  in  his  estimate  of  the  output  of 
gold  for  the  year  1911,  places  its  value  _  at  $466,000,000.  That 
was  but  a  slight  increase  over  the  years  immediately  preceding. 
But  ten  years  ago  the  gold  output  was  valued  at  only  $262,- 
000,000,  while  twenty  years  ago  it  was  only  $130,000,000,  and 
the  average  for  the  decade  of  1880  to  1890  was  but  a  little  over 
$100,000,000.  The  product  of  gold  from  the  Transvaal  has 
grown  in  ten  years  from  $9,000,000  to  $191,000,000.  It  is  not 
contended  that  the  recent  rise  of  prices  is  to  be  attributed  to 
the  gold  flood  alone,  yet  few  reputable  economists  will  deny  that 
it  is  the  most  effective  cause.  The  phenomenal  increase  of  gold 
has  brought  us  the  "  fifty-cent  dollar "  which  was  so  decried 
in  the  notable  Bryan  campaign  of  1896.  The  gold  "  standard  " 
was  even  more  inconstant  and  unreliable  in  Stevens'  day  than 
in  ours,  the  difference  being  that  in  Civil  War  times  the  metal 
was  scarce,  while  in  these  times  of  high  prices  it  is  abundant. 

Professor  Irving  Fisher,  of  the  Department  of  Economics  of 
Yale  University,  has  recently  presented  much  evidence  and  sound 
argument  to  prove  that  the  present  high  cost  of  living  is  due 
primarily  "to  gold  and  credit  inflation."  He  is  reminding  the 


WAYS  AND  MEANS  IN  THE  WAR     291 

tree,  as  the  radical  custom  always  was  with  Thaddeus 
Stevens.  The  value  of  gold  has  so  calamitously 
changed  in  the  wrong  (?)  direction  in  recent  years 
that  the  orthodox  may  well  question  the  divinity  that 
has  always  been  supposed  to  hedge  about  the  yellow 
metal  as  a  standard  of  value.  It  is  barely  possible 
that  they  may  be  led  to  see  that  Thaddeus  Stevens, 
the  Greenbacker,  even  fifty  years  ago  in  the  midst 
of  the  trials  of  war,  had  an  intelligent  conception  of 
the  need  of  a  uniform  national  currency,  and  that  he 
saw  and  understood  the  merits  of  gold  in  relation  to 
money  as  clearly  as  some  of  his  hasty  and  intolerant 
critics. 

Stevens  looked  upon  this  struggle  over  a  national 
currency  as  a  contest  between  Privilege  and  Democ 
racy.  America  has  never  produced  a  more  power 
ful,  more  consistent,  and  more  uncompromising  foe 
to  Privilege  than  Thaddeus  Stevens.  In  this  cause  he 
felt  and  spoke  for  the  people  with  the  same  fervent 
democratic  spirit  that  characterized  his  opposition  to 
slavery.  He  knew  the  motives  that  were  actuating 
men  in  their  importunities  for  government  favors. 
He  had  as  keen  and  as  sensitive  an  appreciation  of  the 
financial  honor  of  the  nation  as  any  man  of  his  time. 
He  saw  the  bearings  of  this  financial  legislation  upon 
the  burdens  wrhich  his  government  was  undergoing 
and  upon  the  prosperity  of  his  fellow-countrymen. 

public  of  what  ought  to  be  obvious  to  all,  that  gold  inflation  is 
as  bad  as  any  other  kind,  and  that  sound  money  that  is  really 
honest  demands  emancipation  "  from  fluctuations  in  either  di 
rection  of  the  purchasing  value  of  the  monetary  unit,"  and  that 
business  "  may  suffer  from  gold  inflation  which  comes  from 
natural  causes  as  truly  as  from  inflation  through  legislative  enact 
ment."  This  helps  to  get  the  dust  out  of  the  eyes  of  the  public. 


292     THE  LIFE  OR  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

His  record  upon  this  subject,  as  upon  all  others,  mani 
fested  a  yearning  for  the  welfare  and  prosperity  of  the 
masses,  an  unfaltering  purpose  to  resist  special  favors 
and  to  promote  a  democratic  equality  for  all.  He  had 
a  burning  scorn  for  graft,  pretense,  and  hypocrisy. 
He  proved  that  he  was  ready  to  stand,  like  a  great 
commoner  in  the  halls  of  legislation,  to  speak  for  the 
interests  of  the  toiling  masses  and  the  honest  wealth- 
producers  of  his  country,  and  in  resistance  to  those 
who  were  seeking  special  privilege  in  legislation.  The 
time  will  come  when  his  opinion  and  services  in  this 
great  crisis  will  bring  a  reward  in  appreciation  and 
gratitude  that  has  not  yet  been  accorded  to  him. 


CHAPTER  XII 

RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  THE  WAR 

TN  the  latter  part  of  April,  1862,  New  Orleans  was 
•*  captured  by  the  Federal  forces.  Soon  after  this 
event  Union  men  under  the  protection  of  the  army  be 
gan  to  form  associations  to  develop  loyal  sentiment 
in  the  state.  There  were  two  parties  of  opinion 
among  those  who  wished  to  restore  a  Union  state 
government.  One  wished  to  have  an  election  un 
der  the  old  Constitution  of  1852,  on  the  ground  that 
the  act  of  secession  and  the  Constitution  of  1861  were 
void  and,  consequently,  that  the  Constitution  of  1852 
was  still  in  force.  The  other  wished  to  hold  a  con 
stitutional  convention,  recognize  the  abolition  of  slav 
ery,  and  form  a  new  constitution. 

In  August,  1862,  General  George  F.  Shepley,  who 
had  been  mayor  of  New  Orleans  under  the  military  ad 
ministration  of  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  was  ap 
pointed  by  President  Lincoln  as  Military  Governor 
of  Louisiana.  This  may  be  regarded  as  the  first  step 
in  the  restoration  of  Federal  government  in  that  state. 
It  was  the  first  step  in  any  attempt  at  reconstruction. 

In  December,  1862,  Governor-General  Shepley,  by 
permission  of  the  President,  ordered  an  election  for 
members  of  Congress  in  the  districts  over  which  his 
military  jurisdiction  extended.  Lincoln  cautioned  the 

293 


294     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Governor-General  against  the  choice  of  Northern  men 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  which,  he  said,  would  be 
"  disgraceful  and  outrageous." 

Two  citizens  of  Louisiana,  Messrs.  Hahn  and  Flan 
ders,  were  elected  to  Congress  at  an  election  in  which 
7760  votes  were  cast,  and  on  February  9,  1863,  these 
men  were  admitted  to  seats  in  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives.  Their  being  seated  shows  that  Congress  at 
this  time  was  disposed  to  encourage  and  promote  an 
easy  restoration  of  the  seceded  states  and  to  recognize 
any  respectable  body  of  loyal  people  in  Louisiana  as 
the  "  State,"  if  they  would  act  in  harmony  with  the 
Federal  authority. 

Lincoln  wished  to  avert  the  inconveniences  arising 
from  military  occupation.  The  way,  he  said,  was  for 
the  "  people  of  Louisiana  simply  to  take  their  place 
in  the  Union  upon  the  old  terms."  1  "  Let  the  people 
of  Louisiana  who  \vish  protection  to  person  and 
property  reach  forth  their  hands  and  take  it ;  let  them 
reinaugurate  the  national  authority  and  set  up  a  state 
government  under  the  Constitution.  The  army  will 
be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  such  state  government  can 
dispense  with  its  presence;  and  the  people  of  the  state 
can  then,  upon  the  old  constitutional  terms,  govern 
themselves  to  their  own  liking."  2 

Lincoln  was  evidently  anxious  to  restore  old  re 
lations,  and  he  was  disposed,  as  far  as  the  executive 
power  was  concerned,  to  offer  most  liberal  terms,  re 
quiring  as  few  conditions  and  changes  as  possible. 

Nothing   more   was    done    with    reconstruction    in 

1  Works  of  Lincoln,  pp.  214-215,  Letter  to  Reverdy  Johnson. 

2  Lincoln's  Letter  to  Bullett,  July  28,  1862,  Works. 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     295 

Louisiana  until  December,  1863.  It  was  then  that 
Lincoln  set  forth  his  plan  of  reconstruction,  as  far  as 
he  may  be  said  to  have  had  a  plan,  in  his  message  to 
Congress  and  in  his  accompanying  proclamation  of 
December  8,  1863.  In  his  proclamation  which  may  be 
called  a  Proclamation  of  Amnesty  and  Reconstruc 
tion,  Lincoln  offered  full  pardon  (with  excepted 
classes)  for  all  participation  in  rebellion,  "  with  res 
toration  of  all  rights  of  property,  except  as  to  slaves," 
upon  condition  that  every  person  so  pardoned  should 
take  an  oath  thenceforth  faithfully  to  support,  protect, 
and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
to  abide  by  all  laws  and  proclamations  of  the  Federal 
government  made  during  the  existing  Rebellion  hav 
ing  reference  to  slaves,  so  far  as  not  modified  or  de 
clared  void  by  a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

The  exempted  classes  to  whom  the  amnesty  did  not 
apply,  were  all  civil  and  diplomatic  officers  of  the 
Confederate  States;  all  military  and  naval  officers  of 
the  Confederate  States  above  the  rank  of  Colonel;  all 
who  left  the  judicial,  congressional,  or  military  service 
of  the  United  States  to  aid  the  Confederacy;  and  "  all 
who  have  engaged  in  any  way  in  treating  colored  per 
sons,  or  white  persons  in  charge  of  such,  otherwise 
than  lawfully  as  prisoners  of  war." 

Whenever  in  any  one  of  the  insurrectionary  states 
"  a  number  of  voters,  not  less  than  one-tenth  in  num 
ber  of  the  votes  cast  in  such  state  at  the  presidential 
election  of  1860,  shall  establish  a  state  government 
which  shall  be  republican,  such  shall  be  recognized  as 
the  true  government  of  the  state  " ;  and  such  state  was 
to  receive  the  benefit  of  the  guarantee  clause  "  of  the 


296     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Constitution  in  so  far  as  it  gave  to  the  President 
power  "  to  guarantee  to  each  state  a  republican  form 
of  government.  The  state  was  also  promised  pro 
tection  against  invasion  and  domestic  violence.  Any 
provision  adopted  by  such  state  government  concern 
ing  free  men  which  shall  recognize  their  permanent 
freedom  will  not  be  objected  to  by  the  national  gov 
ernment.  Subject  only  to  these  modifications  the 
newly  constructed  loyal  state  government  was  to  be 
as  it  had  been  before  the  Rebellion,  in  name,  boundary, 
subdivisions,  constitution,  and  its  general  code  of  laws. 
It  was  recognized  that  whether  members  sent  to  Con 
gress  from  any  state  shall  be  admitted  to  seats  rested 
exclusively  with  the  two  houses  and  not  to  any  ex 
tent  with  the  Executive. 

This  proclamation  was  intended  to  present  to  the 
people  of  the  insurrectionary  states  a  mode  by  which 
the  national  authority  and  loyal  state  governments 
might  be  reestablished ;  and  "  while  the  mode  is  the 
best  the  Executive  can  suggest  with  his  present  im 
pressions  it  must  not  be  understood  that  no  other  pos 
sible  mode  would  be  acceptable." 

Lincoln  asserted  in  his  annual  message  of  the  same 
date  that  in  this  proclamation  nothing  had  been  at 
tempted  but  what  "  is  amply  justified  by  the  Constitu 
tion."  He  recognized  that  to  guarantee  and  protect  a 
revived  state  government  constructed  from  the  very 
elements  against  whose  hostility  and  violence  it  was 
to  be  protected  was  absurd.  l  There  must  be  a  test 
by  which  to  separate  the  opposing  elements  so  as  to 
build  only  from  the  sound;  and  that  test  is  a  suffi 
ciently  liberal  one  which  accepts  as  sound  whoever  will 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     -97 

make  a  sworn  recantation  of  his  former  unsound- 
ness." 

As  a  test  for  the  recognition  of  statehood  and  res 
toration  to  the  Union  Lincoln  felt  that  he  had  a  right 
to  require  not  only  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Con 
stitution  and  the  Union,  but  also  to  the  laws  and 
proclamations  in  regard  to  slavery.  These  had  been 
of  aid  in  suppressing  the  Rebellion;  there  must  be  a 
pledge  for  their  maintenance.  To  abandon  them 
would  be  "  an  astounding  breach  of  faith."  He 
would  not  retract  or  modify  the  Emancipation  Proc 
lamation.  Support  of  these  should  be  included  in  the 
oath;  and  the  Executive,  Lincoln  contended,  might 
lawfully  claim  it  in  return  for  pardon  and  restora 
tion  of  forfeited  rights  which  he  had  "  clear  constitu 
tional  power  to  withhold  altogether,  or  grant  upon 
terms  which  he  shall  deem  wisest  for  the  public  in 
terest."  This  part  of  the  oath  he  deemed  subject  to 
modification  by  legislation  or  judicial  decision. 

As  a  reason  for  his  proclamation  at  this  time  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  said  that  there  seemed  to  be  elements  in 
some  states  ready  for  resumption,  but  they  remained 
inactive  apparently  for  want  of  a  plan  of  action.  "  By 
the  proclamation  a  plan  is  presented  which  may  be  ac 
cepted  as  a  rallying  point,  and  which  they  are  assured 
in  advance  will  not  be  rejected  here.  This  may  bring 
them  to  act  sooner  than  they  otherwise  would."  1 
President  Lincoln  was  under  the  impression  that  a 
majority  of  the  people  in  all  of  the  seceded  states  were 
really  in  favor  of  the  Union,  and  he  wished  to  erect 
a  standard  around  which  these  loyal  people  would  be 

1  Lincoln's  Message,  December  8,   1863. 


298     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

encouraged  to  rally  and  make  their  influence  potent  for 
the  restoration  of  the  Federal  authority. 

In  pursuance  of  this  policy  of  Lincoln,  on  January 
8,  1864,  a  Free  State  Convention  was  held  in  New 
Orleans  in  harmony  with  the  national  administration. 
It  accepted  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  as  the 
basis  of  its  action.  General  Banks,  the  military  com 
mander,  by  a  proclamation  of  January  n,  1864,  fol 
lowing  the  request  of  the  convention,  appointed 
February  22,  1864,  for  an  election  for  state  officers, 
and  March  4th  for  their  installation.  Banks  recognized 
the  Constitution  of  1852  as  still  in  force;  the  act  of 
secession  and  the  Constitution  of  1861  were  held  as 
void.  No  election  was  ordered  for  members  of  the 
Legislature  for  the  obvious  reason  that  there  was  only 
one-third  of  the  state  within  the  Union  lines  where 
an  election  could  be  held,  and,  therefore,  there  were 
not  enough  counties,  or  constituencies,  to  elect  a  ma 
jority  of  the  Legislature.  Less  than  a  majority  was 
not  a  quorum;  no  business  could  be  transacted,  no 
state  officers  could  be  legally  paid  by  the  state  with 
out  a  quorum,  as  that  could  be  done  only  by  an  ap 
propriation  made  by  law.  Yet  it  was  held  that  a 
Governor  could  be  elected  by  a  few  loyal  people  under 
the  protection  of  Federal  arms. 

More  than  eleven  thousand  votes  were  cast  in  the 
election  for  Governor,  or  more  than  a  fifth  of  the  vote 
of  1860.  Michael  Hahn  was  elected  Governor  as  the 
representative  of  the  President's  policy,  and  was  in 
stalled  on  March  4,  1864.  The  next  step  was  an  or 
der  from  the  new  Governor  for  an  election  of  dele 
gates  to  a  constitutional  convention  to  revise  the  con- 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     299 

stitution  so  as  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the  new 
conditions  created  by  the  war.  On  March  15,  1864, 
President  Lincoln  recognized  Hahn  as  Governor  of 
Louisiana,  "  invested  until  further  orders  with  the 
powers  exercised  hitherto  by  the  Military  Governor  of 
Louisiana."  He  was  to  be  a  trial  Governor  in  a  trial 
state  created  and  sustained  by  military  power,  whose 
existence  was  to  continue  at  the  discretion  of  the  ex 
ecutive  power  of  the  United  States. 

President  Lincoln  congratulated  Hahn  on  having 
fixed  his  name  in  history  as  "  the  first  Free-State  Gov 
ernor  of  Louisiana,"  and  in  speaking  of  the  approach 
ing  state  convention  for  the  formation  of  a  new 
constitution  and  the  defining  of  the  elective  franchise, 
President  Lincoln  suggested  "  for  your  private  con 
sideration,  whether  some  of  the  colored  people  may  not 
be  let  in,  as  for  instance  the  very  intelligent,  and  espe 
cially  those  who  have  fought  gallantly  in  our  ranks." 
This  was  one  of  the  first  official  suggestions  of  negro 
suffrage.1 

Lincoln's  plan  of  reconstruction  for  Louisiana  was 
completed  by  the  state  convention  which  met  in  April, 
1864.  By  a  vote  of  seventy  to  sixteen  the  convention 
declared  slavery  to  be  abolished  forever  within  the 
state.  Suffrage  was  restricted  to  white  males  above 
the  age  of  twenty-one,  but  the  legislature  was  em 
powered  to  confer  the  voting  privilege  on  negroes  in 
harmony  with  the  principles  suggested  by  Mr.  Lincoln. 
On  September  6,  1864,  the  Constitution  was  adopted 
by  the  people  by  a  vote  of  6836  in  its  favor  to  1566 
against  it.  As  the  total  vote  of  Louisiana  in  1860  was 
1  Elaine,  II,  pp.  39-40. 


300     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

50,510  it  was  seen  that  the  new  state  government  had 
more  than  fulfilled  the  requirement  of  the  President's 
proclamation,  about  16  per  cent,  of  the  vote  of  1860 
being  cast  in  the  election  for  the  adoption  of  the  con 
stitution. 

Thus  in  the  fall  of  1864  Lincoln  was  able  to  say 
that  "  a  very  fair  proportion  of  the  people  of  Louisi 
ana  have  inaugurated  a  new  state  government,  mak 
ing  an  excellent  new  constitution, —  better  for  the  poor 
black  than  we  have  in  Illinois.  This  was  done  under 
military  protection,  directed  by  me,  in  the  belief,  still 
securely  entertained,  that  with  such  a  nucleus  around 
which  to  build  we  could  get  the  state  into  position 
again  sooner  than  otherwise."  1 

The  President's  plan  of  reconstruction  had  so  far 
been  completed,  and  Louisiana  was  under  the  form 
of  a  loyal  government.  But  it  was  known  by  all  that 
this  reconstructed  government  could  not  maintain  it 
self  for  a  day  if  the  military  support  of  the  nation 
should  be  withdrawn.  Similar  action  was  taken  in 
Arkansas.  Isaac  Murphy,  a  Union  man,  was  elected 
Governor  in  that  state,  an  anti-slavery  constitution 
was  adopted,  a  government  was  installed  and  Senators 
and  Representatives  were  elected  to  Congress, —  all 
in  the  early  spring  of  1864. 

This  was  the  plan  that  the  President  proposed  to 
put  into  operation  for  the  other  states  as  fast  as  the 
circumstances  and  the  advance  of  the  national  arms 
would  permit. 

We  turn  now  to  see  how  this  presidential  work  in 

1  November  14,  1864,  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  597. 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     301 

reconstruction  was  received  in  congressional  circles. 
The  President's  scheme  and  all  that  had  been  done 
in  pursuance  of  it  were  destined  to  fall  between  two 
fires  in  the  halls  of  Congress.  The  Democrats  who 
were  always  ready  to  put  themselves  in  opposition  to 
whatever  the  President  undertook  for  the  suppression 
of  the  Rebellion,  fell  upon  it  with  their  usual  cries 
of  "  usurpation  "  and  "  violation  of  the  Constitution." 
The  blessed  Constitution  was  the  constant  resource 
upon  which  they  relied  to  hamper  and  embarrass  the 
administration  as  much  as  they  could.  According  to 
this  conservative  Democratic  view,  this  "  Amnesty- 
Reconstruction  Proclamation"  of  the  President  was 
a  naked  act  of  power,  a  rank  usurpation  for  the  aboli 
tion  of  slavery,  prompted  by  hostility  to  the  domestic 
policy  of  the  South  more  than  by  a  desire  to  restore 
the  Union.  The  fact  of  war  was  nothing;  the  sacred 
Constitution  was  still  unimpaired,  and  the  President's 
powers  were  as  much  prescribed  and  limited  in  war 
as  in  peace.  The  only  oath  that  Lincoln  had  a  right 
to  impose  on  the  people  of  Louisiana  was  an  oath 
to  support  the  Constitution;  the  oath  that  he  had  pro 
posed  was  unknown  to  that  great  instrument.  "  It 
is  loyalty  to  proclamations,  not  to  the  Constitution,  on 
which  Mr.  Lincoln  would  rebuild  his  republican 
states."  ..."  A  state  government  founded  on  one- 
tenth  of  the  people  and  dictated  by  himself;  shades  of 
our  fathers !  are  these  the  kind  of  republican  states  that 
are  to  perpetuate  the  American  Union ! "  *  The 

1  Holman,  of  Indiana,  in  the  House,  March  12,  1864,  Globe, 
pp.  1063-1064.  Holman's  speech  is  here  interpreted  as  a  typical 
speech  of  the  Democratic  opposition. 


302     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

states  in  rebellion,  it  was  maintained,  were  still  states 
in  the  Union.  The  Constitution  embraces  them.  The 
President  has  no  authority  to  fix  any  conditions  not 
fixed  by  the  Constitution,  as  a  basis  for  their  recogni 
tion  as  states.  His  only  duty  is  to  execute  the  law, 
to  subdue  the  armed  power  that  for  the  time  being 
suspends  the  authority  of  the  Constitution;  and  it  is 
not  within  his  province  to  organize  civil  government. 
When  the  Rebellion  is  subdued  the  states  are  restored 
by  that  very  fact,  without  conditions  and  without 
change.  No  note  was  to  be  taken  of  the  wrong  and 
penalty  attaching  to  rebellion. 

The  Democrats,  therefore,  rejected  the  President's 
plan  for  restoration  because  he  had  imposed  a  con 
dition  for  the  seceded  states  —  namely,  the  abolition 
of  slavery  —  that  the  Constitution  did  not  impose. 
He  was  acting  in  excess  of  power  and  was  requiring 
too  much,  in  violation  of  the  sacred  Democratic 
slogan,  "  The  Union  as  it  was,  the  Constitution  as  it 


is." 


On  the  other  hand,  Lincoln's  policy  fell  athwart  the 
opinions  and  purposes  of  the  radical  anti-slavery  men 
in  Congress.  According  to  these  radical  congres 
sional  leaders  the  President  was  requiring  too  little, 
and  he  was,  as  they  also  held,  acting  in  excess  of 
power  in  presuming,  without  the  assent  of  Congress, 
to  reestablish  civil  government  in  conquered  terri 
tory,  and  in  reorganizing  states  there,  and  in  lay 
ing  down  conditions  on  which  they  might  be  restored 
to  the  Union.  All  these  were  functions  of  civil  gov 
ernment,  not  of  military  power;  they  were  preroga- 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     303 

tives  of  the  law-making  body,  not  of  the  Executive; 
they  belonged  to  Congress,  not  to  the  President. 

By  the  time  the  Arkansas  Senators  came  to  claim 
seats  in  the  Senate  it  was  seen  that  the  majority  of 
the  Senate  were  not  in  sympathy  with  what  was  called 
the  Lincoln  "  ten  per  cent.,  short-hand  method  of  re 
construction."  Mr.  Sumner  offered  a  resolution,  on 
May  27,  1864,  asserting  that  a  state  "  pretending  to 
secede  from  the  Union  and  battling  against  the  general 
government  to  maintain  that  position  must  be  regarded 
as  a  rebel  state  subject  to  military  occupation  and 
without  representation  on  this  floor  until  it  has  been 
readmitted  by  a  vote  of  both  houses  of  Congress." 
This  was  the  position  that  the  two  houses  of  Congress 
subsequently  took  toward  President  Johnson.  The 
Senate  now  took  the  position  that  the  Rebellion  was 
"  not  so  far  suppressed  in  Arkansas  as  to  entitle  that 
state  to  representation  in  Congress,"  and  the  Arkan 
sas  Senators  were  refused  their  seats. 

This  radical  disposition  in  opposition  to  Lincoln's 
work  in  reconstruction  was  also  reflected  in  the  House, 
especially  by  Stevens,  at  the  opening  of  Congress  in 
December,  1863.  Before  the  Thirty-eighth  Congress 
was  organized,  while  the  Clerk  was  still  presiding, 
Stevens  called  for  the  credentials  "of  the  persons 
claiming  to  be  representatives  of  the  so-called  state  of 
Louisiana."  After  the  credentials  were  read  Stevens 
offered  a  resolution  directing  that  the  names  of  the 
members  from  Louisiana  be  stricken  from  the  roll  of 
the  House.  This  was  objected  to  on  a  point  of  order. 
The  pjint  of  order  was  sustained  by  the  Clerk,  where- 


304     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

upon  Stevens  withdrew  his  motion,  being  satisfied  with 
having  made  his  protest  against  the  appearance  of  the 
names  of  the  Louisiana  members  on  the  rolls,  since  he 
wished  in  no  way  to  recognize,  even  by  silence  or  ac 
quiescence,  the  legitimacy  of  any  "  state  "  in  Louisi 
ana. 

In  his  notable  speech  of  January  22,  1864,  Stevens 
discussed  at  some  length  the  constitutional  status  of 
the  seceded  states  and  their  relation  to  the  United 
States.  He  deplored  the  great  confusion  of  ideas 
and  diversity  of  opinions,  and  he  urged  upon  Congress 
and  the  country  the  essential  importance  of  a  clear, 
safe,  and  logical  theory  on  that  subject.  He  again  set 
forth  his  view  that  the  South,  being  de  facto  an  in 
dependent  belligerent,  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of 
the  Union  were  abrogated  in  respect  to  these  states 
and  their  people;  that  the  law  of  nations  alone  would 
limit  the  conqueror  in  determining  the  conditions  to 
be  imposed  as  the  basis  of  a  restored  Union.1  This 
would  strengthen  the  nation,  give  the  general  govern 
ment  a  free  hand,  and  simplify  the  problem.  In  op 
position  to  this  practical  policy  he  described  the  con 
fusing  and  weakening  theory  that  the  rebellious  states 
were  still  in  the  Union,  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the 
Constitution  and  the  laws ;  that  whenever  these  "  way 
ward  sisters  "  choose  to  abandon  their  frivolities  and 
come  back  and  send  Senators  and  Representatives  to 
Congress,  then,  notwithstanding  all  they  have  done,  we 
must  receive  them,  give  them  all  the  privileges  of 
loyal  men  and  loyal  states,  and  "  throw  over  them 
1  See  p.  218. 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     305 

the  protecting  shield  of  the  Union,  of  which  it  is  said 
they  had  never  ceased  to  be  members."  1 

To  Stevens  a  decision  between  these  two  views  was 
a  matter  of  vast  moment  to  the  outcome  of  the  war 
and  the  future  of  the  country.  He  was  dissatisfied 
with  the  mixture  of  military  and  civil  processes  in 
Lincoln's  work  and  he  was  determined  that  no  state 
hood  should  be  recognized  and  civil  rights  restored 
in  the  South  until  Congress,  representing  the  sovereign 
people  of  the  loyal  states,  was  satisfied  with  the  con 
ditions  and  guarantees  imposed.  To  what  Lincoln 
had  done,  if  he  were  acting  as  a  military  conqueror, 
by  the  rights  of  war,  he  had  no  objections;  but  if 
what  he  had  done  were  to  be  judged  from  the  point 
of  view  of  his  functions  as  a  civil  ruler,  as  President 
of  the  United  States,  then  Stevens  felt  that  there  were 
very  weighty  and  decisive  objections.  He  acknowl 
edged  that  his  own  views  as  to  the  war  powers  of  the 
government  were  not  acceptable  to  either  house  of 
Congress  when  he  announced  them  in  the  extra  ses 
sion  of  1 86 1,  but  now  he  professed  to  see  in  the 
President's  plan  an  endorsement  of  his  views,  and 
he  sought  to  show  that  only  on  the  basis  of  his 
(Stevens')  doctrine  could  Lincoln's  plan  of  reconstruc 
tion,  or  any  other  be  approved  and  carried  out. 

"  In  details,"  he  said,  "  we  may  not  quite  agree ; 
but  his  plan  of  reconstruction  assumes  the  same  general 
grounds.  It  proposes  to  treat  the  rebel  territory  as 
a  conqueror  alone  would  treat  it.  His  plan  is  wholly 
outside  of  and  unknown  to  the  Constitution.  But  it 

1  Globe,  January  22,  1864,  p.  316. 


306     THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

is  within  the  legitimate  province  of  the  laws  of  war. 
His  legal  mind  has  carefully  studied  the  law  of  na 
tions  and  reached  a  just  conclusion. 

"  The  condition  of  the  rebel  states  having  been  thus 
fixed,  reconstruction  becomes  an  easier  question,  be 
cause  we  are  untrammeled  by  municipal  contracts  and 
laws, —  that  refuge  of  conservative  sympathizers  with 
our  (  erring  brethren.'  The  President  may  not  strike 
as  direct  a  blow  with  a  battering-ram  against  this 
Babel  as  some  impetuous  gentlemen  would  desire; 
but  with  his  usual  shrewdness  and  caution  he  is  pick 
ing  out  the  mortar  from  the  joints  until  eventually  the 
whole  tower  will  fall.  .  .  .  When  the  free  North  shall 
be  united ;  when  that  odious  party  which  is  inspired  by 
the  love  of  slavery  alone  shall  have  sunk  into  utter 
contempt  and  be  despised  of  all  men,  then  will  the 
traitors'  hearts  sink  within  them;  then  will  the  brave 
freemen  of  the  North,  having  crushed  into  atoms 
the  ephemeral  empire  whose  cornerstone  was  slavery, 
establish  a  united  and  enduring  nation  on  the  solid 
foundation  of  universal  freedom."  1 

The  rising  opposition  in  Congress  to  the  President's 
work  in  reconstruction  soon  found  expression  in  the 
shape  of  a  congressional  measure.  On  December  19, 
1863,  on  motion  of  Mr.  Henry  Winter  Davis,  of 
Maryland,  that  part  of  the  President's  message  relating 
to  "  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  guarantee  a 
republican  form  of  government  to  the  states  in  which 

1  Globe,  January  22,  1864,  pp.  318-319.  Jn  other  parts  of  this 
speech  which  I  have  incorporated  in  a  previous  chapter,  Stevens 
indicates  his  fundamental  objection  to  any  plan  of  reconstruc 
tion  that  would  treat  the  rebel  states  as  states  within  the  Union, 
with  rights  under  the  Constitution.  See  pp.  218-304, 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     307 

the  governments  recognized  by  the  United  States  have 
been  abrogated  or  overthrown,"  was  referred  to  "  a 
select  committee  of  nine  to  be  named  by  the  Speaker, 
which  shall  report  the  bills  necessary  for  carrying  into 
execution  the  foregoing  guarantee."  Davis's  purpose 
was  to  have  Congress  see  to  it,  when  armed  resistance 
had  ceased  in  the  area  of  rebellion,  that  the  restored 
governments  should  be  republican  in  form. 

Mr.  Davis,  the  chairman  of  this  special  committee, 
introduced  a  bill  in  the  House  designed  to  carry  out 
this  purpose 1  which  came  into  the  open  House  for 
discussion  on  March  22,  1864.  This  bill,  after  pass 
ing  the  House,  was  managed  in  the  Senate  by  Mr. 
Wade,  of  Ohio,  and  it  came  to  be  known  as  the 
"  Wade-Davis  Plan  of  Reconstruction."  It  was  what 
Congress  saw  fit  to  propose  as  a  counter  plan  to  that 
of  the  President.  Its  provisions  may  be  briefly  sum 
marized  as  follows: 

1.  The  President  was  to  appoint  Provisional  Gov 
ernors,   who,   as   soon  as  military   resistance  ceased, 
were  to  enroll  the  white  voters  and  submit  to  each 
voter  an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution. 

2.  When  a  majority  of  these  voters  should  take  the 
oath  of  allegiance  the  Governor  was  to  order  an  elec 
tion  of  delegates  to  a  constitutional  convention.2 

3.  It  was  to  be  the  duty  of  the  convention  to  declare 
for  the  people  of  the  state  their  submission  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  to  involve  three 

1  February  15,  1864. 

2  In  the  original  draft  of  the  bill  one-tenth  of  the  voters  were 
required  to  take  the  oath  before  an   election  of  delegates  to  a 
convention  might  be  held,  but  opposition  and  pressure  brought 
Davis  to  accept  an  amendment  requiring  a  majority.     Davis  in 
the  Globe,  May  4,  1864,  p.  2107. 


308     THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

fundamental  provisions  in  their  organic  law :  First, 
no  one  who  had  held  an  important  office  under  the 
Confederate  government  or  a  military  office  as  high 
as  the  rank  of  Colonel,  should  be  allowed  to  vote  for, 
or  be  a  member  of,  the  Legislature,  or  to  vote  for, 
or  be  elected,  Governor;  second,  slavery  should  be 
forever  prohibited  and  freedom  of  all  persons  guar 
anteed;  third,  no  debt,  state  or  Confederate,  created 
in  aid  of  the  Rebellion  should  ever  be  paid. 

4.  When  the  new  state  constitution  should  be  so 
framed  and  had  been  adopted  by  a  majority  of  the 
popular  vote  as   enrolled,   the   Provisional   Governor 
was  to  notify  the  President  and  the  President,  after 
obtaining  the  assent  of  Congress,   was  to  recognize 
the  state  government  as  the  legitimate  and  constitu 
tional  government,  under  which  Senators  and  Repre 
sentatives  to  Congress  might  be  chosen  by  the  people. 

5.  The  bill  abolished  slavery  at  once  in  all  the  re 
bellious  states  and  imposed  penalties  for  the  violation 
of  this  provision. 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  plan  differed  with  the  Presi 
dent's  in  three  essential  respects.  In  the  first  place 
it  claimed  that  reconstruction  was  a  legislative  prob 
lem,  not  an  executive  problem.  In  the  second  place, 
it  required  the  loyalty  of  at  least  a  majority  of  the 
adult  whites,  instead  of  only  one-tenth.  In  the  third 
place,  it  asserted  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish 
slavery  within  the  limits  of  the  rebellious  states,  deal 
ing  with  the  states  in  this  respect  as  districts,  or  terri 
tories,  under  the  control  of  the  central  government, 
and  not  as  states  in  the  Union. 

The  bill,  and  Mr.  Davis,  its  author,  in  defense  of 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     309 

it,  spoke  of  the  rebellious  states  as  "  states  whose 
governments  have  been  overthrown."  The  purpose  of 
the  national  legislature  in  this  act  was  to  restore  civil 
government  on  the  basis  of  permanent  peace.  "  The 
bill,"  said  Mr.  Davis,  "challenges  the  support  of  all 
who  consider  slavery  the  cause  of  the  Rebellion,  as 
well  as  those  who  seek  to  insure  freedom  and  peace, 
the  first  fruits  of  the  war,  by  adequate  legislation." 
Davis  claimed  that  his  measure  was  entitled  to  the 
support  of  those  who  held,  like  Stevens,  that  the 
Rebellion  "  has  placed  the  citizens  of  the  rebel  states 
beyond  the  protection  of  the  Constitution,  and  that 
Congress,  therefore,  has  supreme  power  over  them 
as  over  a  conquered  enemy,"  as  well  as  of  "  that  other 
class  who  think  that  they  have  not  ceased  to  be  citi 
zens  and  states  of  the  Union,  though  incapable  of 
exercising  political  privileges  under  the  Constitution, 
but  that  Congress  is  charged  with  a  high  political 
power  by  the  Constitution  to  guarantee  republican  gov 
ernments  in  the  states,  and  that  this  is  the  proper  time 
and  mode  of  exercising  it." 

This  power  to  guarantee  republican  government  in 
the  states  is  one  of  the  class  of  plenary  powers  con 
ferred  upon  Congress,  in  its  nature  without  limitation, 
intended  to  meet  just  such  emergencies  in  our  na 
tional  life.  The  secession  governments  were  usurpa 
tions  against  the  authority  of  the  United  States. 
They  do  not  recognize  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  Constitution  can  not  recognize  them. 
"  There  can  be  no  republican  government  within  the 
limits  of  the  United  States  that  does  not  recognize, 
but  does  repudiate,  the  Constitution."  The  seceding 


3io     THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

governments,  being  usurpations,  can  not  be  guaranteed ; 
they  must  be  suppressed  and  expelled.  When  we  have 
suppressed  the  military  usurpation  in  the  South  there 
will  be  no  form  of  state  authority  that  Congress  can 
recognize.  "  Our  success  will  be  the  overthrow  of 
all  semblance  of  government  in  the  rebel  states.  The 
government  of  the  United  States  is,  then,  in  fact  the 
only  government  existing  in  those  states,  and  it  is 
there  charged  to  guarantee  them  republican  govern 
ments.  .  .  .  The  duty  of  guaranteeing  means  to  accom 
plish  the  result ;  .  .  .  that  republican  government  shall 
exist;  that  everything  inconsistent  with  it  shall  be 
weeded  out,"  Congress  itself  being  the  judge.  .  .  . 
"  Until  Congress  recognize  a  state  government  organ 
ized  under  its  auspices,  there  is  no  government  in  the 
rebel  states  except  the  authority  of  Congress." 

Davis  asserted,  what  every  one  recognized  to  be 
true,  that  there  is  now  no  rebel  state  held  by  the  United 
States,  enough  of  whose  population  adheres  to  the 
Union  to  be  entrusted  with  the  government  of  the 
state.  "  One-tenth  can  not  control  nine-tenths.  Five- 
tenths  are  nowhere  willing  to  undertake  the  control 
of  the  other  five-tenths.  Nowhere  does  such  a  pro 
portion  exist  who  can  safely  be  trusted  with  the 
powers  of  a  state  government,  carrying  with  it  the 
right  of  taxation,  the  existence  of  courts,  the  appoint 
ment  of  officers,  the  command  of  the  militia,  the 
supremacy  in  the  internal  concerns  of  the  state,  and 
the  right  to  participate  in  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  by  Representatives,  Senators  and  Electors." 
No  one  believes  that  "  any  respectable  proportion  of 
the  people  of  the  Southern  States  now  in  rebellion  are 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     311 

willing  to  accept  any  terms  that  even  our  opponents 
on  the  other  side  of  the  House  are  willing  to  offer 
them." 

Davis  denounced  Lincoln's  plan  as  a  government 
"of  doubtful  existence,  half  civil  and  half  military; 
neither  a  temporary  government  by  law  of  Congress, 
nor  a  state  government;  something  as  unknown  to 
the  Constitution  as  the  rebel  government  that  refuses 
to  recognize  it."  The  proclamation  of  the  President 
to  which  an  oath  of  allegiance  is  required  may  subse 
quently  be  found  by  the  state  courts  to  be  invalid. 
The  proclamation  declared  that  certain  negroes  were 
to  be  recognized  as  free,  while  others  were  to  remain 
slave.  Were  these  proclamations  on  slavery,  to  which 
an  oath  of  adherence  is  demanded,  within  the  author 
ity  of  the  Executive?  "  How  local  state  governments 
created  by  the  Southern  people  will  decide  such  a 
question  no  one  can  doubt."  If  left  to  their  choice  they 
will  maintain  slavery,  but  if  they  are  required  to  give 
it  up  as  a  condition  precedent  to  restoration  they  will 
abandon  it.  This  must  not  be  left  as  the  President 
leaves  it,  to  be  merely  a  judicial  question.  It  must 
be  settled  by  a  supreme  political  jurisdiction,  and  in 
stead  of  arguing  before  the  courts  the  legality  of  the 
proclamation  of  freedom  it  must  be  enacted  into  law. 
The  paramount  political  power  of  Congress  should 
proceed  to  reorganize  governments  in  those  states,  to 
impose  such  conditions  as  it  thinks  necessary,  to  refuse 
to  recognize  any  governments  there  which  do  not  pro 
hibit  slavery  forever,  and  to  take  the  responsibility  of 
saying,  in  the  face  of  those  clamoring  for  speedy  recog 
nition  of  governments  tolerating  slavery,  that  the 


3i2     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

safety  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  is  the 
supreme  law,  and  that  Congress  is  the  body  author 
ized  to  express  that  will.1 

As  between  these  principles  and  those  on  which  the 
President  appeared  to  be  acting,  Davis  and  the  con 
gressional  leaders  undoubtedly  represented  the  safer 
and  the  sounder  political  science.  If  the  states  were 
out  of  their  normal  relation  to  the  Union,  without 
equal  rights  with  the  other  states,  and  if  conditions  were 
to  be  imposed  for  their  restoration,  Congress  was  un 
doubtedly  the  power  to  determine  what  rights  were 
impaired  and  what  the  conditions  of  restoration  should 
be.  The  doctrine  of  Davis  and  his  bill  was  not  as 
clear  and  as  unmistakable  as  that  of  Stevens;  there 
\vas  more  of  uncertainty  and  inconsistency  about  it. 
It  denied  the  simple  "  restoration  theory  "  of  the  Dem 
ocrats,  but  it  did  not  distinctly  affirm,  with  Stevens, 
that  the  seceded  states  were  out  of  the  Union,  without 
any  rights  under  the  Constitution.  If  Stevens'  posi 
tion  were  admitted,  namely,  that  the  Southern  States 
were  in  the  Confederacy  and  not  in  the  Union,  which 
was  the  undoubted  fact,  all  bodies  of  opinion  in  Con 
gress  would  then  agree  that  the  states  would  have  to 
be  reorganized,  readmitted,  and  that  power  could  be 
exercised  only  by  Congress  itself.2 

This  measure  of  the  majority  party,  like  Lincoln's 
policy,  met  with  Democratic  opposition,  as  was  ex 
pected.  Mr.  George  H.  Pendleton,  of  Ohio,  gave, 
perhaps,  the  most  forcible  and  outspoken  expression  to 

1  Henry  Winter  Davis,  in  the  House,  March  22,   1864,  Globe, 
Appendix,  First  Session,  Thirty-eighth  Congress,  pp.  83-85. 

2  See  Holman's  speech,  Globe,  March  12,  1864,  p.  1064. 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     313 

this  opposition.  "  At  last,"  he  said,  "  the  mask  has 
been  thrown  off,  the  pretenses  laid  aside,  and  the  pur 
poses  of  the  Republican  party  have  been  acknowl 
edged,"--  in  this  bill  that  "  defines  their  ideas  of  Union 
and  interprets  their  construction  of  the  Constitution." 
"  We  have  had  double-dealing,  hypocrisy,  and  fraud 
for  the  last  three  years, —  false  professions,  false 
names,  double-faced  measures.  We  have  had  armies 
raised,  taxes  collected,  battles  fought  under  the  pre 
tense  that  the  war  was  for  the  Union,  the  old  Union, 
the  Union  of  the  Constitution.  These  were  now  seen 
to  be  mere  catchwords  for  the  patriotic  people,  to  be 
sneered  at  in  secret  conclave  as  devices  to  ensnare  the 
innocent,  to  deceive  the  ignorant,  to  coax  the  obsti 
nate.  Now  the  veil  is  drawn  and  the  revolutionary 
purpose  of  the  party  is  revealed.  That  purpose  is  to 
destroy  the  government,  to  change  its  form  and  spirit, 
to  make  a  new  Union,  to  ingraft  upon  it  new  principles, 
new  theories,  new  powers.  It  is  rebellion  against  the 
Constitution,  differing  in  nothing  from  its  armed  ene 
mies  except  in  the  weapons  of  its  warfare.1 

"  Those  who  support  this  revolutionary  bill  should 
admit  that  they  are  revolutionists,  that  they  do  not 
wish  to  restore  the  old  order  and  the  old  Union.  .  .  . 
Where  is  the  authority  to  declare  state  governments 
overthrown,  to  reconstruct  them,  to  appoint  a  Gov 
ernor,  to  call  a  convention,  to  remodel  state  constitu 
tions,  to  fix  qualifications  for  voters  and  state  officers, 
to  dictate  what  debts  a  state  shall  or  shall  not  pay,  or 

1 1  do  not  here  make  exact  quotations  from  Pendleton's 
speech,  but  I  reduce  and  summarize  what  he  said  without  im 
pairing  his  meaning. 


314     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

to  declare  that  slavery  shall  not  exist  within  the  limits 
of  a  state?  The  Constitution  gives  to  Congress  no 
authority  to  prescribe  a  single  one  of  these  conditions, 
as  proposed  by  the  bill;  and  a  republican  form  of 
government  within  the  Union  is  compatible  with  a 
state's  refusal  to  provide  for  any  of  them. 

"  Virginia,  in  repealing  the  ordinance  by  which  she 
ratified  the  Constitution,  merely  breaks  a  link  of  con 
federation,  annuls  a  bond  of  union;  she  repeals  but  a 
single  law,  while  her  constitution,  her  laws,  her  po 
litical  polity,  are  untouched. 

"  Gentlemen  must  not  palter  in  a  double  sense. 
Those  acts  of  secession  are  either  valid  or  they  are  in 
valid.  If  they  are  valid  they  separated  the  state  from 
the  Union.  If  they  are  invalid  they  are  void;  they 
have  no  effect.  The  state  officers  who  act  upon  them 
are  rebels  to  the  Federal  government ;  the  states  are  not 
destroyed ;  their  constitutions  are  not  abrogated ;  their 
officers  are  committing  illegal  acts,  for  which  they  are 
liable  to  punishment;  the  states  have  never  left  the 
Union,  but  so  soon  as  their  officers  shall  perform 
their  duties  or  other  officers  shall  assume  their  places, 
will  again  perform  the  duties  imposed  and  enjoy  the 
privileges  conferred  by  the  Federal  compact;  and  this 
not  by  virtue  of  a  new  ratification  of  the  Constitution, 
nor  a  new  admission  by  the  Federal  government,  but 
by  virtue  of  the  original  ratification  and  the  constant, 
uninterrupted  maintenance  of  position  in  the  Federal 
Union  since  that  date.  .  .  . 

"  The  seceded  states  are  either  in  the  Union  or  out 
of  it.  If  in  the  Union  their  constitutions  are  un 
touched,  their  state  governments  are  maintained,  their 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     315 

citizens  are  entitled  to  all  political  rights,  except  so  far 
as  they  may  be  deprived  of  them  by  the  criminal  law 
which  they  have  infracted.  .  .  . 

'  The  monstrous  doctrine  of  this  bill  and  its  authors 
has  no  foundation  in  the  Constitution.  It  subjects  all 
the  states  to  the  will  of  Congress;  it  places  their  insti 
tutions  at  the  feet  of  Congress.  It  creates  in  Con 
gress  an  absolute  unqualified  despotism.  The  rights 
of  the  people  of  the  state  are  nothing,  their  will  is 
nothing.  My  own  state  of  Ohio  is  liable  at  any  mo 
ment  to  be  called  in  question  for  her  constitution.  She 
does  not  permit  negroes  to  vote.  If  this  doctrine  be 
true,  Congress  may  decide  that  this  exclusion  is  anti- 
republican  and  by  force  of  arms  abrogate  that  consti 
tution  and  set  up  another  permitting  negroes  to  vote. 
From  that  decision  of  the  Congress  there  is  no  appeal 
to  the  people  of  Ohio,  but  only  to  the  people  of  Massa 
chusetts,  New  York,  and  Wisconsin,  at  the  election 
of  Representatives;  and  if  a  majority  can  not  be 
elected  to  reverse  the  decision,  the  people  of  Ohio  must 
submit.  Woe  be  to  the  day  when  that  doctrine  shall 
be  established,  for  from  its  centralized  despotism  we 
will  appeal  to  the  sword. 

"If  this  be  the  alternative  of  secession  I  should 
prefer  that  secession  should  succeed.  I  should  prefer 
to  have  the  Union  dissolved,  the  Confederate  States 
recognized;  aye,  more,  I  should  prefer  that  secession 
should  go  on,  if  need  be,  until  each  state  resumes  its 
complete  independence.  I  should  prefer  thirty- four 
republics  to  one  despotism.  ...  I  would  rather  live  a 
free  citizen  of  a  republic  no  larger  than  my  native 
county  of  Hamilton  than  be  the  subject  of  a  more 


316     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

splendid  empire  than  a  Caesar  in  his  proudest  triumphs 
ever  ruled,  or  a  Napoleon  in  his  loftiest  flights  ever 
conceived."  1 

This  seemed  to  bear  out  the  charge  of  Stevens  and 
the  radical  anti-slavery  Republicans  that  the  Democrats 
were  more  opposed  to  the  administration  and  to  what 
Congress  was  doing  for  the  conduct  and  success  of 
the  war  than  they  were  to  secession  and  rebellion. 
The  Democrats  were,  at  any  rate,  consistent, —  they 
hung  together,  equally  opposed  both  to  the  plan  of 
Lincoln  and  to  the  plan  of  Congress. 

The  basis  of  this  opposition,  which  is  here  repro 
duced  at  such  length,  was  the  old-school,  decentralizing, 
states  rights  conception  of  the  Constitution,  and  the 
purely  theoretical,  impractical  idea  that  the  Constitu 
tion  applied  to  all  the  states  alike,  to  those  that  had 
repudiated  it  and  had  gone  into  rebellion  as  well  as 
to  those  loyal  to  the  Union. 

This  Democratic  view  Stevens  utterly  repudiated 
and  despised.  It  was  difficult  for  him  to  believe  that 
men  who  were  not  fools  could  bring  themselves  to  an 
nounce  and  defend  it  from  any  other  motive  than 
sympathy  with  the  Rebellion  and  from  a  desire  to  em 
barrass  the  conduct  of  the  war.  But  neither  was 
Stevens  satisfied  with  the  Wade-Davis  plan.  His  ob 
jections  were  that  it  partially  acknowledged  the  rebel 
states  to  have  rights  under  the  Constitution,  which  he 
denied ;  the  war  had  abrogated  them  all.  He  criticized 
the  bill  because  it  "  takes  for  granted  that  the  President 
may  partially  interfere  in  the  civil  administration  of 
the  Southern  States,  not  as  conqueror,  but  as  Presi- 

1  Pendleton,  Globe,  May  4,  1864,  pp.  2105-2107. 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     317 

dent  of  the  United  States;  and  because  (and  this  to 
Stevens  was  the  most  objectionable  feature  of  all) 
it  took  away  the  chance  of  confiscation  of  property  of 
the  rebels."  1 

Stevens  restated  his  doctrine  of  the  belligerent 
rights  of  the  nation,  which  should  control  the  govern 
ment's  action  toward  the  rebel  states  in  the  war.2  He 
noticed  the  sharp  and  extensive  criticisms  which  his 
position  had  called  forth.3  He  restated  his  argument 
from  international  law,  quoting  Vattel  and  other  au 
thorities  to  justify  confiscation  by  a  conqueror  in  a 
just  war,  and  he  would  leave  the  House  and  the  country 
to  decide  whether  this  war  was  just. 

"  Yet,"  lie  said,  "  we  hear  a  howl  of  horror  from 
conservative  gentlemen  at  the  inhumanity  of  the  propo 
sition.  A  band  of  men  sufficiently  formidable  to  be 
come  an  acknowledged  belligerent,  have  robbed  the 
treasury  of  the  nation,  seized  the  public  property,  oc 
cupied  our  forts  and  arsenals,  severed  in  twain  the 
best  and  most  prosperous  nation  that  ever  existed, 
slaughtered  two  hundred  thousand  of  our  citizens, 
caused  a  debt  of  two  billion  dollars,  and  obstinately 
maintain  a  cruel  warfare.  If  we  are  not  justified  in 
exacting  the  extreme  demands  of  war  then  I  can  hardly 
conceive  a  case  where  it  would  be  applicable.  .  .  .  No 
one  advises  the  execution  of  the  extreme  right.  But  the 

1  Globe,  May  2,  1864,  p.  2041. 

2  See  pp.  218,  304. 

3  Stevens  seemed  unable  to  refrain  from  indulging  in  another 
thrust  at  Francis  P.  Blair,  whom  he  denounced  as  "  a  political 
Ishmael   who,  having  apostatized   from   all   the  principles  which 
once  gave  him  credit  with  the  people,  has  no  sympathy  with  any 
body  of  men,  in  or  out  of  the  House,  except  his  own  family 
circle." 


318     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

right  exists  and  ought  to  be  enforced  against  the  most 
guilty.  To  allow  them  to  return  with  their  estates  un 
touched,  on  the  theory  that  they  have  never  gone  out 
of  the  Union,  seems  to  me  rank  injustice  to  loyal 
men."1  - 

Stevens  held  boldly  and  consistently  to  the  fact, — 
that  the  seceded  states  were  out  of  the  Union.  If 
they  were  not  and  had  all  the  rights  of  the  other 
states  and  should  come  here  at  the  next  presidential 
election  and  claim  them, —  where  would  such  a  doc 
trine  lead?  "It  leads  you  to  subjection  to  traitors 
and  their  Northern  allies.  If  they  are  in  the  Union, 
where  are  their  Representatives  on  this  floor?  Every 
one  of  the  United  States  is  entitled  to  have  members 
here  and  Senators  in  the  other  branch.  Where  are 
these  evidences  of  existing  states?  They  are  at  Rich 
mond,  where  the  Congress  of  the  Union  does  not  sit." 

Stevens  was  anxious  that  Congress  in  its  conduct 
with  reference  to  the  rebellious  states  should  set  no 
precedent  that  might  subsequently  be  embarrassing,  and 
that  legislation  on  this  line  should  be  based  on  sound 
doctrine.  He  had  opposed  the  seating  of  Harm  and 
Flanders,  the  Representatives  from  Louisiana,  in  the 
previous  Congress.  He  thought  they  had  been  ad 
mitted  to  seats  "  without  any  law  or  right," 2  and 
he  was  now  quite  satisfied  not  to  have  been  in  any 
way  personally  responsible  for  such  a  precedent.3 

1  Globe,  May  2,  1864,  pp.  2041-2042. 

2  House,  January  29,  1864,  Globe,  p.  412. 

3  Stevens  intimated  that  Hahn  and  Flanders  had  been  favored 
on    account    of    party    service,    since    they    had    "  gone    off    and 
stumped    New    England    for   two    months    and   then   come   back 
and  had  their  cases  decided."     When  he  was  asked  by  a  Ken- 
tuckian    whether    if    they    would    stump    two    months    more    he 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     319 

He  now  wished  the  Davis  bill  to  assert  the  full  power 
of  Congress  and  to  deny  all  rights  under  the  Constitu 
tion  to  the  rebellious  states.  He  offered  a  substitute 
for  the  bill  expressing  his  doctrine.  By  arrange 
ment  with  Mr.  Davis,  instead  of  having  a  direct  vote 
upon  his  substitute,  a  portion  of  it  was  proposed 
as  a  preamble  to  the  Davis  measure,  to  be  voted  on 
separately.  This  asserted  that  "the  Confederate 
States  are  a  public  enemy  waging  an  unjust  war, 
whose  injustice  is  so  glaring  that  they  have  no  right 
to  claim  the  mitigation  of  the  extreme  rights  of 
war  which  are  accorded  by  modern  usage  to  an  en 
emy  who  have  a  right  to  consider  the  war  a  just 
one,  and  that  none  of  the  states  which,  by  a  regularly 
recorded  majority  of  its  citizens,  has  joined  the  so- 
called  Southern  Confederacy  can  be  considered  and 
treated  as  entitled  to  be  represented  in  Congress  or 
to  take  any  part  in  the  political  government  of  the 
Union." 

This  preamble  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of  seventy-six 
to  fifty-seven.  When  the  bill  was  put  on  its  passage 
without  the  Stevens  doctrine  and  after  Hubbard  and 
Grinnell,  of  Iowa,  announced  that  they  voted  for  it  un 
der  protest,  Stevens  announced,  with  due  solemnity 
but  amid  the  laughter  of  members,  that  he  "  refused  to 
vote  under  protest."  The  Wade-Davis  Plan  passed 
the  House  May  4,  1864,  by  a  vote  of  seventy- four  to 
fifty-nine. '  It  passed  the  Senate  the  last  day  of  the 
session,  July  4,  1864,  and  came  to  Lincoln  for  his  ap- 

would  not  be  ready  to  admit  them,  Stevens  replied  that  he 
thought  he  might  be,  "  if  they  would  stump  Kentucky  for 
emancipation." 


320      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

proval  less  than  one  hour  before  the  sine  die  adjourn 
ment  of  Congress.  It  was  prevented  from  becoming 
a  law  by  the  "pocket  veto  "  of  the  President.  On 
July  8,  1864,  Mr.  Lincoln  issued  a  proclamation  to  the 
country  giving  his  reasons  for  not  signing  the  bill. 

He  treated  the  Wade-Davis  Bill  as  an  opinion  of 
Congress  as  to  the  best  plan  of  reconstruction,  a  plan 
which  he  now  saw  fit  to  lay  before  the  people  for  their 
consideration.  The  President  stated  that  he  himself 
had  propounded  a  plan  and  that  he  was  not  prepared 
by  a  formal  approval  of  this  bill  to  be  committed  in 
flexibly  to  any  single  plan  of  restoration.  He  was  also 
unprepared,  he  said,  to  declare  that  "  the  Free  State 
constitutions  and  governments  already  adopted  and 
installed  in  Louisiana  and  Arkansas  shall  be  set  aside 
and  held  for  nought,  thereby  repelling  and  discour 
aging  the  loyal  citizens  as  to  further  effort  " ;  and  he 
did  not  wish  to  recognize  a  constitutional  competency 
in  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  a  state.  "  But," 
said  Mr.  Lincoln,  "  I  am  at  the  same  time  sincerely 
hoping  and  expecting  that  a  constitutional  amendment 
abolishing  slavery  throughout  the  nation  may  be 
adopted,  nevertheless  I  am  fully  satisfied  with  the 
system  of  restoration  contained  in  the  bill  as  one  very 
proper  for  the  loyal  people  of  any  state  choosing  to 
adopt  it,  and  I  am,  and  at  all  times  shall  be,  prepared 
to  give  executive  aid  to  any  such  people,  so  soon  as 
the  military  resistance  to  the  United  States  shall  have 
been  suppressed  in  any  such  state,  and  the  people 
thereof  shall  have  sufficiently  returned  to  their  obedi 
ence  to  the  Constitution  ";  then  he  would  be  ready  to 
appoint  Military  Governors  and  instruct  them  "  to  pro- 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     321 

ceed  according  to  the  bill."  Stevens,  though  he  was 
quite  dissatisfied  with  the  Wade-Davis  Bill,  was  su 
premely  disgusted  with  the  President's  pocket  veto  and 
his  defense  of  it.  "  What  an  infamous  proclama 
tion  !  "  he  wrote  privately  to  a  friend.  "  The  Presi 
dent  is  determined  to  have  the  electoral  votes  of 
the  seceded  states,  Tennessee,  Arkansas,  Louisiana, 
Florida  and  perhaps  also  South  Carolina.  The  idea 
of  pocketing  a  bill  and  then  issuing  a  proclamation  as 
to  how  far  he  will  conform  to  it  is  matched  only  by 
signing  a  bill  and  then  sending  in  a  veto.  How  little 
of  the  rights  of  war  and  the  law  of  nations  our  Presi 
dent  knows !  But  what  are  we  to  do  ?  Condemn  pri 
vately  and  approve  publicly!  The  conscription  act 
weighs  heavily  on  our  people's  judge,  as  I  expected."  1 

On  April  5,  1864,  Wade  and  Davis  published  in  the 
New  York  Tribune  a  paper  arraigning  President  Lin 
coln  for  his  course  on  the  Reconstruction  Bill.  They 
complained  that  the  President,  after  defeating  the  act, 
proposed  to  appoint  Military  Governors  over  the  rebel 
states,  without  law,  and  without  the  consent  of  the 
Senate.  This  was  dictatorial  usurpation  which  he  had 
already  exercised  in  Louisiana,  and  now  he  had  de 
feated  the  bill  to  prevent  the  limitation  of  his  power. 
A  more  studied  outrage,  said  this  manifesto,  on 
the  legitimate  authority  of  the  people  had  never  been 
perpetrated;  the  President  must  understand  that  their 
support  of  his  administration  was  that  of  a  cause,  not 
of  a  man;  and  that  he  must  confine  himself  to  his 
executive  duties  and  leave  political  organization  to 
Congress. 

1  Stevens'  Papers,  July  10,  1864. 


322     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

The  party  division  revealed  by  this  controversy  was 
not  permitted  to  endanger  President  Lincoln's  reelec 
tion.  The  method  of  reconstruction  did  not  become 
an  issue  in  the  campaign,  and  all  sections  of  the  "  Na 
tional  Union  "  party,  as  the  Republicans  were  called 
in  1864,  were  united  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  support.  After 
the  election,  when,  in  the  congressional  session  of 
1864-65,  Senator  Trumbull,  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  reported  to  the  Senate  a 
joint  resolution  recognizing  the  new  government  of 
Louisiana  as  legitimate,  Sumner  and  Wade,  and  other 
radical  Republicans  joined  the  Democrats  in  opposi 
tion.  Sumner  asserted  that  the  passage  of  the 
resolution  would  be  "  a  national  calamity  "  and  he 
resorted  to  dilatory  tactics  to  prevent  a  vote  in  the 
Senate.  Sumner  was  chiefly  concerned  because  negro 
suffrage  was  not  provided  for,  though  he  also  insisted 
that  reconstruction  was  a  legislative  function,  to  be 
attended  to  by  law,  and  not  an  executive  function,  to 
be  carried  out  by  military  power. 

Wade  again  denounced  the  President's  plan  with 
vigor.  He  spoke  of  the  foundation  of  the  government 
as  "  being  swept  away  by  executive  usurpation  " ;  he 
objected  to  the  recognition  of  a  state  government  that 
had  been  set  up  by  Major-Generals,  nor  would  he  be 
compelled  "  to  receive  as  associates  on  this  floor  these 
mere  mockeries,  these  men  of  straw,  who  represent 
nobody.".  .  ."  Talk  not  to  me  of  your  ten  per  cent, 
principle,"  he  exclaimed.  "  A  more  absurd  monar 
chical  and  anti-American  principle  was  never  an 
nounced  on  God's  earth."  1 
1  Globe,  February  27,  1865,  p.  1128. 


RECONSTRUCTION  DURING  WAR     323 

The  recognition  of  Louisiana  was  defeated.  Con 
gress  refused  to  count  the  electoral  votes  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  reconstructed  states,  and  the  question  of  recon 
struction  did  not  again  recur  during  Mr.  Lincoln's 
term.  The  problem  had  been  deferred,  and  neither 
the  policy  of  Congress  nor  that  of  the  President  had 
triumphed.  Lincoln  had  shown  that  he  was  not  fixed 
beyond  change  in  favor  of  any  particular  scheme  of 
reconstruction.  No  doubt,  he  would  have  cooperated 
with  Congress  and  the  states  in  carrying  out  such  a 
plan  as  Congress  had  proposed,  if  a  change  of  circum 
stances  had  appeared  to  make  his  cooperation  desirable. 
But  the  problems  of  war  were  then  too  pressing,  and 
the  outcome  of  the  struggle  was  yet  too  uncertain,  to 
permit  the  problem  of  civil  reorganization  to  assume 
first  place  in  the  President's  attention.  That  problem 
was  to  be  bequeathed,  unfortunately,  by  the  untoward 
act  of  the  assassin,  to  other  executive  hands. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

/"T"SHE  period  of  reconstruction  includes  the  years 
•*•  from  1865  to  1876,  from  the  end  of  the  Civil 
War  to  the  election  of  President  Hayes,  who  by  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Federal  troops  from  the  Southern 
States  left  those  states  to  govern  themselves  in  all 
respects  like  the  other  states.  "  The  Southern  ques 
tion  "  then  ceased  to  be  a  dominant  issue  in  American 
politics. 

The  problem  of  reconstruction  was  one  of  the  most 
complex  and  delicate  that  ever  confronted  American 
statesmanship.  It  had  to  be  met  amid  the  disasters 
and  passions  of  war.  Unlike  union  in  the  formative 
period,  reunion  had  to  be  brought  about  immediately 
after  a  period  of  internal  strife  that  had  aroused  the 
bitterest  feelings  of  hate  and  resentment.  The  con 
ditions  and  estrangements  leading  to  fratricidal  war 
had  not  risen  in  a  year ;  they  could  not  be  expected  to 
die  out  in  a  year.  The  reader  of  our  history  in  this 
dark  period  who  is  inclined  to  bewail  the  fact  that  re 
organization  and  reconstruction  were  not  brought 
about  more  rationally  and  more  dispassionately,  should 
bear  constantly  in  mind  the  momentous  factor  of  the 
popular  feeling. 

The  task  would,  also,  have  been  easier  and  simpler 
under  a  consolidated  form  of  government.  In  that 

324 


JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION     325 

case  the  absolute  authority  of  the  reorganizing  power, 
triumphant  by  the  issues  of  war,  would  have  been  rec 
ognized  without  question,  and  the  controversies  over 
constitutional  rights  and  the  limits  of  constitutional 
power  would  have  been  avoided. 

The  problem  clearly  involved  a  number  of  distinct 
factors.  In  the  first  place  it  required  the  reorganiza 
tion  of  Southern  State  governments.  The  old  state 
governments  that  had  gone  into  secession  were  parts  of 
a  defunct  Confederacy.  When  the  Confederate  gov 
ernment  died,  these  state  governments  had  to  be  set 
aside.  All  bodies  of  opinion  in  the  Union  recognized 
that  these  governments  could  no  longer  be  allowed  to 
exercise  authority,  and  that  new  state  governments, 
loyal  to  the  Union  and  the  Constitution,  had  to  be 
erected  in  their  stead.  ^Moderate  and  conservative 
leaders  in  the  North,  Democrats  as  well  as  Republicans, 
who  held  that  the  states  were  indestructible,  that  they 
had  endured  without  impairment  throughout  the  war 
and  that  their  constitutional  rights  and  political  status 
should  be  respected,  still  held  that  the  governments  of 
these  states,  having  wrongfully  attempted  to  secede, 
were  illegal  and  disloyal.;  The  agents  of  these  govern 
ments  were,  in  the  category  of  "  rebels  "  and  "  trai 
tors,"  to  be  saved  from  a  merited  punishment  only 
through  the  grace  of  conciliation  and  pardon.  Conse 
quently  no  exception  was  taken  to  the  policy  of  Presi 
dent  Johnson  in  directing  the  military  commanders  in 
the  South  to  prevent  the  old  legislatures  from  assem 
bling,  while  the  Governors  of  certain  states  —  Brown, 
of  Georgia,  Clark,  of  Mississippi,  Magrath,  of  South 
Carolina,  Vance,  of  North  Carolina,  and  Watts,  of  Ala- 


326     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

bama  —  were  arrested  and  imprisoned.1  New  state 
governments  had  to  be  set  up  on  the  ruins  of  the  old. 
In  the  second  place,  the  restoration  of  the  seceded 
states^.  ..wjth  their  new  governments,  to  their  proper 
relations  Jn  the  Union  had  to  be  provided  for.  The 
Union  had  been  broken  for  a  time  by  secession  and 
Avar  and  had  to  be  restored.  Was  it  to  be  the  old 
Union  or  a  new  one?  Was  the  maxim  that  had  been 
raised  so  persistently,  not  to  say  pestiferously,  by  the 
Democratic  opposition  during  the  war,  "  the  Union  as 
it  was,  the  Constitution  as  it  is," — was  this  maxim 
to  be  the  guiding  principle  and  to  have  decisive  weight 
in  the  councils  of  the  restoring  authority? 

According  to  the  Federal  system  which  the  fathers 
had  made  and  to  which  the  people  had  become  accus 
tomed,  all  matters  of  domestic  concern  in  government 
were  left  with  the  people  of  the  states.  The  national 
government  for  general  affairs,  the  state  government 
for  local  affairs,  and  in  the  allotment  of  governmental 
activities  and  powers  it  is  a  common  observation  that 
the  state  government  touches  the  citizens  a  hundred 
times  where  the  general  government  touches  him  once. 
In  all  matters  of  domestic  concern,  in  the  every-day  life 
of  the  people,  in  their  personal  relations,  in  respect  to 
their  school  laws,  road  laws,  suffrage  laws,  police  laws, 
laws  of  land  tenure,  contracts,  torts,  and  marriage,— 
in  all  these  matters  and  many  others  the  Constitution, 
in  dividing  the  functions  of  government  between  state 
and  nation,  had  left  the  state  supreme.  This  right  of 
local  self-government  had  existed  before  the  Union 
was  formed  and  to  this  idea  the  people  had  become 
1  Dunning,  Reconstruction,  pp.  35-36. 


JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION     327 

devotedly  attached.  This  state  loyalty  had  been  as 
positive  in  the  North  as  in  the  South  before  the  war. 
Had  the  Civil  War  changed  this  old  and  revered  system 
of  government?  Was  there  to  be  a  new  readjustment 
of  powers?  Were  the  states  that  had  taken  the  Con 
federate  view  of  the  Union  and  had  attempted  seces 
sion  in  pursuance  of  their  legal  rights,  as  they 
conceived,  to  be  treated  like  states  of  the  Union?  Or 
were  they  to  be  treated  like  conquered  provinces  to  be 
subject  in  all  their  domestic  concerns  to  the  absolute 
authority  of  the  central  government.  The  Constitu 
tional  theory  of  the  Union  and  of  the  effect  of  the  war 
upon  the  relation  of  the  states  was  one  of  the  factors, 
and  by  no  means  a  small  one,  in  the  problem  of  re 
construction. 

In  the  third  jilace,  in  determining  the  conditions  of 
restoration  and  the.  reconstruction  of  the  Union,  a 
decision  had  to  be  made  as  to  what  should  be  the  status 
of  two  classes  of  people, —  those .who .had ^borne_arms 
against  the  Union,  and  the  slaves  who  had  been  made 
free  TDV  the  war.  Here  was  room  for  conflict  and 
radical  differences  of  .opinion.  The  conflicts  and  dis 
cussions  that  arose  from  the  efforts  to  meet  these  ques 
tions  occupied  a  large  part  of  the  struggle  in  the 
period  under  consideration. 

Such  was  the  problem  of  reconstruction.  If  ever 
the  nation  needed  wisdom,  tact,  and  harmony  in  the 
councils  of  government,  the  spirit  of  bearance  and  fore- 
bearance,  the  dominance  of  reason,  and  the  subjection 
of  passion,  these  qualities  were  needed  then.  Yet 
more  than  at  any  other  period  in  American  history, 
the  period  of  reconstruction  is  distinguished  by  bitter- 


328      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ness,  passion  and  resentment  among  the  people,  and  by 
the  most  violent  and  unseemly  quarrel  between  the 
legislative  and  executive  branches  of  the  government,  a 
conflict  that  made  the  matter  doubly  difficult  and  that 
seems,  in  its  misfortune  and  unhappiness,  second  only 
to  the  conflict  in  arms. 

One  of  the  potent  factors  in  that  conflict,  and  there 
fore  one  of  the  influential  agencies  in  determining  the 
course  of  events  in  reconstruction,  was  the  personal 
character  and  disposition  of  Andrew  Johnson. 

Abraham  Lincoln  died  on  the  morning  of  April  15, 
1865.  Three  hours  later  Andrew  Johnson,  of  Ten 
nessee,  took  the  oath  of  office  of  President  of  the 
United  States.  Johnson  was  born  in  Raleigh,  North 
Carolina,  December  29,  1808.  His  parents  were  uned 
ucated  and  belonged  to  the  class  in  the  South  known  as 
"poor  whites."  The  father  died  when  Andrew  was 
a  mere  child,  and  when  he  reached  the  age  of  ten  he  was 
apprenticed  to  a  tailor.  He  had  no  early  education, 
and  it  was  while  working  at  his  trade  that  he  learned 
to  read,  at  the  age  of  fifteen.  At  eighteen  as  a  jour 
neyman  tailor,  he  moved  with  his  mother  to  Greenville, 
Tennessee,  where  he  had  the  good  fortune  to  meet 
and  marry  Elizabeth  McCardle,  a  woman  of  consider 
able  education  and  refinement.  His  wife  taught  him 
to  write  and  during  the  day  she  read  to  him  while  he 
was  at  work  at  his  tailor's  bench.  Young  Johnson 
showed  a  love  for  oratory  and  he  read  eagerly  the 
speeches  of  Pitt  and  Fox  and  other  English  classics. 
He  was  a  natural  talker  and  this  talent  led  him  into 
politics.  At  twenty  he  became  an  alderman  of  Green 
ville,  was  later  chosen  Mayor  and  then  was  elected 


ANDREW  JOHNSON,  1808-1875. 

President  of  the  United  States,  1865-1869. 


JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION      329 

to  the  Legislature.  In  1843  he  was  elected  to  the 
lower  house  of  Congress,  where  he  served  for  five 
terms,  till  1853.  -^e  was  then  elected  Governor  of 
Tennessee,  and  in  1857  he  was  sent  to  the  United 
States  Senate.  He  was  looked  upon  as  a  "  Plebeian 
Democrat,"  and  was  called  the  "  Mechanic  Governor," 
as  it  was  unusual  in  the  South  for  such  artisans  to  be 
elected  to  such  high  office. 

Johnsan  was  known  in  the  Senate  as  a  strict  con 
struction  states  rights  Democrat,  though  socially  it  was 
recognized  that  he  was  not  in  the  same  class  with  the 
aristocratic  Southern  Senators.  He  shared  with  the 
common  people  of  his  section,  the  non-slaveholding 
majority,  certain  inherited  prejudices  against  the  mas 
ter  class.  He  owed  nothing  to  them  for  his  advance 
ment  and  as  a  Southerner  he  looked  upon  the  war, 
which  he  thought  the  slaveholders  had  brought  upon 
the  country,  as  "  a  rich  man's  war  but  a  poor  man's 
fight."  In  the  campaign  of  1860  he  supported  Breck- 
inridge,  the  Southern  Democrat,  for  the  presidency. 
But  he  stoutly  opposed  secession  in  Tennessee  and 
after  the  state  had  passed  an  ordinance  of  secession  he 
retained  his  place  in  the  Senate.  He  showed  his  un 
bending  devotion  to  the  Union  in  East  Tennessee  un 
der  times  and  circumstances  when  the  fighting  qualities 
were  required  and  in  boldness  of  speech  and  action 
that  left  it  impossible  to  doubt  the  courage  and  integ 
rity  of  his  convictions.  Evidently  he  was  not  in  the 
habit  of  moving  in  the  line  of  least  resistance.  In 
March,  1862,  he  was  appointed  Military  Governor  of 
Tennessee  and  he  sought  to  cooperate  with  Lincoln 
in  the  restoration  of  his  state  to  the  Union.  He  was 


330     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

in  this  office  when  he  was  nominated  for  the  vice- 
presidency  with  Lincoln  in  1864.  It  was  his  stanch 
Unionism  and  his  work  as  Military  Governor  that  led 
to  his  nomination.  The  Republican  party  in  that  year 
called  itself  the  National  Union  Party,  and  it  sought 
to  call  to  its  support  all  who  would  support  the  war 
for  the  Union  and  the  vindication  of  the  national 
authority,  and  in  order  to  give  itself  a  more  national 
and  less  sectional  appearance  it  refused  Vice-President 
Hamlin  a  renomination  and  took  up  Andrew  Johnson 
instead, —  a  mistake  that  caused  the  party,  if  not  the 
country,  bitter  regret  in  the  years  immediately  follow 
ing.1 

It  seems  to  be  the  consensus  of  opinion  among  the 
critics  of  Johnson  that  he  lacked  adaptation,  to  the 
delicate  task  before  him.  He  was  stubborn,  opinion 
ated,  a  man  of  prejudice,  was  lacking  in  tact  and  was 
not  sufficiently  in  touch  with  the  different  sections  of 
the  country.  He  did  not  have  Lincoln's  cautious 
method  of  feeling  the  public  pulse  before  launching 
into  a  new  policy.  He  lacked  the  faculty  of  harmon 
izing  his  advisers  or  of  profiting  by  their  opinions. 
Benjamin  R.  Curtis,  who  defended  him  in  the  im 
peachment  trial,  said :  "  Johnson  is  a  man  of  few 
ideas,  but  they  are  right  and  true,  and  he  could  suffer 
death  sooner  than  yield  up  or  violate  one  of  them.  He 
is  honest,  right-minded,  and  narrow-minded ;  he  has  no 
tact  and  even  lacks  discretion  and  forecast." 

1  Colonel  A.  K.  McClure  relates  that  Stevens  said  to  him 
after  McClure  had  voted  in  the  Convention  of  1864  for  the 
nomination  of  Johnson :  "  Can't  you  find  a  candidate  for  Vice- 
President  in  the  United  States  without  going  down  to  one  of 
those  damned  rebel  provinces  to  pick  one  up?"  Lincoln  and 
Men  of  War  Times. 


JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION     331 

Johnson  took  up  the  work  of  .reconstruction  where 
Lincoln  laid  it  down.  Their  plans  were  identical.  On 
May  9,  1865,  the  Pierpont  government  in  Virginia,  the 
shadow  of  a  government,  was  recognized  as  the  legiti 
mate  government  of  the  state,  and  Lincoln's  reorgan 
ized  governments  in  Louisiana,  Arkansas  and 
Tennessee  were  assumed  to  be  legitimate  and  their 
authority  was  recognized.  Johnson  began  the  work 
of  reconstruction  for  the  other  seven  states  on  May 
29,  1865.  On  that  day  he  issued  a  proclamation  of 
pardon  and  amnesty  for  all  who  had  taken  part  in 
the  Rebellion,  who  were  ready  to  take  an  oath  to  sup 
port  and  defend  the  Constitution.  The  offer  did  not 
apply  to  those  wrho  had  already  taken  advantage  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  previous  offers.  There  were  certain 
excepted  classes, —  those  who  had  held  civil  or  military 
office  under  the  Confederacy,  or  military  office  above 
the  rank  of  Colonel;  those  who  had  left  Congress  or 
judicial  stations  of  the  United  States  to  aid  the  Rebel 
lion;  those  who  had  treated  prisoners  of  the  United 
States  otherwise  than  as  prisoners  of  war;  those  who 
had  been  engaged  in  destroying  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States  upon  the  high  seas ;  those  who  had  passed 
from  the  United  States  through  the  Confederate  lines 
for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  Rebellion;  and  those  \vho 
had  been  under  criminal  or  civil  arrest  or  who  had 
failed  to  keep  the  oath  previously  taken. 

Johnson  excepted  six  more  classes  than  Lincoln,  the 
most  significant  of  the  new  classes  being  that  of  persons 
worth  twenty  thousand  dollars  or  more,  an  exception 
which,  as  had  been  supposed,  was  prompted  by  John 
son's  prejudices  against  the  richer  classes  in  the  South. 


332      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

These  exceptions  would  have  excluded  almost  all  the 
men  qualified  by  experience  and  training  for  leadership, 
but  there  were  liberal  provisions  for  restoration  and 
escape,  since  pardon  and  clemency  would  come,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  to  the  leaders  who  made  personal  ap 
plication  to  the  President.  The  great  body  of  the  peo 
ple  were  amnestied  as  a  whole. 

On  the  same  day  (May  29th),  President  Johnson  is 
sued  a  second  proclamation  appointing  a  Provisional 
Governor  of  North  Carolina  and  authorizing  him  to 
cause  the  election  of  delegates  to  a  state  convention 
for  the  reconstruction  of  the  state  and  its  restoration 
to  the  Union.  The  voters  for  delegates  to  the  state 
convention  should  be  those  who  were  qualified  to  vote 
by  the  laws  of  North  Carolina  just  prior  to  her  seces 
sion  in  May,  1861,  after  taking  the  prescribed  oath. 
The  oath  required  as  a  condition  of  pardon  and  partici 
pation,  an  unqualified  pledge  to  support  all  laws  and 
decrees  touching  slavery.  Any  subordinate  officer 
competent  to  administer  oaths  might  administer  the 
oath  of  loyalty,  issuing  a  certificate  of  restored  citizen 
ship.  County  and  municipal  officers  were  directed  to 
resume  their  functions,  under  the  oath,  and  the  certify 
ing  officer  was  almost  brought  to  the  door  of  every 
Southern  household.  (  The  mercy  and  grace  of  the 
government  fell  upon  the  great  mass  of  those  who 
had  engaged  in  rebellion  as  gently  and  as  plenteously 
as  the  rain  from  heaven  upon  the  place  beneath  the  foot 
of  the  offenders."  *  The  excepted  classes  could  take 
no  part  in  reorganizing  the  state. 

It  appears  that  Johnson's  Cabinet  was  evenly  divided 

1  Elaine,  II,  p.  76. 


JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION      333 

upon  a  proposal  to  include  the  negroes  in  the  new  elec 
torate,  permitting  "  all  loyal  citizens  "  to  participate  in 
the  government  under  provisions  of  law  imposed  on  the 
state  by  Federal  authority.  Chief  Justice  Chase  by 
letters  from  the  South  strongly  urged  this  policy. 
Johnson  was  not  friendly  to  negro  suffrage  but  he 
was  willing  to  see  such  colored  men  admitted  as  voters 
who  were  able  to  read  the  Constitution  .aad  write  their 
names  or  who  paid  taxes  on  as  much  as  two  hundred 
and  fifty  dollars'  worth  of  property.  But  this  conces 
sion  was  made,  not  because  Johnson  believed  in  the 
political  capacity  of  the  negro  or  that  he  should  be  ad 
mitted  to  the  rights  of  manhood,  hbut  as  a  means  of 
"  disarming  the  adversary  "  and  of  preventing  the  rad 
icals  "  who  are  wild  upon  negro  franchise "  from 
"  keeping  the  Southern  States  from  renewing  their  re 
lations  to  the  Union!'  x  While  Johnson  was  willing  to 
yield  something  upon  the  point  of  qualified  negro  suf 
frage  allowed  by  the  consent  of  the  state,  he  was  very 
positive  in  his  position  that  the  state  should  be  left  to 
decide.  To  prescribe  suffrage  rules,  was  not,  in  his 
view,  within  the  scope  of  Federal  power.  "  That  was  a 
power,"  as  Johnson  said,  "  which  the  people  of  the  sev 
eral  states  have  rightfully  exercised  from  the  origin  of 
the  government  to  the  present  time."  Congress,  dur 
ing  the  war,  in  the  Wade-Davis  Bill,  had  wrongfully 
presumed  to  fix  the  suffrage  requirements,  but  even 
then  it  had  proposed  to  restrict  the  suffrage  to  the 
whites.  All  but  six  of  the  Northern  States  denied  the 
negroes  the  right  to  vote  and  one  of  these  (New  York) 

1  Johnson   to   Governor   Sharkey,   Garner's   Reconstruction  in 
Mississippi,  pp.  84-85. 


334     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

required  of  the  black  a  property  qualification  not  re 
quired  of  the  white,  and  Johnson  astutely  said  that  he 
wanted  to  let  all  the  state*  alike  be  independent  in  this 
matter.1 

Under  the  North  Carolina  proclamation  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  were  to  be  put  into  operation  within 
that  state,  the  judges  were  to  open  the  courts  and  the 
military  officers  were  to  render  all  necessary  military 
aid.  The  convention,  or  the  Legislature,  was  to  pre 
scribe  the  qualifications  of  voters  and  the  eligibility 
of  persons  to  hold  office  under  the  state.  The  state 
was  recognized  as  of  old  and  was  looked  upon  as 
simply  amending  its  constitution  in  ways  essential  to 
meet  the  conditions  of  restoration.  This  involved  "  ac 
cepting  the  results  of  the  war."  President  Johnson 
let  it  ,be  known  that  he  would  hold  these  results  to  be 
secured  essentially  if  the  state  consented  to  the  follow 
ing  fundamental  conditions : 

1.  The  repeal  of  the  Ordinance  of  Secession,  or  de 
claring  it  null  and  void. 

2.  The  abolition  of  slavery,  or  the  recognition  of  its 
abolition. 

3.  Repudiation  of  the  debts  incurred  by  the  states 
in  aid  of  the  Rebellion. 

On  the  basis  of  these  conditions  Johnson's  plan  of 
reconstruction  proceeded.  Proclamations  similar  to 
that  for  North  Carolina  were  issued  for  the  other 
states,  appointing  Provisional  Governors  and  restoring 
local  civil  laws  and  authorities.  During  the  summer 
and  fall  of  1865  elections  were  held  in  other  states  on 
the  basis  of  the  old  suffrage;  their  constitutional  con- 
1  Rhodes,  V,  p.  524. 


JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION     335 

ventions  met,  their  state  constitutions  or  laws  were 
amended  in  the  particulars  required,  and  in  October 
and  November  their  people  proceeded  to  elect  members 
of  Congress,  United  States  Senators,  Governors  and 
State  Legislators.  When  their  legislatures  met  they 
were  given  to  understand  through  the  Provisional 
Governors  that  they  were  expected  to  ratify  the  thir 
teenth  amendment.  This  they  all  did  except  Missis 
sippi.1  During  this  period  the  President  had  declared 
the  cessation  of  armed  resistance,  the  restoration  of  in 
tercourse  throughout  the  country,  the  raising  of  the 
blockade  and  putting  all  branches  of  the  civil  govern 
ment  into  operation.2 

Thus  by  the  close  of  1865,  the  states  were  all  re 
organized,3  the  Provisional  Governors  appointed  by  the 
President  were  relieved  of  their  duties,  and  the  new 
governments  were  recognized  as  being  in  the  full  ex 
ercise  of  their  functions.  In  brief,  the  United  States 
government  had,  through  executive  action  alone,  reas 
serted  its  civil  power  and  reassumed  its  civil  functions 
and  duties  within  the  seceded  states;  legal  and  legiti 
mate  state  governments  were  in  operation;  and  every 
legal  connection  under  the  Constitution  between  the 
state  and  the  national  government  had  been  fully  re 
stored.  All  that  Congress  was  to  do  was  to  judge  of 
the  qualifications  and  elections  of  the  members  from 

1  See  Garner,  p.  120. 

2  When  Texas,  somewhat  belated,  had  completed  her  reorgan 
ization  on  the  terms  imposed  (April,  1866),  Johnson  in  disregard 
of   congressional   rebuke  and   dissension,   August  20,    1866,   pro 
claimed  the  complete  restoration  of  peace,  order  and  authority 
throughout  the  United  States.     With  this,  he  persistently  held, 
the  work  of  reconstruction  was  completed. 

8  Except  Texas. 


336      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  South  who  might  come  to  Washington  bearing  the 
credentials  of  the  Johnson  governments.  '''  The  re 
construction  conventions,"  says  Mr.  Elaine,  "  were 
little  else  than  consulting  bodies  of  Confederate  officers 
under  the  rank  of  Brigadier  General,  actually  sitting 
throughout  their  deliberations  in  the  uniform  of  the 
rebel  service  and  apparently  dictating  to  the  govern 
ment  of  the  Union  the  grounds  on  which  they  would 
consent  to  resume  representation  in  the  national  Con 
gress."  Johnson's  Provisional  Governors  were  mostly 
made  up  of  Southern  Whigs  who  had  opposed  seces 
sion,  but  in  the  reorganizing  conventions  there  were 
many  active  secessionists  and  as  time  passed  by  under 
the  operation  of  amnesty  and  pardon  this  secession  ele 
ment  came  to  the  front  in  political  activity  and  control, 
and  the  new  state  governments  that  were  set  up  came 
under  the  control  of  men  who  had  been  active  leaders 
in  the  Confederate  cause.  The  thing  that  loomed  large 
in  the  view  of  the  people  of  the  North  was  that  the 
"  unrepentant  rebels  "  were  again  in  control  of  their 
states  and  that  such  men  were  to  be  sent  to  Congress 
to  help  make  laws  for  the  nation.  The  new  Governor 
of  South  Carolina  had  been  a  Confederate  Senator, 
that  of  Mississippi,  a  Brigadier  General  in  the  Con 
federate  army;  a  Confederate  Major-General  had  been 
elected  to  Congress  from  Alabama,1  and  no  less  a 
person  than  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  who,  when  Con 
gress  adjourned  March  3,  1865,  was  acting  as  Vice- 
President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  had  the  bold 
ness  with  the  iron-clad  oath  "  staring  him  in  the  face, 
to  lay  his  credentials  on  the  table  of  the  Senate  as  a 
1  Dunning,  Reconstruction,  p.  44. 


JOHNSON  AND  RECONSTRUCTION     337 

Senator-elect  from  Georgia."  The  iron-clad  oath 
imposed  by  act  of  Congress,  of  July  2,  1862,  required 
of  all  who  wished  to  qualify  for  any  office  of  profit 
or  honor  under  the  United  States  government,  to 
swear  that  he  had  never  voluntarily  borne  arms  against 
the  United  States,  and  that  he  had  given  no  aid  nor 
encouragement  to  any  one  engaged  in  armed  hostility. 
The  men  who  reorganized  the  Johnson  governments  in 
the  South  denounced  this  law  as  unconstitutional  and 
in  defiance  of  it  the  people  elected  men  as  Senators 
and  Representatives  in  Congress  who  were,  with  few 
exceptions,  active  participants  in  the  Rebellion.1  "  In 
his  astounding  effrontery,"  says  Mr.  Elaine,  "  Mr. 
Stephens  even  went  so  far  as  to  insist  on  interpreting 
to  those  loyal  men  who  had  been  conducting  the  United 
States  government  through  all  its  perils,  the  Con 
stitution  under  which  they  had  been  acting  and  to  point 
out  how  they  were  depriving  him  of  his  rights  by 
demanding  an  oath  of  loyalty  and  good  faith  as  the 
condition  on  which  he  should  be  entitled  to  take  part 
in  legislation  for  the  restored  Union,  as  if  every  liv 
ing  man  had  forgotten  that  for  four  years  he  had  been 
exerting  his  utmost  effort  to  destroy  the  Constitution 
under  which  he  claimed  the  full  rights  of  a  citizen."  2 

flf  Johnson  thought  that  Congress  would  accept 
quietly  and  without  protest  Southern  State  govern 
ments  established  in  such  conditions,  it  shows  how 
sadly  he  misunderstood  the  temper  and  purpose  of 
the  North}  The  men  who  had  borne  the  heat  and 
burden  of  the  war  for  the  Union  for  four  long  years 
were  not  inclined  to  see  the  men  against  whom  they 

1  Elaine,  II,  pp.  87-88.  2  Twenty  Years,  II,  pp.  88-Sg. 


338      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

had  fought  immediately  restored  to  places  of  power 
and  influence  in  state  and  nation.  Those  who  had 
been  so  long  and  so  bitterly  hostile  to  the  Union  had 
given  no  evidence  of  such  change  of  spirit  as  entitled 
them  to  be  replaced  in  power.  If  the  President  had 
organized  state  governments  under  the  control  of  men 
who  could  have  given  reasonable  guarantee  to  the 
North  that  they  were  loyal  to  the  Union ;  and  if  these 
governments  had  shown  a  disposition  to  protect  loyal 
citizens  and  to  secure  freedom  and  a  "  fair  deal "  to 
all  the  inhabitants  of  those  states,  Congress  doubtless 
would  have  overlooked  the  manner  of  their  organiza 
tion  and  have  restored  them  to  their  proper  relations 
to  the  Union.  Congress  and  the  country  were  as 
anxious  as  the  President  that  this  be  done  on  fair  and 
honorable  terms.  But  they  also  felt  under  a  sacred 
obligation  to  safeguard  the  black  man  in  his  "  new 
birth  of  freedom/'  and  they  were  not  willing  that  "  the 
rebellious  states  should  be  ruled  over  by  rebels  and 
that  Union  men  be  persecuted  for  their  loyalty." 

With  the  opening  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Congress  John 
son  was  to  be  given  an  opportunity  to  learn  the  strength 
of  the  Northern  purpose  in  respect  to  reconstruction, — 
a  purpose  that  had  no  expectation  of  being  left  out  of 
the  account.  This  Northern  opinion,  as  reflected  in 
Congress,  Johnson  seemed  determined  to  override  or 
ignore.  How  this  opinion  and  Johnson's  obstinacy 
came  into  collision  the  first  session  of  the  new  Con 
gress  brings  into  view. 

1  Trumbull,  1867,  Harper's  Monthly,  Vol.  34,  p.  399. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON 

'  I  VHE  President's  plan  of  reconstruction  was  com- 
-*•  pleted.  Peace  was  declared  to  be  restored,  but 
there  was  to  be  no  peace.  The  struggle  in  arms,  it  is 
true,  had  ended;  but  the  country  was  on  the  eve  of 
a  political  conflict  unsurpassed  in  its  history. 

When  the  Thirty-ninth  Congress  met  for  its  first 
session  in  December,  1865,  the^Clerk  of  the  preceding 
House,  whose  business  it  was  to  make  up  the  pre 
liminary  roll  of  members  entitled  to  take  part  in  the 
election  of  the  Speaker  and  the  organization  of  the 
House,  omitted  the  names,, ofV those  coming  up  with 
certificates  of  election  from  Johnson's  reconstructed 
states.  In  this  the  Clerk  was  acting  in  obedience  to 
the  Republican  party  caucus  which  had  been  largely 
dominated  by  Stevens.  The  Clerk  refused  to  listen  to 
protests  from  the  Tennessee  members  or  to  entertain 
motions  from  Democrats  directing  him  to  put  on  the 
roll  the  members-elect  from  Johnson's  own  state.  The 
Constitution  requires  the  President  to  be  an  inhabitant 
of  a  state.  Brooks,  a  Democrat  from  New  York, 
demanded  to  know,  if  Tennessee  were  not  a  loyal  state 
and  the  people  of  Tennessee  were  aliens  and  foreigners 
to  the  Union,  by  what  right  the  President  usurped 
his  place  in  the  White  House.  If  members-elect  from 
Tennessee  were  not  entitled  to  their  seats  because 

339 


340     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

their  state  was  not  in  the  Union,  how  was  Johnson 
entitled  to  his  ?  Was  he  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  usurp 
ing  inhabitant  of  a  territory?  Brooks  demanded  a 
decision  of  this  question  before  the  Speaker  was  elected. 
In  the  preceding  Congress  members  from  Louisiana 
had  been  admitted  in  time  of  war;  why  should  Ten 
nessee  now  be  refused  in  time  of  peace? 

But  the  Republicans  were  largely  in  the  majority; 

a  program  had  been  arranged,  and  under  the  leader- 

\  ship  of  Stevens,  with  this  majority  behind  him,  all  at- 

\tempts  at  debate  or  delay  were  overruled,   and  the 

'Southern  members  were  left  off  the  roll.1 

Stevens  had  in  his  pocket  the  resolution  which  was 
to  open  the  great  contest  with  the  President, —  a  con 
test  most  memorable  in  our  congressional  annals.  He 
was  taunted  by  Brooks,  the  Democratic  leader,  with 
the  inquiry  as  to  when,  acting  for  his  party  caucus, 
he  intended  to  press  his  resolution.  "  I  have  no  ob 
jection  to  answering  the  gentleman,"  retorted  Stev 
ens;  "  I  propose  to  press  it  at  the  proper  time."  Im 
mediately  after  the  election  of  the  officers  of  the  House, 
but  before  the  reading  of  the  annual  message  of  the 
President,  Stevens  offered  his  resolution  which  pro 
vided  for  a  joint  committee  on  reconstruction  to 
consist  of  nine  Representatives  and  six  Senators  who 
should  inquire  into  the  condition  of  the  Southern  States 
and  "  report  whether  they  or  any  of  them  are  entitled 
to  be  represented  in  either  house  of  Congress,  and 
until  such  report  shall  have  been  made  and  finally 

1  Schuyler  Colfax,  of  Indiana,  was  elected  Speaker  by  a  vote 
of  139  to  36,  the  minority  vote  being  cast  for  James  Brooks,  of 
New  York. 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       341 

acted  upon  by  Congress  no  member  shall  be  received 
into  either  house  from  any  of  the  so-called  Confeder 
ate  States."  For  the  passage  of  this  resolution  Stev 
ens  moved  the  suspension  of  the  rules  and  the  previous 
question.  This  cut  off  debate,  and  the  resolution  car 
ried  by  one  hundred  and  thirty-three  ayes  to  thirty-six 
noes.  The  members  from  Johnson's  reconstructed 
states  were  not  to  be  allowed  the  usual  privilege  of  the 
floor  while  a  decision  was  pending. 

This  summary  action  gave  indication  of  the  temper 
of  Congress,  showing  that  it  was  in  no  mood  to  ac 
cept  Johnson's  plan  of  reconstruction.  It  served  no 
tice  that  a  contest  was  at  hand,  and  that,  at  any  rate, 
Stevens  and  his  radical  colleagues  were  determined 
to  overthrow  if  possible  what  Johnson  had  set  up. 
'  Before  that  day,"  says  Mr.  McCall,  "  Stevens  had 
een  the  leader  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 
Henceforth  he  was  to  be  its  dictator  and  the  leader 
of  his  party  throughout  the  country."  *\ 

Stevens  was  made  chairrnan  of  the  House  Com 
mittee  on  Reconstruction  and  associated  with  him  were 
such  men  as  Bingham,  Washburn,  Boutwell,  Conkling, 
and  Morrill.  Senator  Fessenden,  of  Maine,  was  made 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee.  On  the  second 
day  of  the  session  Stevens  introduced  three  resolu 
tions  setting  forth  the  terms  of  reconstruction  that  he 
wished  to  have  imposed,  to  be  incorporated  by  amend 
ment  into  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land.  These  res 
olutions  and  the  notable  speech  of  Stevens  of  De 
cember  1 8,  1865,  in  which  he  opened  the  great  debate 
on  reconstruction,  may  be  said  to  lay  down  the  es- 

1  Life  of  Stevens,  p.  259. 


342      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

sential  reasons  why  Congress  rejected  the  reconstruc 
tion  policy  of  President  Johnson  and  began  to  construct 
a  policy  of  its  own. 

In  the  first  place,  Congress  thought  it  was  not  the 
exclusive  business  of  the  President  to  carry  on  recon 
struction.  The  problem  of  restoring  the  broken  union 
was  fundamental.  It  went  to  the  rppts_jof jplitic;al 
power  and  the  institutions  of  government.  It  far 
transcended  the  routine  and  technical  question  of 
whether  men  claiming  to  have  been  elected  to  Congress 
were  of  proper  age  and  had  been  elected  without  fraud. 
It  involved  the  problem  of  rebuilding  the  Union,  the 
readmission  of  states  that  had  foresworn  their  alle 
giance  to  the  Constitution,  and  the  reestablishment  of 
local  government  in  those  states  on  the  principles  ac 
ceptable  to  the  nation.  This  vast  political  problem  of 
reconstruction,  as  we  have  seen,  not  only  involved  the 
destruction  of  the  Confederate  State  governments  of 
the  South  and  the  setting  up  of  new  governments  in 
their  stead  and  the  restoration  of  these  new  govern 
ments  in  their  proper  place  in  the  Union,  all  of  which 
Johnson  had  undertaken  to  accomplish  without  the 
least  shadow  of  constitutional  authority,  but  also  the 
legal  and  constitutional  status  of  two  important  ele 
ments  of  the  population  had  to  be  determined, —  the 
negroes  who  had  been  set  free  by  the  war  and  the 
Confederate  leaders  who  had  for  four  years  borne 
arms  against  the  Federal  government.  It  was  absurd 
to  suppose  that  Congress  was  to  be  barred  from  hav 
ing  any  voice  in  the  determination  of  these  great  ques 
tions  of  state.  They  involved  powers  and  policies 
too  large  for  the  President  alone.  Was  it  short  of 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON        343 

"preposterous,"  as  Stevens  said,  for  Johnson  to  as 
sume  such  powers  to  himself?  It  belonged  to  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled  to  determine 
what  should  be  the  constitutional  and  civil  results  of 
the  war  and  how  these  were  to  be  made  permanent 
and  secure.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  soundness 
of  the  political  theory  that  Stevens  now  so  forcibly 
laid  down  as  the  basis  of  congressional  action.1 

The ..controlling  provision  of  the  Constitution  in  re 
storing  the  broken  Union  was  where  Stevens  found  it, 
in  the  power  to  admit  new  states.  On  this  he  based 
hisjDolicy  of  reconstruction.  It  has  been,.. called  ..his 
"  conquered  province  theory."  It  was  a  practical 
policy  rather  than  a  theory,  and  it  was  the  same  as 
that  on  which  he  sought  to  conduct  the  war  for  the 
Union.  It  was  that  the  war  had  severed  the  original 
compact  and  broken  all  ties  that  had  bound  the  states 
together.  The  power  of  Congress  was  absolute  in  the 
conquered  states,  and  to  their  rights  and  immunities 
the  Constitution  had  ceased  to  apply.  They  must  now 
come  in  as  new  states  or  remain  as  conquered  prov 
inces,  and  Congress  is  the  only  power  that  can  de 
termine  the  conditions  of  readmissionA  "  But 
suppose,"  says  Stevens,  "  as  some  dreaming  theorists 
imagine  that  these  states  have  never  been  out  of  the 
Union,  but  have  only  destroyed  their  state  govern 
ments  so  as  to  be  incapable  of  political  action,"  then 
the  United  States  shall  guarantee  a  republican  form 
of  government.  The  United  States  is  not  the  Presi- 

1  Professor  J.  W.  Burgess,  of  Columbia  University,  a  leading 
American  authority  in  political  science  and  constitutional  law, 
expresses  very  positive  approval  of  Stevens'  view.  "Recon 
struction  and  the  Constitution,"  p-  43. 


344     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

dent  "  but  the  sovereign  power  of  the  people,"  exer 
cised  through  their  representatives  in  Congress.  This 
is  the  power  that  is  to  establish  a  republican  form  of 
government  in  lapsed  or  outlawed  states. 

"  It  is  worse  than  ridiculous  to  hear  men  of  respect 
able  standing  attempting  to  nullify  the  law  of  na 
tions  and  declare  that  because  the  Constitution  forbids 
it,  the  states  could  not  go  out  of  the  Union  in  fact. 
The  theory  that  the  rebel  states,  for  four  years  a  sep 
arate  power  and  without  representation  in  Congress, 
were  all  the  time  here  in  the  Union,  is  a  good  deal 
less  ingenious  and  respectable  than  the  metaphysics  of 
Berkeley  which  proved  that  neither  the  world  nor 
any  human  being  was  in  existence.  If  this  theory 
were  simply  ridiculous  it  could  be  forgiven,  but  its 
effect  is  deeply  injurious  to  the  nation.  I  can  not  doubt 
that  the  late  Confederate  States  are  out  of  the  Union 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  for  which  the  conqueror 
may  wish  to  consider  them.  After  the  palpable  facts 
of  war,  to  deny  that  we  have  a  right  to  treat  them 
as  a  conquered  belligerent,  severed  from  the  Union  in 
fact,  is  not  argument  but  mockery."  If  the  states 
were  to  be  regarded  as  dead  within  the  Union,  from 
their  own  act  of  suicide,  the  only  power  that  could 
reanimate  them  and  make  them  capable  of  political 
action  was  in  Congress.  A  law  of  Congress  is  neces 
sary  to  revive  a  dead  state,  and  until  then  no  member 
can  be  admitted  lawfully  to  either  house.  The  provi 
sion  that  each  house  shall  be  the  judge  of  the  elections 
and  qualifications  of  its  own  members  has  not  the  most 
distant  bearing  on  this  question.  Congress  must  first 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON        345 

create  states  and  declare  when  they  are  entitled  to  be 
represented. 

Standing  on  this  principle  of  congressional  power  in 
the  solution  of  this  problem,  Stevens  insisted  upon  two 
matters  as  of  vital  importance  in  the  beginning  of 
reconstruction.  One  was  that  it  should  be  decided 
for  all  time  what  power  was  competent  to  "  revive, 
recreate,  and  reinstate  these  provinces  into  the  family 
of  states " ;  the  other  was  that  none  of  the  South 
ern  States  should  be  counted  in  adopting  the  amend 
ments  held  to  be  necessary  for  the  reconstructed  Union. 
Congress  should  assert  its  sovereign  authority.  Stev 
ens  very  much  disliked  the  course  Secretary  Seward 
had  assumed  in  counting  the  Southern  States  in  mak 
ing  up  the  three- fourths  necessary  for  the  adoption  of 
the  thirteenth  amendment.  Such  a  position  "  was  in 
tended  to  delude  the  people  and  to  accustom  Congress 
to  hear  repeated  the  names  of  these  extinct  states  as  if 
they  were  alive."  To  Stevens'  mind  these  states  had 
"  no  more  existence  than  the  revolted  cities  of  Latium," 
and  he  proposed  to  take  no  account  of  "  the  aggrega 
tion  of  whitewashed  rebels  who,  without  any  legal 
authority,  have  assembled  in  the  capitols  of  the  late 
rebel  states  and  simulated  legislative  bodies.  .  .  .  How 
shameful  that  men  of  influence  should  mislead  and 
miseducate  the  public  mind ! " 

Having  established  the  power  of  Congress  in  the 
case,  Stevens  sought  next  to  lay  down  the  conditions 
for  the  readmission  of  the  conquered  states.  These 
conditions  should  be  fixed  beyond  recall  by  such  con 
stitutional  amendments  as  would  make  the  Constitu- 


346     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tion  what  its  framers  intended  it  to  be  and  would 
"  render  republican  government  forever  firm  and 
stable." 

One  of  his  proposed  amendments  indicated  the 
second  essential  reason  why  Congress  and  the  country 
were  not  willing  to  accept  Johnson's  plan,  namely,  the 
necessity  for  the  protection  of  the  freedman.  It  pro 
vided  that  "  all  national  and  state  laws  shall  be  equally 
applicable  to  every  citizen  and  no  discrimination  shall 
be  made  on  account  of  race  or  color."  Here  is  the 
germ  of  an  important  part  of  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment, —  the  guarantee  of  civil  rights  to  the  negro. 
Stevens  did  not  at  this  time  propose  to  grant  the  right 
of  suffrage  to  the  freedmen,  though  he  did  not  conceal 
his  opinion  in  favor  of  that  measure.  He  thought  it 
would  be  brought  about  by  the  readjustment  of  rep 
resentation.  However,  he  spoke  boldly  for  the  de 
fense  of  the  freedmen  under  uniform  lawrs  and  for  their 
provision  till  they  could  take  care  of  themselves. 
"  The  infernal  laws  of  slavery,"  he  said,  "  have  pre 
vented  them  from  acquiring  an  education,  understand 
ing  the  commonest  laws  of  contract,  or  of  managing 
ordinary  business  of  life.  We  must  not  leave  them 
to  the  legislation  of  their  late  masters,  but  we  must 
provide  for  them  protective  laws.  .  .  .  If  we  fail  in 
this  great  duty  now  when  we  have  the  power  we  shall 
deserve  and  receive  the  execration  of  history  and  of 
all  future  ages." 

Northern  belief  in  the  necessity  of  protection  for 
the  negro  was  one  of  the  most  potent  influences  lead 
ing  to  the  rejection  and  defeat  of  Johnson's  plan.  The 
electorate  that  he  had  established  precluded  negro 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       347 

suffrage,  but  far  more  important  than  that  was  the 
treatment  accorded  the  freedmen  by  the  Legislatures 
of  Johnson's  newly  erected  states. 

The  unfair  discriminations  visited  upon  the  blacks 
by  the  vagrancy  laws  passed  in  the  South  in  1865  are 
a  matter  of  common  knowledge,  and  they  need  not  be 
recounted  here.  Their  unequal  character  seemed  'to 
General  Sickles  to  call  for  the  intervention  of  the 
military  arm  for  the  sake  of  civil  liberty,  and  one  of 
his  military  orders  decreed  that  the  vagrancy  laws  ap 
plicable  to  free  white  persons  should  be  the  only  ones 
recognized  as  applicable  to  freedmen.1  To  the  North 
ern  mind  it  was  made  to  appear  that  the  design  of 
these  laws  was  the  practical  reenslavement  of  the 
blacks.  "  Vagrants,"  without  visible  means  of  sup 
port  were  to  be  put  to  forced  labor,  and  the  helpless 
blacks,  for  no  other  crime  than  that  of  poverty,  might 
be  "  hired  out "  to  masters,  old  or  new,  who  would 
pay  the  public  for  their  time  and  labor.  These  "  black 
"codes  "  aroused  anger  and  indignation  in  the  North  and 
they  were  looked  upon  as  having  been  enacted  from  a 
spirit  of  irritation  and  defiance  because  of  the  aboli 
tion  of  slavery.  Stevens  was  convinced  that  the  spirit 
"of  slavery  still  lived,  and  he  had  no  doubt  that  if  the 
freedom  of  their  race  was  to  be  preserved  the  negroes 
should  not  be  entrusted  to  the  tender  mercies  of  their 
former  masters  with  political  power  in  their  hands. 
Stevens  had  in  view,  but  held  in  abeyance,  his  policy 
on  this  phase  of  reconstruction.  But  he  sought  here, 
in  the  beginning,  to  emphasize  the  principle  that  the 
protection  of  civil  rights  and  civil  equality  was  a  na- 

1  Cong.  Globe,  March  10,  1865. 


348     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tional  function ;  that  the  Constitution  should  require  the 
states  to  treat  their  own  inhabitants  with  equality  in 
regard  to  their  civil  rights,  and  that  the  only  way 
these  civil  rights  could  be  secured  was  by  national  law. 
He  would  place  that  guarantee  where  it  could  never 
be  undermined  nor  overthrown. 

A  third  reason  why  Congress  would  not  accept  John 
son's  plan  was  that  it  left  the  Southern  States  and  their 
elections  entirely  within  the  control  of  the  .Confeder 
ates.  His  policy  had  led  the  ex-Confederates,  so 
lately  in  arms  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  Union, 
to  show  a  disposition  to  claim  rights  rather  than 
to  submit  to  conditions.  Their  conventions  seemed 
little  more  than  consulting  bodies  of  Confederate  of 
ficers,  "  actually  sitting  throughout  their  deliberations 
in  the  uniform  of  the  rebel  service  apparently  dic 
tating  to  the  government  of  the  Union  the  grounds  on 
which  they  would  consent  to  resume  representation 
in  the  national  Congress."  "  Hardly  is  the  war 
closed,"  said  the  committee  on  reconstruction,  "  be 
fore  the  people  of  the  insurrectionary  states  come 
forward  and  haughtily  claim  as  a  right,  the  privilege 
of  participating  at  once  in  that  government  which  they 
have  for  four  years  been  fighting  to  overthrow.  Al 
lowed  and  encouraged  by  the  Executive  to  organize 
state  governments,  they  at  once  placed  in  power  lead 
ing  rebels,  unrepentant  and  unpardoned,  excluding  with 
contempt  those  who  had  manifested  an  attachment  to 
the  Union,  and  preferring  in  many  instances  those  who 
had  rendered  themselves  peculiarly  obnoxious." 

In  Stevens'  opinion  and  according  to  his  policy,  the 
first  duty  of  Congress  was  to  pass  a  law  defining  the 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON        349 

condition  of  these  "  defunct  states  "  and  providing 
civil  government  for  them.  He  recognized  that  mili 
tary  law  was  despotic  and  ought  not  to  exist  any  longer 
than  is  necessary.  A  territorial  government  was  the 
proper  arrangement,  and  he  saw  no  symptoms  that  they 
would  be  ready  to  participate  in  constitutional  govern 
ment  for  some  years  to  come.  In  this  territorial  state 
they  "can  learn  the  principles  of  freedom  and  eat 
the  fruit  of  foul  rebellion."  Congress  could  then  fix 
the  qualifications  for  voters  and  the  rebels  might  be 
given  an  opportunity  "  to  practise  justice  to  all  men  and 
make  and  obey  equal  laws."  As  to  their  rights  of 
life  and  property  and  the  retributive  justice  that  was 
due  them  he  had  opinions  that  he  proposed  to  an 
nounce  "  at  the  proper  time." 

There  were  other  reasons  that  had  great  weight  in 
Stevens'  mind,  and  in  those  of  the  other  radical  lead 
ers,  why  Congress  should  overturn  the  policy  of  John 
son.  The  national  debt  should  be  guaranteed,  as,  also, 
the  sacred  pension  obligations  to  soldiers  and  sailors 
and  to  their  widows  and  orphans,  against  any  possible 
hostile  combination  of  "  Southern  rebels  "  and  "  North 
ern  Copperheads."  The  payment  of  the  Confederate 
debt  contracted  by  a  state  for  Confederate  purposes 
should  be  prevented  by  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
land,  before  these  states  should  be  readmitted  and  be 
given  the  rights  of  local  self-government.  The  na 
tion  should  not  permit  men  to  be  rewarded  or  repaid 
for  an  effort  upon  its  life.  Stevens  wished  to  outlaw 
these  debts  that  had  been  contracted  for  lawless  and 
wicked  purposes,  and  he  believed  that  if  the  states  were 
admitted  and  left  to  do  as  they  pleased,  these  debts 


THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

would  be  taken  up  and  paid.  Money  lenders  who 
staked  their  capital  on  the  effort  to  disrupt  the  Union 
and  destroy  the  government  should  be  taught  the  les 
son  they  deserved. 

Stevens  was  in  entire  harmony  with  the  public  opin 

ion  of  the  North  in  regarding  the  Rebellion  as  a  gi 

gantic  crime  and  he  held  that  its  leaders,  instead  of 

being  pardoned  and  exonerated  and  elected  to  office 

and  admitted  again  into  the  seats  of  honor  and  power, 

should    be    visited    with    condign    punishment.     He 

would  provide  homesteads  and  the  suffrage  for  the 

negroes  for  their  protection,  and  as  a  means  to  this 

end  and  as  a  punitive  measure  calculated  as  a  fair 

warning  to  future  ages,  he  advocated  the  confiscation 

of  the  estates  of  Southern  leaders  and  their  exclusion 

/  from  political  power.     No  one  to-day  would  approve 

I  Stevens'  drastic  plan  of  confiscation  as  a  public  policy, 

I  and  wherein  he  manifested  the  spirit  of  vindictiveness 

\and  revenge  in  public  speech  and  policy  he  is,  as  a 

'matter  of  course,  to  be  disapproved  distinctly  and  con- 


But  the  feeling  that  there  should  be  some 
punishment  meted  out  for  the  Rebellion  was  almost 
universal  in  the  North.  On  that  matter  Stevens  was 
not  by  any  means  exceptional.  The  hatred  engen 
dered  by  the  war  was  not  more  intense  in  Stevens  than 
in  thousands  of  others  in  the  North. 

The  final  and  one  of  the  most  important  reasons 
for  the  break  with  Johnson  came  from  the  desire  of 
Stevens  and  the  radical  leaders  in  Congress  to  read 
just  the  distribution  of  political  power  among  the 
states.  This  came  partly  from  a  desire  to  promote 
political  equity  and  partly  to  secure  party  ascendency. 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON        351 

It  was  to  be  secured  by  one  of  Stevens'  proposed 
amendments  apportioning  representation  among  the 
states,  not  according  to  population  but  in  proportion 
to  legal  voters.  Stevens  was  most  anxious  to  see  to 
it  that  the  basis  of  representation  for  the  allotment  of 
political  power  should  be  changed.  He  believed  that 
the  Slave  States  had  enjoyed  an  unfair  share  of  political 
power  from  the  foundation  of  the  government  and  that 
Johnson's  reconstruction  would  aggravate  the  evil. 
The  opportunity  for  remedy  that  now  presented  itself 
should  not  go  unimproved.  It  was  seen  that  the  adop 
tion  of  the  thirteenth  amendment,  forever  abolishing 
slavery,  would  give  to  the  Southern  States  an  increased 
representation  in  Congress.  In  this  fact,  so  unpalata 
ble  to  the  Northern  Republicans,  Stevens  found  a  great 
source  of  support  for  his  cause.  The  representation 
for  non-voting  people  of  color  in  the  South  was  then 
thirty-seven.  The  South  had  seventy  representatives 
in  Congress,  having  twenty- four  for  three-fifths  of 
their  slaves.  Add  the  other  two-fifths  of  the  blacks 
now  free,  and  they  would  have  thirteen  more,  making 
eighty-three.  If  colored  people  were  not  to  be  allowed 
to  vote,  Stevens  wished  not  only  not  to  add  these 
thirteen  to  the  South's  representation,  but  to  take  away 
the  twenty- four  which  had  been  allotted  to  them  on  ac 
count  of  three-fifths  of  the  slaves.  This  would  reduce 
their  representation  to  forty-six, —  a  material  reduction 
in  political  power.  If  the  basis  remained  unchanged 
the  eighty-three  Southern  members,  with  the  Demo 
crats  that  will  in  the  best  of  times  be  elected  from  the 
North,  will  always  give  them  a  majority  in  Congress 
and  in  the  Electoral  College.  "  At  the  first  election," 


352      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS  ' 

said  Stevens,  "  they  will  take  possession  of  the  White 
House  and  the  halls  of  Congress.  I  need  not  depict  the 
ruin  that  would  follow.  Assumption  of  the  rebel  debt; 
repudiation  of  the  Federal  debt,  oppression  of  the  freed- 
men,  reamendment  of  their  state  constitutions,  and  the 
reestablishment  of  slavery  would  be  the  inevitable  re 
sult.  They  would  scorn  and  disregard  their  present 
constitutions  forced  upon  them  by  martial  law  while 
in  duress, —  which  would  be  but  natural  action  on  their 


The  party  motive  prompting  this  proposal  was 
frankly  avowed  by  Stevens.  He  resorted  to  no  subter 
fuges  and  made  no  concealments.  The  support  of 
Johnson's  plan  by  the  Northern  "  Copperhead  De 
mocracy  "  in  combination  with  Southern  leaders  was 
condemnation  enough  for  Stevens.  He  believed  John 
son  had  in  view  a  party  scheme  for  uniting  these  ele 
ments,  together  with  the  conservative  elements  of  the 
Republican  party,  to  the  undoing  of  the  country  and 
the  sacrifice  of  the  results  of  the  war.  The  men  in 
the  North  who  had  stood  most  stoutly  against  slavery 
and  for  the  Union  were  to  be  thrust  from  power.  It 
was  up  to  the  radical  leaders  to  circumvent  the  scheme. 
Stevens  boldly  declared  his  opinion  that  the  ascen 
dency  of  the  Union  Republican  party  was  essential 
to  make  secure  the  great  results  of  the  war  and  that 
if  these  results  were  not  made  safe  by  amendments 
before  the  states  were  restored  they  never  could  be. 
His  amendment  did  not  impose  negro  suffrage  on  the 
Southern  States,  but  if  these  states  refused  to  admit 
the  blacks  to  suffrage,  their  representation  would  be 
so  reduced  as  to  render  them  powerless  for  evil ;  while 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       353 

~~7 
if  they  granted  the  suffrage  to  the  negroes  there  would    / 

always   be   Union   white   men   enough   aided   by   the  / 
blacks  to  divide  the  representation  and  continue  Re-/ 
publican  ascendency. 

Steveas  closed  his  appeal  for  a  more  radical  policy 
with  a  bold  advocacy  of  the  equality  of  all  men  before 
the  law.  He  held  firmly  to  the  great  democratic  prin 
ciple  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  upon  which 
our  fathers  created  a  revolution  and  build  the  republic. 
He  never  quailed  nor  failed  in  his  defense  of  the  great 
enduring  principles  of  democracy.  He  urged  that  the 
republic  should  be  made  to  stand  on  the  principles  of 
the  fathers,  otherwise  it  could  have  "  no  honest  foun 
dation  and  the  Father  of  all  men  will  still  shake  it  to 
its  center.  If  we  have  not  yet  been  sufficiently 
scourged  for  our  national  sin  to  teach  us  to  do  justice 
to  all  God's  creatures,  without  distinction  of  race  or 
color,  we  must  expect  the  still  more  heavy  vengeance 
of  an  offended  Father. 

"  This  is  not  a  '  white  man's  government/  To  say 
so  is  political  blasphemy,  for  it  violates  the  funda 
mental  principles  of  our  gospel  of  liberty.  This  is 
man's  government,  the  government  of  all  men  alike. 
Equal  rights  to  all  the  privileges  of  the  government 
is  innate  in  every  mortal  being,  no  matter  what  the 
shape  or  color  of  the  tabernacle  which  it  inhabits.  .  .  . 
Sir,  this  doctrine  of  a  white  man's  government  is  as 
astrocious  as  the  infamous  sentiment  that  damned  the 
late  chief  justice  to  everlasting  fame  and  I  fear  to 
everlasting  fire."  1 

1  Globe,  December  18,  1865. 

That  Stevens  was  supported  in  his  course  by  the  public  sen 
timent    of    his    party    and    by    many    who    would    now    be    re- 


354     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

This  speech  went  to  the  country  as  an  attack  on  the 
policy  of  the  administration.  Mr.  Henry  J.  Ray 
mond,  of  New  York,  an  administration  Republican, 
replied  to  it  urging  a  liberal  policy  toward  the  South, 

garded  as  moderate  and  conservative  mentis  attested  by  the 
numerous  letters  that  poured  in  upon  him  in  approval  ^  of  this 
speech.  The  lack  of  space  forbids  the  use  of  these  indorse 
ments,  but  a  few  may  be  cited  as  typical  of  many. 

The  following  is  from  Judge  Alphonso  Taft,  father  of  Presi 
dent  Taft,  written  from  Cincinnati,  December  28,  1865 :  "  I 
read  your  speech  on  reconstruction,  as  I  read  all  your  speeches, 
with  great  interest  and  pleasure.  With  the  President  against 
you  I  suppose  it  is  impossible  to  accomplish  all  that  should  be 
accomplished.  I  suppose  you  can  not  accomplish  negro  suffrage 
except  in  the  District,  where  I  would  fight  for  it  to  the  last. 
But  I  trust  you  may  be  able  to  get  a  constitutional  amendment 
making  the  Federal  power  of  every  state  proportional  to  its 
number  of  voters.  That  and  the  taxing  of  exports  are  so  just 
and  necessary  that  they  must  be  insisted  on  and  fought  for. 
Negro  prejudice  does  not  stand  in  the  way  of  these  two  meas 
ures.  The  task  of  this  Congress  is  all  the  more  arduous  as  the 
President  is  so  precipitate  in  his  reconstruction  policy.  I  hope 
he  will  not  prove  obstinate.  Persevere!  The  true  people  will 
applaud  you.  God  bless  your  efforts !  " 

Hon.  John  L.  Ketcham  writes  from  Indianapolis,  December 
24,  1866:  ''Beyond  all  controversy  yours  is  the  true  ground. 
.  .  .  The  states  that  went  into  rebellion  are  now  only  con 
quered  provinces.  Their  state  governments  are  dead  and 
buried  and  damned,  and  ought  to  be.  To  waste  words  about 
whether  they  are  in  the  Union  or  out  of  the  Union  is  all  tom 
foolery.  And  the  men  who  talk  so  know  it  well.  Andy  John 
son  knows  it.  And  he  knows  the  people  of  the  South  are  not 
fit  to  exercise  political  rights.  When  I  read  your  speech  over 
(as  I  did  twice,  every  word  of  it)  I  could  not  but  think  if  my 
father-in-law,  Samuel  Merrill,  were  only  living,  how  proud  he 
would  be  over  this  speech !  I  tell  you  it  has  the  right  ring 
about  it,  and  if  Congress  will  go  right  forward  the  people  will 
sustain  them.  But  if  they  hesitate  and  are  timid  all  is  lost. 
The  people  love  bold  leaders  and  bold  action,  especially  in  the 
right.  I  pray  God  your  life  may  be  spared  to  establish  freedom 
everywhere  and  to  bring  into  disgrace  treason  and  traitors." 

Alfred  Conkling,  of  Genesee,  New  York,  commended  _  this 
"  noble  speech."  "  I  can  not  forbear  to  tender  to  you  the  tribute 
of  my  admiration  and  thanks.  It  will  secure  to  you  an  im 
mortality  of  enviable  fame." 

O.  A.  Brownson,  the  publicist,  wrote  frcm  Elizabeth,  New 
Jersey,  December  19,  1865,  to  thank  Stevens  for  his  "  admirable 
speech."  "  Your  general  views  I  hold  to  be  sound  and  politic. 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       355 

in  harmony  with  Johnson's  message,1  which  urged  am 
nesty  and  Southern  representation  and  restoration  of 
local  control  to  the  South  at  the  earliest  day  consistent 
with  public  safety.  The  debate  became  general  both 
in  the  House  and  the  Senate.  Mr.  Sumner,  of  Mas 
sachusetts,  was  particularly  hostile  in  the  Senate  to 
Johnson's  .plan.  He  urged  the  importance  of  suf 
frage  and  civil  rights  for  the  negroes  and  he  painted 
in  vivid  colors  what  he  called  the  "  rebel  barbarism  " 
and  outrages  of  the  Southern  whites  against  the  help 
less  freedmen.  The  report  of  General  Carl  Schurz  on 
the  political  temper  and  conditions  in  the  South  was 
called  for  by  the  Senate  and  used  with  great  effect  to 
sustain  the  case  against  the  President.  Johnson  was 
irritated  and  his  combativeness  was  aroused. 

Congress,  proceeding  to  legislate  for  the  protection 
of  the  emancipated  blacks,  passed  the  Freedmen's 
Bureau  Bill,  extending  the  powers  and  enlarging  the 
staff  of  that  bureau.  Johnson  was  not  ready  to  ac 
cept  this  modification  of  his  work  and  on  February 

To  pretend  that  the  Confederate  States  are  and  have  been  in 
the  Union  is  utterly  absurd  and  mischievous.  They  have  no 
state  character  and  no  political  rights;  they  are  territories  sub 
ject  to  the  Union.  But  I  especially  indorse  your  assertion  of 
the  congressional  prerogative.  The  President  has  been  dabbling 
with  reconstruction  for  eight  months  without  constitutional  or 
legal  warrant-" 

Reverend  Doctor  H.  T.  Cheever  wrote  from  Worcester,  Massa 
chusetts,  January  ip,  1866:  "You  have  the  thanks  of  every  loyal 
American  not  a  trimmer  for  the  noble  stand  you. have  taken  in 
the  House.  Massachusetts  likens  you  to  her  '  Old  Man  Elo 
quent.'  May  God  grant  that  Congress  may  not  recede  a  hair 
from  its  position,"  and  he  commended  Stevens  as  "one  whom 
the  people  delight  to  honor  for  his  eloquence  and  devotion  to 
the  rights  of  man  as  man.  That  God  may  sustain  and  make 
you  immortal  till  your  work  is  done  is  the  prayer  of  myself  and 
of  many  here." 

1  December  5,  1865. 


356     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

19,  1866,  he  vetoed  this  bill, —  a  veto  that  officially 
opened  the  breach  between  the  two  departments  of  the 
government. 

This  veto  was  obviously  not  based  altogether  on 
the  merits,  or  the  demerits,  of  the  bill.  The  President 
was  evidently  prompted  by  his  combativeness  and  by 
his  resentment  of  personal  attacks  that  had  been  made 
upon  him.  He  was  a  born  fighter ;  he  had  been  fight 
ing  all  his  life,  and  he  was  not  of  the  kind  readily  to 
yield  to  criticism  or  opposition.  He  had  said,  and 
he  now  proposed  to  stand  up  for  it,  that  Congress  had 
no  right  under  the  Constitution  to  exclude  states  from 
representation.  On  this  rock  he  proposed  to  establish 
his  plan.  While  the  congressional  leaders  were  per 
versely  keeping  the  eleven  states  out  of  the  Union 
and  were  thus  disregarding  this  fundamental  principle 
of  reconstruction  the  President  did  not  intend  that 
their  legislation  should  go  by  unchecked. 

The  veto  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  Bill  was  John 
son's  declaration  of  war,  or  his  acceptance  of  the  gage 
of  battle,  between  him  and  Congress,  which  was  des 
tined  to  lead  to  a  long  and  uncompromising  struggle. 
The  first  victory  in  this  long  fight  rested  with  Johnson, 
as  the  Senate,  by  a  narrow  margin  of  two  votes^jsus-^ 
tained  the  veto  amid  the  applause  and  hisses  of  its 
gallery.  But  the  President's  first  victory  was  his  last, 
for  upon  the  very  day  on  which  the  Senate  sustained 
his  veto,  the  House,  under  the  leadership  of  Stevens, 
adopted  a  concurrent  resolution  declaring  that  no  Sena 
tor  or  Representative  should  be  admitted  from  any 
insurrectionary  state  until  Congress  should  have  de 
clared  the  state  entitled  to  representation.  This  reso- 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       357 

lution  the  Senate  adopted  on  March  2,  1866,  and  the 
two  houses  thus  stood  openly  committed  in  opposition 
to  the  President's  Constitutional  doctrine  of  reconstruc 
tion. 

This  resolution  has  been  called  the  "  counter-stroke  " 
to  the  veto.  The  respective  positions  assumed  by  the 
two  departments  of  the  government  were  directly  an 
tagonistic  and  irreconcilable.  One  had  to  give  way  or 
be  overcome.  The  Executive  might  bar  the  passage 
of  measures  which  Congress  wished  to  enact,  but  the 
Congressional  Joint  Committee  on  Reconstruction 
"  carried  on  its  girdle  the  keys  of  the  Union,"  as 
Senator  Cowan  said,  and  unless  it  unlocked  the  doors 
"  the  wayward  sisters  could  not  get  in."  1 

(Antagonistic  personalities  as  well  as  opposing  prin 
ciples  tended  to  promote  the  breach  between  the  Presi 
dent  and  Congress)  The  veto  of  the  Freedmen's  Bureau 
Bill  became  the  occasion  of  a  public  speech  by  John 
son  in  which  he  indulged  in  unbecoming  personalities, 
tending  still  further  to  aggravate  the  situation.  To 
a  serenading  party  that  came  to  the  White  House  on 
February  22,  1866,  to  congratulate  the  President  on 
the  success  of  his  veto,  Johnson  spoke  at  considerable 
length.  He  referred  to  the  Reconstruction  Committee 
of  Congress  as  an  "  irresponsible  central  directory," 
that  was  assuming  nearly  all  the  powers  of  Congress 
in  disregard  of  the  Constitution.  "  You  have  been 
struggling  for  four  years  to  put  down  a  rebellion. 
You  contended  at  the  beginning  of  that  struggle  that 
a  state  had  not  a  right  to  go  out.  That  question  has 
been  settled.  ...  I  am  opposed  to  the  Davises,  the 

1  Dewitt,  Impeachment  of  Johnson,  p.  58. 


358     THE  LIFE  OB]  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Toombses,  the  Slidells,  and  the  long  list  of  such.  But 
when  I  perceive  on  the  other  hand  men  [a  voice,  "  call 
them  off"]  I  care  not  by  what  name  you  call  them  — 
still  opposed  to  the  Union,  I  am  free  to  say  to  you  that 
I  am  still  with  the  people."  Some  one  from  the  crowd 
called  for  the  names  of  the  members  of  Congress  to 
whom  the  President  alluded.  "  Suppose  I  should  name 
them  to  you,"  replied  Johnson,  "  those  whom  I  look 
upon  as  being  opposed  to  the  fundamental  principles  of 
this  government  and  as  now  laboring  to  destroy  them. 
I  say  Thaddeus  Stevens,  of  Pennsylvania ;  I  say  Charles 
Sumner,  of  Massachusetts;  I  say  Wendell  Phillips,  of 
Massachusetts.  [A  voice,  "  Forney."]  I  do  not  waste 
my  fire  on  dead  ducks.  I  stand  for  the  country  and 
though  my  enemies  may  traduce,  slander,  and  vituper 
ate,  I  may  say  that  has  no  force." 

It  has  been  said  that  from  the  moment  of  this  speech 
"  personal  rancor  against  the  President  filled  the  heart 
of  Stevens,  at  least,  if  not  of  others."  2  It  is  certainly 
true  that  forgiveness  and  conciliation  and  the  sweet 
spirit  of  personal  charity  for  his  opponents  were  not 
traits  for  which  Stevens  was  especially  distinguished. 
Johnson's  coarse  speech  had  brought  a  feeling  of  shame 
and  humiliation  to  the  country.  It  is  not  likely,  how 
ever,  that  Johnson's  rage  and  his  rash  language  toward 
Congress  and  its  leaders  seriously  influenced  Stevens' 
public  policy  in  reconstruction.  Johnson's  veto  of 
the  Freedmen's  Bureau  Bill  gave  him,  a  momentary 
triumph.  But  Stevens  was  now  more  easily  able,  on 
account  of  Johnson's  personalities  and  rude  and  tact- 

1  McPherson,  Reconstruction. 

2  Burgess,  Reconstruction,  p.  67. 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       359 

less  speech  on  February  22nd,  to  arouse  opposition  to 
the  President  and  his  plan.  On  March  10,  1866,  Stev 
ens  improved  his  opportunity  in  his  second  notable 
speech  on  reconstruction.  He  restated  his  former 
position,  that  of  considering  the  Southern  States  as 
in  the  status  of  conquere3  provinces. 

One  may  well  disapprove  of  Stevens'  motives  and 
purposes,  but  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that  in  the 
political  thinking  of  the  time,  judged  either  by  the 
canons  of  political  science  or  of  constitutional  law,  no 
one  excelled  Stevens,  or  answered  him  successfully  in 
argument.  The  position  that  he  assumed  was  clear, 
straightforward,  consistent  from  beginning  to  end,  and 
he  presented  his  cause  with  a  force  and  ability  that 
made  his  position  seem  unassailable.  He  was  again 
accused  of  admitting  by  his  doctrine  the  efficacy  of 
secession.  He  denied  this,  and  asserted  that  the  or 
dinances  of  secession  amounted  to  nothing  either  in 
law  or  in  fact.  It  was  the  formation  of  a  regular 
hostile  government,  and  the  raising  and  supporting  of 
large  armies,  and  for  a  time  maintaining  their  declara 
tion  of  independence  that  made  the  South  a  belligerent 
and  the  contest  a  war.  .  .  .  He  stood  on  the  fact, 
recognized  of  all  men.  "  Who  is  simple  enough  to 
believe  that  the  assertion  of  a  fact  is  the  justification  of 
it?  The  people  are  astute  enough  to  discern  between 
the  right  and  the  fact." 

Stevens  held  that  the  war  had  not  disorganized  the 
rebel  states.  They  had  continued  under  state  govern 
ments  and  their  relation  to  the  United  States  did  not 
affect  that  question.  Others  contended  that  the  loyal 
people  formed  the  state ;  he  thought  that  all  the  people 


360      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

within  its  jurisdiction  who  are  legal  citizens  have  an 
equal  part  in  making  up  the  state,  without  regard  to 
character;  the  control  of  republics  depends  on  the 
number  not  on  the  quality  of  voters.  "  This  is  not 
a  government  of  saints,"  he  said;  "  it  has  a  large  sprin 
kling  of  sinners.  The  Confederate  States  continued  to 
be  well-organized  states  out  of  the  Union,  under  laws, 
it  is  true,  different  from  those  of  the  United  States. 
If  they  were  not  out  of  the  Union  the  logical  position 
would  be,  as  some  contend,  that  they  might  at  any 
time  send  representatives  here  and  demand  admission 
without  asking  leave  of  any  one.  ...  In  what  de 
plorable  guilt  does  it  involve  the  President  to  declare 
that  the  states  were  never  out  of  the  Union!  What 
rank  usurpation  has  he  practised  in  intermeddling 
with  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  state!  All  states  in 
the  Union  are  equal.  How  long  could  the  President 
stay  in  the  White  House  if  he  should  attempt  in  New 
York  or  Pennsylvania  what  he  had  done  in  South 
Carolina  and  Alabama?  If  I  believed  as  the  gentle 
men  do  I  should  deem  it  the  duty  of  Congress  forth 
with  to  present  articles  of  impeachment." 

He  contended  that  what  the  President  had  done  he 
had  done  not  to  states  in  the  Union,  but  to  conquered 
provinces,  and  that,  not  under  any  power  in  the  con 
stitution,  but  as  a  commander  exercising  military 
authority.  The  President  appoints  a  Governor  in  Ten 
nessee,  authorizes  him  to  call  a  constitutional  conven 
tion,  fixes  the  qualification  of  voters  and  finally  orders 
certain  things  for  the  convention  to  adopt  in  the  con 
stitution.  Obedience  was  instantaneous,  thanks  to  the 
virtue  of  martial  law  and  fixed  bayonets!  What  a 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       361 

free,  republican,  constitutional  restoration  this  is !  So 
with  the  other  states.  Johnson's  government  of  Vir 
ginia  was  even  worse.  There  "  the  free  representa 
tives  of  fragments  of  about  eleven  townships  out  of 
one  hundred  and  forty-two  counties,  elected  in  spots 
between  the  contending  armies  on  disputed  ground, 
twelve  men,  who  met  within  the  Federal  lines,  called 
itself  a  convention,  formed  a  constitution,  ordered  elec 
tions  for  the  whole  state,  and  Governor  Pierpont  re 
ceived  about  thirty-three  hundred  votes  for  Governor 
(half  Yankee  soldiers,  I  suspect)  and  was  proclaimed 
in  the  market  house  of  Alexandria,  the  Governor  of 
imperial  Virginia,  the  mother  of  statesmen!  .  .  .  This 
is  one  of  the  twenty-seven  states  that  adopted  the  con 
stitutional  amendment!  I  am  fond  of  genteel  comedy, 
but  this  low  farce  is  too  vulgar  to  be  acted  on  the 
stage  of  nations.  Are  these  the  free  republics  such  as 
the  United  States  is  bound  to  guarantee  to  all  the  states 
in  the  Union?  Should  these  swindlers,  these  impos 
tors,  bred  in  the  midst  of  martial  law,  without  author 
ity  from  Congress,  be  acknowledged  here?  " 

In  reply  to  the  suggestion  that  the  Southern  com 
munities  had  been  sufficiently  punished,  he  said  that 
one  might  search  the  whole  records  of  crime  from  the 
rebellion  of  the  angels  and  the  first  transgression  of 
man  to  the  present  day,  and  "  you  can  find  nowhere  so 
great  a  crime  so  inadequately  punished."  They  were 
"  punished  only  in  the  pugilistic  sense  of  having  been 
knocked  out  in  a  fight.  Did  any  respectable  govern 
ment  ever  before  allow  such  high  criminals  to  escape 
with  such  shameful  impunity?  I  have  never  desired 
bloody  punishments  to  any  great  extent,  even  for  the 


362     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

sake  of  example.  But  there  are  punishments  quite  as 
appalling,  and  longer  remembered  than  death.  They 
are  more  advisable  because  they  would  reach  a  greater 
number.  Strip  a  proud  nobility  of  their  bloated  es 
tates;  reduce  them  to  a  level  with  plain  republicans; 
send  them  forth  to  labor,  and  teach  their  children  to 
enter  the  workshops  or  handle  the  plow  and  to  respect 
labor,  and  you  will  thus  humble  the  proud  traitors." 

He  named  again  the  reforms  he  expected  to  see  in 
corporated  in  the  Constitution.  He  had  no  fear  that 
the  people  would  surrender  the  fruits  of  victory.  Only 
a  few  in  Congress  would  grow  weak  in  the  knees  at 
the  footstool  of  power.  '  You  can  easily  designate 
them  by  their  shuffling,  cringing,  fawning  manner. 
They  never  stand  erect  when  manhood  is  required. 
But  the  great  majority  will  stand  by  their  own  honor 
and  their  country's  welfare.  If  these  reforms  are  not 
accomplished,  then  in  three  short  years  this  whole  gov 
ernment  will  be  in  the  hands  of  the  late  rebels  and 
their  Northern  allies."  He  would  put  the  conquered 
territory  under  territorial  governments  and  let  them 
know  that  in  adopting  amendments  their  aid  would  be 
neither  invited  nor  permitted,  and  when  they  came 
again  to  enter  the  Union  they  would  swear  allegiance 
to  a  constitution  remodeled  without  their  consent. 

It  was  in  a  diversion  in  the  midst  of  this  speech 
that  Stevens  uttered  his  notable  mock  eulogy  of  Presi 
dent  Johnson,  in  which  we  find  a  specimen  of  Stev 
ens'  scathing  satirical  invective.  For  ability  and  ef 
fectiveness  in  this  line  of  attack  it  is  probable  that,  in 
all  the  annals  of  American  politics,  Stevens  stands 
without  an  equal.  It  is  difficult  to  believe,  in  view  of 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON       363 

the  context,  as  Mr.  McCall  seems  to  do,  that  Stev 
ens  uttered  even  any  part  of  his  tribute  to  the  Presi 
dent  with  a  candid  and  serious  purpose.  He  did  say 
in  the  beginning  of  his  personal  allusion  what  seemed 
to  be  serious  words,  and  no  doubt  he  spoke  in  grave 
and  solemn  tones.  He  asserted  that  he  had  no  feel 
ing  of  enmity  toward  the  President  but  respect  rather, 
and  "  honor  for  his  integrity,  patriotism,  courage,  and 
good  intentions."  He  disclaimed  any  personal  hos 
tility  to  the  President,  but  he  proposed  to  oppose  and 
denounce  his  policy;  as  it  would  be  to  forget  the  ob 
loquy  that  he  had  calmly  borne  for  thirty  years  in 
the  war  for  liberty,  if  he  should  turn  craven  now.  Mr. 
Price,  of  Iowa,  appeared  to  accept  this  personal  allu 
sion  to  the  President  as  a  candid  and  intentional  com 
pliment  on  the  part  of  Stevens  and  he  interrupted  the 
latter  to  ask  whether  it  were  possible  that  the  "  Thadv 
Stevens  "  now  eulogizing  the  President  could  be  the 
same  as  the  "  Thad  Stevens  "  referred  to  in  the  late 
White  House  speech.  The  question  might  have  been 
anticipated,  or  prearranged.  At  any  rate  it  gave 
Stevens  his  opportunity,  and  he  turned  from  his  mild 
tone  of  compliment  and  conciliation  toward  the  Presi 
dent  to  one  of  mean  and  satirical  abuse.  It  may  be 
that  the  passage  of  coarse  and  abusive  invective,  in 
which  Stevens  now  indulged  and  which  his  friends 
may  well  wish  had  been  omitted  from  an  otherwise 
worthy  speech,  may  have  come  from  the  impulse  and 
taunt  of  the  moment,  without  premeditation  or  personal 
malice  aforethought.  However  that  may  be,  he  pro 
ceeded  to  express  surprise  that  the  learned  gentleman 
should  refer  to  the  White  House  speech  as  if  it  were 


364     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

a  fact.  He  then  offered  to  make  a  confidential  com 
munication  and  he  hoped  none  present  would  violate 
his  confidence,  for  fear  his  motives  might  be  mis 
understood.  He  desired  the  House  and  the  country  to 
understand  that  the  so-called  speech  of  the  President 
was  one  of  the  grandest  hoaxes  ever  perpetrated,  more 
successful  than  any  except  the  moon  hoax  which  had 
deceived  so  many  astute  astronomers.  He  was  glad  of 
the  opportunity  to  exonerate  the  President  from  ever 
having  made  that  speech.  "  It  is  a  part  of  the  cunning 
contrivance  of  the  Copperhead  party  who  have  been 
persecuting  our  President  since  the  fourth  of  March 
last  "  to  make  the  people  believe  that  the  President  ever 
made  such  a  speech.  "  Why,  sir,  taking  advantage  of 
an  unfortunate  incident  which  happened  on  that  occa 
sion  1  [laughter]  they  have  been  constantly  denouncing 
him  as  addicted  to  low  and  degrading  vices."  To 
prove  the  truth  of  this  hoax  and  his  view,  Stevens  sent 
to  the  desk  and  had  read  and  put  on  record  an  editorial 
of  March  7,  1865,  from  the  Democratic  New  York 
World  j  which  was  now  supporting  Johnson's  policy 
on  reconstruction.  This  editorial  compared  Johnson 
to  "  the  drunken  and  beastly  Caligula,  the  most  prof 
ligate  of  the  Roman  emperors,"  and  referred  to  the 
disgrace  that  he  had  brought  upon  an  honorable  office 
once  held  by  an  Adams  and  a  Jefferson,  a  Calhoun  and 
a  Van  Buren.  And  "  now,"  the  editorial  ran,  "  to 
see  the  office  filled  by  this  insolent  drunken  brute," 
and  "  only  one  frail  life  between  this  clownish  drunk 
ard  and  the  presidency ! "  Having  brought  this 

1  Referring  to  the  drunken  condition  of  Johnson  at  the  time 
of  his  inauguration  as  Vice-President 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON        365 

editorial  to  the  publicity  of  the  record,  Stevens  then 
proceeded  to  denounce  it  as  a  slander,  and  as  a  proof 
that  this  Copperhead  party  had  been  persecuting  the 
President.  "  We  never  credited  it  but  looked  with  in 
dignation  upon  the  slander  which  was  thus  uttered 
against  the  President  of  our  choice.  My  friend  be 
fore  me 1  if  he  were  trying  in  court  a  case  dc  lunatico 
inquirendo,  and  if,  the  outside  evidence  being  doubt 
ful,  leaving  it  questionable  whether  the  jury  would 
adopt  the  view  that  insanity  existed,  he  should  cau 
tiously  lead  the  alleged  lunatic  to  speak  upon  the  sub 
ject  of  the  hallucination,  and  if  he  could  be  induced 
to  gabble  nonsense,  the  intrinsic  evidence  would  make 
out  the  case  of  insanity.  So  if  these  slanderers  can 
make  the  people  believe  that  the  President  uttered  that 
speech  they  have  made  out  their  case.  But  we  all 
know  that  he  never  did  utter  it.  The  people  may  have 
been  deceived  but  we  who  knew  the  President  knew  it 
was  a  lie  from  the  start."  Having  exposed  this 
mendacious  libel,  he  then  expressed  the  hope  that  he 
might  be  permitted  to  occupy  the  same  friendly  posi 
tion  with  the  President  that  he  had  held  before. 

Here  is  revealed  one  of  the  most  untoward  events 
in  our  history,  namely,  that  while  facing  a  problem 
of  great  complexity,  the  country  was  vexed  by  a  per 
sonal  quarrel  aij4  a  party  brawl  that  \vere  calculated  to 
inflame  the  passions  and  to  obscure  the  judgment  of 
all  concerned.  It  was  most  unfortunate  that  the  issue 
of  reconstruction  should  have  been  determined,  or  in 
any  way  impaired,  by  a  personal  contest  between  two 
such  men  as  Johnson  and  Stevens.  Both  were  honest 

1  Bingham,  of  Ohio. 


366      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

and  patriotic  men,  but  both  had  intensely  passionate 
and  combative  dispositions.  They  were  unyielding  in 
temper,  and  were  without  that  deeper  statesmanlike 
wisdom  that  leads  men  to  look  above  themselves  to  the 
higher  ends  of  the  state.  After  these  personal  insults 
had  been  bandied  between  them  it  was  hardly  possible 
that  they  could  be  brought  to  work  together  in  harmony 
toward  a  common  end.  They  were  not  reconcilable. 

It  has  been  said  that  this  bitter  personal  speech  of 
Stevens  had  for  its  purpose  the  goading  of  Johnson 
to  veto  the  Civil  Rights  Bill  that  was  soon  to  come 
before  him.  Johnson's  acceptance  of  that  bill  would 
have  brought  him  great  support  in  Congress  and 
in  the  country.  It  was  not  inconsistent  with  his 
scheme  of  reconstruction,  and  he  might  have  ac 
cepted  it  without  the  surrender  of  a  single  principle 
that  he  had  professed.  His  veto  of  it  left  him  without 
hope,  and  gave  Stevens  and  the  radicals  the  right  of 
way.  From  the  time  of  that  veto  the  breach  between 
Congress  and  the  President  was  complete  and  seem 
ingly  irreparable.  More  and  more,  from  that  time,  the 
temper  of  the  congressional  leaders  became  personally 
antagonistic  toward  Johnson.  They  felt  that  he  was 
insincere  and  prone  to  treachery;  that  he  had  broken 
faith  and  betrayed  the  party  that  had  elevated  him  to 
power;  that  he  was  obstinate,  ungentlemanly,  coarse, 
and  ill-tempered,  and  that,  having  changed  his  mind, 
he  was  angry  and  vengeful  toward  all  others  wrho 
would  not  change  theirs.  There  followed  charges  and 
countercharges,  threats  and  counter-threats.  Johnson 
professed  to  see  in  the  suggestion  of  the  congressional 
leaders  that  the  "  presidential  obstacle  would  have  to 


THE  BREACH  WITH  JOHNSON        367 

be  removed,"  a  threat  of  assassination,  while  the  radical 
leaders  constantly  manifested  a  growing  disrespect  of 
the  President,  jeering  at  his  name,  putting  aside  his 
messages  unread,  and  referring  to  him  as  "  only  acting- 
President  by  right  of  assassination/'  They  professed 
to  believe  that  the  President  was  capable  of  attempting 
a  bold  military  usurpation  by  a  coup  d'etat,  in  that  he 
might  refuse  to  recognize  Congress  as  a  legitimate  body 
and,  instead,  recognize  a  Congress  of  his  own  making, 
and  thus  plunge  the  country  into  a  new  civil  war.  This 
suspicious  fear  had  its  basis  partly  in  the  fact  that 
the  President  was  constantly  referring  to  Congress 
as  "  only  a  part  of  Congress  "  and  to  its  Joint  Com 
mittee  on  Reconstruction  as  "  an  irresponsible  direc 
tory,"  and  partly  because  of  certain  rash  and  startling 
utterances  of  some  of  the  President's  supporters  in 
Congress.  Senator  Garrett  Davis,  of  Kentucky,  said 
in  the  Senate  that  the  President  had  a  right  to  decide 
what  body  of  men  constituted  Congress,  since  he  had 
to  communicate  with  the  two  houses.  "  Whenever 
Andrew  Johnson,"  said  Davis,  "  chooses  to  say  to  the 
Southern  Senators,  '  Get  together  with  the  Dem 
ocrats  and  the  conservatives  of  the  Senate,  and  if  you 
constitute  a  majority,  I  will  recognize  you  as  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,'  what  then  will  become  of  you 
gentlemen  ?  You  will  quietly  come  in  and  form  a  part 
of  the  Senate."  l 

There  was  thus  engendered  a  situation  full  of  dis 
trust,  suspicion,  and  soreness.  It  was,  at  best,  a  state 
of  political  war,  to  which  were  added  many  features  of 
a  partisan  and  personal  wrangle.  The  issue  was 

1  Globe,  App.,  pp.  300-304,  cited  by  Dewitt,  p.  57. 


368     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

joined.  The  question  was  whether  the  policy  of  John 
son  or  that  of  the  radicals,  led  by  Stevens  and  Sumner, 
should  prevail.  On  that  issue  appeal  was  to  be  made 
to  the  country  and  the  congressional  leaders  set  about 
to  formulate  their  plan. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  FIRST    CONGRESSIONAL   PLAN 

\T7E  have  noticed  the  reasons  that  led  to  the  re- \ 
jection  of  Johnson's  reconstruction.  When  the 
breach  with  the  President  had  become  irretrievable 
Congress  addressed  itself  to  providing  a  plan  of  its 
own,  such  as  would  safeguard  the  interests  that  the 
congressional  leaders  felt  had  been  flagrantly  disre 
garded  in  the  plan  of  the  President. 

Their  first  efforts  were  directed  to  providing  ade 
quate  protection  for  the  negro.  The  first  agency  em 
ployed  for  this  purpose  was  the  Freedman's  Bureau. 
The  original  act  establishing  this  bureau  was  passed 
on  March  3rd,  1865.  It  was  made  an  arm  of  the  war 
department,  was  established  under  conditions  of  war, 
and  the  act  was  to  expire  one  year  after  the  termina 
tion  of  hostilities.  Its  object  was  to  protect  and  sup 
port  the  freedmen  within  the  territory  controlled  by 
the  Union  forces.  Clothing  and  fuel  were  to  be  given 
to  the  destitute.  Vacant  lands  were  to  be  parceled 
out  to  freedmen  and  refugees, —  not  more  than  forty 
acres  to  any  one  individual,  and  protection  in  the  use 
of  the  land  was  promised  for  three  years. 

The  Southerners  charged  that  this  bureau  had  a 
bad  effect ;  that  it  led  the  blacks  to  believe  that  the  gov 
ernment  was  going  to  support  them ;  \  that  good  old 

369 


370      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

plantation  darkies  were  turned  into  vagabonds  and 
loafers,  each  looking  for  the  happy  day  when  "  de  land 
was  goin'  fur  to  be  dewided  "  and  every  darky  would 
have  his  "  forty  acres  and  a  mule."  Such  considera 
tions  were  urged  as  an  apology  for  the  black  codes 
of  the  South. 

There  may  have  been  mistakes  or  bad  management 
in  the  local  administration  of  the  bureau.  But  the  mo 
tive  of  the  act  was  that  of  mercy  and  charity  for  the 
freedmen,  and  General  O.  O.  Howard,  who  was  at  the 
head  of  the  bureau,  was  a  man  of  generous  and  benev 
olent  impulses,  whose  services  to  the  South  were  of 
the  highest  order.  Common  humanity  demanded  that 
the  ignorant  and  helpless  negroes,  without  money  and 
without  homes,  should  not  be  left  helpless  upon  the 
world.  "  Without  the  bureau/'  said  the  congressional 
committee,  "  the  colored  people  would  not  be  permitted 
to  labor  at  fair  prices  and  could  hardly  live  in  safety. 
It  was  impossible  to  abandon  them.  The  whole  civ 
ilized  world  would  have  cried  out  against  such  base 
ingratitude,  and  the  bare  idea  is  offensive  to  all  right 
thinking  men."  3 

The  Freedmen's  Bureau  Act  which  Johnson  vetoed  2 
extended  the  time  and  enlarged  the  effective  force  of 
this  bureau.  Military  protection  was  provided  for 
its  officers  and  agents.  In  addition  to  the  "  forty 
acres,"  schoolhouses  and  asylums  were  to  be  provided 
and  protection  was  to  be  afforded  in  all  criminal  cases 
when  equal  civil  rights  were  denied.  Johnson's  veto 
was  based  on  the  ground  that  this  was  a  war  measure 

1  Report  of  the  Cong.  Com.,  June  18,  1866. 

2  February  19,  1866. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      371 

in  time  of  peace,  indefinite  in  time,  and  operative  over 
territory  where  the  civil  authority  of  the  United  States 
was  undisputed.  The  President  held  that  a  state  of 
war  no  longer  existed,  and  that  the  great  army  of  of 
ficials  provided  for  in  the  act  involved  too  great  an 
expense,  and  that  it  conferred  too  much  patronage  and 
power  for  any  one  man  to  wield.  The  act,  he  as 
serted,  was  unconstitutional,  as  by  it  the  United  States 
government  was  to  assume  functions  on  behalf  of 
'negroes  that  it  had  never  been  authorized  to  assume 
on  behalf  of  white  men.  It  was  calculated  to  coddle 
the  negro  to  his  detriment.  And  besides,  and  this  was 
of  the  highest  importance  in  Johnson's  mind,  this  leg 
islation  was  undertaken  while  the  eleven  states  that 
were  most  affected  were  unrepresented  in  Congress. 
Johnson's  veto  compassed  the  defeat  of  this  measure, 
greatly  to  the  disappointment  and  displeasure  of  the 
Northern  advocates  of  the  freedmen's  interests.1 

The  second  attempt  of  Congress  to  secure  the  rights 
and  protection  of  the  freedmen  was  involved  in  the 
Civil  Rights  Bill.  The  purpose  of  this  bill  was  to 
establish  equality  of  citizenship,  to  place  the  negro  on 
the  same  civil  footing  as  the  white  man,  and  it  in 
volved  substantially  the  provisions  afterward  inserted 
in  the  fourteenth  amendment  on  that  subject.  It  pro 
vided  that  all  persons  born  in  the  United  States  and 
not  subject  to  any  foreign  power,  excluding  Indians 
not  taxed,  were  to  be  recognized  as  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  On  all  these,  of  whatever  class  or 

1  On  July  16,  1866,  after  the  breach  with  Congress  had  be 
come  complete,  a  new  Freedmen's  Bureau  Bill  was  passed  over 
the  veto  of  the  President,  containing  the  essential  features  of 
the  bill  that  was  vetoed  in  February. 


372     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

color,  were  to  be  conferred  the  rights  to  sue;  to  make 
and  enforce  contracts;  to  give  evidence;  to  inherit;  to 
buy,  lease,  sell,  hold  and  convey  real  and  personal 
property,  and  to  have  the  benefit  of  equal  laws  for 
security  of  life  and  liberty.  This  protection  was  to  be 
secured,  not,  as  under  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  Bill,  by 
the  operation  of  military  power,  but  by  the  usual 
operation  of  the  civil  courts.  Pains  and  penalties 
were  provided  for  violation  of  the  act  against  any  one 
who,  under  color  of  state  laws,  might  discriminate 
against  any  citizen  on  account  of  race,  color  or  pre 
vious  condition  of  servitude.1 

This  legislation  marks  a  departure  in  the  juris 
prudence  of  the  United  States.  Not  until  then  had  the 
central  government  assumed  to  define  and  protect  civil 
equality  within  the  states.  "  But  it  was  a  change," 
says  Professor  Burgess,  "  which  history  had  forced 
upon  the  country,"  and  it  was  but  a  recognition  of  the 
vital  fact  that  "  real  civil  liberty  is  always  national."  2 
It  was  ably  contended  by  the  supporters  of  this  bill 
that  the  nation  had  legalized  the  change  by  the  adop 
tion  of  the  fourteenth  amendment,  and  the  issue  that  it 
presented  may  be  recognized  as  one  of  the  most  funda 
mental  in  the  history  of  American  constitutional  law. 
Shall  the  state  or  shall  the  nation  be  the  guardian  of 
civil  liberty  in  America? 

Johnson's  veto  of  this  bill  on  March  29,  1866,  is  a 
landmark  in  the  struggle  over  reconstruction.  It 
raised  the  direct  issue  between  the  President  and  Con- 


penalty  might  be  a  fine  of  one  thousand  dollars,  or  a 
year's  imprisonment,  or  both. 

2  Reconstruction  and  the  Constitution,  p.  70. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN     373 

gress,  and  made  it  apparent  that  either  he  or  the  con 
gressional  leaders  must  give  way  or  be  overridden. 
Johnson  was  insistent  upon  two  points :  first,  that 
there  should  be  speedy  recognition  and  readmission  of 
his  reconstructed  states;  and,  second,  that  the  blacks 
should  be  left  to  state  control.  That  Congress  re 
fused  to  accept  his  reconstructed  states  was  to  John 
son  a  personal  offense,  and  his  veto  of  the  Civil  Rights 
Bill  showed  his  combative  and  petulant  spirit.  The 
measure  was  not  inconsistent  with  his  plan  of  recon 
struction.1  Johnson  had  not  indicated  that  he  had  any 
objection  to  the  Civil  Rights  Bill  until  after  its  pas 
sage.  The  veto  was  a  part  of  his  struggle  of  deter 
mined  oppostion  to  a  Congress  that  had  refused  to 
accept  what  he  had  done.  This  bill  was  framed  in 
harmony  with  what  he  himself  professed  to  have  been 
doing  to  protect  the  freedrnen  in  their  civil  rights 
throughout  the  rebellious  states.  It  was  strictly  limited 
to  the  protection  of  the  civil  rights  belonging  to  every 
free  man,  the  birthright  of  every  American  citizen, 
and  it  carefully  avoided  conferring,  or  interfering 
with,  political  rights  or  privileges  of  any  kind.  It 
conferred  no  rights,  and  abridged  no  rights.  It  sim 
ply  declared  that  in  civil  rights  there  should  be  an 
equality  among  all  classes  of  citizens,  and  that  all  shall 
be  subject  to  the  same  punishments  and  the  same  pro 
tection.  Each  state  might  grant  or.  withhold  such 
civil  rights  as  it  pleases;  all  that  the  nation  was  re- 

1 "  The  measure  did  not  militate  against  the  President's  plan 
of  reconstruction.  He  could  have  accepted  it  without  compro 
mising  that  plan  in  the  slightest,  and  it  was  a  monumental 
blunder  on  his  part  that  he  did  not  do  so."  Burgess,  Recon 
struction  and  the  Constitution. 


374     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

quiring  in  the  Civil  Rights  Act  was  that  in  this  respect 
the  laws  shall  be  impartial.1 

The  general  government  in  thus  defining  citizen 
ship,  in  saying  who  should  be  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  requiring  that  state  laws  should  treat 
all  citizens  with  equal  and  impartial  justice,  was  un 
doubtedly  within  its  legal  rights.  The  path  of  its  duty 
was  as  clearly  manifest.  There  is  no  more  sacred 
nor  fundamental  function  for  a  nation  to  perform  than 
to  secure  justice  among  men  and  to  require,  in  the  dis 
pensation  of  justice,  that  men  of  all  kinds  and  ranks 
and  creeds  shall  be  treated  without  discrimination. 

Over  against  the  assertion  of  national  power  and 
duty,  Johnson  set  the  rights  of  equal  states.  The  late 
insurrectionary  states,  according  to  his  view,  were  now 
in  the  Union,  and  South  Carolina  was  entitled  to 
all  such  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  as  Massa 
chusetts  or  any  other  state.  He  regarded  it  as  an 
assumption  of  power  in  Congress  to  attempt  to  make 
freedmen  into  citizens  while  eleven  states  were  unrep 
resented.  Such  an  act,  moreover,  was  a  discrimina 
tion  in  favor  of  the  ignorant  negroes  against  unnatu- 
ralized  foreigners.  The  exercise  of  power  by  the  cen 
tral  government  to  secure  civil  equality  within  the 
states,  he  asserted,  would  destroy  the  Federal  system, 
and  would  be  degrading  to  the  states  and  their  offi 
cials,  while  the  proposed  military  enforcement  of  the 
law  by  national  power  was  unconstitutional. 

There  was  much  fear  among  the  Republicans  that 

1Trumbull,  April  4,  1866,  Globe,  p.  1760.  Tnimbull's  able 
exposition  of  the  purpose  and  scope  of  this  act  seemed  to  leave 
no  tenable  grounds  for  its  opponents  to  stand  on. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN     375 

Johnson's  veto  might  be  sustained.  The  struggle  in 
the  Senate  in  order  to  get  the  necessary  two-thirds 
vote  to  overcome  the  veto  is  one  of  the  most  memorable 
parliamentary  struggles  in  our  history.  The  radical 
cause  was  at  stake  and  the  congressional  leaders  felt 
that  if  they  were  defeated  here  and  the  President's 
veto  were  sustained  they  might  be  defeated  ultimately. 
It  has  been  charged  that  Senator  Stockton's  seat  in  the 
Senate  was  contested  and  declared  vacant  from  this 
motive;  that  Senator  Morrill,  of  Maine,  was  induced 
to  relieve  himself  unfairly  of  a  pair  for  the  sake  of  a 
vote,  and  that  Stevens  brought  about  delay  in  the  con 
gressional  vote  on  the  veto  in  order  to  gain  time  to 
enable  Senator  Edmunds,  of  Vermont,  to  qualify  and 
be  seated  in  place  of  Senator  Foote,  who  had  just  died.1 
There  were  fifty  Senators.  Eleven  of  these  wrere 
Democrats.  Four  of  the  Republicans  were  out-and- 
out  supporters  of  the  President,  while  three  others  were 
inclined  that  way.  The  attitude  of  Willey,  of  West 
Virginia,  and  Morgan,  of  New  York  (who  had  been 
under  the  influence  of  Seward),  was  uncertain,  and  it 
was  therefore  seen  that  the  result  was  in  jeopardy. 
On  the  evening  of  April  5th,  the  minority  proposed 
that  the  vote  on  the  veto  be  postponed  till  the  morrow 
in  order  that  two  of  the  President's  supporters,  Dixon, 
of  Connecticut,  and  Wright,  of  New  Jersey,  who  were 
ill  in  the  capital,  might  be  able  to  attend.  Wright,  an 
swering  the  urgent  call  of  his  party,  had  arrived  in  the 
capital  in  a  feeble  condition,  in  the  care  of  his  son. 
Dixon  was  ready  to  be  carried  in  that  he  might  cast 

1  See  Dewitt's  Impeachment  of  Johnson  and  Flack's  Fourteenth 
Amendment, 


376     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

his  vote  to  sustain  the  President.  It  was  under  these 
circumstances  that  Mr.  Hendricks,  of  Indiana,  speak 
ing  for  the  Democrats,  asked,  as  a  matter  of  comity, 
for  a  postponement  of  the  vote,  saying  that  if  the  sick 
Senators  were  not  able  to  come  on  the  morrow  at  the 
time  fixed  no  further  delay  would  be  asked. 

It  appears  that  the  testing  time  was  at  hand  in  the 
struggle  for  the  two-thirds.  It  was  at  this  time,  when 
"  the  suspense  was  so  heavy  that  business  was  inter 
rupted  and  Senators  were  gathering  in  buzzing  groups 
or  moving  to  and  fro  with  hurried  mien  "  1  that  Ben 
Wade,  of  Ohio,  the  undaunted  radical,  gave  forth  one 
of  his  heated  and  partisan  outbursts  against  the  Presi 
dent  and  his  policy  and  in  favor  of  the  bill.  "  I  view 
this,"  he  said,  "  as  one  of  the  greatest  and  fundamental 
questions  that  ever  came  before  the  Senate.  The 
President  has  no  power  to  interpose  his  authority  to 
prescribe  the  principle  upon  which  these  states  shall 
be  admitted  to  the  Union.  He  is  to  execute  the  laws 
that  we  make.  We  are  to  judge  the  forms  of  govern 
ment  under  which  the  states  shall  exist.  We  are  not 
to  be  wheedled  out  of  this  power  by  the  President. — 
The  great  question  of  congressional  power  and  author 
ity  is  at  stake  here,  and  I  shall  yield  to  no  importunities 
on  the  other  side.  I  will  not  yield  to  these  appeals  to 
comity  on  a  question  like  this ;  but  I  will  tell  the  Presi 
dent  and  everybody  else  that  if  God  Almighty  has 
stricken  one  member  so  that  he  can  not  be  here  to  up 
hold  the  dictation  of  a  despot,  I  thank  Him  for  His  in 
terposition  and  I  will  take  advantage  of  it  if  I  can."  2 


1  Dewitt,  Impeachment  of  Johnson,  p.  8i« 

2  Globe,  April  5,  1866,  p.  1786. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      377 

On  the  other  hand,  Democrats  like  Saulsbury,  of 
Delaware,  equally  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  partisan 
ship  and  afflicted  with  an  unreasoning  prejudice  against 
the  free  negro,  declaimed  against  the  purpose  to  pass 
this  bill  as  a  scheme  to  inaugurate  revolution  and  to 
"  plunge  the  country  again  into  the  horrors  of  civil 
war."  He  warned  the  people  of  the  country  that  they 
should  set  their  house  in  order  to  resist  the  radicals  who 
were  perpetrating  this  great  wrong  and  who  were 
"  trampling  into  dust  the  bleeding,  mangled  body  of  the 
Constitution  of  their  country  lying  in  their  pathway." 
He  thought  that  if  a  state  legislature  passed  a  law  dis 
criminating  between  white  and  black  the  people  of  the 
state  would  never  allow  their  legislature  to  be  dragged 
from  their  legislative  halls  by  free-negro  agents  sent 
by  free-negro  commissioners;  nor  did  he  suppose  that 
an  honest  judiciary  in  a  state  would  observe  "  an  act 
so  flagrantly  unconstitutional."  1 

Rather  than  undergo  an  all  night's  session  the  Sen 
ate  adjourned;  but  on  April  6,  1866,  the  struggle  for 
the  two-thirds  was  won  by  a  single  vote,  and  the  Presi 
dent's  veto  was  overridden.2 

Shorter  work  of  the  veto  was  made  in  the  House. 
The  bill  was  passed  there  under  the  management  of 
Stevens  by  the  application  of  the  previous  question, 
without  debate,  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
two  to  forty-one, —  twenty-one  members  not  voting. 

Stevens  was  like  Wade.  He  had  no  scruples  about 
disregarding  comity  for  the  sake  of  his  cause.  He 

1  Saulsbury  in  the  Senate,  April  6,  1866,  Globe,  p.  1809. 

2  Yeas,  33;  nays,  15;  Dixon  absent;  Morgan  and  Willey  voting 
against  the  President. 


378     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

was  no  doubt  ready  to  resort  to  whatever  strategic 
measures  the  politics  of  the  situation  seemed  to  make 
necessary  in  order  to  compass  the  defeat  of  the  Presi 
dent.  He  spared  no  pains  nor  energy  to  that  end.  He 
believed  that  Johnson's  vetoes  and  his  opposition  to 
Congress  were  leading  ex-Confederates  to  think  that 
the  administration,  with  its  power  and  patronage,  in 
combination  with  the  conservative  Republicans  and  the 
whole  Democratic  party  in  the  North,  would  finally 
enable  them  to  determine  for  themselves  their  own  po 
litical  status  as  well  as  that  of  the  freedmen.  In  Stev 
ens'  mind,  the  leaders  of  the  South  were  still  alive  to 
the  same  old  struggle  as  in  the  days  before  the  war, — 
the  purpose  with  them  was  to  control  the  government. 
It  was  a  struggle  for  power,  and  the  defeated  Con 
federates,  instead  of  accepting  such  conditions  as  a 
conquering  nation  saw  fit  to  impose,  were  now  expect 
ing  that,  on  Johnson's  terms,  they  would  be  restored 
to  control  not  only  in  their  own  states  but  in  the  af 
fairs  of  the  nation.  This,  Stevens  thought,  must  be 
prevented  at  every  hazard.  Stevens  regarded  the  per 
sistent  contention  of  Johnson  that  these  Southerners 
should  have  seats  in  Congress,  as  an  "  arrogant  de 
mand."  It  was  intolerable  that  the  men  of  the  North 
should  be  asked  to  admit  to  the  seats  of  power  the  very 
men  who  had  led  the  Rebellion  for  four  years  against 
the  laws  and  sovereignty  of  the  United  States.  The 
Republican  war  party  in  the  North,  now  in  absolute 
control  in  Congress,  looked  upon  these  Southern  men 
as  "  rebels  "  and  "  traitors,"  whom  they  had  had  to 
fight  for  four  years  in  order  to  save  the  Union  from 
destruction.  The  leopard's  spots  had  not  been 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN     379 

changed  within  a  year  arid  the  purposes  of  these 
"  rebels  "  were  still  unchanged.  They  had  shown  no 
change  of  heart  nor  humbleness  of  spirit.  Was  it 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  this  Republican  majority 
while  they  had  the  power  to  prevent  it,  would  permit 
these  men  to  come  back  into  political  privileges  and 
power  through  a  combination  with  Johnson  and  the 
Northern  Democrats?  These  Northern  Democrats, 
these  Southerners  demanding  their  seats,  and  Johnson 
from  his  high  office, —  all  had  denounced  the  Civil 
Rights  Bill  as  unconstitutional.  If  that  were  true,  it 
was  the  bounden  duty  of  the  Republicans  to  see  to  it 
that  before  the  Southern  States  were  restored  to  their 
political  privileges  there  should  be  such  changes  in  the 
organic  law  of  the  nation  as  would  guarantee  civil 
rights  forever  to  the  freedmen  and  would  make  secure 
and  permanent  the  great  results  of  the  war. 

The  Cjvil  Rights  Bill  was  passed  pyer  the  President's 
veto  by  the  narrowest  margin.  There  were  others, 
however,  aside  from  Johnson  and  his  supporters,  who 
believed  it  was  unconstitutional.  John  A.  Bingham, 
of  Ohio,  an  able  lawyer  and  himself  one  of  the  radical 
leaders,  made  a  long  and  able  argument  against  it, — 
not  against  its  principle,  but  against  the  constitutional 
power  of  Congress  to  pass  it.  He  believed  that,  under 
the  "  Constitution  as  it  was,"  Congress  had  no  power 
to  declare  that  there  should  be  no  discrimination  of 
civil  rights  among  citizens  in  any  state;  that  political 
rights,  such  as  suffrage,  were  embraced  in  the  term  civil 
rights:  and  it  was  known  that  there  was  hardly  a  state 
in  the  Union  but  what  made  some  discrimination  in  its 
laws  on  account  of  race  or  color;  that  the  enforcement 


380      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  the  protection  of  life,  liberty  and 
property,  within  the  states  was  not  one  of  the  dele 
gated  powers  of  Congress,  but  had  been  reserved  to  the 
states.  Bingham  was  easily  able  to  show  that  the  de 
cisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  were  in  harmony  with  his 
argument;  that  while  the  United  States  government 
was  forbidden  to  make  any  discrimination  or  deprive 
any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  this  limitation  did  not  apply  to  the 
states.1 

Other  opponents  of  Johnson  and  friends  of  the 
freedmen,  like  Bingham,  had  grave  doubts  concerning 
the  final  outcome  of  this  legislation.  They  believed 
that  the  principle  of  the  bill  should  be  embraced  in  the 
law  of  every  state,  and  lived  up  to,  and  as  it  was  per 
fectly  obvious  that  the  Southern  States  would  not  give 
equal  rights  to  the  freedmen  of  their  own  accord,  they 
should  be  compelled  to  do  so  by  expressly  prohibiting 
every  state  from  violating  this  principle.  But  the  rem 
edy,  they  contended,  was  not  in  assuming  a  power  not 
delegated,  but  rather  in  an  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion.  While  they  recognized  that  it  might  be  reason 
ably  contended  that  such  powers  pertained  to  Congress 
under  a  broad  construction  of  the  thirteenth  amend 
ment,  on  the  principle  that  slavery  was  nothing  more 
than  extreme  inequality  in  civil  rights  and  that  under 
the  power  to  enforce  its  abolition  all  inequality  might 
be  prevented,  yet  it  was  by  no  means  certain  that  the 
courts  would  take  this  broad  view,  and  the  Civil  Rights 
Act,  if  not  subsequently  repealed  by  a  hostile  Congress, 
might  be  declared  void  by  the  courts. 

1  Barren  vs.  Baltimore,  Globe,  March  9,  1866. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      381 

It  was  these  considerations  that  led  to  the  first  clause 
of  the  fourteenth  amendment.  Stevens  in  discussing 
it1  emphasized  these  considerations.  He  recognized 
that  the  Constitution  limited  only  the  power  of  Con 
gress  to  deny  civil  rights  and  was  not  a  limitation  on 
the  states.  The  amendment  would  supply  that  defect 
and  provide  that  the  law  that  operates  upon  one  man 
shall  operate  equally  upon  all ;  that  which  affords  pro 
tection  to  the  white  man  shall  equally  protect  the  black. 
No  law  shall  have  respect  to  the  color  of  the  skin. 
Stevens  called  the  attention  of  the  House  to  the  fact 
that  the  Civil  Rights  Bill  did  not  make  these  rights 
secure.  "  I  need  hardly  say  that  the  first  time  that 
the  South  with  their  Copperhead  allies  obtain  the  com 
mand  of  Congress  it  will  be  repealed.  The  veto  of 
the  President  and  their  votes  are  conclusive  evidence 
of  that.  The  amendment  once  adopted  can  not  be 
annulled  without  two-thirds  of  Congress  and  that 
they  will  hardly  get.  Yet  some  were  guilty  of  the 
madness  of  proposing  to  readmit  these  states  before 
this  becomes  a  part  of  the  Constitution." 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  principle  underlying 
the  Civil  Rights  Bill  and  here  incorporated  in  the  Con 
stitution,  was  in  harmony  with  fundamental  democracy 
and  righteous  law.  It  means  merely  that  the  law 
should  be  no  respecter  of  persons.  /It  served  notice 
that  the  whites  of  the  South  were  not  to  be  given  spe 
cial  privileges  nor  the  blacks  to  be  visited  with  special 
penalties.  3  It  was  passed  to  secure  legal  protection  to 
the  black  man,  but  its  underlying  purpose  was  broader 

1  May  8,  1866. 

2  Globe,  Vol.  73,  p.  2459,  May  8,  1866. 


382      THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

than  that.  It  sought  to  secure  to  every  man  within 
the  pale  of  national  citizenship  and  under  the  egis  of 
national  law,  equality  of  rights  and  opportunities.  It 
proclaimed  civil  liberty  throughout  the  land  to  all  the 
inhabitants  thereof,  any  law  or  custom  in  any  state  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding.  It  was  democratic  in 
its  spirit,  sound  in  its  political  science,  righteous  in  its 
morality,  since  civil  equality  is  the  first  principle  of 
public  justice.  ( It  is  poor  apology  or  palliation  for  the 
black  codes  of  "the  South  to  plead  that  they  sought 
merely  to  "  set  the  freedmen  apart  as  a  special  class 
with  a  status  at  law  corresponding  to  their  status  in 
fact/'/  as  if  the  law  may  justly  recognize  a  varying 
or  diverse  social  status  among  men.  Under  hateful 
governments  and  in  hateful  times,  the  law  had  recog 
nized  distinctions  in  social  classes.  But  in  setting  up  a 
new  government  in  the  world,  our  fathers  had  made 
it  their  plea  that  they  sought  to  escape  from  such  con 
ditions  and  from  aristrocratic  systems  under  which 
some  men  were  recognized  as  having  been  born  booted 
and  spurred  ready  for  riding,  while  others  were  sad 
dled  and  bridled  ready  to  be  ridden;  under  which  the 
raiment  of  the  toilers  was  prescribed  in  law,  and  the 
toe  of  the  peasant  must  not  come  too  near  the  heel  of 
the  courtier  whose  garments,  as  well  as  whose  privi 
leges,  were  special  and  distinct.  Democracy  in  Amer 
ica,  as  everywhere  in  the  world,  stood  for  a  different 
principle, —  of  equal  and  exact  justice  to  all  men  alike 
before  the  law.  That  was  the  principle  of  the  first 
section  of  the  fourteenth  amendment.  It  was  writ 
ten  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  in  the 
1  Dunning,  Reconstruction,  p.  63. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN     383 

American  Bill  of  Rights, —  that  the  law  is  for  all  alike, 
high  or  low,  rich  or  poor,  white  or  black,  Greek  or 
Barbarian,  Jew  or  Gentile,  and  for  men  of  all  races, 
conditions  and  creeds.1 

This  was  the  principle  of  the  Civil  Rights  Amend 
ment  to  the  Constitution.  To  secure  it  was  but  to 
carry  to  its  natural  fruition  and  completion  the  great 
humanitarian  movement  for  the  emancipation  of  the 
slaves.  The  two  movements  were  one.  With  Thad- 
deus  Stevens,  this  principle  of  human  equality  was  im 
bedded  in  the  marrow  of  his  bones.  He  was  a  demo 
crat.  To  the  cause  of  fundamental  democracy  he  had 
shown  undoubted  loyalty  throughout  a  long  and  stormy 
political  life,  and  for  that  cause,  it  may  readily  be  be 
lieved,  he  stood  ready  to  show  forth  the  last  full  meas 
ure  of  devotion.  It  was  a  noble  cause,  and  in  the  hard 
fighting  for  it,  which  the  men  of  his  day  and  genera 
tion  witnessed,  no  man  struck  harder  blows  nor  proved 
more  faithful  and  efficient  than  Thaddeus  Stevens. 
He  thought  the  time  had  come  in  rebuilding  the  shat 
tered  nation,  to  write  that  principle  into  the  funda 
mental  law  of  the  land,  as  it  had  been  originally  pro 
claimed  in  the  immortal  Declaration  of  Independence. 
He  believed  that  our  fathers  intended  this  great  prin 
ciple  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  to  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  our  government,  and  if  they  had  been 
able  to  base  their  Constitution  upon  it,  it  would  have 
needed  no  amendment,  as  every  human  being  would 
have  had  his  rights  and  would  have  been  equal  to 

1  As  Horace  Greeley  expressed  it,  there  should  be  "  equal 
rights  for  all  alike,  regardless  of  color, —  white,  black,  red, 
brown,  ring-streaked  or  speckled." 


384      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS     , 

every  other  before  the  law.  "  But  it"  so  happened 
when  our1  fathers  came  to  reduce  the  principles  on 
which  they  founded  this  government  into  Order,  in 
shaping  the  organic  law,  an  institution  hot  from  hell 
appeared  among  them,  which  has  been  increasing  in 
volume  and  guilt  ever  since.  This  obstructed  their 
movements  and  caused  postponement  and  compromise. 
But  now  the  time  has  come  when  this  black  popula 
tion  are  to  be  treated  as  our  fathers  declared  by  solemn 
declaration  they  ought  to  be  treated,  or  to  be  op 
pressed  by  us  as  insolent  tyrants,  by  which  ,we  shall 
deserve  the  execration  of  the  human  race.  .  .  .  The 
time  has  come  when  we  can  make  the  Constitution 
what  our  fathers  desired  to  make  it,  when  through 
blood  every  stain  has  been  washed  out  unless  we 
choose  to  reestablish  it."  1 

Referring  to  "  the  utterance  of  one  at  the  other  e*id 
of  the  avenue  "  to  the  effect  that  the  Constitution 
needed  no  amendment,  Stevens  said  he  had  rather  not 
live  than  live  and  be  disgraced  by  such  a  sentiment. 
He  wished  that  we  should  not  continue  to  crush  be 
neath  our  feet  four  millions  of  immortal  men.2 

In  presenting  the  fourteenth  amendment  to  the 
House  and  opening  debate  upon  it  (May  8,  1866), 
Stevens  gave  renewed  expressions  of  devotion  to  these 
principles.  For  a  century  he  said  the  public  mind  had 
been  educated  in  error  which  it  was  difficult  to  unlearn. 
In  rebuilding  it  was  necessary  to  clear  away  the  rotten 
and  defective  portion  of  the  old  foundations.  He 
would  sink  the  new  piles  deep  to  rock  bottom,  and  the 
repaired  edifice  should  stand  upon  the  firm  foundation 
1  Globe,  January  31,  1866.  2  Globe,  January  31,  1866. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      385 

of  eternal  justice.  His  plea  was  for  just  treatment 
to  every  human  being  upon  the  continent,  for  the  great 
democratic  principle  announced  by  Jefferson, — "  equal 
rights  to  all  and  special  privileges  to  none." 

The  second  object  in  view  in  the  congressional  plan 
was  the  readjustment  of  political  power  by  changing 
the  basis  of  representation.  Stevens',  first  proposal  of 
an  amendment  on  this  subject,  offered  in  December, 
provided  that  representation  should  be  based  on  legal 
voters,  none  to  be  named  as  legal  voters  except  natural 
born  citizens  and  naturalized  foreigners.  The  object 
of  this  was  either  to  secure  for  the  negro  the  right  of 
suffrage  or  to  reduce  the  South's  proportion  of  political 
power.  There  were  two  alternatives  to  this  proposi 
tion  having  the  same  root  idea  and  the  same  object  in 
view.  One  was  to  deprive  the  states  of  all  power  to 
discriminate  politically  on  account  of  race  or  color;  the 
second,  to  leave  every  state  perfectly  free  to  decide 
for  itself  who  should  vote  and  belong  to  its  political 
community,  but  in  so  deciding  it  should  by  the  same 
choice  decide  who  shall  enter  into  its  basis  of  repre 
sentation  and  who  shall  be  shut  out.  "  What  a  state 
should  decide  for  itself  in  its  own  affairs  it  should  de 
cide  for  itself  in  its  national  affairs."  l 

Objection  soon  developed  to  basing  representation 
on  voters.  It  might  open  the  door  to  inequalities. 
California  might  let  her  Chinese  and  half-breeds  vote, 
Oregon,  her  Indians,  and  any  state,  its  aliens.  Even 
if  state  legislation  were  uniform,  some  injustice 
might  be  worked  toward  those  states  in  which  the 
women  outnumber  the  men,  from  which  the  young 

1  Conkling,  in  the  House,  January  22,  1866. 


386     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

men  were  going  west  in  quest  of  fortune.  It  was 
thought  that  New  England  would  lose  heavily  by  the 
change  and  it  was  charged  that  "  the  real  objection  to 
the  male  suffrage  basis  was  the  fear  of  taking  away 
power  from  fanatical  New  England."  1  Mr.  Elaine, 
of  Maine,  thought  the  incidental  evils  of  the  amend 
ment  too  great  to  permit  of  its  adoption.  He  at 
tempted  to  show  that  the  ratio  of  voters  to  population 
differed  widely  in  different  sections,  from  a  minimum 
of  nineteen  per  cent,  to  a  maximum  of  fifty-eight  per 
cent,  and  he  asserted  that  the  changes  which  this  fact 
would  work  in  the  relative  representation  of  certain 
states  would  be  "  monstrous."  By  the  apportionment 
S>n  the  census  of  1860,  Vermont  and  California  each 
had  three  members  of  the  House.  On  the  basis  of 
voters,  if  Vermont  retained  three,  California  would 
have  eight.  Ohio,  with  seven  and  a  half  times  the 
population  of  California,  would  have  little  more  than 
two  and  a  half  times  the  representation,  while  New 
York,  with  eleven  times  the  population,  would  have 
but  five  times  the  representation.  On  the  new  basis, 
if  Massachusetts  retained  her  ten  votes  in  the  House, 
Indiana  would  have  fifteen  instead  of  eleven,  while  if 
Indiana  retained  eleven,  Massachusetts  would  have  but 
seven. 

Mr.  Elaine  disclaimed  offering  his  objection  on  ac 
count  of  the  interest  of  his  section,  but  it  is  difficult 
to  believe  that  this  consideration  did  not  enter  in.  Mr. 
Elaine  argued  also  that  the  first  proposal  of  Stevens 
would  tend  to  cheapen  the  suffrage  everywhere.  The 

1  Conkling,  in  the  House,  January  22,  1866.  This  is  not 
quoted  as  Conkling's  opinion. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      387 

states  would  scramble  to  increase  their  voters ;  all  con 
servative  restrictions  would  be  stricken  down,  and  the 
ballot  would  be  demoralized  and  disgraced.  Mr. 
Elaine  professed  anxiety  to  accomplish  the  end  in  view, 
that  is,  to  deprive  the  South  of  representation,  but  he 
thought  it  could  be  done  without  imposing  these  of 
fensive  inequalities  among  the  other  states.  He  in 
sisted  that  population  should  be  retained  as  the  basis 
of  representation,  and  he  proposed  a  wording  for  the 
amendment  to  the  effect  that  the  population  should  be 
determined  "  by  taking  the  whole  number  of  persons 
except  those  to  whom  civil  or  political  rights  are  denied 
or  abridged  by  the  Constitution,  and  laws  of  any  state 
on  account  of  race  or  color."  Mr.  Conkling  showed 
by  elaborate  tables  that  Mr.  Elaine's  calculation  was 
without  foundation,  that  it  had  no  practical  bearing 
and  that  the  preponderance  of  men  over  women  in  any 
state  (except  California,  whose  population  was  ab 
normal  and  exceptional)  was  too  small  seriously  to 
affect  the  result.1 

The  discussion  in  public  and  in  conference  of  the 
committee  of  fifteen  showed  that  the  states  would  not 
accept  the  voting  basis  and  Stevens  was  compelled  to 
surrender  it,  though  he  said  it  was  "  dear  to  his  heart." 
It  would  have  been  practically  self-executing  and 
would  more  certainly  have  accomplished  its  purpose 
than  the  provision  that  was  finally  adopted,  as  later 
experience  has  shown. 

The  second  alternative,  that  of  prohibiting  the  states 
from  denying  suffrage  and  political  rights,  on  account 
of  race  to  any  class  of  persons  within  their  borders 

1  Globe,  January  22,  1866. 


388      THE  LIFE  OF.  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ran  counter  to  the  wish  of  the  states  to  regulate  their 
own  affairs  in  their  own  way.  Most  of  the  Northern 
states  did  not  permit  negroes  to  vote,  some  having  re 
peatedly  and  lately  pronounced  against  it.  It  was 
futile  to  ask  three-fourths  of  the  states  to  assent  to 
such  an  amendment.  They  wrould  not  do  it.  In  con 
sequence  of  this  obvious  fact,  the  congressional  lead 
ers  on  the  Reconstruction  Committee  resorted  to  the 
third  alternative.  They  would  base  representation  on 
population,  but  they  would  count  out  the  blacks  in  the 
representation  if  any  of  them  were  counted  out  in  the 
voting.  On  behalf  of  the  committee,  Mr.  Qonkling, 
of  New  York,  first  presented  the  amendment  to  trie 
House,  providing  that  representatives  and  direct 
taxes  should  be  apportioned  among  the  several  states 
"  according  to  the  whole  number  of  persons  in  each 
state,  provided,  that  whenever  the  elective  franchise 
shall  be  denied  or  abridged  in  any  state  on  account  of 
race  or  color,  all  individuals  of  such  race  or  color-shall 
be  excluded  from  the  basis  of  representation."  If  any 
were  cut  out  of  voting  on  account  of  race,  the  whole 
race  should  be  omitted  in  determining  the  basis  of 
representation. 

The  principle  of  this  amendment,  as  Mr.  Conkling 
defined  it  in  his  very  able  speech,  was  that  representa 
tion  does  not  belong  to  those  who  have  no  political 
existence,  but  to  those  who  have,  and  it  therefore  pro 
vides  that  whenever  any  state  finds  within  its  borders 
a  race  of  beings  unfit  for  political  existence,  that  race 
shall  not  be  represented  in  the  federal  government. 
Every  state  was  left  ,fr£e^to..exteiid.,ox_^ritiiliold..-.the 
elective  franchise  on  such  terms  as  it  pleases  arid  this 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      389 

without  losing  anything  in  representation  if  the  terms 
are  impartial  as  to  all.1 

On  January  31,  1866,  St£vejns_sj>o^ 
length  in  support  of  the  amendment  inJhis^Qrm.  He 
held  it  to  Kethe  right  of  the  states,  as  it  always  had 
been,  to  fix  the  qualifications  for  suffrage.  He  af 
firmed  that  the  amendment  neither  granted  nor  took 
away  any  privilege  from  any  state  in  this  matter.  It 
did,  however,  punish  the  abuse  of  that  privilege.  If 

qualification  for 


instead  of  getting  nineteen  states,  which  is 
necessary  to  ratify  this  amendment,  I  venture  to  say 
you  could  not  get  five  in  this  union."  ...  It  says  to 
the  Slave  States,  "  True,  we  leave,  where  it  has  been 
left  for  eighty  years,  the  right  to  fix  the  elective  fran 
chise,  but  you  must  not  abuse  it;  if  you  do  the  Con 
stitution  will  impose  a  penalty,  and  will  continue  to 
impose  it  till  you  have  corrected  your  actions."     If  a 
state  abused  the  suffrage  and  kept  it  from  "  the  only 
loyal  people  there,"  the  Constitution  says  to  such  a 
state,  "  You  shall  lose  power  in  the  halls  of  the  nation, 
and  you  shall  remain  where  you  are,  a  shriveled  and 
dried  up  nonentity  instead  of  being  the  lords  of  crea 
tion,  as  you  have  been,  so  far  as  America  is  concerned 
for  years  past."     Reduce  their  power   from  eighty- 
three  to   forty-five  votes  in  this  hall,  and  then  "  let 
them  have  all  the  Copperhead  assistance  they  can  get, 
liberty  will  still  be  triumphant."     He_preferred  ;  thisjo 
immediate    enfranchisement   of    the   negroes    and   he 
thought   "  no   more   ieYeEEI^nisHmerit  ......  .could  be__in- 

flicted."     For  if  you  make__thejn.  .all  voters  and  let 

^UH»f-.-^  ~~~~  ~~         "  -  ~-  ~"~          " 

1  Conkling,  January  22,  1866. 


390     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

them  into  this  hall  not  one  beneficial  act  for  the  benefit 
of  the  freedmen  or  for  the  benefit  of  the  country  could 
ever  be  passed.  Their  eighty-three  votes,  "  with  the 
Representatives  of  the  Five  Points  *  and  other  dark 
corners,  would  be  sufficient  to  overrule  the  friends  of 
progress  here,  and  this  nation  would  be  in  the  hands 
of  secessionists  at  the  very  next  election." 

He  would  not  impose  the  suffrage  on  the  freedmen 
for  some  years  to  come,  until  Christian  men  had  gone 
among  them  to  teach  them  the  principles  and  duties 
of  citizenship,  and  until  "  Congress  had  done  the  great 
work  of  regenerating  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
country  according  to  the  principles  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence."  .He  objects  to  allowing  the  blacks 
to  be  counted  as  fast  as  they  were  admitted  to  the  suf 
frage  2  on  the  ground  that  the  ex-Confederates  would 
admit  only  their  menials  and  such  as  they  could  control. 
But  when  they  were  ready  to  say  to  all  freedmen, 
"  You  are  men  and  shall  be  represented,"  then  let 
them  come  here.  "  I  shall  not  be  here  to  see  them  as 
I  did  their  masters,  who  a  few  years  since  drew  pis 
tols  and  daggers  upon  me  when  I  was  making  such  a 
speech  as  this,  yet  a  free  people  will  be  here  repre 
sented  and  they  will  take  care  of  themselves."  3 

This  second  cause  for  which  Congress  was  standing, 
though  not  so  fundamental,  was  yet  like  a  corollary 
to  the  first.  It  was  entirely  defensible  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  men  who  had  conducted  the  war  for  the 
Union.  To  them,  having  gone  through  a  terrible 

1  The  slums  in  New  York. 

2  According  to  the  proposal  offered  by  Mr.  Schenck,  of  Ohio. 

3  Globe,  January  31,  1866. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN     391 

struggle  against  men  who  had  misused  their  power  to 
destroy  the  unity  of  the  nation,  it  was  very  natural  to 
ask,  "  Shall  a  premium  be  placed  upon  rebellion  ?  " 
The  master  class  of  the  South,  having  appealed  to  the 
sword  when  they  were  voted  out  of  power, —  should 
these  now  be  allowed,  as  the  result  of  the  war,  to  come 
back  into  the  Union  with  more  political  power  than 
they  had  before?  If  it  be  said  that  this  readjustment 
was  inspired  by  a  party  motive  to  secure  party  power, 
it  may  very  well  be  asked  if  any  political  party  could 
reasonably  be  expected  to  make  a  voluntary  surrender 
of  power  to  its  opponents.  The  prospective  combina 
tion  of  Southern  and  Northern  Democrats,  each  wing 
of  the  party  supporting  Johnson's  reconstruction,  was 
apparent.  Could  the  Republicans  of  the  North  be  ex 
pected  to  say  to  the  men  of  the  South,  "  Come  back 
into  the  Union  and  you  shall  enjoy  a  larger  voice  and 
a  greater  weight  in  the  councils  of  the  nation  than  you 
have  ever  known  "  ?  On  the  basis  of  white  population, 
South  Carolina  was  entitled  to  but  two  representatives 
in  Congress.  If  all  the  blacks  were  counted  for  rep 
resentation  while  the  whites  exercised  all  the  political 
power,  then  two  white  voters  in  that  state  would  equal 
in  political  weight  at  Washington  five  white  voters 
at  the  North.  Was  it  reasonable  to  expect  that  "  one 
pardoned  rebel  of  South  Carolina  who  may  have 
fought  for  four  years  against  the  government  shall,  in 
political  power,  alike  on  the  floor  of  Congress,  and  in 
electing  a  President,  outweigh  three  returned  Union 
soldiers"  in  New  Jersey  or  Ohio?1  Should  127,000 
white  people  in  New  York  have  but  one  voice  and  one 
1  Kelley,  in  the  House,  January  22,  1866,  Globe,  p.  354. 


392      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

vote  in  Congress,  while  the  same  number  in  Mississippi 
should  have  three?  Shall  twenty-eight  votes  be  cast 
in  the  Electoral  College  by  the  white  men  of  the 
South  on  behalf  of  those  whom  they  are  unwilling  to 
admit  to  any  part  or  lot  in  their  own  government? 
"  Shall  the  death  of  slavery  add  two-fifths  to  the  en 
tire  power  which  slavery  had  when  slavery  was  liv- 
ing?  "  ' 

To  the  Northern  mind  these  questions  carried  their 
own  answers.  There  was  absolutely  no  defense  for 
such  proposals.  The  Union  soldiers  and  the  people 
of  the  North  had  some  opinions  upon  that  subject,  and 
it  was  to  the  effect  that  if  Congress  permitted  such  an 
injustice,  it  would  be  guilty  of  such  recreancy  as  would 
deserve  the  severest  anathemas  that  even  a  vocabu 
lary  as  hot  as  that  of  Thaddeus  Stevens  ever  made  it 
possible  for  man  to  utter.  Nothing  can  be  plainer 
than  that  up°2.  that^subject  Stevens  andjthe  radicals 
voiced  the  public  sentiments  of  the  North.  Their  ac 
tion  responded  to  the  fundamental  sense  of  justice  cm- 
bedded  in  the  heart  of  every  man,2  The  principle 
that  the  leaders  of  the  House  were  thus  seeking  to 
establish  was  clear.  The  government  of  every  politi 
cal  society  belonged  to  its  members.  If  the  South 
would  enlarge  the  membership  of  its  political  so 
cieties,  it  could  have  the  increased  power;  otherwise 
not,  and  on  that  proposition  the  congressional  leaders 

1  Conkling,  January  22,  1866,  Globe. 

2  This   is   still  true  of   Northern   sentiment,  and   it  is  perhaps 
more  pronouncedly  so  than  when  the  passions  of  war  were  still 
warm.     "  At  the  present  day,"  says   Mr.   Rhodes,  "  the  strength 
of  the  argument  and  the   essential  justice  of  the  measure  will 
at  the  North  be  hardly  questioned."     History  of  United  States, 
Vol.  V,  p.  609. 


CHARLES  SUMNER,  1811-1874. 

Senator  from  Massachusetts. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN     393 

were  ready  to  appeal  to  the  country.  It  was  one  of 
the  mistakes  of  reconstruction,  though  it  was  no  fault 
of  Thaddeus  Stevens,  that  the  congressional  policy  of 
preventing  an  unjust  apportionment  of  representation 
and  political  power  was  not  made  permanently  effect 
ive  by  a  constitutional  provision  that  would  have  been 
self -operative  and  not  dependent  upon  the  coopera 
tion  of  the  states  or  the  subsequent  will  of  Congress. 
This  end  could  have  been  accomplished  if  representa 
tion  had  been  based  as  Stevens  desired  upon  the  voting 
strength  of  the  respective  states. 

Following  Stevens'  speech  on  January  3ist  the 
House  passed  the  amendment  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty  to  forty-six,  sixteen  memBeTs  not  voting. 
The  resolution  was  defeated  in  the  Senate  on  March 
9th,1  largely  through  the  opposition  of  Sumner  who 
spoke  repeatedly,  and  on  one  occasion  for  four  hours, 
against  it.  He  arraigned  it  in  excited  and  exaggerated 
rhetoric,  denouncing  it  as  "  utterly  reprehensible," 
"  unpardonable,"  "  worse  than  the  crime  against  Kan 
sas  or  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,"  "  obnoxious  to  reason 
and  justice."  Sumner  knew  "  no  language  adequate 
to  depict  its  character."  Its  words  were  "  words  of 
defilement."  It  "violated  the  national  faith,"  "dis 
honored  the  name  of  the  republic,"  "  imperiled  the  na 
tional  peace."  It  was  "  bad  as  bad  could  be,"  "  treach 
erous,"  "  shocking  to  the  moral  sense,"  a  "  master 
piece  of  ingratitude,"  and  a  wrong  to  the  freedman 
who  had  defended  the  republic  in  arms. 

The  amendment  was  all  this,  in  Sumner's  mind,  be 
cause  it  did  not  directly  guarantee  suffrage  to  the  negro 

1  Yeas,  25 ;  nays,  22 ;  falling  considerable  short  of  two-thirds. 


394     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

by  national  authority.  It  fell  short  of  his  ideal,  his 
theory  about  the  rights  of  man.  He,  therefore,  held 
it  up  to  execration  as  another  "  compromise  "  and  con 
cession,  still  permitting  the  states  to  oppress  the  negro, 
admitting  the  idea  of  inequality  of  rights  founded  on 
race  and  color,  sanctioning  "  the  tyranny  of  taxation 
without  representation,"  recognizing  an  oligarchy  of 
aristocracy  and  caste,  unduly  conceding  state  rights, 
and  fostering  the  arrogant  pretension  of  a  white  man's 
government.  As  a  means  of  inducing  the  Southerners 
to  enfranchise  the  blacks,  it  was  but  a  bribe  that  would 
not  prove  alluring;  and  as  a  means  of  depriving  the 
South  of  power,  it  would  prove  deceptive  as  there  were 
tricks  of  evasion  that  would  be  effective. 

Sumner  preferred  to  base  representation  on  suffrage, 
as  Stevens  had  at  first  suggested.  This,  as  he  con 
tended,  would  admit  to  the  Constitution  none  of  the 
base  concessions  now  proposed.  He  had  introduced 
a  proposition  for  the  suffrage  basis  into  the  previous 
Congress,  to  be  accompanied  with  a  guarantee  of  civil 
and  political  equality  of  all  persons  before  the  law.  If 
the  suffrage  basis  should  transfer  power  from  the 
Eastern  to  the  Western  States,  as  some  of  his  New 
England  colleagues  had  contended,  Sumner  felt  that  it 
"  were  better  to  suffer  wrong  ourselves  than  to  do 
wrong  to  others." 

Sumner's  empyrean  idealism  was  more  obstructive 
than  consistent.  Later  he  was  compelled  to  accept  a 
form  of  this  amendment  more  objectionable  than  that 
which  he  was  now  seeking  to  talk  to  death,  while  he 
showed  how  sadly  lacking  he  was  in  that  common  sense 
and  sagacity  that  leads  a  statesman  to  accept  progress 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN     395 

toward  his  goal  though  he  may  not  reach  the  end  at 
a  single  bound.  Stevens  appears  both  wiser  and  nobler 
by  comparison  in  this  conflict  of  plans  and  purposes 
between  these  two  extreme  radical  chieftains  in  Sen 
ate  and  House.1 

After  its  failure  in  the  Senate,  the  amendment  was 
recast  by  the  committee,  and  the  next  time  it  appeared 
in  the  House  it  was  in  the  form  of  the  second  section 
of  the  fourteenth  amendment.  Stevens  reported  this 
amendment  to  the  House  on  April  30,  1866,  and  on 
May  8th,  he  spoke  at  some  length  on  it.  He  called 
attention  to  the  hard  labors  the  committee  had  had  to 
undergo.  He  referred  to  the  amendment  on  repre 
sentation  as  it  had  passed  the  House  in  January,  and 
had  gone  to  the  other  end  of  the  Capitol,  "  there  to  be 
mortally  wounded  in  the  house  of  its  friends."  This 
second  form  of  the  amendment  was  not  so  good  as 
the  first  that  Stevens  had  offered  in  December.  The 
third  form  that  now  appeared  was  still  worse.  The 
first  form,  basing  representation  on  votes,  would  have 
been  self-executing  and  effective.  The  second  form, 
which  was  sent  to  its  death  in  the  Senate,  provided  that 
if  one  of  the  injured  race  was  excluded,  the  state  was 
to  forfeit  the  right  to  have  any  of  that  race  counted 
in  representation.  That  would  more  likely  have  has 
tened  the  freedmen's  enfranchisement. 

1This  conflict  between  Stevens  and  Sumner  will  serve  to 
illustrate  how  the  diverse  and  composite  sections  of  the  four 
teenth  amendment  came  to  be  incorporated  by  Congress  into 
one  article.  Probably  no  one  article  by  itself  would  have  been 
acceptable  to  a  two-thirds  majority  in  Congress  and  the  requi 
site  number  of  states;  combined,  or  as  a  series  of  measures  like 
the  parts  of  the  Omnibus  Bill  of  1850,  they  were  able  to  secure 
the  necessary  support. 


396      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 


The  seclioiLin^its  third  fo£m^allowedM>th£^stat£s  to 
discriminate  and  to  receive  credit  in  representation  in 
proportion  to  the  number  admitted  to  the  suffrage. 
This  Stevens  disliked.  The  language  in  which  he  re 
viewed  the  struggle  must  have  made  Sumner  wince, 
as  he  heard  or  read  the  biting  words.  Stevens  recog 
nized  even  the  last  form  of  the  amendment  as  a  short 
step  forward,  and  he  was  ready  to  take  it.  But  "  the 
large  stride,"  he  said,  "  which  we  in  vain  proposed,  is 
dead  ;  the  murderers  must  answer  to  the  suffering  race. 
I  wrould  not  have  been  the  perpetrator.  A  load  of 
misery  must  sit  heavy  on  their  souls."  He  came  upon 
Sumner  directly  for  his  agency  in  the  defeat  of  the 
former  amendment,  saying  that  it  had  been  "  slaugh 
tered  by  a  puerile  and  pedantic  criticism,  by  a  perver 
sion  of  philological  definition  which,  if  when  I  taught 
school,  a  lad  who  had  studied  Lindley  Murray  had  as 
sumed,  I  would  have  expelled  him  from  the  institu 
tion  as  unfit  to  waste  education  upon.  But  it  is  dead, 
and,  unless  this  shall  pass,  its  death  has  postponed  the 
protection  of  the  colored  race  perhaps  for  ages.  I 
confess  my  mortification  at  its  defeat.  I  grieved 
especially  because  it  almost  closed  the  door  of  hope 
for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition  of  the  freedmen. 
But  men  in  pursuit  of  justice  must  never  despair.  Let 
us  again  try  and  see  whether  we  can  not  devise  some 
way  to  overcome  the  united  forces  of  self-righteous 
Republicans  and  unrighteous  Copperheads.  It  will  not 
do  for  those  who  for  thirty  years  have  fought  the 
beasts  at  Ephesus  to  be  frightened  by  the  fangs  of 
modern  catamounts."  * 

1  Globe,  May  8,  1866,  Vol.  73,  p.  8. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      397 

Stevens  was  a  practical  legislator.  He  made  no 
parade  of  his  conscience  nor  heralded  his  superior  vir 
tue,  as  Sumner  seemed  prone  to  do.  He  would  not, 
any  more  than  Sumner,  surrender  a  principle  vital  to 
justice.  But  in  an  attack  on  an  intrenched  enemy, 
he  would  resort  to  flanking  tactics  rather  than  march 
full  in  the  face  of  a  destructive  fire  merely  to  exhibit 
his  conscience  and  his  courage.  If  he  could  not  at 
once  get  all  he  desired,  he  was  willing  to  take  all  he 
could  get.  His  method  was  clearly  the  part  of  prac 
tical  statesmanship.  In  this  last  rampart  to  which  he 
was  driven  by  the  repeated  changes  of  the  amend 
ment  that  was  so  near  to  his  heart,  he  was  ready  still 
to  defend  the  cause  for  which  he  was  striving.  He 
expected  that  under  the  clause  in  its  final  form,  the 
rebel  states  would  be  greatly  reduced  in  power.  He 
thought  that  the  Southern  pride  would  not  long  brook 
being  reduced  to  a  hopeless  minority.  It  might  take 
"  two,  three,  possibly  five,  years  before  they  conquer 
their  prejudices  sufficiently  to  allow  their  late  slaves 
to  become  their  equals  at  the  polls."  In  the  meantime 
the  freedmen  would  become  more  enlightened  and 
more  fit  for  the  duties  of  citizenship.  Meanwhile, 
also,  these  states  could  be  reconstituted  and  within 
them,  "  the  muniments  of  freedom  may  be  built  high 
and  firm ;  "  and  until  their  states  are  loyal  they  can 
have  no  standing  here.1 

1  Globe,  May  8,  1866,  p.  2460.  Any  amount  of  evidence  could 
be  adduced  to  show  that  the  country  was  much  more  radical 
than  their  representatives  in  Congress,-*- that  that  body  was 
lagging  behind  and  needed  the  prod  that  Stevens  was  disposed 
to  apply  to  keep  it  abreast  of  the  people.  Wendell  Phillips 
wrote  to  Stevens  under  date  of  April  30,  1866 :  "  I  see  the 
report  of  the  Reconstruction  Committee.  It  is  a  fatal  and  total 


398     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

The  third  object  that  Congress  had  in  view  in  re 
jecting  the  plan  of  the  President,  was  to  exclude  from 
office  and  power  the  leaders  of  the  Confederacy.  The 
congressional  leaders,  and  in  this  they  clearly  reflected 
the  sentiment  of  the  North,  were  not  satisfied  to  have 
the  ex-Confederates  immediately  resume  the  functions 
of  government  in  state  or  nation.  It  was  felt  that 
the  Rebellion  was  a  great  crime  and  that  its  guilty 
leaders  should  suffer  punishment.  Indemnity  for  the 
past,  security  for  the  future, —  this  seemed  only  a  rea 
sonable  demand.  The  wrong  to  the  negro  had  been 
righted  as  far  as  possible  in  the  provisions  described. 
How  could  the  future  be  made  secure,  if  the  very  men 
who  had  committed  the  wrong  were  to  be  restored  to 
honor  and  power?  Accordingly,  another  amendment 
was  proposed  which  was  punitive  and  preventive  in 
purpose  and  character.  This  section  of  the  fourteenth 
amendment,  as  first  reported  by  Stevens,1  provided 
that  until  July  4,  1870,  "  all  persons  who  voluntarily 
adhered  to  the  late  insurrection,  giving  it  aid  and  com 
fort,  shall  be  excluded  from  the  right  to  vote  for  rep 
resentation  in  Congress,"  and  for  President  and  Vice- 
President.  This  was  a  political  punishment  for  a  po 
litical  crime.  The  amendment  did  not  disqualify  those 

surrender.  The  South  carries  off  enough  of  the  victory  to  en 
able  her  to  control  the  nation,  mold  its  policy  and  shape  its 
legislation  for  a  dozen  years  to  come.  Twenty  years  of  admir 
ing  trust  in  your  anti-slavery  devotion  must  be  my  apology  for 
urging  you  to  protest  against  this  suicidal  step.  It  is  not  neces 
sary.  The  country  is  ready  for  its  duty.  It  only  needs  leaders. 
Do  not  let  the  Republican  party  desert  its  post.  Or,  if  that 
must  be,  let  the  statesmen,  the  '  practical  statesmen '  of  the 
nation,  be  true  to  their  duty.  .  .  .  The  people  are  ready  to  sup 
port  all  Accessary  measures.  With  leaders  they  will  open  no 
door  which  does  not  admit  all  races."  Stevens'  Letters. 
1  April  30,  1866. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      399 

who  had  aided  the  Confederacy  from  holding  federal 
or  state  office,  nor  from  voting  in  state,  county,  or 
town  elections.  But  for  four  years  they  were  to  be 
barred  from  taking  part  in  choosing  the  national  rulers. 

Stevens  saw  that  there  would  be  some  difference  of 
opinion  within  his  own  party  on  this  subject.  His 
only  objection  to  the  provision  was  that  it  was  too  len 
ient.  He  would  increase  its  severity  by  extending  the 
time  of  exclusion  to  1870  and  by  letting  it  apply  to  all 
elections,  local  as  well  as  national.  In  wonted  sar 
casm  he  decried  such  severity  as  had  lately  been  de 
nounced  upon  the  "  traitors  "  by  a  certain  executive 
officer,  referring  to  "  the  late  lamented  Andrew  John 
son  of  blessed  memory."  He  regarded  the  proposed 
punishment  as  the  "  mildest  ever  inflicted  on  traitors," 
and  he  deplored  "  the  morbid  sensibility  sometimes 
called  mercy,  which  affects  a  few  of  all  classes  from 
the  priest  to  the  clown,  which  has  more  sympathy  for 
the  murderer  on  the  gallows  than  for  his  victim."  "  I 
hope  I  have,"  he  said,  "  a  heart  as  capable  of  feeling 
for  human  woe  as  others.  I  have  long  since  wished 
that  capital  punishment  were  abolished.  But  I  have 
never  dreamed  that  all  punishment  could  be  dispensed 
with  in  human  society.  Anarchy,  treason,  and  vio 
lence  would  reign  triumphant."  1 

In  the  course  of  the  debate  on  this  part  of  the 
amendment,  a  division  developed  on  the  Republican 
side  of  the  House  over  the  wisdom  of  this  section. 
John  A.  Bingham,  of  Ohio,  expressed  the  opinion  that 
it  brought  no  strength  to  the  amendment,  that  it  might 
endanger  adoption  by  the  states,  that  it  would  be  dif- 

1  Globe,  May  8,  1866. 


400     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ficult  of  execution  and  would  be  distasteful  to  have 
Federal  officers  controlling  elections  within  the  states. 
"  Each  state,"  says  the  Constitution,  "  shall  appoint 
electors  in  such  manners  as  the  legislature  thereof 
may  direct."  It  was  urged  by  Bingham  that  until  this 
clause  of  the  Constitution  was  stricken  out,  the  third 
section  of  the  proposed  amendment  was  useless  and 
could  never  be  executed.  To  retain  it  would  be  sim 
ply  to  "  furnish  demogagues  a  pretext  for  raising  the 
howl  that  we  exclude  rebels  for  four  years  only  that 
we  may  control  the  next  presidential  election." 

Bingham  was  an  ardent  supporter  of  the  amend 
ment  as  a  whole,  and  the  force  of  his  attack  on  this 
objectionable  section,  and  the  source  from  which  it 
came,  aroused  the  fire  of  Stevens.  In  closing  the  de 
bate  he  came  to  a  vigorous  defense  of  the  proposal, 
which  he  pronounced  "  the  vital  proposition  of  them 
all."  He  was  not  gratified  to  see  "  division  among 
our  friends."  If  the  third  section  be  stricken  out  he 
said  he  "  cared  not  the  snap  of  the  finger  whether  the 
amendment  be  passed  or  not,"  for  in  that  case,  before 
the  amendment  can  be  put  into-  operation,  "  that  side 
of  the  House  will  be  filled  with  yelling  secessionists 
and  hissing  Copperheads.  Give  us  the  third  section 
or  give  us  nothing." 

As  to  the  party  motive,  he  had  no  compunction  nor 
hesitation, —  he  would  rally  to  his  party  to  save  the 
Union.  "  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  it  at  once, —  that 
section  is  there  to  save  or  destroy  the  Union  by  the 
salvation  or  destruction  of  the  Union  party.  Gen 
tlemen  tell  us  this  provision  is  too  strong.  ...  It  is 
too  lenient  for  my  hard  heart.  Not  only  to  1870  but 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      401 

to  18,070  every  rebel  who  shed  the  blood  of  loyal  men 
should  be  prevented  from  exercising  any  power  in  this 
government."  He  believed  that  the  men  who  had  fos 
tered  and  led  in  rebellion  deserved  humiliation  and 
degradation,  that  none  ever  deserved  it  more.  He 
would  not  welcome  them  back  as  brothers  immediately, 
but  they  should  come  as --supplicants  in  sackcloth  and 
ashes.  He  would  have  a  period  of  probation  and  for 
give  only  when  forgiveness  had  been  asked.  The 
Great  Dispenser  of  mercy  forgives  only  on  those  con 
ditions  ;  why  should  the  rulers  of  the  republic  do  more  ? 
The  common  jailbirds  who  had  committed  such  little 
acts  as  arson  and  larceny  were  not  half  so  bloody  and 
had  not  committed  half  so  many  crimes  as  these  "  reb 
els,"  whom  Johnson  and  his  supporters  were  urging 
should  be  immediately  readmitted  to  seats  in  Congress. 
"  For  my  part  I  am  willing  they  shall  come  in  when 
they  are  ready.  But  do  not,  I  pray  you,  admit  those 
who  have  slaughtered  half  a  million  of  your  country 
men  until  their  clothes  are  dried,  and  until  they  are 
reclad.  I  do  not  wish  to  sit  side  by  side  with  men 
whose  garments  smell  of  the  blood  of  my  kindred. 
Gentlemen  seem  to  forget  the  scenes  that  were  enacted 
here  years  ago,  .  .  .  when  the  men  that  you  propose 
to  admit  occupied  the  other  side  of  the  House,  when 
the  mighty  Toombs,  with  his  shaggy  locks,  headed  a 
gang  who  with  shouts  of  defiance  on  this  floor,  ren 
dered  this  a  hell  of  legislation. 

"  Ah,  sir,  it  was  but  six  short  years  ago  when  they 
were  here,  just  before  they  went  out  to  join  the  armies 
of  Catiline,  just  before  they  left  this  hall.  Those  of 
you  who  were  here  then  will  remember  the  scene  in 


402     THE  LIFE  OK  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

which  every  Southern  member,  encouraged  by  their 
allies,  came  forth  in  one  yelling  body,  because  a  speech 
for  freedom  was  being  made  here,  when  weapons  were 
drawn  and  Barksdale's  bowie-knife  gleamed  before  our 
eyes.  Would  you  have  these  men  back  again  so  soon 
to  reenact  those  scenes  ?  Wait  until  I  am  gone,  I  pray 
you ;  I  want  not  to  go  through  it  again." 

When  asked  by  Thayer,  of  New  York,  if  he  thought 
of  building  a  penitentiary  large  enough  to  hold  eight 
million  people,  he  said  he  would  keep  them  from  the 
halls  of  Congress  by  the  bayonet  if  need  be,  and  "  if 
they  undertake  to  come  here  we  will  shoot  them"  as 
they  deserve, —  so  incredible  and  incongruous  did  it 
seem  to  him  that  these  men  should  offer  credentials  as 
legislators  for  the  nation  against  which  they  had  been 
so  lately  in  arms.  "If  the  gentleman  had  remembered 
the  scenes  twenty  years  ago,  when  no  man  dared  to 
speak  without  risking  his  life,  when  but  few  men  did 
do  it  —  for  there  were  cowards  in  those  days  as  there 
are  in  these  —  you  would  not  have  found  them  asking 
to  bring  these  men  in,  and  I  only  wonder  that  my 
friend  from  Ohio  (Mr.  Bingham)  should  intimate  a 
desire  to  bring  them  here."  When  Bingham  protested 
that  he  had  no  such  desire  and  that  the  section  under 
discussion  did  not  touch  the  question  of  their  coming, 
since  it  disqualified  them  only  as  voters,  Stevens  re 
joined, — "  Then  why  do  you  oppose  it?  If  it  is  going 
to  hurt  nobody,  in  God's  name  let  it.  remain.  If  it  is 
going  to  hurt  anybody  it  will  be  the  men  that  deserve 
it."  1 

The  amendment  passed  the  House  in  the  form  pro- 

1  Globe,  May  10,  1866. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      403 

posed,  on  May  10,  I866.1  Stevens'  onslaught  had 
pressed  down  opposition  in  the  House.  But  when  the 
amendment  came  to  the  Senate  this  clause  was  changed 
to  the  form,  substantially,  as  it  now  appears  in  the 
fourteenth  amendment.  That  is,  instead  of  disqual 
ifying  for  suffrage  for  four  years  the  rank  and  file  of 
those  engaged  in  the  Confederacy,  it  made  their  lead 
ers  ineligible  to  office,  with  the  provision  that  Congress 
by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  each  house  might  remove  such 
disability. 

Such  was  the  final  form  of  the  punitive  clause  pro 
posed  for  the  fourteenth  amendment,  the  only  punish 
ment  proposed  by  a  triumphant  government  on  those 
who  for  four  years  of  war  had  attempted  the  dismem 
berment  of  the  Union  and  the  overthrow  of  its  power.2 

A  fourth  section  of  the  new  amendment  sought  one 
other  guarantee  for  the  future,  which  indicates  the 
fourth  feature  of  the  congressional  plan.  As  it  passed 
the  House  it  guaranteed  that  neither  the  United  States 
nor  any  state  should  ever  assume  or  pay  any  debt  con 
tracted  in  aid  of  the  Rebellion,  nor  any  claim  for  an 
emancipated  slave.  The  Senate  added  that  all  such 
debts,  obligations  and  claims  should  be  illegal  and  void, 
and  added  a  guarantee  of  the  validity  of  the  public 
debt  of  the  United  States,  including  the  debts  for  pen 
sions  and  bounties  contracted  for  services  in  suppress 
ing  the  Rebellion.  The  Senate  also  added  to  the  first 
section  the  well-known  definition  of  citizenship, —  that 
"  all  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the  United  States, 

1  By  a  vote  of  128  to  37;  19  members  not  voting. 

2 "  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  Confederate  leaders  could 
have  been  required  to  suffer  less  and  have  been  rebuked  at  all 
for  their  acts."  Burgess,  Reconstruction  and  the  Constitution- 


404     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of 
the  state  wherein  they  reside." 

Such  was .  the_xongressipiial_plan, —  the  fourteenth 
amendment  added  to  the  conditions  that  Johnson  had 
imposed.  It  was  on  these  four  guarantees,  to  be  in 
corporated  into  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land,  that 
Congress  joined  issue  with  the  President, —  civil  rights 
to  all  citizens  of  the  republic,  just  equality  of  repre 
sentation,  protection  against  claims  founded  in  rebel 
lion,  and  exclusion  from  positions  of  public  trust  of 
certain  leaders  of  those  who  had  proved  hostile  to  the 
Union.  Like  all  jgreat.  measures,  of.  government  that 
emerge  from  constitutional  struggles  the  fourteenth 
amendment  was  a  compromise  between  conflicting 
ideas, —  an  adjustment  obtained  by  mutual  concessions 
among  the  radical  and  conservative  dispositions  repre 
sented  in  the  Committee.  The  plan  gave  the  ballot  to 
no  negro  and  took  it  from  no  white  man  who  would 
swear  to  support  the  Constitution.  It  carried  no 
reprisals,  no  executions,  no  exile,  no  imprisonment,  no 
confiscation  of  property.  It  guaranteed  tQ.th,a,South^ 
ern  States  control  of  their  own  local  affairs.. ..siihj.ect 
to  the  great  democratic  law  of  equal  rights  for  all  and 
special  privileges  for  none.  There  was  not  a  clause 
in  the  proposed  amendment  that  was  not  fully  justified 
by  the  circumstances  of  the  times,  and  the  historian  of 
the  period  but  expresses  the  common  sense  of  men 
when  he  describes  it  as  "  marked  by  even-handed  jus 
tice."  l  It  is  reasonably  certain,  if  these  terms  of  re 
union  had  been  accepted  in  as  reasonable  and  conserva 
tive  a  spirit  as  that  in  which  they  were  offered,  that 
r\ 

*  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  V.,  p.  609. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESSIONAL  PLAN      405 

Congress  would  not  have  advanced  to  the  more  radical 
and  drastic  policy  that  was  subsequently  imposed.  Re 
construction  cpuld  have  been  accomplished  on  the  basis 
of  the  fourteenth  amendment.  The  races  in  the  South 
might  then  have  been  spared  the  bitter  alienation  that 
followed,  and  both  the  North  and  South  might  have 
been  saved  much  of  the  failure,  humiliation,  and  suffer 
ing  that  came  from  later  reconstruction  experiences. 
The  responsibility  for  the  outcome  by  no  means  lies 
wholly  with  the  Republican  party  of  the  North.1 
Johnson  and  his  Democratic  and  conservative  support 
ers  by  their  partisan  resistance  to  this  reasonable  basis 
of  adjustment,  misled  the  South,  and  together  these 
elements  played  directly  into  the  hands  of  Stevens  and 
the  radicals. 

The  resentful  and  misguided  conduct  of  the  South 
in  answer  to  the  terms  proposed  was  an  important 
factor  in  promoting  radical  control  in  Congress  and 
in  the  public  opinion  of  the  North.  The  same  vindic 
tive  and  hateful  spirit  for  which  Thaddeus  Stevens  has 
been  so  constantly  arraigned,  vented  itself  against  him 
and  his  coadjutors  in  this  struggle..  That  spirit  was 
certainly  as  dominant  in  the  South  as  in  the  North  and 
both  sections  must  share  alike  the  responsibility  for  its 
unhappy  results^  The  vital  and  unfortunate  fact  was 
that  it  was  in  this  passionate  spirit  of  war  that  an  ap 
peal  was  made  to  the  people  on  this,  one  of  the  great 
est  issues  of  civil  government  ever  presented  to  the 
American  electorate. 

1  Consider  Elaine,  II,  p.  266. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE    APPEAL   TO   THE   PEOPLE 

/"TTVHE  issue  was  now  joined.  The  decision  between 
-••  the  two  plans,  that  of  the  President  and  that  of 
Congress,  was  to  be  left  with  the  people.  Both  parties 
to  the  contest  prepared  for  the  referendum.  For  once 
in  our  history,  upon  a  dissolution  of  Congress,  the  Ex 
ecutive  was  to  appeal  to  the  electorate  against  the  Leg 
islative  body  that  refused  to  sustain  him.  The  people 
were  to  break  the  deadlock  between  the  two  depart 
ments  of  their  government.  Would  the  people  in  the 
election  of  a  new  Congress  serve  notice  that  that  body 
should  retrace  its  steps,  undo  what  it  had  done,  and 
proceed  to  sustain  the  President  in  restoring  the  union 
of  the  states  on  the  basis  that  he  had  proposed?  Or, 
would  the  popular  mandate  direct  Congress  to  go  ahead 
with  the  work,  disregard  the  "  rights  "  of  the  "  states  " 
that  Johnson  had  set  up  and  insist  upon  the  addi 
tional  guarantees  that  Congress  had  proposed  ? 

Fortunately,  in  the  presentation  of  the  issue  there 
could  be  no  confusion  in  the  minds  of  the  voters. 
There  were  no  side  issues  or  minor  questions  to  dis 
tract  their  attention.  The  issue  was  clear,  simple, 
overshadowing.  Will  you  sustain  Congress  or  will 
you  elect  a  Congress  that  will  sustain  the  President? 
"  If  the  result  showed  a  majority  in  the  next  Congress 

406 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   407 

against  the  President,  his  policy  would  be  doomed;  if 
the  majority  proved  to  be  with  him,  the  policy  of  Con 
gress  would  be  doomed."  1  It  was  a  fortunate  situa 
tion,  conducive  to  political  education  and  to  vigor  and 
efficiency  in  government.  In  such  a  case  the  appeal 
may  be  made  with  force  and  a  verdict  given  that  no 
man  may  doubt. 

The  popular  referendum  on  reconstruction  made 
the  election  of  1866  unique  in  our  political  history. 
It  was  an  "  off  year  " ;  no  President  and  but  few  Gov 
ernors  \vere  to  be  elected,  and  usually  in  such  years 
there  is  apathy  or  a  waning  interest  in  politics  and  elec 
tions.  But  probably  no  political  stakes  were  ever  more 
hotly  contested  and  no  campaign  ever  excited  a  livelier 
interest  than  the  struggle  over  the  congressional  elec 
tions  in  the  summer  and  fall  of  1866.  The  contest 
gave  rise  to  the  congressional  campaign  committee  to 
organize  and  direct  the  fighting  for  the  congressional 
cause  within  the  states.2 

Though  there  were  no  national  nominations  to  be 
made  there  were  not  fewer  than  four  national  con 
ventions  assembled  for  the  purpose  of  appealing  to  the 
people  and  creating  and  influencing  public  sentiment. 
Each  side  held  a  "  Soldiers  and  Sailors  Convention  " 
to  appeal  for  support,  and  each  held  a  political  conven 
tion  to  set  forth  the  platform  and  principles  of  its  ap 
peal.  The  first  of  these  conventions  was  called  by  the 
supporters  of  the  President,  led  by  Seward,  Weed,  and 

1  W.  A.  Dunning,  Reconstruction,  p.  71. 

2  This  party  agency  has  continued  from  that  day  to  this  as  a 
permanent   part   of   the  party  machine   to  look   out  for  the  in 
terest   of   the   party   cause   in   the    contested   congressional    dis 
tricts. 


4o8      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Raymond,  and  was  known  as  the  "  National  Union  " 
Convention.  It  met  at  Philadelphia,  on  August  i/j-th. 
There  was  representation  from  every  state  of  the 
Union,  South  as  well  as  North.  The  convention  was 
to  speak  for  a  restored  Union,  and  to  voice  a  demand 
for  a  speedy  return  of  the  Southern  States  to  full  har 
mony  and  privilege  writh  their  sister  states,  a  return 
that  was  to  mark  a  happy  reunion  between  the  North 
and  the  South.  Former  secessionists  who  had  pro 
voked  the  war,  Northern  Democrats  who  had  opposed 
the  war,  and  old  time  Republicans,  who  had  prosecuted 
the  war,  were  meeting  in  an  effort  to  unite  North  and 
South  in  support  of  the  President's  policy.  To  typify 
the  national  and  united  character  of  the  gathering  the 
Northern  and  Southern  delegates  walked  into  the  wig 
wam  arm  in  arm.  President  Johnson  later  described 
how  deeply  he  was  moved  on  receiving  the  telegram 
telling  him  that  when  Mr.  Orr,  of  South  Carolina,  and 
General  Couch,  of  Massachusetts,  entered  together, 
"  arm  in  arm  "  at  the  head  of  their  delegations,  "  every 
eye  was  suffused  with  tears."  The  congressional 
leaders  were  not  slow  to  turn  this  tearful  and  dramatic 
scene  into  ridicule,  and  their  speakers  and  papers  were 
soon  describing  the  Philadelphia  "  Wigwam "  as 
"  Noah's  Ark,"  into  which  "  the  animals  entered  two 
by  two,  the  elephant  and  the  kangaroo,  of  clean  beasts 
and  of  beasts  that  are  not  clean,  and  of  fowls  and  of 
every  thing  that  creepeth  upon  the  earth."  So  far  as 
we  know,  this  analogy  has  not  been  attributed  to  Stev 
ens,  but  it  was  quite  Stevenesque  and  in  harmony  with 
his  style. 

The  congressional  party  also  charged  that  in  the 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   409 

*'  Arm-in- Arm  "  Convention  the  Southern  delegates 
were  not  permitted  to  speak  out  their  true  sentiments 
and  purposes.  Thomas  Nast,  the  popular  cartoonist 
of  Harper's  Weekly,  represented  the  President  of  the 
convention,  Senator  Doolittle,  of  Wisconsin,  as  pad 
locking  the  mouths  of  the  ex-Confederates  lest  their 
honest  and  candid  speech  might  reveal  their  real  feel 
ing  toward  the  freedmen  and  Union  men  in  the  South 
and  thus  disturb  the  "  unbroken  harmony  "  that  the 
convention  was  appointed  to  proclaim  between  the 
sections.1 

A  Congressional  or  Republican  Convention,  meeting 
early  in  September,  was  presided  over  by  ex-Attorney 
General  Speed,  lately  a  member  of  Johnson's  Cabinet, 
who,  with  others,  wished  no  longer  to  be  responsible 
for  the  opposition  of  the  administration  to  the  four 
teenth  amendment  The  convention  arraigned  the 
President's  plan,  and  denounced  the  President  as 
"  traitor  to  his  party  "  and  "  a  friend  of  the  rebels," 
and  it  urged  the  fourteenth  amendment  as  the  par 
amount  issue  of  the  campaign,  the  adoption  of  which 
was  regarded  as  essential  to  peace  and  reunion. 

Johnson  himself  entered  the  campaign  for  his  cause. 
To  the  committee  that  brought  him  a  report  of  the 
Philadelphia  convention,  he  spoke  of  Congress  with 
characteristic  bad  taste,  as  "  a  body  called,  or  which  as 
sumes  to  be,  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  while, 
in  fact,  it  is  a  Congress  of  only  a  part  of  the  states, 
hanging,  as  it  were,  upon  the  verge  of  the  govern 
ment."  Such  an  utterance  gave  the  intimation  of  a 
danger  that  the  country  might  have  to  confront.  It 

1  Rhodes,  V,  p.  616. 


410     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

gave  some  ground  for  fear  that  if  Johnson's  plan  found 
sufficient  support  in  the  Northern  and  Border  States, 
he  might  recognize  the  representation  from  these 
states  who  supported  him,  together  with  the  repre 
sentation  from  the  South  for  whom  he  was  demanding 
seats  in  Congress,  as  the  Congress  of  the  United  States, 
and  attempt  to  use  his  military  power  to  turn  Thad- 
deus  Stevens'  rump  of  a  Congress  out  of  doors.  In 
his  later  speeches  Johnson  repeatedly  referred  to  his 
lifelong  devotion  to  the  Constitution  as  the  chief  re 
straining  influence  between  the  country  and  himself  as 
a  dictator.  The  danger  may  not  have  been  a  serious 
one,  but  it  had  a  bearing  upon  the  election. 

But  the  worst  of  Johnson  was  yet  to  come.  He 
started  through  the  country  on  his  notable  "  swing 
around  the  circle,"  and  by  his  undignified  and  unseemly 
speeches,  in  which  he  bandied  coarse  epithets  with  the 
crowd,  he  injured  his  cause  and  disgraced  his  office. 
At  Cleveland,  as  he  appeared  on  the  balcony  of  a  hotel 
to  speak  to  the  people,  he  was  too  drunk  to  speak  with 
sense,  and  his  high  office  was  brought  to  "  the  lowest 
depth  of  degradation."  1  He  referred  to  the  radical 
Congress  as  having  begun  another  rebellion  and  as 
seeking  to  "  break  up  the  government."  He  declared 
(and  thoroughly  proved  it  by  his  conduct)  that  he 
"  cared  not  for  dignity."  "  I  would  ask  you  why  not 
hang  Thaddeus  Stevens  and  Wendell  Phillips?  I  tell 
you,  my  countrymen,  I  have  been  fighting  the  South, 
and  they  have  been  whipped  and  crushed  and  they  ac 
knowledge  their  defeat  and  accept  the  terms  of  the 
Constitution ;  and  now  as  I  go  round  the  circle,  having 

1  Rhodes,  V,  p.  618. 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   411 

fought  traitors  at  the  South,  I  am  prepared  to  fight 
traitors  at  the  North.  .  .  .  He  who  is  opposed  to  the 
reunion  of  the  states  is  as  great  a  traitor  as  Jeff  Davis 
or  Wendell  Phillips,"  and  "  though  the  powers  of  hell 
and  Thaddeus  Stevens  and  his  gang  were  by,  they 
could  not  turn  me  from  my  purpose."  *  If  he  had 
played  the  part  of  Judas,  as  his  enemies  had  charged, 
he  wanted  to  know  who  had  been  the  Christ  that  he 
had  played  Judas  with.  "  Was  it  Thaddeus  Stevens  ? 
Was  it  Wendell  Phillips?  Wras  it  Charles  Sumner?  " 
In  vituperative  language  that  would  have  disgraced  a 
common  stump-speaker  he  spoke  of  "  the  nefarious 
and  diabolical  policy  "  of  these  leaders.2  Upon  John 
son's  return  to  Washington,  it  was  said  of  him  that 
no  political  orator  in  our  history  ever  accomplished 
so  much  for  his  opponents  as  Johnson  did  in  this  fort 
night  of  speaking.3 

Anti-negro  riots  in  the  South  in  the  summer  of  1866 
conspired  with  this  unhappy  exposure  of  Johnson  and 
his  cause  to  promote  the  success  of  the  congressional 
party.  In  the  early  days  of  May  there  had  been  riots 
at  Memphis  in  which  twenty- four  negroes  had  been 
killed.  On  July  3Oth,  two  days  after  Congress  ad 
journed  for  the  summer,  a  bloody  "  riot  "  occurred  in 
New  Orleans,  at  a  political  convention  in  which  the 
negroes  \vere  attempting  to  take  part.  Thirty-seven 
negroes  and  white  assailants  were  killed  and  over  one 
hundred  were  wounded.  The  ex-Confederate  police 
had  not  attempted  to  restrain  the  murderous  whites. 

1  Speech  at  Cleveland,  Sept.  3,  1866,  McPherson,  p.  135. 

2  Speech   at    St.    Louis,    Sept.    8,    1866,    McPherson's    Political 
Manual,  1866. 

3  New  York  Nation,  Sept.  27,  1866,  cited  by  Rhodes,  V,  p.  620. 


412      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

General  Sheridan  telegraphed  to  Grant  that  it  was 
"  not  a  riot  but  a  massacre."  Only  one  white  man  lost 
his  life  in  this  affair.  The  congressional  leaders  said 
that  this  was  the  way  freedmen  would  be  treated  under 
Johnson's  reconstructed  governments,  that  negroes 
could  not  obtain  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws ;  and 
they  charged  that  the  life  and  property  of  Union  men 
in  the  South  were  unsafe  and  that  at  least  a  thousand 
had  been  murdered  within  the  year. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  congressional  .cause  was  des 
tined  to  win  by  sheer  default  of  the  opposition.  But 
the  cause  of  Congress  was  not  lacking  in  positive  and 
constructive  support.  That  cause  was  presented  to  the 
country  in  one  of  the  most  notable  documents  of  the 
reconstruction  era.  This  was  the  majority  report  of 
the  Reconstruction  Committee,  submitted  to  the  two 
houses  of  Congress  after  the  passage  of  the  amend 
ment  and  not  long  before  the  adjournment  for  the 
summer  recess.1  Congress  ordered  to  be  printed  sev 
eral  thousand  copies  of  this  report.  It  presented  an 
able  statement  of  the  congressional  case  and  it  proved 
to  be  an  effective  campaign  document.  Its  author 
ship  has  been  attributed  to  Fessenden  but  like  the 
fourteenth  amendment,  it  was  no  doubt  a  composite 
document.  No  one  can  read  it  without  recognizing  in 
all  its  parts  the  impress  and  political  lineaments  of 
Thaddeus  Stevens.  It  describes  Johnson's  recon 
structed  governments  merely  as  temporary,  as  intima 
tions  of  the  Commander-in-chief  that  he  would  with 
draw  military  rule  in  proportion  as  the  people  showed 
a  disposition  to  preserve  order,  to  establish  govern- 

Mmie   18,   1866. 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   413 

ments  denoting  loyalty  to  the  Union  and  to  exhibit  a 
willingness  to  return  to  their  allegiance,  leaving  it  with 
the  law-making  power  to  fix  the  terms  of  their  final 
restoration  to  their  rights  and  privileges  in  the  Union. 
There  was  no  evidence  of  loyalty  in  those  who  had 
participated  in  making  these  new  state  governments. 
Their  elections  "  had  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  candi 
dates  who  had  been  true  to  the  Union,  and  in  the  elec 
tion  of  notorious  and  unpardoned  rebels  who  made  no 
secret  of  their  hostility  to  the  government  and  people 
of  the  United  States.     Was  it  safe  to  admit  such  men 
at  once  to  a  full  participation  in  the  government  they 
had  fought  four  years  to  destroy  ?     They  had  yielded 
after  four  years  of  malignant  war  only  because  they 
could  no  longer  resist.     Within  the  limits  of  humanity 
the  conquered  rebels  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  conquer 
ors.     That  a  government  thus  outraged  had  a  perfect 
right  to  exact  indemnity  for  the  injuries  done  and  se 
curity  against  the  recurrence  of  such  outrages  in  the 
future  would  seem  too  clear  for  dispute.     The  nature 
of  the  security,  the  proof  of  allegiance,  the  time  to 
elapse  before  the  restoration  of  rights  and  privileges, 
—  these  are  matters  for  the  law-making  power  to  de 
cide.     To  apply  the  theory  of  immediate  restoration 
as  if  the  war  were  to  count  for  nothing,  was  to  leave 
the  government  of  the  United  States  powerless  for  its 
own  protection,  and  "  flagrant  rebellion  carried  to  the 
extreme  of  civil  war,  would  then  be  but  a  pastime 
which  any  state  may  play  at,  not  only  certain  that  it 
can  lose  nothing  in  any  event,  but  may  even  be  the 
gainer  by  defeat.     If  rebellion  succeeds  it  accomplishes 
its  purpose  and  destroys  the  government.     If  it  fails 


4H     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  war  has  been  barren  of  results  and  the  battle  may 
still  be  fought  out  in  the  legislative  halls  of  the  coun 
try.  Treason  defeated  in  the  field  has  only  to  take 
possession  of  Congress  and  the  Cabinet."  The  theory 
that  the  late  Confederate  States  are  still  states' in  the 
Union  was  "a  profitless  abstraction,  about  which  so 
many  words  had  been  wasted.  It  is  more  than  idle, 
it  is  mockery  to  contend  that  a  people  who  have  thrown 
off  their  allegiance,  destroyed  the  local  government 
which  bound  their  states  to  the  Union,  defied  its  author 
ity,  refused  to  execute  its  laws,  and  abrogated  every 
provision  which  gave  them  political  rights  within  the 
Union,  still  retain,  through  all,  the  perfect  and  entire 
right  to  resume  at  their  own  will  and  pleasure  all  their 
privileges  within  the  Union,  and  especially  to  partici 
pate  in  its  government  and  to  control  the  conduct  of  its 
affairs.  To  admit  such  a  principle  for  one  moment 
would  be  to  declare  that  treason  is  always  master  and 
loyalty  a  blunder."  The  report  asserted  that  the  Con 
stitution  acts,  not  upon  the  states,  but  upon  the  peo 
ple.  The  people  can  not  escape  its  authority,  but  the 
states,  through  the  act  of  their  people,  may  cease  to 
exist  in  an  organized  form,  and  thus  dissolve  their 
political  relations  with  the  United  States. 

The  paper  then  reviews  and  restates  with  force  the 
cause  for  which  Congress  stood  (  that  the  f reedmen 
should  be  protected;  that  rebellion  should  not  result 
in  increased  political  power  to  the  rebellious  states; 
that  in  freeing  the  slaves  political  advantage  should  not 
come  to  their  former  masters,  who  had  fought  against 
the  Union  while  it  was  withheld  from  those  who  had 
fought  for  it ;  that  political  power  should  be  possessed 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   415 

in  all  the  states  exactly  in  proportion  as  the  right  of 
suffrage  should  be  granted,  without  distinction  of  color 
or  race.  A  forcible  picture  was  drawn  of  the  unhappy 
conditions  in  the  South  and  of  the  disunion  and  dis 
loyal  disposition  of  the  people,  where  without  the 
f  reedmen's  bureau  "  the  colored  people  would  not  be 
permitted  to  labor  at  fair  prices  and  where  Union  men 
though  not  of  Northern  origin,  without  the  protection 
of  the  troops,  would  be  obliged  to  abandon  their 
homes.")  The  deep-seated  prejudice  against  persons 
of  color  would  prevent  their  ever  being  placed  on 
terms  of  civil  equality,  if  left  to  the  tender  mercies  of 
the  Johnson  governments.  Intense  hostility  to  the 
Union  and  intense  love  for  the  late  Confederacy  was 
decisive.  Northern  men  going  South  are  detested 
and  proscribed  while  "  Southern  men  who  adhered  to 
the  Union  are  bitterly  hated  and  relentlessly  perse 
cuted."  What  government  would  leave  the  protec 
tion  of  its  defenders  to  the  mercy  of  its  foes? 

The  conciliatory  measures  of  our  government  have 
not  been  met  half-way.  "  The  bitterness  and  defiance 
exhibited  toward  the  United  States  under  such  cir 
cumstances  is  without  a  parallel  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  In  return  for  our  leniency  we  receive  only  an 
insulting  denial  of  our  authority.  In  return  for  our 
kind  desire  for  the  resumption  of  fraternal  relations 
we  receive  only  an  insolent  assumption  of  rights  and 
privileges  long  since  forfeited." 

The  claim  that  these  states  are  entitled  as  a  matter 
of  right  to  immediate  and  unconditional  representa 
tion  in  Congress  and  that  to  exclude  their  Senators  and 
Represenatives  is  oppressive  and  unjust,  as  well  as  un- 


4i6      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

wise  and  impolitic, —  in  opposition  to  that  claim  the 
committee  set  forth  a  plain  statement  of  familiar 
facts :  That  the  seats  of  these  Senators  and  Represen 
tatives  were  voluntarily  vacated  in  1861,  by  the  direc 
tion  of  their  states.  This  was  done  as  a  hostile  act 
against  the  United  States  government  with  an  avowed 
intent  to  overthrow  that  government  and  to  form  an 
other.  To  that  end  a  four-years'  war  was  levied  by 
sea  and  land  "  within  which  period  the  rebel  army  be 
sieged  the  national  capital,  invaded  the  loyal  states, 
burned  their  towns  and  cities,  destroyed  more  than 
250,000  loyal  soldiers,  and  imposed  an  increased  na 
tional  burden  of  not  less  than  $3,500,000,000."  Dur 
ing  this  war  the  mass  of  these  people  were  insurgents, 
rebels,  traitors,  and  all  of  them  occupied  the  political, 
legal  and  practical  relations  of  enemies  of  the  United 
States.  The  war  obliterated  every  vestige  of  state 
and  Confederate  government  and  their  people  are  re 
duced  to  the  condition  of  enemies  conquered  in  war, 
entitled  only  by  public  law  to  such  rights,  privileges, 
and  conditions  as  might  be  vouchsafed  by  the  con 
queror."  1  Against  such  rebellions  in  the  future  there 
must  be  guarantees  satisfactory  to  the  government 
against  which  this  gigantic  Rebellion  was  directed. 

The  question,  then,  before  the  country  is  whether 
conquered  enemies  have  the  right  and  shall  be  permit 
ted  at  their  own  terms  to  participate  in  making  laws 
for  their  conquerors;  whether  conquered  rebels  may 
change  their  theater  of  operations  from  the  battle-field 
where  they  were  defeated  and  overthrown,  to  the  halls 

1  Report  of  Majority  Committee  on  Reconstruction.  Mc- 
Pherson's  Reconstruction. 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   417 

of  Congress,  and  through  their  representatives  seize 
upon  the  government  which  they  fought  to  destroy; 
whether  the  national  treasury,  the  army  of  the  nation, 
its  navy,  its  forts  and  arsenals,  its  whole  civil  admin 
istration,  its  credit,  its  pensioners,  the  widows  and  or 
phans  of  those  who  perished  in  the  war,  the  public 
honor,  peace,  safety, —  shall  all  be  turned  over  to  its 
recent  enemies  without  delay,  and  without  imposing 
such  conditions  as,  in  the  opinion  of  Congress,  the  se 
curity  of  the  country  and  its  institutions  may  demand. 
The  history  of  mankind  exhibits  no  example  of  such 
madness  and  folly.  The  instinct  of  self-preservation 
protests  against  it.  Surrender  in  the  field  would  have 
been  less  disastrous,  for  new  armies  could  have  been 
raised,  new  battles  fought  and  the  government  would 
have  been  saved.  The  anti-coercive  policy  which,  un 
der  the  pretext  of  avoiding  bloodshed,  allowed  the  Re 
bellion  to  take  form  and  gather  force,  would  be  sur 
passed  in  infamy  by  the  matchless  wickedness  that 
would  now  surrender  the  halls  of  Congress  to  those 
so  recently  in  rebellion  until  proper  precautions  shall 
have  been  taken  to  secure  the  national  faith  and  the 
national  safety.1 

Congress  therefore  appealed  to  the  country  that  be 
fore  representation  should  be  allowed  to  the  late  Con 
federate  States  there  should  be  adequate  security  for  fu 
ture  peace  and  safety,  by  such  changes  in  the  organic 
law  as  shall  determine  the  civil  rights  and  privileges  of 
all  citizens  in  all  parts  of  the  republic,  shall  place  rep 
resentation  upon  an  equitable  basis,  shall  fix  a  stigma 
upon  treason,  and  protect  the  loyal  people  of  the 

1  Report  of  Reconstruction   Committee,   McPherson. 


418     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

United  States  against  future  claims  for  the  expenses 
incurred  in  support  of  the  Rebellion  and  for  manu 
mitted  slaves, —  that  peace  and  harmony  may  be  re 
stored  to  the  country  and  our  republican  institutions 
placed  on  a  stable  foundation.1 

Stevens'  chief  part  in  this  campaign  was  played  be 
fore  the  adjournment  of  Congress  by  his  getting  before 
the  country  a  more  radical  proposal  and  a  powerful 
speech  in  its  support.  Stevens  accepted  and  supported 
the  fourteenth  amendment  without  reservation,  but  he 
was  by  no  means  satisfied  with  it  as  a  basis  of  re 
union.  He  wanted  more  in  the  way  of  securities  and 
punishments.  It  has  been  said  that  he  no  sooner  se 
cured  one  set  of  conditions  than  he  began  to  contrive 
for  others.2  At  any  rate,  he  sought  to  prevent  Con 
gress  from  definitely  committing  itself  to  the  condi 
tions  proposed,  as  if  they  were  final  and  complete. 
When  Stevens  submitted  to  the  House  the  four  guar 
antees  of  the  fourteenth  amendment,  April  30,  1866, 
he  submitted  a  bill  under  instruction  from  the  Joint 
Committee  on  Reconstruction.  This  provided  that 
whenever  these  guarantees  had  "  become  a  part  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  any  state 
lately  in  rebellion  shall  have  ratified  the  same  and 
shall  have  modified  its  constitution  and  laws  in  con 
formity  therewith,  the  Senators  and  Representatives 
from  such  states  may  be  duly  admitted  to  Congress." 
Stevens  was  decidedly  opposed  to  the  proposition. 
He  regarded  it  as  the  result  of  confused  and  ab 
surd  error.  He  scorned  the  idea  that  these  rebel 
communities,  the  "  defunct  states,"  were  to  be  counted 

1  Report  of  Committee.  2  Rhodes,  V,  p.  609. 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   419 

or  consulted  in  adopting  the  amendment.  They  had 
no  right  to  be  considered.  He  disapproved  of  Secre 
tary  Seward's  policy  of  submitting  the  amendment  to 
the  Southern  States,  thus  recognizing  their  statehood. 
When  nineteen  of  the  loyal  states  had  ratified  the 
amendment  (it  would  have  required  twenty-seven  if 
the  Southern  States  were  to  be  counted),  Stevens 
would  have  Congress  consider  it  as  adopted  and  bind 
ing.  Then  the  "  states  "  lately  in  rebellion  when  they 
were  made  ready,  could  do  as  they  chose,  come  in,  or 
stay  out  under  the  new  and  amended  Constitution 
which  would  be  binding  in  all  the  states  alike. 

The  highest  authorities  to-day  will  recognize  this  as 
both  good  public  law  and  sound  political  science.  It 
would  have  avoided  giving  the  opportunity  to  the 
Southern  States  to  reject  the  amendment  and  it  would 
have  avoided  the  inconsistency  on  the  part  of  Congress 
of  appearing  to  regard  the  Southern  communities  as 
states  for  the  amending  purposes  while  they  were  not 
recognized  as  states  for  purposes  of  representation. 
If  Congress  had  adopted  outright  Stevens'  theory  on 
this  point,  it  would  have  been  both  clearer  in  its  po 
litical  thinking  and  more  consistent  in  its  political  con 
duct.  Stevens  was  by  no  means  alone  in  the  radical 
desire  to  exact  other  terms,  especially  to  secure  man 
hood  suffrage  among  all  citizens  regardless  of  race  or 
color,1  and  the  radicals  were  able,  through  his  leader 
ship,  to  bring  about  the  adjournment  for  the  summer 
without  an  official  promise  that  no  other  terms  would 

1  See  amendment  proposed  by  Boutwell,  of  Massachusetts, 
May  ist;  Wilson,  of  Iowa,  May  I5th,  and  Kelley,  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  June  nth,  Globe- 


420     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

be  imposed.  He  was  ready  to  bide  his  time,  and  it  was 
for  time  that  he  was  now  playing.  He  believed  that 
the  country  was  more  radical  than  Congress  in  its  atti 
tude  toward  reconstruction.  Perhaps  he  was  relying 
on  the  obstructive  and  mole-sighted  policy  of  his  op 
ponents  as  a  means  of  bringing  his  Republican  col 
leagues  in  Congress  up  to  what  he  considered  the 
proper  standard.  At  any  rate  he  was  not  willing  to 
give  up  the  field  without  one  more  effort. 

On  the  day  of  adjournment,  before  the  case  was 
sent  to  the  jury,  Stevens  submitted  a  plan  in  the  form 
of  a  bill  that  contained  what  he  considered  suitable 
terms  and  process  of  reconstruction.  The  Southern 
States  were  to  be  regarded  as  having  forfeited  their 
rights  and  were  to  be  reinstated  only  through  the  action 
of  Congress.  The  Johnson  governments  were  to  be 
recognized  de  facto  for  municipal  purposes  only,  till 
such  changes  were  made  as  were  necessary  to  set  up 
valid  state  governments.  The  President  might  direct 
conventions  to  be  called  to  form  legitimate  constitu 
tions,  to  be  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  people,  and  to 
be  ratified  by  a  majority  of  the  legal  voters.  All  male 
citizens  above  the  age  of  twenty-one  were  to  be  legal 
voters,  and  to  be  eligible  to  seats  in  the  convention. 
All  persons  who  held  office,  civil  or  military,  under  the 
so-called  Confederate  government,  or  who  had  sworn 
allegiance  to  said  government,  were  declared  to  have 
forfeited  their  citizenship  and  to  have  renounced  their 
allegiance  to  the  United  States,  and  should  not  be  en 
titled  to  vote  or  hold  office  till  three  years  after  they 
had  filed  an  expression  of  desire  to  be  reinvested  with 
civic  rights,  and  had  sworn  allegiance  to  the  United 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   421 

States  and  renounced  their  allegiance  to  all  other  gov 
ernments.  All  laws  should  be  impartial,  without  re 
gard  to  race  or  color,  and  no  constitution  should  be 
presented  to  Congress  denying  equality  of  citizenship; 
and  if  this  guarantee  were  ever  altered  or  denied,  the 
state  should  lose  its  representation  in  Congress ;  —  that 
whenever  a  constitution  complying  with  these  condi 
tions  was  presented  to  Congress  the  state  might  be 
restored  as  a  member  of  the  Union. 

In  supporting  these  proposals  Stevens  acknowledged 
some  discouragements,  but  he  said  he  would  not  be 
weary  in  well-doing  and  he  would  make  one  more,  per 
haps  an  expiring,  effort  to  do  something  that  might 
be  useful  to  his  fellow  men.  When  he  reflected  "  with 
how  few  acts  of  justice,  with  how  few  wise  enact 
ments  most  of  us  seem  content  to  close  our  labors 
and  disperse  to  the  periphery  of  the  nation  in  search  of 
£ool  shades,  purling  trout  streams,  and  to  see  our  bulls 
and  beeves,"  he  could  not  feel  that  Congress  had  done 
anything  "  worthy  of  its  glorious  opportunity,  worthy 
of  its  duty  to  the  immortal  beings  whose  destinies  for 
good  or  evil,  for  weal  or  woe,  it  holds  in  its  hands."  l 
He  claimed  no  right  to  reproach  others,  especially  when 
he  considered  his  own  life,  "  too  much  of  which  has 
been  spent  in  idleness  or  frivolous  amusement ;  "  and 
while  he  found  himself  "  almost  ready  to  yield  before 
every  man  is  secured  equal  rights  and  impartial  priv 
ileges,  I  can  not  avoid  feeling  humbled,  I  can  not  es 
cape  the  pangs  of  self-condemnation."  We  have  but 
poor  results  of  the  labors  of  an  assembly  clothed  with 
the  sovereignty  of  the  republic.  Congress  had  done 

1  Globe,  July  28,  1866. 


422     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

something  to  aid  the  white  man,  if  he  chose,  to  pro 
tect  the  poor  of  all  races  and  colors.  "  But  nothing 
has  been  done  to  enable  any  but  the  white  man  to  pro 
tect  himself.  ...  In  a  peaceful  well-governed  repub 
lic  the  only  protection  consists  in  the  right  to  partici 
pate  in  the  government  .  .  .  They  must  have  the  bal 
lot,  or  they  will  continue,  virtually,  to  be  slaves;  they 
will  be  the  servants  and  tools  of  the  rich.  But  give 
them  political  power  and  they  will  find  friends  who 
will  recognize  their  manhood.  Republics  must  stand 
upon  the  basis  of  universal  suffrage.  All  who  choose 
to  deal  fairly  by  all  men  may  thus  be  represented  in 
this  body  in  the  next  Congress.  Those  who  clo  not 
choose  to  give  equal  rights  to  all  men  will,  with  my 
consent,  never  enter  this  hall  except  as  delegates.  .  .  . 
No  man  of  common  sense  and  common  honesty  pre 
tends  that  the  present  governments  at  the  South  have 
any  features  of  the  legitimate  governments.  Their  old 
constitutions  were  not  of  their  own  choice,  but  were 
imposed  in  the  midst  of  arms,  when  the  laws  were  si 
lent,  by  a  military  ruler  playing  the  part  of  a  mighty 
conqueror.  Not  one  of  their  organic  laws  was  ever 
submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  people.  Let  us  now 
authorize  the  outlawed  states  to  become  republican 
by  freely  forming  their  constitutions  by  the  action  of 
all  their  freemen.  Then  loyal  men  will  be  protected. 
They  are  now  proscribed  without  regard  to  color.  If 
we  leave  the  colored  race  without  the  protection  oj:  the 
ballot  box  they  will  be  the  mere  serfs  and  victims  of 
their  former  masters."  * 

1  These   quotations   contain   not   the   exact   and   full   form   of 
words,  but  the  essence  of  Stevens'  speech  of  July  28,  1866- 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   423 

Stevens  affirmed  that  there  was  an  objection  to  in 
serting  a  provision  in  the  Constitution  for  equal  man 
hood  suffrage  that  did  not  apply  to  such  a  bill  as  he 
was  proposing.  In  the  Constitution  it  would  operate 
in  all  the  states  alike,  and  in  many  of  the  Free  States 
Stevens  recognized  ua  deep-seated  prejudice,  the  off 
spring  of  ignorance  and  habit,  that  obstructed  the 
cause  of  justice."  In  Copperhead  States  where  jus 
tice  to  the  colored  race  has  no  domicile,  and  in  states 
nearly  balanced,  such  reform  was  thought  to  be  im 
practicable  at  present.  Those  states  had  done  nothing 
to  forfeit  their  rights  and  authorize  the  nation  to  im 
pose  such  new  conditions.  To  deprive  a  few  of  the 
elective  franchise  there,  though  a  great  wrong,  was 
not  thought  to  be  dangerous  or  intolerable.  But  in  the 
rebel  states  the  conditions  were  different.  There  the 
concentration  of  the  whole  political  power  in  the  hands 
of  a  few  tyrannical  and  disloyal  men  has  shown  itself 
dangerous  to  liberty,  and  unless  restrained  must  again 
soon  produce  bloody  insurrections.  Their  right  to 
dictate  the  terms  of  their  participation  in  national  af 
fairs  has  been  forfeited.  To  that  men  of  all  parties 
agree  — "  whether  Republicans,  Copperheads,  Apos 
tates,  or  that  unamiable,  hermaphrodite  race  called 
Conservatives."  As  the  conditions  of  readjustment 
are  to  be  fixed  by  the  government  none  can  deem  it 
too  severe  if  we  put  the  loyal  freedmen  on  an  equal 
footing  at  the  polls  with  the  disloyal  white  men. 

When  these  people  again  become  states,  Congress 
can  not  alter  or  amend  their  constitutions.  The  only 
way  to  reach  the  end  in  view  is  by  enabling  acts,  and 
as  Congress  can  dictate  any  mode  of  reconstruction  it 


424     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

deems  best,  it  may  pass  such  acts  authorizing  these  out 
lawed  districts  to  form  republican  state  governments 
fit  to  partake  in  the  government  of  the  nation.  He 
would  exclude  none  from  the  government  "  but  the 
most  guilty  rebels,"  and  that  was  necessary  "  in  order 
to  enable  the  loyal  men  to  live  in  the  land  of  their  birth ; 
otherwise  the  proud  persecuting  rebels  will  exile  them 
from  their  native  land. 

:t  When  this  is  done  we  shall  have  done  but  partial 
justice  to  the  descendants  of  an  oppressed  race.  God 
may  yet  visit  us  with  further  punishments.  Certainly 
we  deserve  it.  Why  have  we  not  given  them  home 
steads?  Their  rebel  masters  owe  it  to  them.  As  to 
the  punishment  proposed,  they  may  thank  the  tender 
mercy  of  Congress  that  it  is  so  light. 

"  I  have  done  in  this  matter,"  he  concluded,  "  what 
I  deemed  best  for  humanity.  ...  I  know  it  is  easy  to 
protect  the  interests  of  the  rich  and  powerful,  but  it 
is  a  great  labor  to  guard  the  rights  of  the  poor  and 
downtrodden;  it  is  the  eternal  labor  of  Sisyphus  for 
ever  to  be  renewed.  I  know  how  unprofitable  is  all 
such  toil.  But  he  who  is  in  earnest  does  not  heed 
these  things.  I  know,  too,  what  effect  it  has  on  per 
sonal  popularity.  But  if  I  may  be  indulged  in  a  little 
egotism,  I  will  say  that  if  there  be  anything  for  which 
I  have  entire  indifference,  perhaps  I  may  say  contempt, 
it  is  that  public  opinion  which  is  founded  on  popular 
clamor. 

"  In  this,  perhaps  my  final  action  on  this  great  ques 
tion,  upon  a  careful  review,  I  can  see  nothing  in  my 
political  course,  especially  in  regard  to  human  freedom, 
which  I  could  wish  to  have  expunged  or  changed.  I 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   425 

believe  that  we  must  all  account  hereafter  for  deeds 
done  in  the  body,  and  that  political  deeds  will  be  among 
those  accounts.  I  desire  to  take  to  the  bar  of  that  final 
settlement  the  record  which  I  shall  this  day  make  on 
the  great  question  of  human  rights.  While  I  am  sure 
it  will  not  make  atonement  for  half  my  errors,  I  hope 
it  will  be  some  palliation. 

"  Are  there  any  who  will  venture  to  take  the  list, 
with  their  negative  seal  upon  it,  and  will  dare  to  unroll 
it  before  that  stern  Judge  who  is  the  Father  of  the  im 
mortal  beings  whom  they  have  been  trampling  under 
foot,  and  whose  souls  they  have  been  crushing  out?  "  1 

"  This  speech,"  says  Mr.  McCall,  "  made  a  profound 
impression,  having  the  tone  of  a  farewell  message."  2 
It  was  effective  campaign  material  for  the  radical  cause, 
an  appeal  to  the  country  that  no  backward  step  should 
be  taken.  In  the  campaign  proper  the  state  of  Stevens' 
health  did  not  permit  him  to  take  part.  At  the  close  of 
the  session  he  was  all  but  worn  out  by  labors  and  dis 
ease.  His  physician  directed  him  to  take  absolute  rest, 
neither  to  think  nor  speak  nor  read,  if  he  would  regain 
his  strength  by  the  next  session  of  Congress.  John 
son's  "  swing  around  the  circle  "  tempted  him  from  his 
rest.  In  an  impromptu  speech  to  his  constituents  just 
before  the  election,  he  said  he  had  obeyed  the  injunc 
tion  of  his  physician  almost  literally.  He  had  made 
but  one  speech,  at  Bedford,  and  as  to  reading,  he  had 
amused  himself  with  only  "  a  little  light  frivolous  read 
ing.  For  instance,  there  was  a  serial  account  from 
day  to  day  of  a  very  remarkable  circus  that  traveled 
through  the  country  from  Washington  to  Chicago  and 

1  Globe,  July  28,  1866.  2  Life  of  Stevens. 


426      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

St.  Louis,  and  from  Louisville  back  to  Washington. 
I  read  that  with  some  interest,  expecting  to  see  in  so 
celebrated  an  establishment, —  one  which  from  its 
heralding  was  to  beat  Dan  Rice  and  all  the  old  cir 
cuses  that  ever  went  forth, —  I  expected  great  wit  from 
the  celebrated  character  of  its  clowns.  [Laughter.] 
They  were  well  provided  with  clowns ;  instead  of  one, 
there  were  two.  One  of  these  clowns  was  high  in  of 
fice  and  somewhat  advanced  in  years ;  the  other  was  a 
little  less  advanced  in  office,  but  older  in  years.  They 
started  out  with  a  very  respectable  stock  company.  In 
order  to  attract  attention  they  took  with  them,  for  in 
stance,  a  celebrated  general;  they  took  with  them  an 
eminent  naval  officer,  and  they  chained  him  to  the  rig 
ging  so  that  he  could  not  get  away,  though  he  tried  to 
do  so  once  or  twice.  But  the  circus  went  on  all  the 
time, —  sometimes  one  clown  performing  and  some 
times  the  other.  For  instance,  the  younger  clown  told 
them,  in  the  language  of  the  ancient  heroes  who  trod 
the  stage,  that  he  had  it  in  his  power,  if  '  he  chose,  to 
be  a  dictator.'  The  elder  clown  pointed  to  the  other 
one,  and  said  to  the  people,  '  Will  you  take  him  for 
President  or  will  you  take  him  for  King?  '  [Laugh 
ter.]  He  left  you  but  one  alternative.  You  are 
obliged  to  take  him  for  one  or  the  other,  either  for 
President  or  King,  if  '  My  policy '  prevails. 

"  I  am  not  following  them  all  round.  I  shall  not 
describe  to  you  how  sometimes  they  cut  outside  the 
circle,  and  entered  into  street  broils  with  common 
blackguards;  how  they  fought  at  Cleveland  and  In 
dianapolis.  But,  coming  round,  they  told  you,  or  one 
of  them  did,  that  he  had  been  every  thing  but  one. 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   427 

He  had  been  a  tailor, —  I  think  he  did  not  say  drunken 
tailor, —  no,  he  had  been  a  tailor.  [Laughter.]  He 
had  been  a  constable.  [Laughter.]  He  had  been  city 
alderman.  [Laughter.]  He  had  been  in  the  legisla 
ture.  God  help  that  legislature!  [Great  merriment.] 
He  had  been  in  Congress ;  and  now  he  was  President. 
He  had  been  everything  but  one, —  he  had  never  been 
a  hangman,  and  he  asked  leave  to  hang  Thad  Stevens." 
[Laughter.] 

The  speech  at  Bedford,  referred  to  above,  was  one 
of  more  serious  purpose  and  more  important  in  con 
tent.  It  was  made  on  September  4,  1866,  and  is 
well  worth  attention  and  preservation.  In  that  speech 
Stevens  reviewed  the  difficulties  of  Congress  for  the 
five  years  just  passed,  the  doubts  and  difficulties  in  the 
way  when  "their  elected  chief  apostatized."  He. as 
serted  that  the  work  of  reconstruction  would  have 
been  easy  if  the  Executive  had  confined  himself  to  his 
proper  sphere,  since  "  the  rebels  were  submissive  and 
asked  only  to  be  allowed  their  forfeited  lives."  He 
retraced  Johnson's  usurpations,  approving  Justice  Ruf- 
fin,  of  North  Carolina,  in  his  denunciation  of  the  Presi 
dent's  dictating  what  the  Southern  States  should  do. 
Not  one  of  these  governments,  said  Ruffin,  had  a  law 
ful  government.  Stevens  arraigned  Johnson  for  using 
the  patronage  of  office  to  corrupt  the  people,  and  he 
spoke  with  special  fierceness  against  the  doctrine  set 
up  by  Raymond,  editor  of  the  New  York  'Times,  for 
"  the  President's  squad,"  that  the  "  awful  horrors  and 
losses  and  wrongs  of  the  war  had  made  no  difference 
in  the  constitutions  or  institutions  of  the  South;  and 
that  the  nation  had  no  power,  in  the  South,  territorial 


428     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

or  civil,  not  possessed  before  the  war  broke  out.'* 
This  idea  Stevens  denounced  as  "  a  strange,  wild  and 
wicked  doctrine."  "  Was  there  ever  before  a  human 
brain  frenzied  enough  to  engender  such  folly,  or  a  hu 
man  front  brazen  enough  to  utter  it?  The  war  had 
changed  everything, —  old  treaties  and  leagues  had 
ceased.  They  cry  out  against  confiscation  for  crime 
as  if  it  were  inhuman.  God  willing,  I  shall  try  it  again 
and  see  if  they  do  not  pay  part  of  the  cost  and  damages 
of  the  war  before  they  help  to  make  our  laws." 

But  the  great  issue,  as  he.  recognized  it,  was  that  of 
negro  rights.  He  would  not  dodge,  nor  flinch  from 
the  Copperhead  cry,  "  Nigger,  Nigger,  Nigger ! 
Down  with  the  Nigger  party,  we  are  the  White  Man's 
party,  we  are  urged  to  save  the  daughters  of  the  \vhites 
from  negro  husbands !  "  :i  These  unanswerable  argu 
ments,"  said  Stevens,  "  will  be  uttered  by  unprincipled 
demagogues  possessed  of  some  cunning  but  no  con 
science,  and  they  will  ring  in  every  low  barroom  and 
be  printed  in  every  blackguard  sheet  throughout  the 
land." 

Stevens  did  not  shrink  from  the  issue  presented  by 
the  claims  of  the  negroes,  and  he  announced  for  the 
Republicans  the  doctrine  of  equal  rights, —  the  im 
mortal  democratic  creed  which  asserts  that  every  hu 
man  being  should  have  equality  before  the  law;  that 
"  the  laws  should  apply  alike  to  every  mortal,  Ameri- 
ican,  Irish,  African,  German  or  Turk." 

"  I  need  not  be  admonished,"  he  said,  "  that  the  sup 
port  of  this  doctrine  on  the  eve  of  an  election  is  dan 
gerous,  especially  in  counties  bordering  on  the  Slave 
States.  A  deep-seated  prejudice  against  races  has  dis- 


THE  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE   429 

figured  the  human  mind  for  ages.  For  two  centuries 
it  has  oppressed  the  black  man  and  held  him  in  bondage 
after  white  salvery  had  ceased  to  exist.  Now  it  de 
prives  him  of  every  right  in  the  Southern  States.  We 
have  joined  in  inflicting  these  wrongs.  How  has  the 
Father  of  this  blameless  race  rewarded  this  prejudice 
and  treated  this  despotism?  Let  the  scarfs  upon  your 
garments  and  the  gory  graves  that  dot  a  thousand 
bloody  battle-fields  give  the  sad  answer. 

"  This  doctrine  of  human  equality  may  be  unpopu 
lar  with  besotted  ignorance.  But,  popular  or  unpop 
ular,  I  shall  stand  by  it  until  I  am  relieved  of  the 
unprofitable  labors  of  earth.  Being  the  foundation  of 
our  Republic  I  have  full  faith  in  its  ultimate  triumph. 
I  may  not  live  to  see  it.  I  may  not  be  worthy  of  such 
happiness.  If  it  is  to  be  finally  defeated  and  the  hopes 
of  man  thus  extinguished,  I  pray  God  that  when  it 
happens  I  may  be  insensible  to  human  misery ;  that  my 
senses  may  be  locked  in  '  cold  obstruction  and  in 
death.' " 

Is  there  anything  in  all  of  Stevens'  long  life  incon 
sistent  with  this  noble  confession  of  political  faith? 
Though  he  stood  facing  great  odds  he  dared  to  defy 
the  deep  popular  prejudices  surrounding  him,  and  his 
campaign  message  sounded  forth  like  a  clarion  note 
or  a  high  call  to  arms  in  defense  of  the  rights  of  man, 
—  of  black  men  as  well  as  white.  No  man  ever  stood 
with  a  more  unswerving  or  a  bolder  front  for  this 
fundamental  article  of  democracy, —  the  equal  rights 
of  all  men  beneath  the  law.  In  that  cause  his  militant 
courage  never  wavered,  and  his  spirit  was  immortal. 

The  result  of  the  election  was  an  overwhelming  de- 


430     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

feat  for  the  President.  The  Republicans  elected  one 
hundred  and  forty-three  members  to  the  House  of 
Representatives,  the  Democrats  but  forty-nine.  This 
gave  the  Republicans  a  three-fourths  majority  in  the 
House.  They  had  carried  every  Union  state  with  the 
exception  of  Delaware,  Maryland,  and  Kentucky.  In 
the  Senate  they  had  more  than  a  two-thirds  majority, 
and  it  was  evident  that  the  congressional  party  would 
be  able  to  do  as  it  chose  in  the  matter  of  reconstruc 
tion,  regardless  of  the  opinions  and  vetoes  of  the  Pres 
ident.  The  people  had  spoken  in  unmistakable  tones 
on  the  subject  of  reconstruction.  The  policy  of  the 
President  had  been  discredited;  the  policy  of  Con 
gress  had  been  sustained.  The  popular  will  had  been 
made  clear.  It  was  now  to  be  seen  how  the  popular 
mandate  would  be  interpreted  and  observed  by  those 
in  places  of  power  and  responsibility. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

MILITARY    RECONSTRUCTION 

TT7TIEN  Congress  met  in  December,  1866,  John- 
"  *  son's  policy  of  reconstruction  was  regarded  as 
res  adjudicata.  The  country  had  sat  in  judgment  upon 
it  and  had  thrown  it  out  of  court.  It  had  been  fully 
explained  to  the  people  and  as  fully  repudiated,  wrhile 
Congress  had  received  an  endorsement  that  was  em 
phatic  and  complete.  If  ever  we  needed  in  America 
responsible  ministerial  government  we  needed  it  then. 
We  needed  a  working  system  by  which  the  Executive, 
after  such  a  defeat  upon  an  appeal  to  the  people,  would 
have  been  forced  to  resign,  and  the  administrative  and 
legislative  branches  of  the  government  could  have  been 
brought  into  unity  and  harmony  upon  the  pressing  is 
sue  before  the  country. 

After  such  a  crushing  defeat  before  the  electorate, 
Johnson  should  have  resigned  or  modified  his  course. 
He  did  neither.  In  his  message  of  December,  1866, 
he  again  boldly  defended  his  policy.  He  asserted  that 
his  convictions  had  undergone  no  change,  but  their 
correctness  had  been  confirmed  by  time;  that  the  ten 
political  communities  at  the  South  "  are  nothing  less 
than  states  of  this  Union,"  and  that  "  their  right  to 
representation  is  as  strong  now  as  it  will  be  ten  years 
hence."  He  renewed  expression  of  his  regret  that 
loyal  Senators  and  Representatives  from  his  recon- 

431 


432     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

structed  states  had  not  been  admitted  to  their  vacant 
seats  in  Congress,  and  the  chief  recommendation  of 
his  message  was  for  the  speedy  admission  of  Southern 
members,  which  would,  as  he  said,  "  consummate  the 
work  of  reconstruction." 

This  seemed  like  an  obstinate  reiteration  of  old 
ideas,  already  discredited  by  the  country,  and  it  is  not 
surprising  that  Congress,  refusing  to  pay  any  further 
heed  to  Johnson,  proceeded  with  plans  of  its  own.  It 
was  now  known  that  the  Fortieth,.  Congress  would 
have  a  greater  majority  against  the  President  and 
would  be  more  radical  than  the  Thirty-ninth  had  been, 
and  it  was  hardly  to  be  expected  that,  in  the  closing 
session  of  the  latter  body,  much  respect  or  patience 
would  be  shown  toward  Johnson's  proposals. 

Johnson  had  said  at  Cleveland  that  nothing  could 
turn  him  from  his  purpose  "  but  the  people  and  the 
God  who  spoke  me  into  existence."  The  people  had 
done  what  they  could,  but  since  no  heed  was  given  to 
their  voice,  it  was  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  con 
gressional  leaders  acted  upon  the  theory  that  the  voice 
who  had  "  spoken  him  into  existence  "  had  as  little 
weight  in  determining  Johnson's  course  as  the  voice  of 
the  people  who  had  spoken  in  such  unmistakable  tones 
at  the  ballot  box;  that  if  Johnson  were  guided  by  any 
spiritual  revelation  apart  from  this  world,  it  was  a 
revelation  that  came  up,  not  down.  A  pious  old 
Scotchman  had  fervently  prayed  that  he  might  be  put 
right  at  the  outset,  because,  the  Lord  knows,  if  ever 
he  got  wrong  heaven  and  earth  could  not  change  him. 
So  it  was  with  Johnson,  the  Obstinate,  who  had  de 
termined  in  all  respects  what  reconstruction  should  be, 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        433 

and  no  verdict  of  earth  or  heaven  was  to  be  allowed 
to  change  it. 

For  a  President  in  such  a  state  of  mind  there  was 
no  further  use.  Since  he  could  not  be  made  to  resign 
he  could  be  ignored.  Hereafter  Johnson  is  to  be 
looked  upon  merely  as  an  obstacle  to  the  work  of  mod 
erate  and  conservative  reconstruction,  or  as  one  of  the 
factors  on  which  the  radicals  might  rely  to  promote 
their  ends.  His  obstinate  and  persistent  refusal  to  co 
operate  with  Congress  in  reconstruction,  and  the  un 
happy  results  that  followed,  will  ever  serve  to  remind 
the  student  of  this  period  of  the  great  loss  and  calamity 
that  came  to  his  country  in  the  death  of  Abraham 
Lincoln. 

The, .people  had  commanded  Congress  to  advance, 
not  to  retreat.  Moderate  congressional  leaders  now 
recognized  and  openly  declared  that  the  people  had 
demanded  at  the  ballot  box  that  an  additional  condi 
tion  of  reconstruction  should  be  imposed.  This  meant 
negro  suffrage.1  Reunion  on  the  basis  of  the  four 
teenth  amendment  might  have  been,  butit,was.,now  too 
late  for  that.  Events  were  serving  Stevens  well,  and 
things  were  coming  his  way.  /The  fall  elections ;  the 
persistent  attitude  of  Johnson  in  spite  of  the  popular 
mandate;  and  the  action  of  the  Southern  Legislatures 
in  rejecting  the  fourteenth  amendment, —  all  these 
played  directly  into  the  hands  of  the  radical  leader.J 
He  now  used  Johnson's  obstinacy  and  his  discredited 
policy  for  purposes  of  party  discipline.  If  he  could 
convict  any  lingering  weak-kneed  Republican  of  be- 

1  See  Elaine,  in  the  House,  Dec.  loth,  1866,  and  Fessenden  and 
Edmunds,  in  the  Senate,  Dec.  igth  and  20th. 


434     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ing  tinged  with  "  Andy  Johnsonism,"  it  was  sufficient 
for  his  purpose. 

But  a  most  powerful  weapon  in  his  hand,  for  his 
radical  work,  was  the  attitude  of  the  South  toward 
the  fourteenth  amendment,  fit  has  been  charged  that 
Stevens  and  the  radicals  neither  desired  nor  expected 
that  the  South  would  ratify  the  fourteenth  amendment, 
and  that  the  punitive  clause  of  that  amendment  was 
inserted  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  preventing  its 
ratification  by  the  South,  and  thus  defeating  its  adop 
tion.1  It  is  impossible  to  see  how  this  could  be  be 
lieved  concerning  Stevens,  whose  outspoken  opinions 
on  the  subject  were  known  of  all  men.  He  was  un 
willing  to  have  the  South  consulted  in  the  matter.  If 
his  opponents  urged  that  policy,  that  was  their  busi 
ness,  not  his.f^If  this  charge  were  believed  by  John 
son  and  his  political  advisers  in  the  North,  common 
political  sagacity  would  have  suggested  that  they  should 
seek  to  circumvent  the  radicals  by  throwing  their  sup 
port  to  the  amendments  If  the  President  with  the 
Democratic  party  at  the  North  had,  at  any  time  after 
the  amendment  were  offered,  advised  the  people  of  the 
South  to  accept  it  and  come  into  the  Union  on  the 
terms  that  it  offered,  as  Tennessee  had  been  permitted 
to  do,  it  could  have  been  accomplished.2 

Johnson  and  his  followers  pursued  exactly  the  op 
posite  course.  The  President  advised  the  Southern 

1 "  This  seems  to  have  been  inserted  for  the  express  purpose 
of  preventing  the  adoption  by  the  Southern  States  of  any  of  the 
amendments  proposed.  It  may  not  be  the  motive  of  the  com 
mittee,  but  it  will  be  the  result  of  their  action."  Raymond,  in 
the  House,  May  9,  1866.  See,  also,  Dewit's  Impeachment  of 
Johnson,  pp.  93^96,  and  Rhodes,  V,  p.  609. 

2  Garfield,  in  the  House,  Feb.  12,  1867,  Globe. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        435 

Legislatures  to  reject  the  amendment.  He  would  yield 
nothing  to  Congress.  He  denied  the  right  of  Con 
gress  to  pass  the  amendment  while  some  of  the  states 
were  unrepresented,  and  he  led  the  South  to  hope  that 
a  new  Congress  might  offer  easier  terms.  Samuel  J. 
Randall,  Democratic  member  from  Pennsylvania,  said 
it  were  better  to  punish  the  Southern  leaders  by  ban 
ishment,  or  otherwise,  and  not  put  a  stigma  upon  a 
whole  people;  they  would  not  belie  their  natures  by 
"  writing  themselves  down  as  slaves  at  the  bidding  of 
this  central  directory."  1  Randall  quoted  a  fierce  de 
nunciation  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  from  an  ed 
itorial  in  the  New  York  Times  that  was  calculated  to 
further  arouse  and  stiffen  resistance  in  the  South.  Ac 
cording  to  the  Times  the  amendment  was  but  a  "  bur 
lesque  and  a  farce,"  and  its  proper  designation  should 
be,  "  a  plan  to  prolong  indefinitely  the  exclusion  of  the 
South  from  Congress,  by  imposing  conditions  to  which 
the  Southern  people  would  never  submit."  Raymond, 
of  New  York,  a  Johnson  Republican,  asserted  in  the 
House  that  the  Southern  States  would  not  seek  rep 
resentation  on  the  conditions  proposed ;  they  "  would 
not  purchase  the  mockery  of  representation  at  such  a 
price."  They  would  take  their  chances  on  a  new  dis 
pensation,  and  would  wait  to  see  whether  in  three 
short  years  the  government  would  not  come  into 
the  hands  of  "  the  late  rebels  and  their  Northern 
allies."  2  Senator  Dixon,  of  Connecticut,  also  a  John 
son  Republican,  spoke  to  the  same  effect.  He  pre- 

1  House,   May  10,   1866.    This  was  said  of  the  first  form  of 
the  third  section  of  the  amendment. 

2  Globe,  May  9,  1866. 


436     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

dieted  (the  wish  obviously  being  father  to  the 
thought)  that  the  South  would  wait  to  see  what  the 
next  elections  would  develop,  and  he  said  it  was 
"  hardly  worth  while  to  discuss  the  merits  of  measures 
which  to  be  valid  must  be  accepted  by  communities 
which  are  sure  to  reject  them."  l 

Stevens'  plan,  of  course,  would  have  been  wiser,— 
to  have  adopted  the  fourteenth  amendment  without 
asking  the  consent  of  the  Southern  States.  It  must 
be  confessed  that  Congress  showed  a  lack  of  common 
sense  and  sagacity  in  asking  the  Southern  leaders  and 
their  people  deliberately  to  consent  to  their  own  pun 
ishment, —  a  punishment  that  was  made  to  appear  to 
a  proud  people  like  a  humiliation.  It  was  said  that 
they  were  asked  to  be  the  instruments  of  their  own 
dishonor,  and  to  put  a  stigma  upon  the  men  whom  they 
had  elected  to  lead  their  cause.  But  that  was  not 
Stevens'  policy,  and  in  the  light  of  the  repeated  en 
couragements  that  Johnson  and  his  Northern  sup 
porters  gave  to  the  South  to  reject  the  plan  that  Con 
gress  saw  fit  to  impose,  it  is  hardly  reasonable  to 
charge  upon  Stevens  and  the  radicals  responsibility 
for  that  rejection.2  That  responsibility  lay  else 
where. 

True,  Stevens  expected  the  Southern  States  to  act 
as  they  did.  The  offer  of  the  fourteenth  amendment 
to  the  South,  against  his  will,  merely  gave  him  an 

1  Globe,  May  2,  1866,  p.  2332. 

2  Some  of  the  Johnson  State  Legislatures  in  the  South  would 
very  probably  have  ratified  the  fourteenth  amendment  if  it  had 
not  been  for  the  President's  direct  interference  and  advice.     He 
was    constantly    urging,    by    letter    and    telegram,    that    "there 
should  be  no  faltering"  in  the  sustainment  of  "my  policy,"  and 
holding  out  false  promises  as  to  what  they  might  expect. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        437 

added  advantage;  he  could  now  plausibly  assert  that 
its  rejection  and  the  testimony  of  his  opponents  in  en 
couraging  its  rejection,  exactly  confirmed  what  he  had 
said  all  along,  namely,  that  the  ex-Confederates  were 
not  disposed  to  submit  to  the  national  authority  any 
further  than  they  were  compelled  to  by  the  necessity 
of  force;  that  if  left  to  a  free  choice  their  spirit  would 
be  that  of  defiance.  Now  that  they  had  had  a  chance 
to  show  their  temper,  the  proof  was  positive.  By  the 
close  of  1866  all  but  three  of  the  Southern  Legisla 
tures,  following  the  advice  of  Johnson  and  the  North 
ern  Democratic  party,  had  rejected  this  amendment, 
and  it  was  known  that  the  other  three  would  soon  fol 
low  in  the  same  policy.  In  many  cases  this  rejection 
was  almost  unanimous,  in  some  cases  peremptory. 
"  The  most  votes  they  got  for  it  were  four,"  as  Stevens 
said,  while  combating  Bingham's  policy  of  waiting 
still  further  for  the  adoption  of  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment.  This  certainly  seemed  .like  an  attitude  of  de 
fiance,  if  not  of  contempt,  fine  radicals  could  now 
urge  with  force  that  terms  had  been  offered  that  were 
moderate,  reasonable,  and  fair;  that  the  terms  had 
been  rejected  with  arrogance,  and  that  these  states 
with  increased  political  power,  should  never  again  en 
ter  the  halls  of  Congress,  until  "they  had  changed 
their  tone  and  manner.'V 

The  way  this  action  appeared  to  the  people  of  the 
North  was  repeatedly  reflected  in  Congress.  "  The 
last  one  of  the  sinful  ten,"  said  Garfield,  "  has  at  last, 
with  scorn  and  contempt,  flung  back  into  our  teeth, 
the  magnanimous  offer  of  a  generous  nation.  It  is 

iWade,  Senate,  Dec.  14,  1866. 


438     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

now  our  turn  to  act.  They  would  not  cooperate  with 
us  in  rebuilding  what  they  had  destroyed.  We  must 
remove  the  rubbish  and  rebuild  from  the  bottom."  1 
Congress  had,  in  good  faith,  offered  the  plan  of  the 
fourteenth  amendment  to  the  country,  and  it  was  un 
derstood,  though  there  was  no  express  pledge  to  that 
effect,  that  the  great  turning  point  in  the  readmission 
of  the  states  was  its  adoption  by  the  South.  What 
motive  was  there  in  its  rejection  but  a  spirit  of  dis 
loyalty,  or  a  partisan  purpose  for  the  recovery  of 
power  in  the  hope  of  being  able  later  to  dictate  terms 
that  would  suit  themselves?  This  was  the  way  the 
matter  appeared  to  nine-tenths  of  the  victorious  Re 
publicans  of  the  North. 

Under  the  circumstances  it  was  not  difficult  for 
Stevens  and  his  fellow  radicals  to  convince  their  party 
colleagues  in  Congress  that  it  was  the  expectation  and 
purpose  of  their  opponents,  by  a  combination  of  the 
President,  the  Democratic  party  of  the  North,  and  the 
solid  unreconstructed  South,  to  restore  the  "  rebels," 
not  only  to  their  rights,  but  to  political  power  within 
the  Union.  New  provisions  and  guarantees  must  be 
had  to  prevent  this  consummation. 

No  one  could  doubt  the  honesty  of  Stevens'  pur 
pose,  nor  his  deep  convictions.  His  qualities  as  a 
party  leader  now  stood  out  preeminently.  His  leader 
ship  had  been  potent  before;  the  party  situation  now 
made  it  absolute.2  Stevens  deemed  it  his  bounden 

1  Globe,  Feb.  6,  1867. 

"  Stevens  and  Sumner  were  now  to  see  the  triumph  of  their 
doctrines  which  had  long  been  treated  with  contumacy  and 
ridicule.  Stevens,  truculent,  vindictive,  and  cynical,  dominated 
the  House  of  Representatives  in  the  second  session  of  this  Con- 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        439 

duty  to  do  all  that  in  him  lay  to  circumvent  and  con 
found  the  party  politics  of  his  opponents,  and  secure 
the  dominance  of  his  own,  the  only  true  party  of  the 
Union.  He  believed  that  negro  suffrage  would  help 
his  party  to  retain  power;  he  therefore  favored  negro 
suffrage.  He  did  not  urge  it  as  an  abstract  proposi 
tion,  nor  -as  necessary  to  a  fair  equality  of  human 
rights.1  (Though  he  believed  devotedly  in  the  equality 
of  all  men  before  the  law  in  their  right  to  life,  liberty 
and  happiness,  yet  he  did  not  regard  voting,  regardless 
of  qualification,  as  a  natural  right,  and  in  urging  un 
qualified  negro  suffrage  at  this  time,  he  was  governed 
chiefly  by  his  party  interests.  He  was  no  hypocrite 
and  he  made  no  concealment  of  his  purpose. 

"  I  believe  upon  my  conscience,"  he  said,  "  that  on 
the  continued  ascendency  of  that  party  depends  the 
safety  of  this  great  nation.  If  impartial  suffrage  is 
excluded  in  the  rebel  states  every  one  of  them  is  sure 
to  send  a  solid  rebel  delegation  to  Congress  and  cast  a 
solid  rebel  electoral  vote.  They,  with  their  kindred 
Copperheads  in  the  North  will  elect  the  President  and 
control  Congress/'  2 

In  this  Stevens  merely  voiced  the  opinion  of  an 
overwhelming  majority  of  his  countrymen.  Those 
who  deplore  the  mistakes  of  reconstruction  —  and 
those  mistakes  were  many, —  and  those  who  are  ac- 

gress  with  even  less  opposition  than  in  the  first.  A  keen  and 
relentlessly  logical  mind,  an  ever  ready  gift  of  biting  sarcasm 
and  stinging  repartee,  and  a  total  lack  of  scruple  as  to  means 
in  the  pursuit  of  a  legislative  end,  secured  him  an  ascendency  in 
the  House  which  none  of  his  party  associates  ever  dreamed  of 
disputing."  Dunning,  Reconstruction,  pp.  86-87. 

1  See  p.  389. 

2  Globe,  Jan.  3,  1867. 


440      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

custpmed  tpjtjiink  of  Thaddeus  Stevens  as  a jpartisan 
and  vindictive  reprobate,  whp^  was  gerspnall^  respon 
sible  for  all  the  ills  of  those  unhappy  times,  would  do 
well  to  remember  that  the  partisanship  of  Stevens  was 
merely  the  partisanship  of  his  day.  He  undoubtedly 
had  the  endorsement,  if  not  the  clear  and  direct  man 
date,  of  his  party  constituency  in  the  North,  as  well 
as  the  backing  of  his  party  majority  in  Congress. 
What  he  did,  he  did  by  their  approval  and  consent.  It 
is  also  well  to  reflect  that  for  the  two  cardinal  errors 
in  the  early  history  of  reconstruction, —  those  relating 
to  the  great  amendment  that  was  generously  offered 
as  a  basis  of  reunion, —  Thaddeus  Stevens  was  cer 
tainly  not  responsible.  The  first  of  these  errors  was 
in  submitting  the  amendment  to  the  Southern  States; 
the  second  was  in  their  defiant  rejection  of  it  upon  its 
submission, —  an  action  which  was  one  of  the  most 
potent  and  most  fatal  factors  in  the  whole  history  of 
reconstruction. 

It  is,  of  course,  no  tribute  to  Stevens  to  suggest  that 
if  these  errors  had  been  avoided  his  further  purposes 
would  have  been  thwarted.  But  if  better  things  came 
to  worse  it  should  be  recognized  that  others  were  re 
sponsible  as  well  as  he,  and  fairness  requires  that  this 
be  appreciated  properly,  as  we  come  to  view  the  un 
fortunate  policy  of  reconstruction  in  which  Stevens 
now  becomes  the  prime  promoter. 

At  the  close  of  1866,  Johnson's  plan  having  been 
eliminated,  there  were  open  to  the  congressional  lead 
ers  two  possible  modes  of  dealing  with  the  problem  of 
the  South.  One  was  to  adopt  a  waiting  policy  that 
wrould  let  the  Southern  States  alone,  recognize  them 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        441 

as  organized  states  with  federal  rights  suspended,  but 
refuse  them  representation  until  they  were  ready  to 
reconsider  their  action,  and,  of  their  accord,  accede 
to  the  terms  that  Congress  had  proposed  in  the  four 
teenth  amendment.  The  other  mode  pointed  to  a  pol 
icy  of  national  interference  and  control  that  would 
supersede  the  governments  set  up  by  President  John 
son,  and  set  up  new  governments  that  would  be  ac 
ceptable  to  Congress,  in  the  meantime  governing  the 
South  by  national  authority  until  such  time  as  Con 
gress  saw  fit  to  restore  statehood. 

The  more  radical  policy  was  adopted  and  Congress 
began  the  work  of  reconstruction  anew, — "  clearing 
away  the  rubbish  and  building  from  the  bottom  up," 
as  Garfield  expressed  it.  This  was,  on  the  whole, 
probably  the  wiser  of  the  two  courses  for  Congress  to 
adopt,  but  a  combination  of  untoward  circumstances 
seemed  destined  to  prevent  Congress  from  adopting  a 
scheme  of  reorganization  that  was  moderate  and  wise.1 
There  was  no  longer  any  hope  of  cooperation  between 
President  and  Congress ;  the  rejection  of  the  four 
teenth  amendment  showed  that  the  problem  had  to  be 
met  in  the  midst  of  sectional  passion  and  resentment; 
the  frequent  and  cruel  Southern  outrages  —  or  the  be 
lief  in  the  Northern  mind  that  such  outrages  were  of 
common  occurrence  —  toward  the  negroes  and  Union 

1  Professor  Burgess,  an  eminent  political  scientist  and  a  stu 
dent  of  this  period  of  American  history,  says  that  "  there  can 
be  no  question  in  the  mind  of  any  sound  political  scientist  and 
constitutional  lawyer,  that  Congress  was  in  the  right  in  brush- 
ling  aside  the  results  of  Executive  reconstruction  in  1867,  and  in 
beginning  the  work  itself  from  the  bottom  up.  It  ought  to  have 
done  so  in  1865.  .  .  .  While  it  is  strange  that  Congress  did  not 
follow  this  course  in  1865  it  is  simply  astounding  that  it  made 
such  a  mess  of  it  in  1867."  Reconstruction. 


442     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

men  of  the  South,  leading  to  the  belief  that  there  must 
be  immediate  national  protection;  the  feeling  that  the 
ballot  might  be  a  weapon  of  self-protection  for  the 
negro;  Republican  bitterness  toward  Johnson  on  ac 
count  of  his  partisan  removals;  serious  divisions 
within  the  councils  and  among  the  leaders  of  the  Re 
publican  party, —  these  circumstances,  combined  with 
the  fact  that  the  problem  had  to  be  met  in  the  short 
session  of  a  few  weeks,  amid  other  pressing  business 
of  importance,  will  serve  to  explain,  if  not  to  excuse, 
.what  has  been  considered  the  culpable  shortcoming  of 
the  final  congressional  plan  of  reconstruction. 

These  extenuating  circumstances,  the  conflicts  and 
cross-purposes  in  the  midst  of  haste  and  hurry,  as  well 
as  Stevens'  agency  in  the  progress  of  events,  are  re 
vealed  in  the  record  of  the  last  session  of  the  Thirty- 
ninth  Congress. 

At  the  opening  of  Congress  in  December,  1866,  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Reconstruction  was  reappointed, 
the  life  of  the  old  committee  having  expired  with  the 
previous  session.1  One  of  the  earliest  matters  to 
which  Congress  directed  its  attention  was  that  of  fix 
ing  a  day  for  the  meeting  of  the  Fortieth  Congress. 
Johnson  was  not  to  be  left  again  to  direct  affairs  alone 
during  a  recess  of  Congress.  The  latter  body  was  de 
termined  to  regulate  the  times  of  its  own  sessions,  that 
it  might  be  in  position  to  regulate  and  control  in  mat 
ters  of  reconstruction.  Accordingly,  on  December  3, 
1866,  Schenck,  of  Ohio,  introduced  a  bill  providing 
for  the  meeting  of  the  Fortieth  Congress  immediately 
upon  the  expiration  of  the  Thirty-ninth, —  so  distrust- 
December  4,  1866. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        443 

ful  and  antagonistic  was  Congress  toward  the  Execu 
tive.  This  bill  passed  both  houses  and  became  a  law 
on  January  10,  1867. 

At  the  opening  of  the  session  the  problem  of  re 
construction  was  pending  before  Congress  under  two 
forms.  One  proposal  was  the  bill  of  April  30,  1866, 
promising  restoration  on  the  basis  of  the  fourteenth 
amendment  and  the  establishment,  in  the  Southern 
States,  of  a  republican  form  of  government.  This 
had  come  before  Congress  by  the  order  and  sanc 
tion  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Reconstruction.  It 
recognized  the  Southern  communities  as  organized 
states,  competent  to  ratify  an  amendment.  It  in 
volved  the  submission  of  the  amendment  to  those 
states  and  the  recognition  of  the  validity  of  Johnson's 
work  in  reconstruction  to  a  large  extent. 

This  was  the  policy  of  waiting,  of  patience,  of  giv 
ing  the  South  another  chance  at  the  conservative  offer 
already  rejected.  This  was  the  policy  still  favored  by 
the  more  moderate  Republicans  led  by  John  A.  Bing- 
ham,  of  Ohio.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  this 
was  not  the  policy  of  Stevens.  He  set  himself,  as  he 
had  been  in  the  previous  session,  in  stout  opposition  to 
it,  and  the  difference  of  view  on  this  policy  led  to  a 
breach,  if  not  to  bitterness,  between  Stevens  and 
Bingham,  two  of  the  ablest  of  the  congressional  lead 
ers. 

The  other  proposal  before  Congress  was  a  substi 
tute  offered  by  Stevens,  on  January  3,  1867,  n°t  on 
behalf  of  the  committee,  but  for  himself.  He  offered 
this  as  a  substitute,  also,  for  the  bill  that  he  had  in 
troduced  and  discussed  in  the  closing  days  of  the  pre- 


444     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ceeding  session.1  Stevens^  substitute  asserted  that  the 
Southern  States  had  forfeited  their  rights  under  the 
Cons  titutjon;_  that  they  could  be  reinstated  only  by 
action  of  Congress,  and  it  prescribed  a  method  by 
which  those  states  were  to  be  permitted  to  form  valid 
The  Johnson  governments  were 


recognized  as  valid,  not  as  state  governments,  but  for 
municipal  purposes  only,  and  provisions  were  set  forth 
for  holding  new  state  conventions  and  forming  and 
adopting  new  constitutions.  In  the  process  of  new 
state-making  a  new  electorate  was  created.  The  ne 
groes  were  included,—  •"  all  male  citizens  above  the  age 
of  twenty-one  years  ";  but  all  persons  who  held  office, 
civil  or  military,  under  the  Confederacy,  were  declared 
to  have  "  forfeited  their  citizenship  "  and  were  not  to 
be  allowed  to  vote  until  five  years  after  they  had  de 
clared  their  desire  to  be  reinvested  with  the  rights  of 
citizenship,  and,  renouncing  allegiance  to  all  other 
governments,  had  sworn  allegiance  to  the  United 
States. 

This  was  virtually  an  enabling  act  providing  for  the 
making  of  new  states  in  the  South  on  the  basis  of 
negro  suffrage,  and  the  exclusion  of  the  leading  ex- 
Confederates. 

On  these  two  policies,  or  proposals,  an  extended  de 
bate  occurred,  lasting  until  the  last  of  January,  1867, 
till  so  late  in  the  session  that  if  anything  were  clone  at 
all  by  the  Thirty-ninth  Congress  it  had  to  be  done  in  a 
hurry.  Such  a  diversity  of  opinion  developed  on  the 
Republican  side  that  Stevens  himself  was  disposed  to 
have  his  measure  laid  on  the  table,  and  to  let  the  prob- 
1  See  p.  420. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        445 

lem  of  reconstruction  go  over  to  the  Fortieth  Con 
gress.1  In  proposing  his  bill,  Stevens  made  an  ex 
tended  speech,  on  January  3,  1867.  He  urged  early 
action,  as  he  deemed  it  important  that  some  conclu 
sion  should  be  arrived  at  as  to  what  should  be  done 
with  the  rebel  states.  They  were  getting  worse  and 
worse,  and  action  was  now  all  the  more  necessary  on 
account  of  the  late  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in 
the  Milligan  case.  In  this  case  the  Court  had  decided 
that  military  commissions  and  trials  by  courts  martial 
were  unconstitutional,  except  where  a  state  of  war  pre 
vented  the  civil  courts  from  acting.  "  That  decision," 
said  Stevens,  "  although  in  terms  perhaps  not  as  in 
famous  as  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  is  yet  far  more 
dangerous  in  its  operation  upon  the  lives  and  liberties 
of  the  loyal  men  in  the  rebel  states.  .  .  .  That  decision 
has  unsheathed  the  dagger  of  the  assassin,  and  places 
the  knife  of  the  rebel  at  the  throat  of  every  man  who 
dares  to  proclaim  himself  to  be  now,  or  to  have  been 
heretofore,  a  loyal  Union  man.  If  the  doctrine  enun 
ciated  in  that  decision  be  true,  never  were  the  people  of 
any  country,  anywhere  or  at  any  time,  in  such  terrible 

1  The  strained  relation  between  Stevens  and  Bingham  is  re 
vealed  in  the  debates.  Bingham  sought  to  have  Stevens'  bill 
referred  to  the  Reconstruction  Committee,  to  delay  its  passage 
or  materially  to  modify  it.  Stevens  believed  that  this  would  be 
to  send  it  to  its  grave.  His  former  bill  had  been  sent  to  this 
"  tomb  of  the  Capulets,"  and  he  wished  that  whatever  amend 
ments  the  House  saw  fit  to  propose  in  the  process  of  perfecting" 
the  bill,  should  be  offered  in  the  House  without  reference  to 
the  committee.  Bingham  remarked  that  he  did  "not  concur 
in  the  declaration  of  the  venerable  gentleman  from  Pennsyl 
vania,  that  the  recommitment  of  the  bill  is  equivalent  to  its 
death,"  whereupon  Stevens  retorted  that  he  had  not  asked  his 
concurrence,  and  in  "  all  this  contest  about  reconstruction  I  do 
not  propose  either  to  take  his  counsel,  recognize  his  authority, 
or  believe  a  word  he  says."  Globe,  Jan.  28,  1867,  p.  816. 


446     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

peril  as  are  our  loyal  brethren  at  the  South."  Unless 
Congress  acts  speedily  for  the  protection  of  the  freed- 
man  and  Unionist  at  the  South  "  against  the  barba 
rians  who  are  daily  murdering  them,"  he  asked  every 
man  who  loved  liberty  whether  "  we  shall  not  be  liable 
to  the  just  censure  of  the  world  for  our  negligence  or 
cowardice." 

His  bill  was  designed  to  enable  loyal  men  to  form 
governments  that  would  be  in  loyal  hands,  by  which 
they  might  protect  themselves  from  these  outrages. 
The  Johnson  governments  "  would  not  convict  the 
murderers  that  were  being  turned  loose  under  the  Mil- 
ligan  decision,"  saved  from  trial  by  United  States 
military  authorities;  and  provision  must  be  made  that 
such  construction  should  not  open  the  door  to  greater 
injuries. 

"  Congress  must  not  allow  the  revolution  through 
which  the  country  had  been  passing  to  subside  until  the 
nation  has  been  erected  into  a  perfect  republic.  But 
little  had  been  done  toward  establishing  the  govern 
ment  on  the  true  principles  of  liberty  and  justice.  We 
have  broken  the  material  shackles  of  four  million 
slaves.  We  have  unchained  them  from  the  stake  and 
allowed  them  locomotion,  provided  they  do  not  walk  in 
paths  that  are  trod  by  white  men.  .  .  .  We  have  im 
posed  upon  them  the  privilege  of  fighting  our  battles, 
of  dying  in  defense  of  freedom,  of  bearing  their  equal 
portion  of  taxes,  but  where  have  we  given  them  the 
privilege  of  ever  participating  in  the  formation  of  the 
laws  of  the  government  of  their  native  land?  By 
what  civil  weapon  have  we  enabled  them  to  defend 
themselves  against  oppression  and  injustice?  Call 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        447 

you  this  liberty,  where  four  millions  are  subjects,  but 
not  citizens  ?  Then  Persia  with  her  kings  and  satraps 
was  free;  then  Turkey  is  free!  Their  subjects  had 
liberty  of  motion,  but  the  laws  were  made  without  and 
against  their  will.  .  .  .  Think  not  I  would  slander  my 
native  land;  I  would  reform  it.  Twenty  years  ago  I 
denounced  it  as  a  despotism;  then  twenty  million 
white  men  enchained  four  million  black  men.  I  pro 
nounce  it  no  nearer  a  true  republic  now  when  twenty- 
five  million  of  a  privileged  class  exclude  five  million 
from  all  participation  in  the  rights  of  government."  1 

Then  Stevens  again  set  forth  at  length  his  theory  as 
to  the  belligerent  states  of  the  South.  He  denied  to 
the  President,  the  mere  servant  of  the  sovereign  people, 
who  issue  their  orders  to  him  through  Congress,  any 
power  to  create  new  states,  or  to  dictate  organic  laws, 
or  to  fix  the  qualification  of  voters,  or  to  determine 
that  states  are  republican.  "  Though  the  President  is 
Commander-in-chief,  Congress  is  his  commander,  and, 
God  willing,  he  shall  obey.  He  and  his  minions  shall 
learn  that  this  is  not  a  government  of  kings  and 
satraps,  but  a  government  of  the  people,  and  that 
Congress  is  the  people."  Congress  has  all  power  but 
what  is  executive  and  judicial. 

He  reviewed  the  shortcomings  of  the  President's 
policy  that  had  been  condemned  by  the  country.  In 
opposition  he  demanded  that  the  conquered  belligerent, 
according  to  the  law  of  nations,  should  pay  at  least  a 
part  of  the  damages  and  expenses  of  the  war;  and  es 
pecially  that  the  loyal  people  who  were  plundered  and 
impoverished  by  rebel  raiders,  should  be  fully  indemni- 

1  Globe,  January  3,  1867. 


448      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

fied.     Treason  should  be  made  odious,  not  by  bloody 
executions,  but  by  other  adequate  punishments. 

These  states  are  now  without  governments.  They 
must  have  enabling  acts.  They  must  be  placed  under 
the  guardianship  of  loyal  men,  or  the  blood  and  treas 
ure  of  the  war  would  have  been  spent  in  vain.  He 
would  waive  at  the  time  the  matter  of  punishment, 
though  wisdom  prompted,  in  future,  moderate  confisca 
tions  both  as  reproof  and  example.  Impartial  suf 
frage  was  to  be  the  rule.  That  principle  had  been 
fixed  in  regard  to  the  territories  and  the  District  of 
Columbia,  and  there  is  more  reason  why  the  colored 
voters  should  be  admitted  in  the  rebel  states,  being 
the  great  bulk  of  the  loyal  people.  Otherwise  these 
states  would  be  ruled  by  traitors,  and  loyal  men 
would  be  oppressed,  exiled,  or  murdered.  Loyal 
blacks  had  a  better  right  to  choose  rulers  and  make 
laws  than  rebel  whites.  It  is  necessary  to  the  protec 
tion  of  the  loyal  white  men.  The  blacks  and  the  loyal 
whites  would  act  in  a  body,  and,  united,  they  would 
form  a  majority,  control  the  states,  and  protect  them 
selves. 

Such  a  measure  as  the  one  for  which  he  was  plead 
ing  had  been  urged  by  the  late  convention  of  Southern 
loyalists  at  Philadelphia;  without  it  these  Union  men 
would  be  the  victims  of  daily  persecutions. 

He  then  spoke  of  the  party  purpose.1  "  You  must," 
he  said,  "  divide  the  South  between  loyalists,  without 
regard  to  color,  and  disloyalists,  or  you  will  be  the  per 
petual  vassals  of  the  free-trade,  irritated,  revengeful 
South.  For  these,  among  other  reasons,  I  am  for  the 

i  See  p.  391. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        449 

negro  suffrage  in  every  rebel  state.  If  it  be  just,  it 
should  not  be  denied;  if  it  be  necessary,  it  should  be 
adopted;  if  it  be  a  punishment  to  traitors,  they  deserve 
it. 

"  But  it  will  be  said,  '  This  is  negro  equality ! ' 
What  is  negro  equality,  about  which  so  much  is  said 
by  knaves,  and  some  of  which  is  believed  by  men  who 
are  not  fools?  It  means,  as  understood  by  honest  re 
publicans,  just  this  much  and  no  more :  Every  man, 
no  matter  what  his  race  or  color;  every  earthly  being 
who  has  an  immortal  soul,  has  an  equal  right  to  justice, 
honesty  and  fair  play  with  every  other  man;  and  the 
law  should  secure  him  those  rights.  The  same  law 
which  condemns  or  acquits  an  African,  should  con 
demn  or  acquit  a  white  man.  The  same  law  which 
gives  a  verdict  in  a  white  man's  favor  should  give  a 
verdict  in  a  black  man's  favor  on  the  same  state  of 
facts.  Such  is  the  law  of  God,  and  such  ought  to  be 
the  law  of  man.  This  doctrine  does  not  mean  that  a 
negro  shall  sit  on  the  same  seat  or  eat  at  the  same 
table  with  a  white  man.  That  is  a  matter  of  taste 
which  every  man  must  decide  for  himself.  The  law 
has  nothing  to  do  with  it.  If  there  be  any  who  are 
afraid  of  the  rivalry  of  the  black  man,  let  them  meet 
their  competitors  in  a  fair  field,  and  there  will  be  no 
danger  that  their  white  neighbors  will  prefer  the  Afri 
cans  to  themselves.  But  there  will  be  danger  that 
those  will  be  distanced  in  the  race  who  are  influenced 
by  this  senseless  cry  of  negro  equality,  for  I  have 
never  seen  even  a  contraband  slave  who  had  not  more 
sense  than  such  men." 

Suffrage  for  the  negro  is  a  step  forward.     It  is  "  an 


450     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

assault  upon  ignorance  and  prejudice,  and  timid  men 
shrink  from  it.  Are  such  men  fit  to  sit  in  the  places 
of  statesmen?  There  are  periods  in  the  history  of  na 
tions  when  statesmen  can  make  themselves  names  for 
posterity;  but  such  occasions  are  never  improved  by 
cowards.  In  the  acquisition  of  true  fame  courage  is 
just  as  necessary  in  the  civilian  as  in  the  military  hero. 
It  was  courage  that  made  Luther  the  great  man  of  the 
Reformation,  around  whom  the  others  revolve  as 
satellites  and  shine  by  his  light.  We  may  not  aspire 
to  fame.  But  great  events  fix  the  eye  of  history  on 
small  objects  and  magnify  their  meanness.  Let  us  at 
least  escape  that  condition."  1 

Between  this  radical  program  of  Stevens'  and  the 
more  conservative  spirits  on  the  Republican  side  of  the 
House,  there  was  to  be  another  trial  of  strength. 
Bingham,  leader  of  the  conservative  Republicans, 
made  a  plea  for  the  "  grander  qualities  of  magnanimity 
and  mercy "  rather  than  "  stern,  relentless,  even- 
handed  justice,"  and  Mr.  Rhodes  expresses  the  opinion 
that  despite  the  irritation  caused  by  the  rejection  of  the 
amendment  by  the  Southern  States,  such  were  the 
differences  which  cropped  out  when  the  details  of  any 
measure  were  considered,  that  no  further  act  of  re 
construction  would  probably  have  been  passed  at  this 
session  had  it  not  been  for  the  able  and  despotic  parlia 
mentary  leadership  of  Stevens.2 

1  In    this    extract    I    have    made    some   condensation    without 
always   indicating   omissions,   but   I   think   I   have   faithfully   re 
flected  the   substance,   meaning,   and  temper   of   Stevens'   utter 
ance. 

2  Rhodes  says  further  of  Stevens  in  this  passage :     "  The  old 
man's    energy   was   astonishing.     Vindictiyeness    seemed   to    ani 
mate  his  frame.     Already  bitter  enough  in  his  personal  antago- 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        451 

Early  in  the  session,1  Spalding,  of  Ohio,  prompted 
by  Bingham,  as  Stevens  believed,  offered  a  resolution 
requesting  the  Committee  on  Reconstruction  to  con 
sider  the  propriety  of  again  proposing  to  receive  the 
Senators  and  Representatives  from  the  South,  if  they 
would  ratify  the  fourteenth  amendment.  Spalding, 
who  could  speak  of  Stevens  as  his  "  only  senior  in  this 
House,"  complained  that  he  could  never  take  the  floor 
"  without  being  subjected  to  the  caustic  criticism  of 
the  learned  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania."  Spald 
ing  sought  to  explain  his  position  and  to  defend  him 
self  and  his  more  conservative  proposal  against 
Stevens'  attacks.  He  pleaded  for  time  before  other 
and  more  violent  measures  were  adopted.  "  Let  the 
fourteenth  amendment  be  in  the  train  of  adoption 
where  it  now  is  till  the  fourth  of  March,  then  if  we 
find  the  measure  is  repudiated  with  contempt,  and 
flung  back  in  our  faces,"  he  pledged  himself  to  go  with 
Stevens  and  his  bill.  He  urged  Congress  to  proceed 
with  caution,  to  "  listen  to  the  counsels  of  reason 
rather  than  the  impulses  of  passion."  Congress  was 
now  being  urged  to  impeach  the  President  and  to  con 
fer  the  franchise  on  the  freedmen.  "  What  will  our 
people  at  home  think  of  these  rank  and  radical  meas 
ures  ?  "  2  asked  Spalding. 

Bingham   supported    Spalding   in   this   policy.     He 

nism  to  Johnson  and  the  Southern  people,  he  added  to  this 
bitterness  by  frequent  consultations  with  those  whom  he  termed 
'  loyal  men  from  the  South '  who  hated  '  the  national  leaders  of 
opinion/  the  men  of  brain  and  education  in  their  section,  and 
who  aimed  at  supplanting  them  in  political  influence  and  power." 
History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  VI,  p.  14. 

1  December  10,  1866. 

2  Globe,  Jan.  5,  1867. 


452     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

wished  not  to  recede  from  the  principles  of  the  four 
teenth  amendment.  This  amendment  had  been  offi 
cially  recognized  by  the  committee,  and  had  been  given 
out  by  Congress  as  the  best  basis  for  future  reconstruc 
tion.  Stevens'  more  radical  proposal  had  been  of 
fered,  as  Bingham  contended,  in  a  spirit  of  hostility  to 
this  amendment,  "  in  the  spirit  of  a  distinguished  man 
of  this  country  [referring  to  Johnson]  who  had  been 
making  war  on  the  amendment,  and  asking  Congress 
to  fling  the  swindling  amendment  out  of  the  window." 
An  effort  was  being  made,  Bingham  asserted,  to  get 
the  people  to  reject  this  amendment  as  a  basis  of  resto 
ration, —  the  firm  enduring  basis  of  fundamental  law 
for  a  repealable  act  in  assumption  of  powers  not  be 
longing  to  Congress.  Bingham  contended  that  Con 
gress  had  power  to  propose  the  pending  amendment  to 
the  Johnson  states  organized  as  they  were;  that  the 
people  of  these  states  might  recognize  their  local 
state  governments  and  ratify  the  amendment.  He 
sought  to  sustain  his  position  by  the  analogy  of  North 
Carolina  and  Rhode  Island  in  1789  and  1790. 
"  These  states,  not  in  the  Union  nor  of  the  Union,  did 
ratify  and  accept  the  Constitution,  and  thereupon  were 
admitted  to  representation  in  Congress.  ...  So  I  sub 
mit,  the  people  of  the  insurrectionary  states  may  pro 
ceed  with  the  work  of  reorganizing,  the  formation  of  a 
constitution,  the  election  of  a  legislature,  and  the  for 
mal  ratification  of  a  constitutional  amendment,  and  all 
they  do  in  that  behalf  may  by  subsequent  act  of  the 
national  sovereignty,  by  resolution,  be  made  valid." 

Bingham' s   argument   was   a   mass   of   inconsisten- 

1  Congressional  Globe,  Jan.   16,  1867. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        453 

cies  and  could  lead  to  nothing  but  confusion  in  political 
thought,  and  inefficiency  in  political  action.  Stevens 
was  perfectly  right  in  denouncing  it  as  absurd  and  per 
nicious,  and  it  was  a  position  which  a  man  of  Stevens' 
keen  and  relentless  logic  found  it  quite  easy  to  demol 
ish.  In  one  passage  Stevens'  opponents  in  this  con 
troversy  would  assert  that  "  to  ratify  a  constitutional 
amendment  is  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  a  state  of 
the  Union  " ; 1  in  another  it  would  be  distinctly  affirmed 
that  "  those  states  have  no  power  whatever  as  states 
of  this  Union,"  and  that  they  could  not  prevent  the 
other  states  from  adopting  the  fourteenth  amendment 
and  making  it  valid.2  Bingham  recognized  that  the 
executive  and  judicial  departments  of  the  government 
were  arrayed  against  this  latter  view,  and  he  went  so 
far  as  to  assert  that  if  the  Supreme  Court  should  ven 
ture  to  declare  the  adoption  of  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment  by  this  process  unconstitutional  and  invalid,  the 
people  might  see  fit  to  abolish  the  court  itself, —  an  ut 
terance  so  radical  in  its  suggestion  as  to  put  to  shame 
anything  that  Stevens  had  ever  proposed  toward  a 
coordinate  department  of  the  government.  For  one 
purpose  it  was  asserted  that  these  Southern  communi 
ties  were  states  for  self-direction  and  control  in  de 
termining  their  relation  to  the  Union,  and  their  deci 
sion  on  questions  of  their  fundamental  law;  for  an 
ther  purpose  it  was  affirmed  that  "  these  disorganized 
Southern  States  have  no  power  to  legislate  on  any 
subject  touching  life,  liberty  or  property,  save  by  the 
sufferance  of  the  nation  represented  in  Congress, 
whose  legislative  power  is  absolute  and  exclusive  with- 
1  Bingham,  January  16.  2  Bingham,  January  16. 


454      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

in  these  regions  that  have  by  rebellion  ceased  to 
possess  the  legal  co-active  force  for  local  state  govern 
ment."  Congress  should  hold  out  the  olive  branch 
of  peace  once  more,  in  the  shape  of  the  amendment, 
to  states  legally  competent  to  accept  it;  but  if  they 
did  not  accept  they  were  to  be  thrown  over  as  illegal 
states,  and  valid  and  legitimate  states  were  to  be  set 
up  in  their  stead,  to  be  composed  of  loyal  Union  men. 

The  more  one  reads  of  these  confused  and  confusing 
utterances,  the  more  one  understands  tli£  valid  reason 
for  Stevens'  unquestioned  leadership.  yHe  had  the  un 
clouded  mind  to  see  things  clearly  and  to  think 
through  the  problem  of  constitutional  restraints  with 
logical  accuracy.  He  knew  his  solution  and  the 
ground  for  it.  He  had  a  doctrine  that  was  consistent, 
and  he  was  without  fear  of  successful  attack  upon  it.S 
He  was  at  times  defeated,  often  on  important  proposi 
tions,  and  had  to  accept  less  than  what  he  contended 
for;  but  from  the  hour  the  struggle  opened  he  neither 
doubted  nor  wavered  as  to  what  he  wanted,  and  dur 
ing  all  the  long  struggle  he  never  laid  down  a  propo 
sition  in  debate  on  which  he  could  be  convicted  of  ob 
scurity  or  inconsistency.  He  never  had  to  retract**-- 
but  repeatedly  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  his 
tardy  Republican  colleagues  come  forward  to  occupy 
the  position  that  he  had  held  from  the  start.  It  was 
these  qualities, —  firmness  of  purpose,  clearness  of 
vision  and  the  absence  of  all  doubt  and  fear  —  that 
now  enabled  him  again  to  overcome  his  inconsistent 
and  more  wavering  Republican  colleagues. 

Stevens  was  in  the  habit  of  calling  things  by  the 
names  that  he  thought  applied  to  them.     Is  he  to  be 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        455 

censured  greatly  for  denouncing  the  argument  of 
Bingham  and  his  conservative  coadjutors,  as  absurd 
nonsense  ?  Was  not  such  a  contention  a  "  pernicious 
obstruction  to  sound  work  "  in  reconstruction?  Was 
the  position  of  his  opponents  any  thing  short  of  self- 
stultification  on  the  part  of  Congress?  If  Johnson's 
states  were  to  be  declared  illegal  it  should  have  been 
because  they  were  illegal.  If  they  were  illegal  they 
had  no  right  to  act  on  the  amendment.  So  far  Con 
gress  had  not  recognized  these  states  by  any  deliberate 
act;  but  to  submit  the  amendment  would  be  to  admit 
their  legality,  and  then,  how  could  Congress  proceed 
to  overthrow  them  on  the  ground  that  they  had  no 
legal  right  to  be? 

Toward  those  whom  Stevens  regarded  as  weak  and 
wavering  Republican  opponents  on  this  proposition, 
he  was,  as  usual,  unsparing  in  his  severity.  He  de 
nounced  the  idea  that  the  fourteenth  amendment  was 
to  be  the  final  action  of  Congress  with  reference  to 
the  readmission  of  the  states,  as  the  most  "  pernicious 
heresy  ever  promulgated  anywhere  by  any  party.  It 
left  us  open,  if  adopted,  to  the  influx  from  the  South 
of  all  the  unreconstructed  rebels  that  chose  to  come 
here.  When  three-fourths  of  the  loyal  states  have 
ratified  that  amendment  it  becomes  a  part  of  the  Con 
stitution.  What,  then,  is  there  for  the.  Southern 
States  to  do  but  to  send  their  representatives  here  ?  If 
that  doctrine  is  to  prevail  there  is  no  power  to  keep 
them  out.  .  .  .  What  rebel  sympathizer  could  propose 
a  more  pernicious  action?  "  "  Now,  sir,  I  think  I  saw 
this  tadpole  before  it  had  its  present  shape."  Its  pres 
ent  form  is  due  to  Bingham, —  a  soft  invitation,  a  feel- 


456  THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ing  the  way.  It  distinctly  invites  and  legalizes  the 
action  of  those  states  on  the  amendment;  while  we 
deny  that  they  have  any  power  or  legal  right  to  act  as 
states.  Could  anything  more  effectually  stultify  this 
body?  '  The  gentleman  (Mr.  Spalding)  did  not  in 
tend  to  stultify  us,  but  he  would  have  done  it  un 
doubtedly." 

As  to  his  animus  in  urging  the  policy  that  he  wished 
adopted,  Stevens  asserted  that  while  dealing  boldly 
and  fearlessly  with  principles,  he  wished  to  deal  fairly 
and  justly  with  all  individuals  of  all  parties.  He 
claimed  that  the  adoption  of  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment  had  no  bearing  whatever  on  reconstruction,  ex 
cept  by  providing  in  its  vital  feature,  "  that  they  shall 
not  overwhelm  us  by  a  representation  based  upon  the 
negroes  who  are  not  voters." 

Instead  of  placing  before  these  communities  a 
proposition  that  none  but  states  could  act  upon,  Stev 
ens  proposed  to  repudiate  their  pretended  governments, 
erected  under  a  "  bastard  reconstruction  " ;  to  regu 
late  them,  and  direct  them  to  go  on  and  form  such 
governments  as  Congress  should  order  them  to  form. 
He  had  voted  for  the  admission  of  Tennessee,  not  be 
cause  that  state  had  ratified  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment,  which  was  of  no  importance,  except  as  an  evi 
dence  of  loyalty,  but  because  that  state  had  adopted  a 
republican  form  of  government  and  its  new  constitu 
tion  had  been  ratified  by  the  people.  He  insisted  that 
Congress  should  hold  the  ground  he  had  held  from  the 
first :  that  "  these  disloyal  states  are  not  states  known 
to  us,  but  are  captive  provinces  with  certain  municipal 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        457 

institutions  which  we  do  not  propose  yet  to  disturb, 
but  which  are  referred  to  in  my  enabling  acts." 

In  voting  to  admit  Tennessee  he  had  shut  his  eyes 
to  the  fact  that  "  a  loyal  negro  had  been  put  on  the 
same  footing  with  a  rebel,  in  being  excluded  from  the 
ballot,  and  he  gave  notice  that  he  would  never  vote  for 
the  admission  of  another  state  without  negro  suf 
frage.  When  Maynard,  of  Tennessee,  reminded  him 
that  if  a  rebel  should  go  to  Pennsylvania  he  would  find 
political  fellowship  there,  while  a  loyal  negro  could 
not,  Stevens  replied  that  Pennsylvania  ought  to  blush, 
and  many  others  of  the  Free  States  ought  to  blush  for 
the  infamous  exclusion  to  which  the  gentleman  refers. 
But  will  our  blushes  whiten  the  countenance  of  Ten 
nessee?  "  1 

1  Congressional  Globe,  Jan.  5,  1867. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION  \COntlHUedJ 

TN  spite  of  Stevens'  objection,  his  substitute  bill,  to- 
•**  gether  with  the  original  measure  of  the  committee, 
was  referred  to  the  Joint  Committee  on  Reconstruc 
tion,  January  28,  1867.  Ten  days  later  (February 
6th),  by  the  instruction  of  the  committee,  one  Repub 
lican  dissenting,1  Stevens  reported  a  new  bill  to  the 
House.  This  involved  the  plan  for  military  recon 
struction  that  resulted  in  the  famous  Reconstruction 
Act  of  March,  1867.  The  bill  set  aside  "  the  pre 
tended  state  governments  of  the  late  so-called  Con 
federate  States,  since  they  were  set  up  without  the 
authority  of  Congress  or  the  sanction  of  the  people; 
it  divided  these  states  into  five  military  districts 
and  made  them  subject  to  military  rule;  the  Gen 
eral  of  the  army  (Grant)  was  to  assign  to  the  com 
mand  of  each  district  a  regular  army  officer  not  be 
low  the  rank  of  Brigadier  General,  with  soldiers  suffi 
cient  to  enforce  his  authority;  the  commanders  were 
to  protect  all  persons  in  their  rights  of  person  and 
property,  to  suppress  insurrection,  disorder  and  vio 
lence,  to  punish  all  criminals  and  disturbers  of  the 
peace,  either  by  the  use  of  civil  tribunals  or  by  the 
employment  of  military  tribunals  if  deemed  necessary, 

1  Probably  Bingham. 

458 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        459 

without  interference  by  any  officer  or  proceeding  of 
the  pretended  state  government;  and  the  courts  and 
judicial  officers  of  the  United  States  were  forbidden  to 
issue  writs  of  habeas  corpus  on  behalf  of  persons  in 
military  custody. 

The  day  after  offering  the  bill  Stevens  explained  its 
purpose  in  a  brief  speech  and  called  for  immediate  ac 
tion.  Already  there  had  been  several  weeks  of  dis 
cussion,  and  as  he  did  not  see  that  anything  was  to  be 
gained  by  further  debate,  he  felt  bound  on  the  mor 
row  to  call  for  a  vote.  For  nearly  two  years,  he 
asserted,  these  states  had  been  lying  in  a  disorganized 
condition,  and  they  have  now  no  governments  that  are 
known  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
States.  Lack  of  harmony  in  the  councils  of  the 
dominant  party  has  caused  this  delay.  The  Executive 
has  attempted  to  enact  new  laws  and  to  authorize  the 
conquered  territory  to  be  represented  in  Congress  with 
out  the  action  of  the  sovereign  power  of  the  nation. 
The  sovereign  power  of  Congress  has  repudiated  the 
authority  which  has  attempted  to  place  states  within 
those  conquered  provinces  and  has  patiently  waited  in 
the  hope  of  realizing  harmony  in  our  councils.  The 
hope  has  failed  and  a  pertinacious  Executive  has 
sought  to  maintain  the  usurpation  of  pretended  gov 
ernments.  And  now,  at  this  late  period,  it  has  become 
the  duty  of  Congress  to  assert  its  right  and  to  do  its 
duty  in  establishing  some  kind  of  government  for  this 
people.  Such  was  the  substance  of  Stevens'  apology 
in  presenting  this  bill. 

"  For  two  years  these  pretended  states,"  said 
Stevens,  "have  been  in  a  state  of  anarchy;  for  two 


460     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

years  the  loyal  people  of  those  ten  states  have  endured 
all  the  horrors  of  the  worst  anarchy  of  any  country. 
Persecution,  exile  and  murder  have  been  the  order  of 
the  day  within  all  these  territories  so  far  as  loyal  men 
were  concerned,  whether  white  or  black,  and  more  es 
pecially  if  they  happened  to  be  black.  We  have  seen 
the  best  men,  those  who  stood  by  the  flag  of  the  Union, 
driven  from  their  homes  and  compelled  to  live  on  the 
cold  charity  of  a  cold  North.  We  have  seen  their 
loyal  men  flitting  about  everywhere  through  your 
cities,  around  your  doors,  melancholy,  depressed,  hag 
gard,  like  the  ghosts  of  the  unburied  dead  on  this  side 
of  the  river  Styx,  and  yet  we  have  borne  it  with  ex 
emplary  patience.  We  have  been  enjoying  'our  ease 
in  our  inns  ' ;  and  while  we  were  praising  the  rebel 
South  and  asking  in  piteous  terms  for  mercy  for  that 
people,  we  have  been  deaf  to  the  groans,  the  agony, 
which  have  been  borne  to  us  by  every  southern  breeze 
from  dying  and  murdered  victims. 

"  And  now  we  are  told  that  we  must  not  hasten 
this  matter.  I  am  not  for  hastening  it  unduly;  but  I 
am  for  making  one  more  effort  to  protect  these  loyal 
men,  without  regard  to  color,  from  the  cruelties  of  an 
archy,  from  persecutions  by  the  malignant,  from  ven 
geance  visited  upon  them  on  our  account.  If  we  fail 
to  do  it,  and  to  do  it  effectually,  we  should  be  respons 
ible  to  the  civilized  world  for,  I  think,  the  grossest 
neglect  of  duty  that  ever  a  great  nation  was  guilty  of 
before  to  humanity.1 

The  bill,  then,  proposed  to  put  the  "  ten  disorgan 
ized  states  "  under  the  control  of  the  army.  "  That  is 

1  Globe,  Feb.  7,  1867,  p.  1076. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION         461 

the  whole  bill,"  said  Stevens.  "  It  does  not  need  much 
examination.  One  night's  rest  after  its  reading  is 
enough  to  digest  it."  There  were  now  less  than  fif 
teen  days  on  the  safe  side  of  a  veto  in  which  the  bill 
must  be  brought  to  passage  in  both  houses.  Its 
friends  were,  therefore,  not  at  liberty  to  indulge  dis 
cussion,  and  "  to-morrow,"  said  Stevens,  "  God  will 
ing,  I  will  demand  the  vote." 

The  purpose  of  this  measure,  the  theory  of  it,  or  the 
conception  of  the  situation  on  which  it  was  based,  are 
frequently  misunderstood.  It  was  not  intended  as  a 
reconstruction  bill.  The  preamble  of  the  bill  set  forth 
the  reason  for  it :  That  the  "  pretended  state  govern 
ments  "of  the  South  afford  no  adequate  protection  for 
life  or  property,  but  "  countenance  and  encourage  law 
lessness  and  crime  " ;  and  that  "  it  is  necessary  that 
peace  and  good  order  should  be  enforced  until  loyal 
state  governments  can  be  legally  established."  The 
bill  was  proposed  and  supported  by  its  advocates  dis 
tinctly  as  a  war  measure,  on  the  theory  that  war  was 
still  existing;  that  the  South  was  in  a  state  of  anarchy, 
rebellion,  disorder  and  disloyalty.  The  bill  was  a  new 
article  of  war,  "  commanding  the  army  to  return  to  its 
work  of  putting  down  the  Rebellion  "  and  keeping  the 
peace  till  the  nation  could  provide  suitable  republican 
governments  there.1  The  bill  rested  for  its  defense, 
according  to  its  advocates,  entirely  upon  such  a  state 
of  facts.  There  was  a  state  of  war  in  the  South,  not 
flagrant,  but  cessante  as  Mr.  Shellabarger  expressed 
it.  The  bill,  in  authorizing  the  suspension  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus  did  so  on  the  assumption  that  the  re- 

iGarfield,  Globe,  Feb.  8,  1867,  p.  1104. 


462      THE  LIFE  OF.  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

public  was  in  a  condition  of  rebellion,  and  the  public 
safety  required  "  the  exercise  of  this  mighty  reserved 
force  of  your  government  lodged  in  the  ultimate 
powers  of  war."  Flagrant  rebellion  in  the  field  had 
been  crushed  by  the  arms  of  the  republic,  but  this 
rebellion  was  still  sufficiently  strong  to  overthrow  and 
defy  the  courts  in  nearly  half  of  the  republic.  "If 
this  is  not  the  condition  of  the  country,"  said  Mr. 
Shellabarger,  "  then  we  must  abandon  the  bill."  * 

Mr.  Shellabarger  asserted  that  he  could  not  support 
such  a  military  measure  if  it  were  to  be  regarded 
as  at  all  permanent  in  character.  Mr.  Brandegee,  of 
Connecticut,  in  supporting  the  measure,  asserted  that 
"  already  fifteen  hundred  Union  men  have  been  mas 
sacred  in  cold  blood,  whose  only  crime  has  been  loyalty 
to  the  flag."  2 

Mr.  Boutwell,  of  Massachusetts,  asserted  that  the 
South  was  "  writhing  under  cruelties  nameless  in 
their  character,  injustice  such  as  has  not  been  per 
mitted  to  exist  in  any  country  in  modern  times,"  and 
that  the  President  had  allowed  a  rebel  despotism  to  be 
enthroned  there  that  must  be  broken  up.3  Mr.  Kel- 
ley,  of  Pennsylvania,  defended  the  bill  merely  as  a 
police  measure,  the  necessity  for  it  arising  because  of 
the  perfidy  of  the  President.  He  had  set  up  states 
whose  laws  depended  upon  his  temper  or  the  state  of 
his  digestion,  whose  statutes  he  suspends  or  enforces 
as  it  please  his  whim.  They  were  not  "  states  "  but 
were  the  offspring  of  Executive  usurpation  and  "  when 

1  Shellabarger,  Feb.  8,  1867,  Globe,  p.  1099. 

2  Elaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Cong.,  Vol.  II,  p.  252. 

3  Globe,  Feb.  9,  1867,  p.  1122. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        463 

we  have  brushed  these  usurpations  aside  "  as  Con 
gress  is  in  duty  bound  to  do,  the  law  will  arise  which 
it  was  the  purpose  of  this  bill  to  restore,  namety,  the 
law  that  "  was  in  force  when  Lee  and  Johnston  sur 
rendered/'  1 

It  was  on  this  ground  only,  as  a  war  measure 
prompted  by  public  necessity,  that  Stevens  defended 
the  bill  as  he  pressed  it  to -passage.  He  called  it  "a 
police  bill,"  a  temporary  substitution  for  anarchy, 
designed  to  provide  "  something  that  will  give  pro 
tection  to  the  people  of  the  Southern  States  and  pre 
vent  the  murders,  robberies,  and  slavery  there  until 
we  can  have  time  to  frame  civil  government  more  in 
conformity  with  the  genius  of  our  institutions."  2  If 
conditions  existed  in  the  South  such  as  the  promoters 
of  this  bill  claimed,  then  the  bill  is  to  be  judged,  not 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  Constitution  operative  in  a 
restored  Union,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of  war 
and  public  necessity.  If  the  conditions  were  those  of 
insurrection  and  war,  the  Constitution  had  nothing  to 
do  in  restraint  of  power  that  might  be  exercised  by  the 
government  of  the  United  States. 

The  House,  refusing  to  sustain  Stevens'  motion  for 
the  previous  question,  entered  upon  a  week  of  debate. 
Bingham  and  Blaine,  for  the  conservative  Republi 
cans,  sought  to  amend  the  bill  so  as  to  provide  for  the 
termination  of  military  rule  and  for  early  reconstruc 
tion  on  the  basis  of  universal  suffrage.  Blaine  was 
unwilling  to  support  a  measure  that  would  place  the 
South  under  military  government  if  it  did  not  at  the 

1  Kelley,  Feb.  12,  1867,  Globe,  p.  1177. 

2  Globe,  Feb.  8,  p.  1104. 


464      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

same  time  "  prescribe  the  methods  by  which  the  peo 
ple  of  a  state  could  by  their  own  action  reestablish  civil 
government."  Elaine,  therefore,  urged  his  amend 
ment,  declaring  that  when  any  one  of  the  late  Confed 
erate  States  should  assent  to  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment  and  provide  by  its  constitution  for  impartial 
male  suffrage,  without  regard  to  race  or  color,  and 
when  such  constitution  shall  have  been  ratified  by  the 
popular  vote  of  said  state,  then  such  state  should  be 
declared  to  be  entitled  to  representation  in  Congress.1 
Bingham  denounced  Stevens '"  dogma,  that  those  ten 
insurrectionary  states  were  a  foreign  and  conquered 
country,"  and  affirmed  that  every  act  of  legislation 
"  from  the  day  this  Rebellion  commenced  to  this  hour 
asserts  the  very  contrary."  He  asserted  again  that 
these  states  were  states  of  the  Union,  not  conquered 
territories,  and  their  citizens  should  be  accorded  the 
rights  of  other  citizens.  Yet,  to  defend  himself  from 
the  Democratic  position,  to  save  himself  from  "  Andy 
Johnsonism,"  he  affirmed  that  Congress  had  undoubted 
power  to  legislate  over  those  insurgent  states  "  without 
their  consent  and  against  their  consent,"  and  that  their 
state  courts  were  to  be  allowed  no  such  jurisdiction 
as  those  of  other  states. 

Bingham's  argument  seems  rather  abstract  and  doc 
trinaire,  based  largely  in  opposition  to  the  phrase, — 
"  so-called  states,"  in  the  preamble  of  the  act.  He 
wished  the  Southern  communities  called  "  states,"  but 
he  was  not  willing  to  be  consistent  by  going  to  the 
length  of  the  Democratic  position  and  treating  them  as 
states  in  all  respects,  with  all  the  rights,  powers  and 

1  Twenty  Years  of  Cong.,  II,  p.  256. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        465 

privileges  of  the  other  states.     Stevens  regarded  Bing- 
ham's  opposition  as  "  captious  and  discourteous."  l 

The  Democrats  and  Johnson  Republicans  de 
nounced  the  bill  in  vigorous  terms.  Mr.  Le  Blond, 
of  Ohio,  said  that  its  passage  would  be  the  "  death- 
knell  of  civil  liberty,"  and  the  dissolution  of  the  Union. 
"  Its  preamble,  admitting  the  right  of  secession,  em 
braces  not  a  single  truth."  No  one,  in  Mr.  Le  Blond's 
view,  had  a  right  to  expect  perfect  peace  throughout 
those  states  as  soon  as  the  war  ended.  In  the  nature 
of  things  there  would  be  lawless  conduct  on  the  part 
of  many  citizens.  The  radicals  desired  such  dis 
order,  that  they  might  base  legislation  upon  it  and 
carry  out  their  designs.  This  maelstrom  committee, 
swallowing  up  eve^thing  that  is  good  and  giving  out 
everything  that  is  evil,  reports  this  bill  taking  from  the 
President  his  powers  as  Commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  in  defiance  of  the  Constitution.  No  one  had 
ever  heard  of  such  a  monstrosity,  such  a  stretch  of 
power  on  the  part  of  Congress  as  authorizing  military 
commanders  to  confer  power  on  civil  tribunals  to  try 
civil  cases.  "  The  bill  denies  the  right  of  trial  by  jury 
and  strikes  down  at  a  blow  every  important  provision 
of  your  Constitution.  It  paralyzes  the  arm  of  the 
judiciary  and  repudiates  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court.  It  is  an  attempt  to  destroy  the  Union  by  legis 
lative  usurpation;  and  in  my  honest  conviction  noth 
ing  but  the  strong  arm  of  the  American  people,  wielded 
upon  the  bloody  battle-field,  will  ever  restore  civil  lib 
erty  to  the  American  people  again."  2 

1  Globe,  Feb.  13,  1867,  p.  1213. 

2  Globe,  Feb.  1867,  p.  1078. 


466     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

A  few  days  later,  on  February  I2th,  in  discussing  a 
proposed  bill  for  the  civil  government  of  Louisiana,  Le 
Blond  distinctly  affirmed  that  in  the  conflict  of  opinion 
on  the  Republican  side  of  the  House,  Stevens  was  the 
one  man  who  foresaw  the  difficulties  that  were  to  be 
encountered.  Le  Blond  evidently  thought  the  bill 
might  be  made  unpopular  if  it  could  be  shown  to  rest 
on  Stevens'  "  conquered  province  theory."  "  At  an 
early  period  in  this  contest,"  said  Le  Blond,  "  he 
(Stevens)  foresaw  where  we  were  drifting,  and  for 
the  purpose  of  meeting  it,  he  at  once  took  the  position 
that  these  states  were  conquered  provinces  whose  peo 
ple  were  subjects  to  be  dealt  with  according  to  the  will 
of  Congress.  But  who  does  not  remember  that  when 
he  proclaimed  that  doctrine  in  this  House  there  were 
not  within  these  walls  ten  men  who  approved  it? 
Since  that  period  a  change  has  come  over  the  spirit, 
over  the  dreams  of  the  other  side,  and  we  now  find 
them,  if  not  yielding  themselves  willing  subjects  to  his 
doctrine,  at  least  willing  to  vote  for  provisions  quite 
as  bad  and  quite  as  revolutionary  as  any  that  have 
been  directed  by  that  gentleman."  1 

Mr.  Finck,  of  Ohio,  another  Democrat,  denounced 
the  bill  as  "  an  attempt  to  overthrow  free  government 
and  to  establish  on  its  ruins  the  principles  of  military 
despotism;."  It  is  at  war  with  the  Constitution.  The 
only  ground  for  it  was  the  revolutionary  theory  of 
its  author,  the  theory  of  conquest.  No  government 
can  continue  to  be  free  when  one-third  of  its  people 
are  subject  to  military  power.  We  can  not  perpetuate 
the  Union  of  the  states  on  principles  of  hatred,  malice, 

1  Globe,  Feb.  12,  1867,  p.  1170. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        467 

and  revenge.  "  Do  we  expect  to  make  the  people  of 
the  South  love  the  Union  by  trampling  upon  rights  as 
sacred  to  them  as  they  can  be  to  us?  " 

Finck  denied  that  there  was  a  state  of  war  existing 
within  the  Union, —  the  assumption  on  which  the  bill 
rested.  "  There  is  not  in  any  one  of  these  states,"  he 
said,  "  a  single  arm  upraised  against  the  just  authority 
and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.  We  are  in  a 
state  of  peace.  The  purpose  is  to  compel  these  states 
to  endorse  the  policy  of  the  radicals  whose  doctrines,  if 
carried  out  successfully,  would  subvert  the  Constitu 
tion  and  disrupt  the  Union.  The  effect  of  this  bill  is 
to  prevent  the  Union  of  the  states  and  to  strike  down 
the  great  right  of  local  government.  It  is  an  attempt 
not  only  to  control  the  government  of  a  state,  but  to 
take  power  out  of  the  hands  of  your  own  race  and  to 
confer  it  upon  another  race."  For  this  and  other  rea 
sons  Finck  denounced  the  bill  as  "  monstrous  and  revo 
lutionary."  2 

Henry  J.  Raymond,  of  New  York,  in  a  speech  of 
considerable  length,  denounced  the  bill  as  a  "  simple 
abnegation  of  all  attempts  to  exercise  civil  authority." 
He  denied  its  necessity;  no  emergency  called  for  it 
He  affirmed  that  the  President  had  restored  peace. 
The  war  "  is  ended  in  every  sense :  in  a  legal  sense,  in 
every  international  sense,  in  the  sense  of  the  Constitu 
tion."  He  denounced  the  measure  as  one  of  the  "  most 
violent  the  ingenuity  of  man  could  devise.  Stevens' 
bill,"  he  said,  "  that  had  been  sent  to  the  committee  was 

1  Globe,  Feb.  7,  1867,  p.  1078. 

2  Globe,  Feb.    12,   1867,  p.   1170.     Finck's   speech  here  referred 
to  was  on  a  bill  providing  a  civil  government  for  Louisiana,  but 
his  remarks  apply  also  to  the  pending  military  bill. 


468     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

far  preferable  to  this  one.  The  passage  of  such  a 
bill  will  disturb  business  and  confidence  everywhere  and 
will  not  in  the  slightest  degree  tend  to  restore  peace 
and  harmony  in  the  Union/' 

Stevens  proved  more  than  a  match  for  his  opponents 
at  every  turn.  He  paid  no  attention  to  the  spokesman 
of  Andrew  Johnson  in  the  House,  Mr.  Raymond,  nor 
to  the  Copperhead  opposition  of  Le  Blond  and  Finck. 
It  was  enough  to  know  that  they  were  the  friends 
and  apologists  of  rebels.  He  taunted  his  weak-kneed 
Republican  colleagues,  who  wished  to  delay  or  amend 
his  bill,  with  having  been  convinced  by  the  arguments 
of  the  President, —  and  the  sentiment  of  the  country 
was  so  pronounced  against  Johnson  that  such  a  ref 
erence  never  failed  to  make  his  opponents  wince.  He 
prevented  amendments  from  coming  to  a  vote,  and 
finally  he  defeated  on  a  decisive  test  Elaine's  motion 
to  refer  the  bill  for  revision  to  the  Committee  on  the 
Judiciary. 

It  was  on  the  I3th  of  February,  1867,  tnat  tne  de- 
cisive  vote  occurred  in  the  House.  Stevens,  though 
in  his  seventy-fifth  year  and  in  a  weak  state  of  health, 
manifested  a  remarkable  vigor  in  his  management  of 
the  bill  and  in  his  final  speech  just  before  the  vote  was 
taken.  He  professed  depression  of  spirit  and  grief 
because  of  the  supineness  of  Congress  and  the  dis 
tressed  condition  of  the  country.  Here  Congress  has 
been  sitting  for  months,  and  while  the  South  has  been 
bleeding  at  every  pore  nothing  has  been  done  to  protect 
the  loyal  people  there  in  their  persons,  liberty,  or  prop 
erty.  He  would  indulge,  not  in  reproach,  but  in  grief 
rather,  since  we  live  here  "  enjoying  ourselves,  those 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        469 

of  us  who  have  health  and  spirits,  while  the  South 
is  covered  all  over  with  anarchy,  murder,  and  rapine." 
We  have  declared  that  the  President  has  usurped  au 
thority,  and  that  what  he  has  done  is  void  in  the 
face  of  the  law;  that  Congress  alone  has  power  to  erect 
governments  and  protect  the  people.  Yet  we  sit  by 
and  move  no  hand  and  raise  no  voice  to  effect  what  we 
declare  to  be  the  duty  of  Congress.  It  is  a  great  dere 
liction  of  duty. 

Stevens  replied  to  the  criticism  that  the  committee 
had  proposed  no  plan  of  reconstruction.  He  recounted 
the  effort  he  had  made  for  his  own  bill  that  had  been 
under  discussion  for  three  weeks.  He  had  wished  that 
bill  perfected  in  the  House,  but  his  wish  had  been  de 
fiantly  refused.  He  had  sought  to  save  the  bill  from 
death  in  the  Committee  and  he  thought  it  uncivil,  un 
just,  and  indecent  not  to  attempt  to  amend  it  and  make 
it  better.  Our  vigorous  friend  from  Ohio  [Bingham] 
had  assured  us  that  the  bill  would  come  back  from  the 
committee  fresh  and  blooming,  but  it  had  not  come, 
and  he  [Stevens]  had  accepted  a  position  that  he  could 
not  help.  He  had  labored  upon  his  bill,  in  conjunc 
tion  with  committees  of  loyal  men  from  the  South,  had 
altered  and  realtered  it,  written  and  rewritten  it  sev 
eral  times.  He  had  warned  the  House  that  if  that 
bill  should  go  back  to  the  committee,  it  must  die. 
This  bill  that  now  comes  in  lieu  of  it  encounters  the 
same  obstacles  in  precisely  the  same  spirit.  There  are 
in  it  some  words  difficult  to  spell;  adverbs  are  im 
properly  placed;  gentlemen  object  to  its  particles  and 
its  articles;  and  "  my  friend  from  Ohio  [Bingham]  de 
clared  this  morning  with  proper  exultation  that  he  had 


4/o      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

succeeded  in  passing  through  this  House  a  bill  which 
uses  the  word  '  states  '  precisely  as  the  President  uses 
it  in  his  theory  as  to  the  right  of  admission  of  those 
claiming  to  represent  the  rebel  states." 

That  which  most  aroused  the  fighting  spirit  and  op 
position  of  Stevens  was  what  he  denounced  as  the 
"  pertinacious  determination  "  of  the  conservative  Re 
publicans  to  make  the  fourteenth  amendment  a  final 
condition  of  readmission  and  reunion.  That  was  the 
purpose,  chiefly,  of  the  Elaine  amendment.  Stevens 
denounced  it  as  a  "  step  toward  universal  amnesty  and 
universal  Andy  Johnsonism, —  it  lets  in  a  vast  num 
ber  of  rebels  and  shuts  out  nobody."  "  If  this  Con 
gress  so  decides,  it  will  give  me  great  pleasure  to  join 
in  the  io  triumphe  of  the  gentleman  from  Ohio  in 
leading  this  House,  possibly  by  forbidden  paths,  into 
the  sheepfold,  or  the  goatfold,  of  the  President."  1 

Stevens  felt  that  the  fight  in  which  he  was  engaged 
was  one  for  justice  and  liberty.  "  If,  sir,"  he  said, 
"  I  ought  presume  upon  my  age,  without  claiming  any 
of  the  wisdom  of  Nestor,  I  would  suggest  to  the  young 
gentlemen  around  me,  that  the  deeds  of  this  burning 
crisis,  of  this  solemn  day,  of  this  thrilling  moment, 
will  cast  their  shadows  far  into  the  future,  and  will 
make  their  impress  upon  the  annals  of  our  history,  and 
that  we  shall  appear  upon  the  bright  pages  of  that  his- 

1  In  this  discussion  Mr.  Stevens  incidentally  remarked  that 
he  had  no  respect  for  the  fourteenth  amendment,  by  which  he 
meant,  obviously,  as  a  final  basis  for  reconstruction.  Though 
that  amendment  was  not  as  Stevens  had  sought  to  make  it,  as 
we  have  seen,  yet  it  was,  in  the  main,  in  harmony  with  his 
principles  and  purposes.  He  wished  to  impose  more  as  a  basis 
for  readmission,  and  was  especially  unwilling  for  Congress  to 
be  tied  up  to  this  amendment  in  advance  as  a  finality  in  recon 
struction. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        471 

tory,  just  in  so  far  as  we  cordially,  without  guile,  with 
out  bickering,  without  small  criticisms,  lend  our  aid 
to  promote  the  great  cause  of  humanity  and  universal 
liberty."  * 

He  referred  to  the  spirit  of  forgiveness  and  mercy 
so  much  enunciated  by  the  opposition.  But  he 
thought  that  when  generosity  and  benevolence,  "  the 
noblest  qualities  of  our  nature,"  are  "  squandered  upon 
vagabonds  and  thieves,"  no  respect  could  be  had  from 
any  quarter.  The  forgiveness  of  the  gospel  refers  to 
private  offenses,  "  where  men  can  well  forgive  their 
enemies  and  smother  their  feeling  of  revenge  without 
injury  to  anybody."  But  that  has  nothing  to  do  with 
municipal  punishment,  with  "  political  sanction  of  po 
litical  crimes."  When  nations  pass  sentence  and  de 
cree  confiscation  for  crimes  unrepented,  there  is  no 
question  of  malignity. 

"  When  the  judge  sentences  the  convict  he  has  no  ani 
mosity.  When  the  hangman  executes  the  culprit  he  rather 
pities  than  hates  him.  Cruelty  does  not  belong  to  their  vo 
cabulary.  Gentlemen  mistake,  therefore,  when  they  make 
these  appeals  to  us  in  the  name  of  humanity.  They,  sir, 
who  while  preaching  this  doctrine  are  hugging  and  caress 
ing  those  whose  hands  are  red  and  whose  garments  are 
dripping  with  the  blood  of  our  and  their  murdered  kinsmen, 
are  covering  themselves  with  indelible  stains  which  all  the 
waters  of  the  Nile  can  not  wash  out."  2 

Following  this  speech  the  motion  to  refer  the  bill 
to  the  Judiciary  Committee  was  defeated  and  the  bill 
was  put  upon  its  passage.  It  passed  the  House  by  a 

1  Globe,  Feb.  13,  1867,  p.  1214. 

2  Globe,  Feb.  13,  1867,  p.  1214. 


472      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

vote  of  one  hundred  and  nine  to  fifty-five,  twenty 
members  being  recorded  as  "  not  voting." 

Before  making  the  motion  to  reconsider  and  to  lay 
that  motion  on  the  table,  in  order  to  prevent  recon 
sideration,  Stevens  arose  and  with  some  exultation  in 
quired  "  if  it  is  in  order  for  me  now  to  say  that  we 
endorse  the  language  of  good  old  Laertes  that  Heaven 
rules  as  yet  and  there  are  gods  above?  "  1 

The  bill  had  its  first  reading  in  the  Senate  the  day 
it  passed  the  House.  There  were  pronounced  dif 
ferences  of  opinion  among  Republicans  there,  as  there 
had  been  in  the  House,  and  it  was  apparent  that  un 
less  these  were  reconciled  by  some  authoritative  ac 
tion  on  the  part  of  the  majority,  debate  would  be 
continued  unduly  and  no  bill  could  be  passed  in  the 
limited  time.  Accordingly,  a  caucus  was  held  of  the 
Republican  Senators  which  agreed  upon  a  substitute 
bill,  and  this  was  passed  by  the  Senate  after  an  all- 
night  session  at  six  o'clock  Sunday  morning,  February 
1 7th. 

The  first,  four  sections  of  the  Senate  bill  were  the 
same  as  the  military  bill  of  Stevens,  except  that  the 
President  instead  of  the  General  of  the  army  was 
given  the  power  to  appoint  the  commandants  of  the 

1  Globe,  p.  1215.  Mr.  Rhodes  says  of  this  occasion: 
"  Stevens  carried  this  bill  through  an  unwilling1  House ;  a  strong 
minority  of  his  own  party  was  opposed  to  it  largely  for  the 
reason  that  pure  military  rule  without  any  provision  for  its 
termination  was  unpalatable.  He  obtained  his  majority  by  sar 
casm,  taunts,  dragooning  and  by  cracking  the  party  whip. 
There  had  been  no  such  scene  in  Congress  since  Douglas  car 
ried  his  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  through  the  Senate.  Bingham, 
a  veteran ;  Elaine,  very  adroit  for  a  member  serving  his  second 
term  only,  were  unable  to  cope  with  the  leader ;  both  voted  with 
him  on  the  passage  of  the  bill"  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  Vol.  VI, 
pp.  17,  1 8. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        473 

several  military  districts;  it  was  deemed  unconstitu 
tional  for  Congress  to  deprive  the  President  of  his  con 
stitutional  power  as  Commander-in-chief.  But  the 
Senate  also  inserted  what  was  substantially  the  Bing- 
ham-Blaine  amendment  which  had  been  voted  down  by 
the  House.1  This  provided  in  the  fifth  section  that 
when  any  one  of  the  said  rebel  states  should  have 
formed  a  constitution  in  harmony  with  the  Constitu 
tion  of  the  United  States, —  framed  by  a  convention 
of  delegates  elected  under  manhood  suffrage  regard 
less  of  race,  color,  or  previous  condition  of  servitude, 
excepting  such  as  may  be  disfranchised  for  partici 
pating  in  rebellion;  and  when  the  state  constitution 
should  provide  for  such  manhood  suffrage  for  the  fu 
ture;  and  when  the  Constitution  should  have  been 
ratified  by  a  majority  of  qualified  voters  and  submitted 
to  and  approved  by  Congress ;  and  when  the  state,  by 
its  legislature,  should  have  ratified  the  fourteenth 
amendment  and  that  amendment  had  become  a  part  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  —  then,  after 
these  conditions  were  fulfilled,  the  state  should  be  de 
clared  entitled  to  be  represented  in  Congress  and  its 
Senators  and  Representatives  should  be  admitted  upon 
their  taking  the  "  iron-clad  "  oath  as  required  by  law. 
Thereafter  the  military  sections  of  the  act  were  to  be 
inoperative  within  the  state. 

This  was  entirely  a  different  bill  from  the  one  whose 
passage  Stevens  had  secured  in  the  House.  Instead 
of  a  temporary  bill  designed  to  restore  order  under 
military  rule  until  time  could  be  had  for  perfecting  a 
suitable  scheme  of  restoration,  the  Senate  prepared, 

1  Rhodes,  VI,  p.  19. 


J 


474     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

in  a  hurry,  and  offered  to  the  country  a  final  plan  of 
reconstruction.1  Stevens  has  suffered  the  fate  of  be 
ing  held  up  in  history  as  being  the  chief  sponsor  and 
promoter  of  this  scheme  of  forcing  negro  suffrage 
on  the  South  by  military  rule.  The  scheme  was  not 
his,  and,  as  on  former  occasions  when  the  Senate  had 
interfered  with  legislation  that  he  had  proposed,  he 
resisted  it  with  all  his  might.  "  The  worst  feature 
about  the  Reconstruction  Acts,"  says  Mr.  Rhodes, 
"  was  not  the  military  government.  Honest  govern 
ment  by  American  soldiers  would  have  been  better 
than  negro  rule  forced  on  the  South  at  the  point  of 
the  bayonet,  which  was  the  actual  result  of  this  legis 
lation."  But  it  should  be  remembered  that  "  negro 
suffrage  was  grafted  in  the  military  bill  by  the  con 
servative  Republicans  and  was  resisted  by  Stevens."  2 
True,  Stevens  was  not  prompted  in  this  opposition 
by  any  motives  of  benevolence  and  mercy  toward  the 

1  In  June,    1867,   the  Nation  criticized   Stevens   for  his  public 
letter  in  which  he  called   for   an  extra  session  of   Congress  to 
mend  the  defects  in  the  Reconstruction  Act  which  had  been  ex 
posed   by   Attorney-General    Stanberry.       The   Nation   said   this 
act  should  have  been  fully  discussed,  as  that  would  have  brought 
out  its  defects  and  its  friends  could  have  perfected  it.     Stevens, 
"old  and  experienced  as  he  is,  should  learn  the  lesson  of  the 
mischievousness   of  the  habit  which  he  indulges   in  more  than 
any  one  else,  of  checking  and  stifling  debate  on  important  meas 
ures."    Nation,  June  20,  1867.      This  is  said  as  if  Stevens  were 
responsible  for  pushing  through  this  hurried  and  defective  legis 
lation.     Exactly  the  opposite  is  true.     He  opposed  it  stoutly,  for 
the  very  reason  that  there  was  not  sufficient  time  to  consider  it. 
He  had  urged  a  general  scheme  of  reconstruction  on  ^Congress 
for  many  months,  but  now  that  the  last  weeks  of  the  Thirty-ninth 
Congress  had  come  and  nothing  had  been  done,  he  sought  "  hon 
est  government  by  American  soldiers,"   until  the  Fortieth  Con 
gress   could  digest   a   suitable   scheme.    The  more   conservative 
"  safe  and  sane "   Republicans  should  bear^  the  chief  burden  of 
credit,  or  discredit,  for  this  hurried  legislation. 

2  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  VI,  p.  29. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        475 

South.  It  may  be  said  by  his  critics  that  any  plan  he 
would  have  consented  to  could  only  have  been  a  worse 
one  and  that,  in  his  Senate  bill,  he  favored  only  what 
was  bad  and  objected  only  to  what  was  good.  Let 
him  be  judged  by  the  judgment  that  is  his  due.  But 
it  is  essential  that  the  record  shall  not  be  confused 
nor  belied,  and  that  responsibility  for  military  recon 
struction  as  it  was  finally  consummated  should  rest 
where  it  belongs,  and  that  record  shows  that  it  does 
not  rest  primarily  upon  Stevens. 

The  Senate  bill  came  up  in  the  House  on  February 
1 8,  1867,  the  day  after  its  passage  by  the  Senate.  As 
soon  as  it  was  read  Stevens  moved  that  the  amend 
ments  of  the  Senate  be  not  concurred  in  and  he  asked 
for  a  committee  of  conference.  Stevens  yielded  a  part 
of  his  time  to  Boutwell,  of  Massachusetts,  and  Stokes, 
of  Tennessee,  who  spoke  in  opposition  to  the  Senate 
plan,  because  by  it  reconstruction  would  be  carried  on 
under  the  agency  of  "  disloyal  "  men.  It  provided  for 
universal  amnesty  and  universal  suffrage.  There  was 
no  discrimination  in  favor  of  the  "  loyal,"  and  under 
this  plan,  since  every  rebel  in  the  South  was  admitted 
to  the  ballot,  the  loyal  men,  white  and  black,  would 
go  under.1 

Stevens  then  attacked  the  Senate  amendments  in  a 
brief  speech  of  his  usual  vigor.  He  regretted  that 
the  Senate  had  attempted  the  difficult  task  of  attempt 
ing  civil  government  in  the  South.  The  House  bill 
had  not  a.wprd  in  it  beyond  a  police  regulation  for  pro 
tection.  The  Senate  has  sent  back  a  bill  which  raises 
the  whole  question  in  dispute,  as  to  the  best  mode  of 

1  Globe,  p.  1316. 


476      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

reconstruction  by  distant  and  future  pledges,  which 
this  Congress  has  no  authority  to  make  and  no  power 
to  execute.  He  objected  to  taking  the  management  of 
these  states  from  the  General  of  the  army  and  put 
ting  it  in  the  hands  of  the  President.  "  Our  friends 
who  love  this  bill  love  it  now  because  the  President  is 
to  execute  it,  as  he  has  executed  every  law  for  the 
last  two  years,  by  the  murder  of  Union  men,  and  by 
despising  Congress  and  flinging  into  our  teeth  all  that 
we  seek  to  have  done.  That  seems  to  be  the  sweeten 
ing  ingredient  in  this  bill  for  many  of  our  friends 
around  us."  Stevens  held  to  the  constitutional  au 
thority  of  Congress  to  detail  for  particular  service  par 
ticular  officers  of  the  army. 

Stevens'  most  strenuous  objection  was  to  the  pro 
vision  of  the  new  fifth  section  of  the  Senate  bill,  that 
which  pledged  the  government  "  to  all  the  traitors  in 
rebeldom  "  that  if  they  would  do  certain  things  they 
might  "  come  into  this  House  and  act  with  us  as  loyal 
men."  Appealing  to  the  party  instincts  and  inter 
ests  of  his  colleagues,  he  referred  to  "  the  impatience 
to  bring  in  these  chivalric  gentlemen  lest  they  should 
not  be  here  in  time  to  vote  for  the  next  President  of 
the  United  States,"  and,  therefore,  there  is  to  be 
grafted  on  a  police  bill  a  provision  that  will  enable 
them  to  be  here  in  time.  He  said  he  was  willing  to 
have  them  "  come  in  as  soon  as  they  were  fairly  en 
titled,"  but  he  did  not  profess  to  be  very  impatient 
to  embrace  them,  and  he  was  not  anxious  to  see  their 
votes  cast  along  with  others  to  control  the  next  election 
of  President  and  Vice-President. 

Stevens  here  took  occasion  to  refer  in  an  ironical 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        477 

way  to  the  idea  which  he  had  formerly  combated,  that 
a  few  loyal  men  might  constitute  a  state  for  recon 
struction  purposes.  '''  There  was  a  time,"  he  said, 
"  when  some  people,  and  among  them  that  good  man 
who  is  now  no  more,  carried,  as  I  thought,  the  idea 
of  reconstruction  by  loyal  men  rather  to  the  extreme. 
The  doctrine  was  once  held  that  in  these  outlawed 
communities  of  robbers,  traitors,  and  murderers,  so 
far  as  the  real  state  was  concerned,  it  consisted  of 
the  '  loyal  men  '  of  the  community  and  that  the  oth 
ers  counted  for  nothing.  I  do  not  say  that  I  hold 
this  doctrine,  not  being  myself  an  extreme  man  [laugh 
ter]  ,  but  it  was  held  by  gentlemen  all  around  me  and  it 
was  held  by  the  late  President  of  the  United  States. 
But  now  the  doctrine  seems  to  be  that  the  state  is 
composed  of  loyal  men  and  traitors.  We  ignore 
wholly  the  disloyal  element  in  all  the  states  and  are 
hurrying  to  introduce  these  disloyal  men  among  us." 

It  was  Stevens'  plan  to  have  the  Thirty-ninth  Con 
gress  pass  only  his  military  bill  and  allow  the  more 
radical  Fortieth  Congress  to  deliberate  on  reconstruc 
tion.  He  then  hoped  to  secure  the  disfranchisement 
of  the  "  rebels,"  the  enfranchisement  of  the  negroes, 
and  a  "  moderate  plan  "  of  confiscation,  and  then  to 
delay  the  restoration  of  the  Southern  States  to  their 
privileges  within  the  Union  until  they  were  well  ready 
to  participate  in  governing  the  country. 

He  would  deem  them  "  ready "  when  they  were 
well  under  the  control  of  men  who  were  loyal  to  the 
Union  and  to  the  true  principles  of  democratic  equal 
ity.  He  was  not  anxious  to  have  these  states  ready 
to  vote  for  President  in  1868.  He  objected  to  "  the 


478     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

anxiety  for  universal  amnesty."  "  Is  there  danger," 
he  asked,  "  that  somebody  will  be  punished  ?  Is  there 
any  fear  that  this  nation  will  wake  from  its  lethargy 
and  insist  upon  punishment  by  fine,  by  imprisonment, 
by  confiscation,  or  that  a  spirit  will  be  raised  in  this 
nation  which  sleeps  only  here  and  which  no  other  na 
tion  ever  before  allowed  to  slumber?"  It  riled  his 
spirit  to  see  confiscated  property  of  the  United  States 
given  back  to  enrich  rebel  enemies;  to  see  Unionists 
suffer  poverty  and  deprivation,  whose  houses  had  been 
laid  in  waste,  farms  robbed  and  cattle  taken,  "  while 
Wade  Hampton  and  his  black  horse  cavalry  are  to 
revel  in  their  wealth,  and  traitors  along  the  Mississippi 
valley  are  to  enjoy  their  manors. 

"  Sir,  God  helping  me  and  I  live,  there  shall  be  a 
question  propounded  to  this  House  and  to  this  na 
tion,  whether  a  portion  of  the  debt  shall  not  be  paid 
by  confiscated  property  of  the  rebels." 

When  a  vote  was  reached  on  the  Senate  bill,  which 
Stevens  felt  forestalled  and  prevented  his  scheme,  it 
was  rejected  by  the  House.2  Stevens  then  carried  a 
motion  for  a  committee  of  conference,  a  result  that 
was  brought  about  "  by  a  coalition  of  all  the  Demo 
crats  with  a  minority  of  extreme  Republicans."  3 

The  Senate  refused  a  conference  and  insisted  upon 
its  bill.  Thus  with  only  thirteen  days  of  the  session 
remaining,  during  ten  of  which  the  President  was  cer 
tain  to  keep  the  bill  before  returning  it  with  his  veto, 
it  looked  as  if,  by  a  disagreement  of  Republicans,  re- 

1  Globe,  Feb.  18,  1867. 

2  By  a  vote  of  98  to  73,  Globe,  Feb.  19,  1867,  p.  1340. 

3  Elaine,  Twenty  Years,  II,  p.  260. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        479 

construction  would  be  defeated  or  be  left  over  to  the 
Fortieth  Congress.  "  Under  the  pressure  of  this  fear," 
says  Mr.  Elaine,  "  Republican  differences  were  ad 
justed,  and  the  Senate  and  House  found  common 
ground  to  stand  upon  by  adding  two  amendments  to 
the  bill  as  the  Senate  had  framed  it."  One  of  these 
was  that  of  Mr.  Wilson,  of  Iowa,  which  provided  that 
those  excluded  from  office  by  the  fourteenth  amend 
ment  should  also  be  excluded  from  voting  for,  or  act 
ing  as,  delegates  to  the  state  constitutional  conven 
tions.1  The  other  amendments,  offered  by  Mr.  Shella- 
barger,  of  Ohio,  provided  that  until  the  people  of  the 
rebel  states  should  be  admitted  to  representation  in 
Congress,  any  civil  government  therein  should  be  con 
sidered  as  provisional  only  and  "  in  all  respects  subject 
to  the  paramount  authority  of  the  United  States  at 
any  time  to  abolish,  modify,  control  or  supersede  the 
same."  No  person  was  to  be  allowed  to  hold  any 
office  under  this  provisional  state  government  who  was 
disqualified  by  the  fourteenth  amendment,  and  none 
was  to  be  allowed  to  vote  except  those  specified  and 
described  under  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

While  these  amendments  were  before  the  House, 
the  Democrats  filibustered  for  delay.  Stevens  acted 
as  a  spectator,  not  voting  on  their  dilatory  motions. 
Stevens  voted  for  the  Wilson-Shellabarger  amend 
ments,  the  latter  being  added  as  an  additional  section 
of  the  bill,  and  he  then  voted  for  the  passage  of  the 
bill  so  amended.2 

1  Globe,  Feb.  19,  1867,  p.  1356. 

2  The    record    hardly    bears    out    the    assertion    that    Stevens 
"  filibustered "    on    this    occasion    to    defeat    this    measure.     He 
merely  gave  the  consent  of  his  silence.     The  Notion  says  that 


480     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

The  concurrence  of  the  House  in  the  Senate  bill 
was  also  promoted  by  the  insertion  in  the  Army  Ap 
propriation  Bill  of  a  provision  depriving  the  President 
of  all  power  to  interfere  with  the  execution  of  the  Re 
construction  Act.  This  was  done  by  a  clause  in  the 
appropriation  bill  providing  that  all  military  orders 
and  instructions  should  be  issued  through  the  Gen 
eral  of  the  army  (General  Grant),  whose  headquarters 
should  be  at  Washington,  and  that  all  other  orders 
should  be  null  and  void.  /Power  was  denied  to  the 
President  to  remove,  suspend,  or  relieve  the  General 
from  command,  or  assign  him  to  duty  elsewhere, —  a 
palpable  violation  of  the  constitutional  provision  which 
makes,  the  President  the  Commander-in-chief  of  the 
army. ; 

The  military  bill  passed  the  House  on  February  20, 
1867.  Stevens  consented  to  it,  but  he  was  by  no 
means  satisfied.  He  was  not  its  author,  nor  its  de 
fender.  He  accepted  the  amended  bill  as  the  best 
that  could  be  had  at  the  time,  but  he  regarded  it  as 
Sumner  characterized  it  in  the  Senate,  as  containing 

Stevens  "  filibustered  in  vain  in  favor  of  his  own  scheme  of 
military  government  without  limit  or  qualification,"  and  refers 
to  "  the  combination  of  Mr.  Stevens  with  the  Democratic  mem 
bers  to  secure  the  defeat  of  the  military  bill."  The  editor  says 
that  Stevens,  believing  that  every  delay  in  reconstruction  will 
make  the  final  settlement  more  severe  upon  the  South,  "  will 
ingly  accepts  all  the  aid  he  can  get  from  the  wise  ( ?)  poli 
ticians  like  Mr.  Le  Blond  who  oppose  him  in  principle  but  help 
him  in  practise." 

The  Nation  was  a  strong  supporter  of  the  reconstruction  meas 
ures  as  they  were  finally  passed.  New  York  Nation,  Feb.  21, 
28,  1867.  No  doubt  Stevens  could  have  defeated  the  measure  if, 
instead  of  being  a  silent  onlooker,  he  had  asserted  himself  to 
arouse  radical  opposition  while  the  advocates  of  the  Senate  bill 
were  arranging  compromise  amendments  that  would  placate  and 
satisfy  the  radical  contention. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        481 

much  that  is  good,  but  as  "  a  very  hasty  and  crude  act 
of  legislation,"  and  as  "  coming  far  short  of  what  a 
patriotic  Congress  ought  to  supply  for  the  safety  of 
the  republic."  l 

The  Senate  passed  the  amended  bill  in  a  night  ses 
sion,  the  same  day  that  it  passed  the  House.  John 
son,  held  it  for  the  constitutional  limit  of  ten  days  be 
fore  returning  it  to  the  House  with  his  veto.  His  veto 
came  in  on  Saturday  afternoon  of  March  2nd.  The 
Thirty-ninth  Congress  was  to  expire  at  noon  Monday, 
March  4th.2 

Upon  the  reading  of  the  veto  message,  Stevens  im 
mediately  moved  that  the  House  consider  the  ques 
tion  whether  it  would  pass  the  bill  notwithstanding  the 
objections  of  the  President.  Eldridge,  of  Wisconsin, 
in  the  minute  of  time  allowed  for  protest,  recognizing 
that  it  was  not  within  the  physical  power  of  the  minor 
ity  to  defeat  the  bill  by  filibustering,  denounced  it  as 
"  a  dissolution  of  the  Union."  Le  Blond  called  it  "  the 
death-knell  of  republican  liberty  upon  this  continent," 
and  he  asserted  that  if  enough  numbers  would  stand 
with  him  he  would  never  consent  to  the  passage  of  the 
bill  "  unless  overpowered  by  physical  exhaustion  or  re 
strained  by  the  rules  of  the  House."  Mr.  Finck  again 
denounced  the  bill  as  "  a  monstrous  scheme  to  sub- 

1  Globe,  Feb.  20,  1867,  p.  1626. 

2  Dewitt    must    be    mistaken    in    his    assertion    that    Johnson 
might    have    defeated    the    Reconstruction    Act    by    the    absolute 
negative  of  his  pocket  veto  but  that  he  took  no  advantage  of 
the    opportunity.     Impeachment    of    Johnson,    p.    203.     The    bill 
passed  the  Senate  on  February  2Oth,  twelve  days  before  the  ex 
piration  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Congress-     Johnson  conceded  noth 
ing  to  his  opponents  in  the  partisan  game,  nor  was  he  disposed  to 
agree  with  his  adversary  quickly,  from  fear  of  a  more  sweeping 
and  drastic  measure. 


482      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

vert  constitutional  government  in  this  country,"  and 
he  said  he  would  aid  every  legitimate  parliamentary 
effort  for  its  defeat. 

Mr.  Thayer  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  House 
had  had  enough  of  this  entertainment,  and  Mr.  Stev 
ens  took  the  floor  to  bring  the  bill  to  its  passage.  He 
said  that  he  had  listened  with  patience  to  the  gentle 
men;  that  he  would  not  be  discourteous,  for  he  was 
"  aware  of  the  melancholy  feelings  with  which  they 
were  approaching  this  funeral  of  the  nation,  amid  a 
difference  of  opinion  among  the  mourners  to  an  ex 
tent  that  we  can  not  expect  to  harmonize." 

Stevens  then  called  upon  Elaine  to  offer  a  motion 
for  a  suspension  of  the  rules.  The  rules  were  sus 
pended  and  the  bill  was  passed  by  the  House  by  a  vote 
of  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  to  forty-eight,  amid 
applause  on  the  floor  and  in  the  galleries.  The  Senate 
passed  the  bill  over  the  President's  veto  on  the  same 
day  by  a  vote  of  thirty-eight  to  ten,  and  the  Military 
Reconstruction  Act  became  a  law. 

This  act  has  been  frequently  referred  to  as  one  of 
the  most  unjust  and  direful  that  ever  passed  the  Ameri 
can  Congress,  and  the  odium  that  has  been  held  to 
attach  to  it  has  been  heaped  chiefly  upon  the  head  of 
Thaddeus  Stevens,  as  if  he  alone  of  all  men  was  re 
sponsible  for  it.  The  act  has  been  denounced  as  a 
personal  expression  of  Stevens'  hatred  and  vindic- 
tiveness  toward  the  South.  His  record  for  vindictive- 
ness  is  bad  enough,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  his  de 
termined  purpose  to  punish  the  South  would  have 
wrought  something  worse  than  this  military  bill  into 
the  legislation  of  his  country  could  he  have  had  his 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        483 

way.  But  it  is  absurd  to  place  upon  Stevens  alone 
these  evil  aspects  of  reconstruction.  True,  he  holds 
a  preeminence  for  his  fierce  language  of  denunciation 
toward  slaveholders  and  the  leaders  of  the  Rebellion. 
But  history  can  accord  him  no  monopoly  on  the  spirit 
of  sectional  hatred,  begotten  of  war,  no  monopoly  on 
the  desire  to  deprive  the  ex-Confederates  of  political 
power  and  to  punish  them  for  the  wrongs  and  suf 
ferings  that  war  entailed.  That  spirit  and  desire  were 
all  but  universal  in  the  ruling  party  of  the  North.  The 
minority  party  was  so  impotent  as  to  be  negligible. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  this  legislation  came  into 
being  at  a  time  when  the  vindictive  passions  of  war 
were  shared  by  all,  and  it  is  likely  that  sectional  hatred 
was  as  general  and  positive  in  the  South  as  in  the 
North.  What  the  South  would  have  done  with  Stev 
ens  and  his  fellow-radicals  if  the  tables  had  been 
turned,  no  one  has  yet  attempted  to  set  forth.  It  is 
not  likely  that  "  Old  Thad  "  and  his  "  abolition  co 
horts  "  would  have  been  the  objects  of  brotherly  affec 
tion,  to  be  restored  quickly  to  equal  power  in  a  slave 
holders'  Union  which  "  traitorous  abolitionists  "  had 
failed  in  their  attempt  to  destroy.1 

1 "  It  is  probable  that  since  time  began  there  has  never  been  an 
example  of  the  hatred  of  one  people  for  another  so  measure 
less  in  degree,  so  unfathomable  in  depth,  so  utterly  groundless 
in  fact,  as  the  hatred  of  the  people  of  the  South  for  the  people 
of  the  North.  There  was  a  spirit  of  malignant  vindictiveness, 
the  offspring  of  hatred."  Southern  Union  Refugee  in  Open  Let 
ter  to  President  Lincoln,  1863.  This  is  but  one  testimony  of 
many  that  might  be  adduced  to  show  that  the  passions  of  hatred 
were  at  least  as  strong  in  the  South  as  in  the  North  and  that 
Stevens'  utterances  and  policy  but  reflected  the  common  temper 
of  the  country  so  far  as  unbrotherly  feeling  was  concerned. 
When  a  great  and  gentle  spirit  like  Phillips  Brooks  could  speak 
as  he  did  soon  after  the  death  of  Lincoln,  one  may  understand, 
to  a  degree,  how  the  Civil  War  had  wrought  upon  the  hateful 


484      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

The  responsibility  for  this  bill,  which,  as  we  have 
shown  from  the  record,  Stevens  denounced  and  sought 
to  defeat,  should  rest  with  the  Republican  leaders  of 
the  Senate,  with  the  majority  that  passed  it  in  both 
houses  of  Congress,  as  well  as  with  the  people  of  the 
North  who  besought  its  enactment  and  who  backed 
the  measure  with  an  overwhelming  body  of  public 
opinion.  Stevens  did  not  arouse  this  spirit  of  vin- 
dictiveness ;  he  merely  shared  and  expressed  to  an  ex 
ceptional  degree  what  was  indulged  by  all. 

It  is  equally  unjust  to  say  that  Stevens'  declarations 
on  Southern  conditions  were  "  prompted  only  by  hate 
and  revenge  "  and  were  "  entitled  to  no  credence."  * 
His  declarations  on  that  point  (not  in  support  of  this 
bill  but  of  his  own  temporary  military  bill)  were  the 
declarations  of  his  party  majority.  His  opinions  and 
expressions  on  this  point  were  shared  by  his  col 
leagues,  by  their  constituencies  in  the  North,  and  by 
the  enlightened  organs  of  the  public  will.  They  were 
the  declarations  of  Wilson,  Sumner,  Wade,  Sherman 
and  Fessenden  in  the  forum;  they  were  the  declara 
tions  of  Generals  Howard,  Thomas,  Sheridan,  Sick 
les  and  other  commanders  in  the  field;  they  were  the 
declarations  of  men  like  Carl  Schurz,  George  William 
Curtis,  James  Russell  Lowell,  Joseph  Medill,  and  other 

passions  and  resentment  of  noble  men.  "  I  know  not,"  said 
Brooks,  "  how  the  crime  of  him  who  shoots  at  law  and  liberty  in 
the  crowded  glare  of  a  great  theater  differs  from  theirs  who 
have  leveled  their  aim  at  the  same  great  beings  from  behind  a 
thousand  ambuscades  and  on  a  hundred  battle-fields  of  this  long 
war.  Every  general  in  the  field  and  every  false  citizen  who 
has  plotted  and  labored  to  destroy  the  lives  of  our  soldiers  is 
brother  to  him  who  did  this  deed."  Brooks'  Sermon  on  Lincoln, 
1865. 
1  Rhodes,  VI,  p.  24. 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        485 

leaders  of  Northern  public  opinion  at  the  time.  These 
men  voted,  or  urged  others  to  vote,  to  sustain  this  meas 
ure,  and,  along  with  Stevens,  they  asserted  that  it 
was  justified  by  the  deplorable  and  unbearable  con 
ditions  in  the  Southt/ 

Radicalism  was  popular,  not  odious.  The  people 
were  so  anxious  to  have  the  ex-Confederates  deprived 
of  all  political  power  and  reduced  to  impotence,  that 
they  were  ready  to  resort  to  more  drastic  means  than 
their  more  timid  representatives  in  Congress  seemed 
willing  to  allow.  The  New  York  Nation  described 
conditions  in  the  South  as  thoroughly  unsound.  Ac 
cording  to  its  representation,  law  was  systematically 
perverted  into  oppression  and  so  unblushingly  over 
ridden  that  it  was  sheer  mockery  to  refer  any  loyal 
man  to  an  average  Southern  court  for  justice;  the 
Johnson  governments  were  founded  by  military  power 
and  had  their  origin  in  usurpation ;  their  "  course  had 
been  atrocious  and  wicked  "  and  the  military  bill  of 
Congress  deserved  hearty  sympathy.  Reorganization 
of  the  South  "  should  never  be  entrusted  to  men  who 
have  shown  such  malignity^and  bigotry  as  the  major 
ity  of  Southern  officials."^ 

This  is  entirely  in  harmony  with  what  Stevens  was 
in  the  habit  of  saying  and  it  may  serve  as  one  of  a 
thousand  worthy  witnesses  to  show  that  Stevens'  "  vin 
dictive  and  vengeful  "  language  was  not  exceptional. 
The  whole  sad  truth  was  that  reconstruction  had  to  be 

1  One  has  only  to  read  the  testimony  coming  from  the  mili 
tary  commanders  in  the  South  and  the  files  of  the  New  York 
Nation,  Harper's  Weekly  and  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  not  to  men 
tion    the    more    distinctly    partisan    journals,    to    appreciate   the 
truth  of  this  statement. 

2  Nation,  Feb.  21,  1867. 


486     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

accomplished  amid  sectional  hatred,  bitterness,  and  an 
tagonism.  The  spirit  of  cooperation  and  fraternal 
regard  did  not  exist;  the  natural  and  inevitable  out 
come  was  the  attempted  subjection  of  one  section  to 
the  other  which  a  successful  war  would  ordinarily  im 
ply.  /One  of  the  terms  imposed  —  universal  suffrage 
for  the  negro  in  his  unpreparedness  —  was,  no  doubt, 
unwise.  But  the  responsibility  for  that  lies  not  alone 
with  one  man  nor  with  one  section]  It  was  Stevens' 
desire  originally  to  carry  suffrage  gradually  by  the 
consent  of  the  Southern  States  and  to  accompany  it 
with  education.  The  resistance  and  temper  of  the 
South  brought,  by  national  power,  an  act  of  enfran 
chisement  which  it  will  take  more  than  a  generation 
to  make  really  effective. 

The  reconstruction  measures  are  often  criticized  as 
if,  at  the  time,  the  conditions  of  the  country  were 
normal.  Congress  is  denounced  for  "  brutally  striking 
down  state  governments,"  as  if  Johnson's  military 
creations  were  legal  states.  The  problem  is  spoken 
of  as  if  the  Rebellion  might  have  been  treated  as  a  com 
mon  riot,  or  only  as  an  insurrection  against  authority, 
and  that,  the  disorderly  citizens  having  yielded,  every 
thing  could  now  go  on  as  it  was  before.  The  true 
state  of  the  case  was,  and  the  men  of  the  time  who 
had  made  great  sacrifices  to  preserve  the  Union  felt 
it  most  deeply,  that  the  difference  between  North  and 
South  in  war  and  reconstruction  is  to  be  looked  upon 
as  a  great  life  and  death  struggle.  It  was  a  great 
public  war  between  two  contending  powers,  and  it  was 
nothing  short  of  the  ridiculous  and  the  absurd  to  sup 
pose  that  the  victors  after  such  a  conflict  should  be 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        487 

satisfied  with  things  as  they  were  before  the  conflict 
began.  Great  conflicting  principles  and  forces  in  civ 
ilization  were  disputing  for  mastery.  It  was  a  strug 
gle  that  went  deeper  than  parties.  It  was  the  pur 
pose  of  the  nation,  and  Stevens'  leadership  but  rep 
resented  that  firm  unflinching  resolution,  to  plant  the 
government  anew  upon  the  principles  of  the  Declara 
tion  of  Independence. 

The  nation's  conscience  had  the  conviction  that 
atonement  had  to  be  made  for  a  century  of  injustice 
and  that  the  honor  and  safety  of  the  future  demanded 
the  establishment  of  a  truer  and  broader  democracy, 
a  democracy  as  wide  as  the  human  race.  This  ideal 
ism  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  then  so  fer 
vently  revived,  was  not  to  be  realized  immediately; 
but  it  was  the  nation's  determination  that  no  by-ques 
tions,  no  fallacies  of  generosity  to  the  vanquished, 
should  turn  it  aside  from  the  one  fixed  purpose  it  had 
at  heart, —  that  the  war  should  not  have  been  in  vain ; 
that  the  Slave  States,  when  they  returned  to  the  Union, 
should  return  on  suitable  terms,  terms  by  which  politi 
cal  rights  and  powers  should  be  distributed  on  prin 
ciples  that  were  righteous  and  true.  Such  were  the 
motives  and  purposes  of  reconstruction  by  which  its 
ablest  sponsors,  like  Thaddeus  Stevens,  should  be 
judged. 

Stevens  has  been  represented  as  utterly  regardless 
of  the  restraints  of  the  Constitution  and  as  seeking  to 
impose  military  rule  and  negro  suffrage  upon  the 
South  merely  to  humiliate  and  punish  a  proud  and 
worthy  people.  The  criticism  expresses  only  a  narrow 
and  temporizing  view  of  his  conduct.  Perhaps  he 


488     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

manifested  to  an  exceptional  degree  the  unseemly 
qualities  of  resentment  and  revenge,  as  he  did  many 
of  the  worthier  qualities  of  human  nature.  But  to 
Stevens  equal  suffrage  to  all  was  a  measure  of  justice, 
not  of  punishment.  It  is  more  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  he  was  primarily  inspired  by  nobler  motives,  the 
motives  suggested  in  the  deep-seated  desire  to  secure 
the  political  justice  and  regeneration  to  which  we  have 
referred. 

To  secure  civil  and  political  justice  for  all  men 
alike,  regardless  of  race,  color,  or  previous  condition 
of  servitude, —  this  was  the  permanent  cause  involved 
in  reconstruction.  Stevens  represented  that  cause. 
To  that  end  he  would  have  remodeled  the  Constitution 
of  his  country  in  whatever  way  he  thought  best  cal 
culated  to  uproot  the  last  vestige  of  human  slavery, 
and  to  establish  in  America  a  race-wide  democracy  of 
equal  rights.  True,  he  entertained  no  reverence  for 
the  Constitution  as  a  complete  and  inspired  instrument 
needing  no  change.  He  is  to  be  admired  greatly  and 
commended  for  that.  That  idolatrous  conception  of 
our  Constitution  which  has  been  so  sedulously  culti 
vated  in  this  country  is  an  incredible  stupidity,  tending 
to  discourage  all  independence  of  political  thought. 
To  him  the  Constitution  was  a  means,  not  an  end.  He 
would  adapt  it  to  the  nation's  needs  and  use  it  as  an 
instrument,  not  to  hamper,  but  to  promote  the  prog 
ress  and  freedom  of  the  race.  He  sought  to  make  it 
an  instrument  of  government  under  which  no  oppres 
sion  could  find  a  resting  place.  He  was  therefore, 
and  most  rightly,  not  satisfied  with  the  Constitution 
of  1787.  He  sought  a  nearer  approach  to  the  true 


MILITARY  RECONSTRUCTION        489 

principles  of  liberty  than  our  fathers  had  reached.  He 
was,  indeed,  guilty  of  the  great  audacity  of  believing 
that  we  could  do  much  better  for  human  liberty  than 
our  fathers  had  done.  Who  is  there  to  reproach  him 
for  such  faith  ?  He  wished  to  establish  a  nation  over 
a  continent  under  laws  of  supreme  unvarying  char 
acter,  not  intending  that  one  part  of  the  nation  should 
be  governed  by  one  set  of  laws,  another  by  another. 
The  principles  applying  to  the  dwellers  on  the  Penob- 
scot  should  apply  to  those  on  the  Susquehanna  and  the 
Savannah,  with  inalienable  rights  and  perfect  liberty 
for  all. 

It  was  this  motive  and  these  principles,  not  vindic 
tive  hate,  that  led  Stevens  to  favor  civil  liberty  and 
manhood  suffrage  for  all,  black  as  well  as  white.  No 
man,  as  he  believed,  could  sell  his  liberty  or  his  priv 
ileges  for  a  price.  No  contract  nor  instrument  of  gov 
ernment,  no  matter  how  solemn,  no  matter  how  hedged 
about  by  broad  seals  or  stamped  by  legislative  and  ex 
ecutive  approval, —  none  of  these  things  could  alienate 
a  man's  liberties  and  rights.  With  a  peculiar  devotion 
he  held  that  there  were  certain  rights,  privileges,  and 
immunities  that  belonged  to  every  being  who  had  an 
immortal  soul,  none  of  which  could  be  rightfully  taken 
from  him  by  any  sort  of  arrangement  with  society  or 
government. 

However  inadequate  the  means  he  employed  may 
have  proved  to  bring  about  these  political  ideals ;  how 
ever  the  temporary  enactments  he  promoted  in  recon 
struction  may  have  failed  to  bring  about  results  that 
only  time  could  work  out,  those  who  believe  in  democ 
racy  and  the  faith  proclaimed  by  the  founders  of  the 


490     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

republic  will  continue  to  maintain  that  the  underlying 
principles  on  which  Stevens  and  his  radical  coadjutors 
sought  to  reconstruct  the  dissevered  Union  are  not  des 
tined  to  ultimate  failure  nor  decay. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

IMPEACHMENT 

A  POLITICAL  condition  existed  in  the  country  in 
-*  *•  which  Congress  and  the  President  were  at  war. 
It  was  an  impossible  situation,  and  no  constitution  of 
government  should  ever  permit  it  to  exist.  The  Ex 
ecutive  and  the  Legislative  had  denounced  one  another 
beyond  the  limit  of  decency.  The  country  had  given 
to  Congress  such  a  majority  as  enabled  that  body  to 
reduce  the  President  to  impotency,  yet  they  were  with 
out  an  Executive  of  their  own  with  a  heart  to  carry 
out  the  nation's  will.  The  President  had  obstinately 
determined  that,  wherever  he  could,  he  would  defeat 
and  circumvent,  nag  and  annoy,  the  responsible  leg 
islative  leaders,  and  he  would  go  to  the  bounds  of  the 
law  in  opposition  to  the  public  will  as  expressed  in 
Congress.  It  passeth  knowledge  to  determine  what 
reason  can  be  urged  in  constitution-making  or  in  state 
craft  for  a  constitutional  system  of  government  that 
makes  possible  for  any  length  of  time  such  a  rela 
tionship  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
branches  of  government.  It  is  well  known  that  if  the 
framers  of  our  Constitution  had  understood  the  mod 
ern  responsible  Cabinet,  or  if  they  could  have  foreseen 
the  party  character  and  the  great  political  power  of  the 
American  presidency  they  would  not  have  made  the 
mistake  of  setting  such  a  disjointed  and  jarring  rela- 

491 


492      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tionship  between  the  legislative  and  executive  branches 
of  government. 

The  movement  for  the  removal  of  Andrew  John 
son  found  its  cause  in  the  politics  of  the  time.  His 
impeachment  was  essentially  a  political  issue,  as  Stev 
ens  very  frankly  declared,  with  his  usual  habit  of  bold 
avowal  and  unconcealment.  Johnson's  case  was  de 
cided,  however,  not  as  a  political  question  but  as  a 
purely  legal  question,  by  a  few  lawyers  in  the  United 
States  Senate  who  deemed  themselves  to  be  sitting  as 
judges  in  a  purely  criminal  case.  What  a  President 
may  do  to  harm  his  country,  short  of  proving  himself 
a  criminal,  is  beyond  measure.  If  Johnson  had  stolen 
a  chicken,  as  one  of  the  political  managers  at  his  trial 
suggested,  he  could  have  been  impeached  and  removed. 
But  to  throw  himself  athwart  the  national  will  and  to 
circumvent  important  political  ends  upon  which  the 
nation  has  determined,  while  yet  keeping  within  the 
limits  of  the  criminal  law, —  in  such  a  case  there  is 
operative  now  no  method  of  impeachment,  or  recall, 
within  the  sovereign  power  of  the  people. 

It  may  reasonably  be  regretted,  especially  by  those 
who  wish  to  democratize  the  American  government, 
as  Stevens  did,  that  such  a  narrow  view  of  the  im 
peaching  powers  prevailed  in  the  historic  trial  of  An 
drew  Johnson.  It  is  well  known  that  President  Jef 
ferson,  in  his  day,  desired  to  restrain  the  federalist 
judges  by  an  easier  process  of  impeachment  and  to 
accomplish  their  removal  by  the  united  vote  of  the  two 
houses,  somewhat  after  the  present  English  method. 
If,  as  the  Jeffersonian  Republicans  desired  and  at 
tempted,  impeachment  could  have  been  used  in  the 


IMPEACHMENT  493 

first  place  under  Jefferson  by  a  legislative  process  and 
for  a  public  purpose,  to  impeach  a  biased,  cantanker 
ous,  and  partisan  judge  like  Justice  Chase,  who  was  ut 
terly  unfit  to  sit  upon  the  bench;  and  if,  in  the  second 
important  instance  in  our  history,  the  impeachment 
power  could  have  been  successfully  employed  as  a 
political  weapon  to  remove  a  President  who,  if  not 
utterly  unfit  for  his  place,  was  not  only  an  accident  in 
his  office  but  an  incumbrance  and  obstruction  to  the  ex 
ercise  of  popular  power, —  then  the  precedents  might 
have  so  vitalized  the  impeaching  powers  that  it  would 
now  be  possible  to  use  them,  in  a  measure,  as  a  means 
of  promoting  responsible  parliamentary  government 
in  America.  But  legalism  and  the  undemocratic  re 
strictions  of  a  written  constitution  have  determined 
otherwise.  And  now  into  whatever  indignation  and 
anger  a  President  may  bring  the  people,  however  in 
ane,  or  supine,  or  incompetent  and  perverse  he  may  be, 
there  is  nought  for  the  nation  to  do,  fret  and  fume  as 
it  may,  but  to  await  the  expiration  of  his  four  years' 
term.  If  that  had  been  the  precedent  and  the  law 
for  the  century  gone  by,  Stevens  would  have  set  an 
other  precedent  for  the  centuries  to  come. 

It  is  the  custom  to  lift  up  voice  and  hands  in  dis 
approval  of  allowing  such  scope  to  unrestrained  pop 
ular  power.  The  masses  would  be  so  controlled,  it  is 
said,  by  partisan  passion  and  popular  excesses  as  to 
make  such  power  in  the  hands  of  the  representatives 
of  the  people  altogether  too  dangerous.  But  those 
who  believe  in  democratic  government  for  America 
are  quite  inclined  to  believe  that  it  would  be  far  safer 
to  allow  the  people  to  remove,  or  recall,  their  Presi- 


494     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

dent  by  a  two-thirds  adverse  vote  (if  not  by  a  major 
ity)  in  both  houses  of  Congress,  than  to  try  to  get  on 
under  a  cumbersome  and  rigid  Constitution  that  was 
instituted,  in  the  first  place,  and  has  since  been  con 
stantly  applied,  to  restrain  the  people  from  working 
out  their  will  in  governmental  law  and  administration. 
Impeachment  may  be  revived  for  a  time  under  popular 
pressure,  or  it  may  be  threatened  occasionally  against 
judicial  offenders  for  political  reasons,  but  it  is  safe  to 
say  that  it  will  never  again  be  revived  to  harm  or 
restrain  a  President  in  the  performance,  or  misper- 
formance  of  his  public  duties. 

It  was  with  some  such  ideas  of  responsible  demo 
cratic  government  as  these  that  Stevens,  leading  his 
party  colleagues,  undertook  the  impeachment  of  An 
drew  Johnson.  Stevens  realized  that  some  of  the 
senatorial  judges  would  have  to  be  convinced  by  purely 
judicial  considerations,  and  he  sought,  in  part,  to  pre 
sent  his  cause  with  that  in  view.  But  he  also  deemed 
it  proper,  from  the  governmental  considerations  that 
I  have  partly  adduced,  to  appeal  to  partisanship  to 
secure  votes  from  his  party  colleagues,  for  the  sake 
of  what  he  deemed  worthy  political  and  public  ends. 
It  is  but  fair  to  judge  his  course  in  impeachment  with 
these  considerations  in  mind. 

A  proposition  to  impeach  the  President  for  high 
crimes  and  misdemeanors  had  been  pending  in  the 
House  for  more  than  a  year  before  that  body  came  to 
the  point  of  deciding  in  favor  of  this  drastic  policy. 
In  June,  1867,  the  Judiciary  Committee  of  the  House 
was  instructed  to  inquire  into  the  conduct  of  Johnson, 
to  see  if  he  were  guilty  of  offenses  that  were  impeach- 


IMPEACHMENT  495 

able  under  the  Constitution.  In  the  closing  days  of 
the  Thirty-ninth  Congress,  the  committee  reported 
that  there  was  enough  evidence  to  justify  the  continu 
ance  of  the  investigation  by  the  incoming  Fortieth  Con 
gress.  In  June,  1867,  the  majority  of  the  committee 
reported  that  there  was  not  sufficient  ground  for  im 
peachment,  but  it  was  decided  to  have  the  committee 
continue  the  search  for  evidence. 

During  the  recess  of  Congress  from  July  to  Novem 
ber,  1867,  Johnson  removed  General  Sheridan  from 
the  military  department  of  Louisiana  and  suspended 
Secretary  Stanton,  head  of  the  war  department,  and 
these  events,  it  appears,  were  influential  in  bringing  a 
majority  of  the  committee  to  support  the  policy  of 
impeachment.  George  S.  Bout  well,  of  Massachusetts, 
made  a  report  in  the  House  to  this  effect  on  Novem 
ber  25,  1867;  but  two  of  the  Republican  members  of 
the  committee  were  still  opposed  to  the  policy  of  im 
peachment  and  the  proposal  was  rejected  by  the  House 
by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  and  eight  to  fifty-seven, 
sixty-seven  Republicans  and  all  the  Democrats  voting 
against  the  policy. 

In  December,  the  Senate  refused  to  sustain  the  rea 
sons  which  the  President  submitted  to  that  body  for 
the  removal  of  Stanton.  Thereupon,  General  Grant, 
who  had  been  acting  as  Secretary  of  War  ad  interim, 
left  the  office  and  Stanton  again  took  up  its  duties. 
This  action  of  General  Grant  in  allowing  Stanton  to 
again  take  possession  of  the  war  office  angered  John 
son  and  he  accused  Grant  of  a  breach  of  promise.  He 
asserted  that  Grant  had  promised  to  hold  the  office 
and  force  Stanton  to  resort  to  judicial  proceedings  in 


496      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

his  efforts  to  regain  possession.  This  process  would 
have  tested  in  the  courts  the  constitutionality  of  the 
Tenure  of  Office  Act  and  it  might  have  resulted  in  its 
judicial  nullification.  A  quarrel  therefore  resulted  be 
tween  the  President  and  the  Commander  of  the  army 
that  had  considerable  results  in  the  politics  of  the 
times.  If  the  President  had  had  a  little  tact  and  more 
affability,  he  might  have  secured  the  powerful  influ 
ence  of  Grant  in  the  fight  against  Stanton  and  Con 
gress. 

Stanton  now  remained  in  the  Cabinet,  not  as  a  Sec 
retary  of  the  President,  but  as  a  Secretary  of  Con 
gress  ;  but  while  attending  to  the  routine  duties  of  the 
office  he  did  not  attend  the  Cabinet  meetings. 

Johnson  was  advised  to  allow  Stanton  to  retain  his 
office,  to  perform  its  clerical  and  legal  duties,  while 
the  President  and  his  advisers  could  afford  to  abide 
their  time.  While  Stanton's  continuance  in  the  of 
fice  was  an  offense  to  the  Executive,  he  could  not  be 
seriously  obstructive  nor  injurious,  and  the  country 
would  understand  that  responsibility  for  his  presence 
there  rested  with  the  Senate  and  not  with  the  Presi 
dent,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  congressional  party 
would  not  find  Stanton  a  popular  issue. 

Disregarding  this  advice,  Johnson,  on  February  21, 
1868,  issued  a  peremptory  order  removing  Stanton 
from  the  office  as  Secretary  of  War,  and  he  appointed 
Lorenzo  B.  Thomas  Secretary  ad  interim.  Johnson 
held  that  he  had  the  right  to  get  rid  of  Stanton.  To 
accomplish  this  he  intended  to  resort  to  judicial  pro 
ceedings  if  necessary,  while  if  the  Senate  refused  to 
concur  in  his  removal,  the  Secretary  might  have  re- 


IMPEACHMENT  497 

sort  to  the  courts  to  test  his  right.  In  either  case 
the  President  would  have  his  right  to  a  harmonious 
Cabinet  tested  by  the  laws.  Stanton  refused  to  sur 
render  the  office  to  Thomas,  denounced  as  illegal  all 
orders  issuing  from  Thomas  as  Secretary  of  War,  and 
instructed  generals  of  the  army  to  pay  no  respect  to 
such  orders.  Upon  receiving  reports  of  these  facts, 
Johnson  again  instructed  Thomas  to  take  charge  of  the 
office  and  perform  its  duties. 

The  Senate  was  notified  of  these  proceedings  by 
both  the  President  and  Stanton.  The  Senate  went 
into  an  executive  session  which  lasted  for  seven 
hours,  in  the  course  of  which  it  was  resolved,  "that 
under  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  the  President 
had  no  power  to  remove  the  Secretary  of  War,  and 
to  designate  any  other  officer  to  perform  the  duties 
of  that  office  ad  interim."  Secretary  Stanton,  having 
heard  that  Thomas  had  threatened  to  take  possession 
of  the  war  office  by  force,  had  a  warrant  issued  for 
Thomas's  arrest,  and  before  Thomas  had  break 
fasted  next  morning  he  was  arrested  and  brought  into 
court.  Thomas,  having  been  released  on  bail,  pre 
sented  himself  at  Stanton's  office  and  in  the  presence 
of  a  number  of  gentlemen,  who,  with  Stanton,  had 
been  holding  possession  of  the  office  during  the  night, 
he  demanded  that  Stanton  surrender  possession.  A 
serio-comic  colloquy  followed  between  the  two  claim 
ants  of  the  office,  Stanton  ordering  Thomas  out, 
Thomas  refusing  to  go,  and  each  claiming  the  right 
to  perform  the  functions  of  the  office. 

On  February  21,  1868,  the  House,  having  received 
the  news  from  Stanton  of  the  attempt  to  remove  him, 


498      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

was  now  in  a  state  of  mind  for  the  impeachment  pro 
posal.  On  February  10,  1868,  on  motion  of  Mr. 
Stevens,  the  evidence  taken  by  the  Judiciary  Commit 
tee  had  been  transferred  to  the  Reconstruction  Com 
mittee,  and  the  latter  committee  thereafter  had  charge 
of  the  impeachment  question.  On  February  I3th,  this 
committee  had  laid  on  the  table  by  a  vote  of  six  to 
three  a  resolution  to  impeach.  But  now  there  was  a 
different  temper,  and  Covode's  resolution,  offered  on 
the  2ist,  "that  Andrew  Johnson  be  impeached  of 
high  crimes  and  misdemeanors  "  was  referred  to  the 
Committee  on  Reconstruction  with  full  expectation 
that  it  would  be  reported  favorably  on  the  morrow. 
At  twenty  minutes  past  two  of  the  next  day  (Feb. 
22nd),  after  a  committee  session  in  violation  of  the 
House  rule  which  forbade  committee  meetings  during 
the  session  without  special  leavey  the  Reconstruction 
Committee,  with  Stevens  at  its  head,  came  into  the 
House,  with  a  report  recommending  the  adoption  of 
the  impeachment  resolution.  Stevens  wished  to  take 
a  vote  without  debate,  saying  as  he  offered  the  report 
that  such  a  removal  as  Johnson  had  been  guilty  of, 
had  always  been  considered  a  crime  and  misdemeanor 
and  was  never  before  practised.  But  the  debate,  or 
series  of  speeches,  continued  through  the  day  and  late 
into  the  night  of  the  22nd,  and  the  discussion  was  re 
sumed  on  Monday,  the  24th,  to  the  extent  altogether 
of  two  hundred  columns  of  the  Globe.  "  There 
seemed,"  says  Mr.  Blaine,  "to  be  an  inordinate  de 
sire  among  gentlemen  who  had  hitherto  been  con 
servative  on  the  question,  as  well  as  among  those  who 
1  Speech  of  Brooks,  House,  Feb.  22,  1868,  Globe,  p.  1336. 


IMPEACHMENT  499 

had  been  constantly  in  favor  of  impeachment,  to  place 
themselves  on  record  against  the  President."  1 

Brooks,  a  "  Peace  Democrat,"  or  "  Copperhead," 
during  the  war,  protested  against  this  final  stage  of 
the  revolution  for  the  destruction  of  the  executive 
branch  of  the  federal  government.  Bingham,  of 
Ohio,  expressed  his  sincere  conviction  that  the  Presi 
dent  had  "  violated  the  Constitution,  his  oath  of  of 
fice,  and  the  laws  of  the  country."  Farnsworth,  of  Il 
linois,  denounced  Johnson  as  an  "  ungrateful,  despic 
able,  besotted  traitor, —  a  man  who  had  turned  his  back 
upon  the  men  who  had  elected  him."  2  Kelley,  of 
Pennsylvania,  declared  that  the  House  was  about  to 
bring  to  trial  "  the  great  criminal  of  our  age  and  coun 
try,  a  man  who  for  two  years  has  been  plotting  with 
deliberate  and  bloody  purpose  the  overthrow  of  the 
institutions  of  our  country  " ;  and  he  thought  it  well 
for  men  to  pause  before  speaking  in  defense  of  the 
"great  criminal  whom  the  American  people  arraign 
for  thousands  of  crimes."  3 

John  A  Logan,  of  Illinois,  who  was  afterward  one 
of  the  impeachment  managers,  said :  "  Not  one  act 
has  been  passed  by  your  Congress  in  the  direction  of 
peace,  union,  and  prosperity,  that  he  has  not  vetoed; 
and  when  passed  over  his  veto  by  a  constitutional 
majority,  that  he  has  not  attempted  to  prevent  the  ex 
ecution  of  the  same.  He  has  advised  and  encouraged 
rebels  and  traitors  in  the  South  to  disobey  the  laws; 
he  has  removed  military  commanders  that  the  recon- 

1  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  II,  p.  356. 

2  Globe,  40th  Congress,  2d  Session,  p.  1344. 

3  Globe,  pp.  1347  and  1348. 


500      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

struction  laws  might  be  disregarded  and  opposed. 
.  .  .  He  has  not  only  insulted  the  nation  by  his  con 
duct  as  President,  but  he  has  disgraced  that  high  of 
fice  in  which  he  was  placed  by  the  death  of  his  illus 
trious  predecessor." 

It  would  be  tiresome  to  quote  further  from  this 
partisan  and  impassioned  debate.  Members  spoke  of 
the  occasion  as  one  of  thrilling  and  transcendent  im 
portance,  and  the  men  of  the  minority  professed  to  be 
lieve  that  the  future  peace,  honor  and  stability  of  the 
country,  and  everything  held  dear  in  our  political  life, 
hung  upon  the  outcome.2 

Stevens  took  twenty-five  minutes  to  close  the  dis 
cussion.  He  recognized  the  gravity  of  the  issue  in 
volved  and  professed  a  desire  to  discuss  it  "  in  no 
partisan  spirit,  but  with  legal  accuracy  and  impartial 
justice.  The  people  desire  no  victim  and  they  will 
endure  no  usurper." 

1  Globe,  pp.  1352-1353- 

2  Niblack,  Globe,  p.  1398. 

That  the  Johnson  party  was  as  partisan  as  those  leading1  the 
impeachment  may  be  seen  from  a  passage  in  the  Diary  of 
Gideon  Wells,  a  stanch  protagonist  of  the  President,  which 
has  recently  appeared :  "  The  impeachment  is  a  deed  of  ex 
treme  partisanship,  a  deliberate  conspiracy,  involving  ^  all  the 
moral  guilt  of  treason  for  which  the  members  would,  if  fairly 
tried,  be  liable  to  conviction  and  condemnation.  .  .  .  The  Presi 
dent  is  innocent  of  crime,  his  accusers  and  triers  are  culpably 
guilty.  In  this  violent  and  vicious  exercise  of  partyism,  I  see 
the  liberties  and  happiness  of  the  country  and  the  stability  ^  of 
the  government  imperiled."  Wells  quotes,  without  suggestion 
of  impropriety,  Mr.  John  Bigelow,  as  predicting  that  impeach 
ment  would  fail  from  political  motives,  because  the  conservative 
Senators,  "  with  the  Chief  Justice,  look  with  repugnance  and 
horror  to  the  accession  of  Wade,  and  would  prefer  to  continue 
the  President.  Unless,  therefore,  Wade  will  resign  and  allow 
some  good  conservative  Senator  to  be  made  President  of  the 
Senate,  he  [Bigelow]  thinks  impeachment  will  be  defeated." 
Atlantic  Mo.,  Oct.,  igio. 


IMPEACHMENT  501 

To  sustain  impeachment  Stevens  held  that  it  was 
not  necessary  to  prove  a  crime  as  an  indictable  of 
fense,  or  any  act  malum  in  se.  He  held  this  to  be  a 
purely  political  proceeding,  a  remedy  for  malfeasance 
in  office  and  to  prevent  its  continuance.  Beyond  that 
it  is  not  intended  as  a  personal  punishment  for  past 
offenses  or  future  example.  He  held  that  the  punish 
ment  resulting  from  impeachment  has  been  substi 
tuted  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  for  that  of 
attainder,  in  order  to  prevent  revenge  and  punishment 
from  being  inflicted  upon  political  and  personal 
enemies.  The  question  should  be  treated  as  wholly 
political.  If  an  officer  abuse  his  trust  or  attempt  to 
pervert  it  to  improper  purposes,  whatever  might  be 
his  motives,  he  becomes  subject  to  impeachment  and 
removal.  He  asserted  that  in  no  case  of  impeach 
ment  yet  tried  in  this  country  has  an  attempt  been 
made  to  prove  the  offense  criminal  and  indictable. 

Stevens  then  proceeded  to  a  review  of  the  Tenure 
of  Office  Act  and  Johnson's  alleged  violations  of  the 
same.  The  President  had  taken  an  oath  to  execute 
the  laws,  and  from  that  oath  Johnson  could  not  now 
plead  exemption  "  on  account  of  his  condition  at  the 
time  it  was  administered  to  him."  He  had  sought  to 
induce  the  General  of  the  army  to  cooperate  with 
him  in  the  avowed  purpose  of  preventing  the  opera 
tion  of  the  law.  No  matter  which  of  the  two,  Grant 
or  Johnson,  in  the  question  of  veracity  between  them 
should  be  shown  to  be  the  man  of  truth  and  which 
the  man  of  falsehood,  the  President  by  the  statement 
of  either,  has  "  committed  wilful  perjury  by  refusing 
to  take  care  that  the  laws  should  be  faithfully  exe- 


502     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

cuted.  Indeed  to  show  the  utter  disregard  of  the 
laws  of  his  country,  we  have  only  to  return  to  his  last 
annual  message  in  which  he  proclaims  to  the  public 
that  the  laws  of  Congress  are  unconstitutional  and 
not  binding  on  the  people.  Who,  after  that,  can  say 
that  such  a  man  is  fit  to  occupy  the  executive  chair, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  inculcate  obedience  to  those  very 
laws  and  see  that  they  are  faithfully  obeyed?  Then 
the  great  beauty  of  this  remedial  and  preventive  pro 
cess  is  dearly  demonstrated.  He  is  dull  and  blind 
who  can  not  see  its  necessity  and  the  beneficial  pur 
poses  of  the  trial  by  impeachment." 

Stevens,  as  might  be  expected,  found  cause  against 
the  President  in  his  whole  course  of  conduct  in  re 
construction,  because  of  his  persistent  usurpation  of 
powers  that  belonged  alone  to  Congress.  When  the 
territory  of  the  South  had  been  surrendered  by  the 
fortunes  of  war  to  the  victorious  arms  of  the  Union, 
"  no  power  but  Congress  had  any  right  to  say  whether 
ever  or  when  they  should  be  admitted  to  the  Union 
as  states.  Yet  Andrew  Johnson  with  unblushing 
hardihood,  undertook  to  rule  them  by  his  own  power 
alone;  to  lead  them  into  full  communion  with  the 
Union;  direct  them  what  governments  to  erect  and 
what  constitutions  to  adopt,  and  to  send  Senators 
and  Representatives  to  Congress  according  to  his  in 
structions.  When  admonished  by  expressed  act  of 
Congress,  more  than  once  repeated,  he  disregarded 
the  warning,  and  continued  his  lawless  usurpation. 
He  is  since  known  to  have  obstructed  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  those  governments  by  the  authority  of  Con- 

1  Globe,  p.  1400. 


IMPEACHMENT  503 

gress  and  has  advised  the  inhabitants  to  resist  the 
legislation  of  Congress.  In  my  judgment  his  conduct 
with  regard  to  that  transaction  was  a  high-handed 
usurpation  of  power  which  ought  long  ago  to  have 
brought  him  to  impeachment  and  trial  and  to  have 
removed  him  from  his  position  of  great  mischief. 
He  has  been  lucky  in  thus  far  escaping  through  false 
logic  and  false  law.  But  his  acts,  which  will  on  the 
trial  be  shown  to  be  atrocious,  are  open  evidence  of 
his  wicked  determination  to  subvert  the  laws  of  his 
country/' 

"  The  sovereign  power  of  the  nation  rests  in  Congress, 
who  have  been  placed  around  the  Executive  as  muniments 
to  defend  his  rights,  and  as  watchmen  to  enforce  his  obedi 
ence  to  the  law  and  the  Constitution.  His  oath  to  obey  the 
Constitution  and  our  duty  to  compel  him  to  do  it  are  a 
tremendous  obligation,  heavier  than  was  ever  assumed  by 
mortal  rulers.  We  are  to  protect  or  to  destroy  the  liberty 
and  happiness  of  a  mighty  people,  and  to  take  care  that  they 
progress  in  civilization  and  defend  themselves  against  every 
kind  of  tyranny.  As  we  deal  with  the  first  great  political 
malefaction  so  will  be  the  result  of  our  efforts  to  perpetuate 
the  happiness  and  good  government  of  the  human  race. 
The  God  of  our  fathers  who  inspired  them  with  the  thought 
of  universal  freedom,  will  hold  us  responsible  for  the  noble 
institutions  which  they  projected  and  expected  us  to  carry 
out.  This  is  not  to  be  the  temporary  triumph  of  a  political 
party,  but  is  to  endure  in  its  consequence  until  this  whole 
continent  shall  be  filled  with  a  free  and  untrammeled  people 
or  shall  be  a  nest  of  shrinking  cowardly  slaves."  1 

When  Stevens  closed,  he  called  for  the  yeas  and 
nays  on  the  resolution.  The  Republicans  voted  yea, 

1  Globe,  Feb.  24,  1868,  p.  1400. 


504      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

and  the  Democrats  nay,  and  impeachment  was  carried 
by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-six  to  forty- 
seven. 

A  committee  of  seven  was  appointed  to  draw  up 
articles  of  impeachment.1 

Stevens  and  Bingham  were  appointed  a  committee 
of  two  to  inform  the  Senate  of  the  action  of  the 
House.  On  the  following  day,  February  25th,  these 
noted  leaders  appeared  at  the  bar  of  the  Senate.  Sum- 
ner,  who  was  a  witness  of  the  scene,2  describes  Stev 
ens  as  "  looking  the  ideal  Roman,  with  singular  im- 
pressiveness,  as  if  he  were  discharging  a  sad  duty."  3 
Standing  before  the  Senate  in  solemn  mien,  Stevens 
arraigned  the  President  in  words  that  thrilled  and  im 
pressed  the  listener.  "  I  doubt,"  said  Sumner,  "  if 
words  were  ever  delivered  with  more  effect. —  Who 
can  forget  his  steady  solemn  utterance  of  this  great 
arraignment  ?  "  4 

"  In  the  name  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  of  all  the  people  of  the  United  States,  we  do  im 
peach  Andrew  Johnson,  President  of  the  United 
States,  of  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors  in  office; 
and  we  further  inform  the  Senate  that  the  House 
of  Representatives  will,  in  due  time,  exhibit  particu 
lar  articles  of  impeachment  against  him  and  make 
good  the  same ;  and  in  their  name  we  demand  that  the 

1  This    committee    consisted   of   Thaddeus    Stevens,    Benjamin 
F.  Butler,  John  A.  Logan,  John  A.  Bingham,  George  S.  Bout- 
well,  George  W.  Julian  and  Hamilton  Ward.    Later,  James  F. 
Wilson,  of  Iowa,  and  Thomas  Williams,  of  Pennsylvania,  were 
substituted  for  Julian  and  Ward. 

2  Rhodes,  VI,  p.  in. 

3  Storey's  Sumner. 

*McCall,  p.  336,  Globe,  Dec.  18,  1868. 


IMPEACHMENT  505 

Senate  take  order  for  the  appearance  of  the  same 
Andrew  Johnson  to  answer  said  impeachment." 

The  President  of  the  Senate  replied,  "  The  Senate 
will  take  order  in  the  premises." 

Stevens  and  Bingham  then  withdrew. 

Stevens  was  appointed  one  of  the  managers  to  pre 
sent  the  case  to  the  Senate.  His  physical  condition 
prevented  his  taking  the  leading  part  in  the  "  most  im 
portant  trial  of  the  century,"  for  the  sickness  from 
which  he  never  again  fully  rallied  had  now  laid  hold 
upon  him.  But  his  masterful  will  never  allowed  him 
to  yield  the  pursuit  of  his  object.  When  too  weak  to 
walk  he  was  carried  into  the  Senate  chamber,  and 
when  too  weak  to  talk  "  his  fellow  managers  would 
read  his  words."  1 

On  March  4th,  the  House  managers  appeared  be 
fore  the  bar  of  the  Senate.  The  Speaker  of  the 
House  took  a  seat  beside  that  of  the  President  pro 
temp  ore  of  the  Senate.  The  sergeant-of-arms  of  the 
Senate  made  proclamation,  "  Hear  ye !  Hear  ye ! 
Hear  ye!  All  persons  commanded  to  keep  silence, 
on  pain  of  imprisonment,  while  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  is  exhibiting  to  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  articles  of  impeachment  against  Andrew  John 
son,  President  of  the  United  States." 

The  managers  rose,  and  remained  standing,  with 
the  exception  of  Mr.  Stevens,  who  was  physically  un 
able  to  do  so,  while  Mr.  Manager  Bingham  read  the 
articles  of  impeachment2 

The  President,  in  the  eleven  historic  articles,  was 
charged  in  much  verbal  reiteration  with  violating  the 

1  McCall,  p.  337.  2  Globe,  p.  1647. 


506      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Tenure  of  Office  Act,  in  deposing  Stanton  and  ap 
pointing  Thomas;  with  violating  the  Anti-Conspiracy 
Act  of  July  31,  1 86 1,  in  conspiring  with  Thomas  to 
expel  Stanton  and  to  seize  the  papers  and  property 
of  the  office;  with  violating  the  Reconstruction  Act, 
of  March  2,  1867,  in  directing  that  military  orders 
should  issue  through  others  than  the  General  of  the 
army,  as  in  his  attempting  to  induce  General  Emory 
to  take  orders  direct  from  the  President  in  violation 
of  said  act;  and  with  committing  "high  crimes  and 
misdemeanors  "  in  his  attitude  toward  and  denuncia 
tions  of  Congress;  in  his  public  efforts  to  bring  that 
body  "  into  disgrace,  ridicule,  hatred  and  contempt, 
and  to  impair  and  destroy  the  regard  and  respect  of 
all  the  good  people  of  the  United  States  for  the  Con 
gress  thereof." 

The  famous  eleventh  article,  the  one  on  which  the 
crucial  vote  was  taken  and  on  which  rested  the  chief 
hope  of  conviction,  was  drawn  by  Stevens.  It 
charged  that  Johnson,  "  unmindful  of  his  oath  of  office 
and  in  disregard  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  laws;  did 
on  the  1 6th  day  of  August,  1866,  in  the  City  of  Wash 
ington,  by  a  public  speech,  declare  and  affirm  that  the 
Thirty-ninth  Congress  was  not  a  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  authorized  by  the  Constitution  to  exer 
cise  legislative  power,  but  on  the  contrary,  was  a  Con 
gress  of  only  part  of  the  states,  thereby  denying  and 
intending  to  deny  that  the  legislation  of  said  Congress 
was  valid  or  obligatory  upon  him,  except  in  so  far  as 
he  saw  fit  to  approve  the  same,  and  also  thereby  deny 
ing  and  intending  to  deny  the  power  of  Congress  to 
propose  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 


IMPEACHMENT  '507 

States."  The  article  also  charged  that  Johnson  had 
attempted  to  prevent  the  execution  of  the  Tenure  of 
Office  Act. 

This  article  has  been  referred  to  as  the  "  Omnibus 
Article," — a  combination  of  all  the  charges  into  one 
article,  "  a  trick  to  catch  wavering  Senators,"  "  a 
nondescript  and  a  curiosity  in  pleading."  1  Profes 
sor  Dunning  characterizes  it  as  a  striking  testimony 
to  "  the  undiminished  shrewdness  and  intellectual 
strength  of  the  veteran  whose  physical  forces  were 
close  to  their  ends."  2 

We  can  not  here  follow  the  trial  in  detail.  Al 
though  there  were  able  lawyers  among  the  prosecu 
ting  managers,  they  were  equaled,  if  not  over  matched, 
by  the  array  of  legal  counselors  that  came  to  the 
President's  defense.  Among  these  were  ex-At 
torney  General  Stanbery;  Benjamin  R.  Curtis,  former 
Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  who  had  given  the 
able  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Dred  Scott  case;  Wil 
liam  M.  Evarts,  of  New  York,  W.  S.  Grosbeck,  of 
Ohio,  and  Thomas  A.  R.  Nelson,  of  Tennessee,  five 
of  the  ablest  lawyers  of  their  day. 

Butler  opened  for  the  prosecution  by  a  speech  of 
three  hours  in  which  he  sought  to  arouse  the  politi 
cal  antipathy  of  the  Senators  by  reminding  them  of 
the  President's  "  swing  around  the  circle  "  of  his  buf 
foonery  in  public,  and  of  his  repeated  and  coarse 
abuse  of  the  congressional  leaders.  But  Evarts  broke 
the  force  of  Butler's  plea  by  quoting  from  the  debates 
in  the  House  to  show  that  worse  abuse  than  the  Presi- 

1Dewitt,  p.  388,  Rhodes,  VI,  p.  116,  Senator  Buckalew. 
2  Reconstruction,  p.  106. 


5o8      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

dent  could  be  charged  with  had  been  indulged  in  by 
two  of  the  Honorable  Managers  toward  each  other. 

Curtis  made  the  chief  speech  for  the  defense,  speak 
ing  during  two  days.  He  sought  to  divorce  the  case 
from  its  political  bearings  and  reduce  it  entirely  to  a 
judicial  character.  In  addressing  the  Chief  Justice  in 
his  opening  remarks,  Curtis  said  he  was  there  to 
speak  to  the  Senate  "  sitting  in  its  judicial  capacity," 
and  he  affirmed  that  in  such  a  case,  "  party  spirit,  po 
litical  schemes,  foregone  conclusions,  outrageous 
biases,  can  have  no  fit  operation."  As  a  purely  legal 
question  it  was  not  difficult  for  him  to  show  that 
the  question  hung  chiefly  on  whether  Stanton's  case 
came  under  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act.  He  held  that 
it  did  not,  that  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act  did  not  ap 
ply  to  Stanton.  But  even  if  it  did,  Johnson  had  not 
violated  it  in  seeking  as  he  had  done  to  have  the  case 
brought  before  the  courts  for  a  decision  as  to  its 
constitutionality.  He  had  not  erected  himself  into  a 
judicial  court  to  decide  that  the  act  was  unconsti 
tutional  and  that,  therefore,  he  would  not  enforce  it. 
He  claimed  no  such  power.  That  would  be  to  em 
power  the  President,  not  only  to  veto  a  law,  but  to  re 
fuse  all  action  under  it  after  it  had  passed,  and  pre 
vent  a  judicial  decision  from  being  made.  But  if  a 
law  were  passed  over  the  President's  veto  which  he 
believed  to  be  constitutional  and  that  law  affects  the 
interests  of  third  persons,  those  whose  interests  are 
affected  must  take  care  of  them,  raise  questions  con 
cerning  them.  If  such  a  law  affects  the  public  in 
terests,  the  people  must  take  care  at  the  polls  that  it 


IMPEACHMENT  509 

is  remedied  in  a  constitutional  way.  But  when  such  a 
law  cuts  off  a  power  confided  to  the  President  by  the 
people  in  their  Constitution  and  the  President  alone 
can  raise  the  question  and  cause  a  legal  decision  to  be 
made  as  to  which  of  the  two  branches  of  the  gov 
ernment  is  right,  it  remains  to  be  decided  by  you, 
Senators,  whether  there  is  any  violation  of  his  duty 
when  he  takes  the  needful  steps  to  raise  that  question 
and  have  it  peacefully  decided."  1 

It  is  the  judgment  of  Mr.  Rhodes  that  Stevens 
made  the  ablest  argument  for  the  prosecution.  He 
confined  himself  to  his  own  article,  the  eleventh,  and 
he  never  lost  sight  of  his  dear  single  purpose  to  secure 
the  doubtful  Senators.2 

Stevens  had  carefully  prepared  his  argument  and 
he  began  to  read  it  while  standing  at  the  Secretary's 
desk;  "but  after  proceeding  a  few  minutes,  being 
too  feeble  to  stand,  obtained  permission  to  take  a 
seat,  and  having  read  nearly  a  half  an  hour  from  hi^ 
chair  until  his  voice  became  almost  too  weak  to  be 
heard,  handed  over  his  manuscript  to  Mr.  Manager 
Butler,  who  concluded  the  reading."  3 

One  may  well  wonder  as  Mr.  Rhodes  says, 
"  whether  if  Stevens  had  possessed  his  physical 
strength  of  two  years  previous,  the  result  would  have 
been  different.  Certainly  the  trial  would  have  been 
conducted  otherwise.  He  would  have  been  chairman 
of  the  managers  and  dictated  the  line  of  procedure; 
but  on  account  of  his  infirm  health,  the  management 

1  Curtis's  speech,  cited  in  Rhodes'  VI,  pp.  123,  124. 

2  Rhodes,  VI,  p.  135- 

3  Globe,  Supplement,  p.  324. 


510     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

of  the  trial  fell  to  Butler,  next  to  him  the  most  adroit 
of  the  prosecutors."  1 

Stevens  began  by  saying  that  experience  had  taught 
him  that  nothing  was  so  prolix  as  ignorance, —  there 
fore  he  would  be  brief,  that  he  would  discuss  only  his 
own  article,  the  eleventh,  which,  if  proved,  was  suffi 
cient  to  convict,  and  to  bring  about  the  only  legitimate 
object  of  the  impeachment,  the  removal  of  Johnson 
from  office.  He  wished  to  speak  in  no  spirit  of  ma 
lignity  or  vituperation,  but  to  argue  the  charges  in  a 
manner  worthy  of  the  high  tribunal  before  which  he 
stood  and  of  the  exalted  position  of  the  accused. 
"  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  his  [Johnson's]  char 
acter  or  condition,  he  has  been  made  respectable  and 
his  condition  has  been  dignified  by  the  action  of  his 
fellow  citizens.  Railing  accusation,  therefore,  would 
ill  become  this  occasion,  this  tribunal,  or  a  proper  sense 
of  the  position  of  those  who  discuss  this  question,  on 
the  one  side  or  the  other." 

When  the  charges  against  such  a  public  servant 
accuse  him  of  an  attempt  to  betray  the  high  trust  con 
fided  in  him  and  usurp  the  power  of  a  whole  people 
that  he  may  become  their  ruler,  it  is  "  intensely  inter 
esting  to  millions  of  men,  and  should  be  discussed  with 
a  calm  determination  which  nothing  can  divert  and 
nothing  can  reduce  to  mockery.  Such  is  the  condi 
tion  of  this  great  republic,  as  looked  upon  by  an  as- 
__jtonished  and  wondering  world." 

Stevens  denied  that  American  impeachment  was 
analogous  to  that  under  English  law.  In  England 
high  crimes  might  be  punished  through  impeachment 

'VI,  p.  135. 


IMPEACHMENT  511 

by  fine,  imprisonment,  or  death.  Our  Constitution 
excluded  all  penalties  beyond  removal  and  disqualifi 
cation, —  the  public  safety,  not  the  punishment  of  the 
officer,  being  the  object  in  view.  Hence  impeachment 
applies  to  political  offenses,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to 
allege  or  prove  an  indictable  offense.  If  the  defen 
dant  is  shown  to  be  abusing  his  official  trust  to  the 
injury  of  the  people,  and  if  he  persevere  in  this 
abuse,  the  true  mode  of  dealing  with  him  is  to  remove 
him  by  impeachment,  if  his  continuance  in  office  is 
deemed  dangerous  to  the  public  welfare.  No  matter 
about  the  motive.  "  Mere  mistake  in  intention,  if  so 
persevered  in  after  proper  warning  as  to  bring  mischief 
upon  the  community,  is  sufficient. 

"  The  only  question  to  be  considered  is :  Is  the  re 
spondent  violating  the  law  ?  -  -  To  obey  the  com 
mands  of  the  sovereign  power  of  the  nation,  and  to 
see  that  others  should  obey  them,  was  his  whole  duty 
which  he  could  not  escape,  and  any  attempt  to  do  so 
would  be  in  direct  violation  of  his  official  oath;  in 
other  words,  a  misprision  of  perjury.  I  accuse  him 
in  the  name  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  hav 
ing  perpetrated  that  foul  offense  against  the  laws  and 
interests  of  this  country." 

Stevens  then  entered  upon  an  extensive  argument 
to  prove  that  the  Tenure  of  Office  Act  applied  to 
Stanton  and  that  Johnson  was  serving  out  Lincoln's 
term  of  office.  He  traced  the  plain  facts  in  the  case 
as  they  had  occurred  and  showed  that  Johnson  had 
violated  the  act  by  his  efforts  to  prevent  Stanton  from 
performing  the  duties  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  "  I 
disclaim  all  necessity,"  he  said,  "  in  a  trial  of  im- 


512      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

peachment  to  prove  the  wicked  or  unlawful  intention 
of  the  respondent,  and  it  is  unwise  ever  to  aver  it. 
In  indictments  you  charge  that  the  defendant  '  insti 
gated  by  the  devil,'  and  so  on;  and  you  might  as 
well  call  on  the  prosecution  to  prove  the  presence, 
shape,  and  color  of  his  Majesty  as  to  call  upon  the 
managers  in  impeachment  to  prove  intention.  No 
corrupt  or  wicked  motive  need  instigate  the  acts  for 
which  impeachment  is  brought.  It  is  enough  that 
they  were  official  violations  of  law." 

The  President  had  not  the  same  right  of  removal 
that  former  Presidents  had,  since  a  law  had  been 
passed  by  Congress,  after  a  stubborn  controversy  with 
the  Executive,  denying  that  right  and  prohibiting  it  in 
future,  after  the  President  had  made  issue  on  its 
constitutionality,  and  been  defeated.  Did  he  "  take 
care  that  this  law  should  be  faithfully"  executed? 
The  plea  of  the  President  that  he  had  removed 
Stanton  in  order  to  test  the  constitutionality  of  the 
Tenure  of  Office  Law  was  not  valid.  That  had  been 
tested  and  decided  by  votes,  twice  given,  of  two- 

V thirds  of  the  Senators  and  Representatives  in  Con 
gress.  It  was  a  law.  ^No  case  had  arisen  to  require 
judicial  interposition.  /"  Instead  of  enforcing  the 
law  he  takes  advantage  of  the  name  and  funds  of 
the  United  States  to  resist  it,  and  to  seduce  others  to 
resist  it.  He  sought  to  induce  the  General  in  Chief  of 
the  army  to  aid  him  in  an  open  avowed  obstruction 
of  the  law  as  it  stood  unrepealed  upon  the  statute 
books.  A  plain  recital  of  the  facts  that  are  unde- 
nied  is  sufficient  to  prove  this  contention.  The  un 
happy  man  is  in  this  condition.  He  has  declared 


IMPEACHMENT  513 

himself  determined  to  obstruct  that  act;  he  has,  by 
two  several  letters  of  authority,  ordered  Lorenzo 
Thomas  to  violate  that  law. —  He  must  therefore 
either  deny  his  own  solemn  declarations  and  falsify 
the  testimony  of  General  Grant  and  Lorenzo  Thomas, 
or  expect  that  verdict  whose  least  punishment  is  re 
moval  from  office." 

Referring  to  the  angry  correspondence  between 
Grant  and  Johnson,  he  said  that  it  was  immaterial 
which  of  these  gentlemen  had  lost  his  memory  or  told 
the  truth  "  though  who  can  hesitate  to  choose  be 
tween  the  words  of  a  gallant  soldier  and  the  petti 
fogging  of  a  political  trickster?  The  charge  is  that 
the  President  did  attempt  to  prevent  the  due  execution 
of  the  Tenure  of  Office  Law  by  entangling  the  Gen 
eral  in  the  arrangement;  and  unless  both  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  General  have  lost  their  memory  and  mis 
taken  the  truth  with  regard  to  the  promises  with  each 
other,  then  this  charge  is  made  out." 

The  President's  plea  that  he  might  disregard  the 
law  because  of  its  unconstitutionally  could  not  hold. 
Could  he  expect  "  a  sufficient  number  of  his  tryers  to 
pronounce  that  law  unconstitutional  and  void, —  those 
same  tryers  having  passed  upon  its  validity  on  sev 
eral  occasions  "  ? 

Discussing  the  charge  of  usurpation  brought 
against  the  President,  Stevens  brought  forward  his 
conquered  province  theory,  that  the  conquerors  in  the 
war  might  deal  with  the  vanquished  as  to  them  might 
seem  good,  subject  only  to  the  laws  of  humanity, — 
"  a  doctrine  as  old  as  a  Grotius  and  as  fresh  as  the 
Dorr  Rebellion.  Neither  the  President  nor  the 


514      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Judiciary  had  any  right  to  interfere,  to  dictate  any 
terms,  or  to  aid  in  reconstruction  further  than  they 
were  directed  by  the  sovereign  power,  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States.  Whoever,  besides  Congress, 
undertakes  to  creat  new  states  or  to  rebuild  old  ones, 
and  fix  the  condition  of  their  citizenship  and  union, 
usurps  powers  which  do  not  belong  to  him,  and  is 
dangerous  according  to  the  extent  of  his  power  and 
his  pretensions.  Andrew  Johnson  did  usurp  the 
legislative  power  of  the  nation  by  building  new 
states  and  reconstructing  this  empire.  He  directed 
the  defunct  states  to  come  forth  and  live  by  virtue  of 
his  breathing  into  them  the  breath  of  life.  He  told 
theni  what  constitutions  to  form;  fixed  the  qualifica 
tions  of  voters  and  office-holders;  directed  them  to 
send  forward  members  of  Congress  and  to  aid  him  in 
representing  the  nation.  When  Congress  declared 
these  doings  unconstitutional  and  fixed  a  mode  for 
the  admission  of  this  new  territory  into  the  nation, 
he  proclaimed  it  unconstitutional  and  advised  the  peo 
ple  not  to  submit  to  it  nor  obey  the  commands  of 
Congress.  This  seemed  to  Stevens  the  vital  phase 
and  real  purpose  of  all  of  the  President's  misdemean 
ors.  The  nation  had  been  in  conflict;  the  mutineers 
had  laid  down  their  arms;  the  laws  were  about  to  re 
gain  their  accustomed  sway;  old  institutions  were 
about  to  be  reinstated  on  principles  satisfactory  to 
the  conquerors,  when  "  one  of  their  inferior  serv 
ants,  instigated  by  unholy  ambition,  sought  to  seize 
a  portion  of  the  territory  according  to  the  fashion 
of  neighboring  anarchies,  and  to  convert  a  land  of 
freedom  into  a  land  of  slaves.  The  people  spurned 


IMPEACHMENT  515 

the  traitors  and  have  put  the  chief  of  them  upon 
trial  and  demand  judgment  upon  his  misconduct.  He 
will  be  condemned  and  his  sentence  inflicted  without 
turmoil,  tumult,  or  bloodshed,  and  the  nation  will  con-  X 

tinue  its  accustomed  course  of  freedom  and 
prosperity." 

The  President  was  bound  to  execute  the  laws,  not 
to  obstruct  them,  nor  advise  their  infraction.  ''  Who 
was  grieved  by  the  Tenure  of  Office  Bill  that  he  was 
authorized  to  use  the  name  and  the  funds  of  the 
government  to  relieve? 

"If  he  were  not  willing  to  execute  the  laws  passed 
by  the  American  Congress  and  unrepealed,  let  him  re 
sign  the  office  which  was  thrown  upon  him  by  a  hor 
rible  convulsion  and  retire  to  his  village  obscurity. 
Let  him  not  be  so  swollen  by  pride  and  arrogance, 
which  sprang  from  the  deep  misfortune  of  this  coun 
try,  as  to  attempt  an  entire  revolution  of  its  internal 
machinery,  and  the  disgrace  of  the  trusted  servants 

of  his  lamented  predecessor."  * 

* 

It  appears  from  Stevens'  speech  that  he  expected  a 
verdict  for  conviction.  This  is  not  surprising  as  more 
than  two-thirds  of  the  Senators  had  gone  on  record 
condemning  Johnson  for  his  removal  of  Stanton. 
Few  expected  that  so  many  Republicans  would  break 
away  from  their  party  to  vote  for  acquittal.2  On  the 

1  Trial,  April  27,  1868,  Supplement  to  the  Cong.  Globe. 

2  Greeley    wrote   to    Stevens    under   date   of    April    20,    1868: 
"  Keep  us  posted  in  the  Tribune  office.     I  do  not  fear  the  ver 
dict,  but  I  greatly  desire  to  make  the  majority  on  the  first  vote 
as  strong  as  possible."     No  doubt  the  Republican  Senators  who 
voted  for  acquittal  disappointed  the  public  expectation  and  de 
sire  and  went  counter  to  an  overwhelming  party  opinion.     One 
of  Stevens'  correspondents  expressed  the  prevailing  party  opin 
ion  when  he   said  that  these  Johnson   Senators   had  "made  a 


5i6     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

test  vote,  on  the  eleventh  article,  seven  Republican 
Senators  supported  the  President,  thirty-five  Senators 
voting  for  conviction,  nineteen  for  acquittal.  The 
President  had  escaped  by  a  margin  of  one  vote.  On 
two  subsequent  votes  the  prosecution  could  muster 
no  greater  strength,  and  on  May  26,  1868,  the  Senate 
as  a  Court  of  Impeachment  adjourned  to  meet  no 
more. 

No  doubt  the  result  of  the  impeachment  trial  was  a 
bitter  disappointment  to  Stevens.  It  was  his  sincere 
conviction  that  the  welfare  of  his  country  demanded 
the  removal  of  the  President  and  that  Johnson  richly 
deserved  the  degradation.  He  felt  that  a  great  op 
portunity  had  been  lost  to  lay  down  the  true  law  and 
principles  of  impeachment,  and  that  improper  mo 
tives  and  influences  had  operated  to  save  Johnson 
from  the  fate  that  an  injured  people  wished  to  have 
imposed  upon  him. 

A  few  weeks  after  the  close  of  the  trial,  July  7, 
1868,  Stevens  proposed  in  the  House  some  supple 
mentary  articles  of  impeachment,  not  with  a  view  to 
bringing  them  to  a  vote  but  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
himself  an  opportunity  to  review  the  trial  and  to  set 
forth  what  he  considered  the  true  principles  of  im 
peachment. 

On  the  one  hand,  he  would  not  allow  political  of 
fenders  to  escape  for  abusing  their  high  trust,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  would  not  allow  heated  and  malig 
nant  demagogues  to  persecute  political  opponents  and 
rivals  in  a  spirit  of  hatred  and  vengeance. 

record  for  themselves  that  they  and  their  posterity  will  forever 
blush  to  see." 


IMPEACHMENT  517 

Instead  of  assenting  to  the  idea  that  impeachment 
can  only  be  instituted  where  there  is  an  indictable 
offense,  he  contended  that  impeachment  could  be  had 
mainly  for  political  offenses,  to  punish  malfeasance 
in  office  and  to  save  the  country  from  injury. 
Wickedness  of  heart  or  malice  aforethought  it  is  not 
necessary  to  prove.  The  President  may  believe  that 
"  a  certain  course  of  conduct  tends  to  the  good  of  his 
administration  and  the  country.  He  is  warned  by  his 
advisers  and  by  the  legislative  branch  that  he  is  mis 
taken  and  must  desist.  He  reconsiders  it  and  per 
sists  under  the  conscientious  belief  that  he  is  right  and 
his  advisers  wrong. 

"  Here  is  no  indictable  offense.  Yet  if  there  be 
large  interests  at  stake  intrusted  to  his  care  he  may 
be  crushing  the  life  of  the  nation  while  he  believes 
himself  but  doing  his  duty.  How  can  any  man  pre 
tend  that  such  acts  as  these,  which  are  destroying  the 
welfare  of  a  whole  people,  and  are  persevered  in  after 
repeated  warnings,  do  not  constitute  impeachable  of 
fenses,  although  not  indictable  ones?" 

He  appealed  to  authority,  to  Story,  Rawle,  Madi 
son,  Hamilton,  May,  and  Curtis.  Madison  "  the  fa 
ther  of  the  Constitution,"  had  said  that  arbitrary  re 
movals  for  party  purpose  would  be  an  impeachable 
offense.  Johnson  had  certainly  been  guilty  of  this 
offense.  By  this  process  the  President  had  attempted 
to  corrupt  and  bribe  citizens  of  the  United  States  and 
members  of  Congress  who  were  at  the  capital  ready 
to  discharge  their  duty. 

He  reviewed  the  political  misconduct  of  Johnson. 
He  charged  him  with  trying  to  bribe  the  Senators  of 


518      THE  LIFE  OF]  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  proposed  new  state  of  Colorado,  agreeing  to  sign 
the  bill  for  admission  if  they  would  support  his  policy 
in  the  Senate;  with  pardoning  deserters  from  the 
United  States  army  if  they  would  cast  their  votes  for 
partisans  of  the  President, —  the  pardon  being  urged 
upon  that  ground  alone;  with  other  abuses  of  the 
pardoning  power ;  with  embezzling,  or  allowing  others 
to  embezzle  the  public  property;  with  allowing  the 
confiscation  laws  to  be  inoperative,  thereby  restoring, 
to  the  special  disgust  of  Stevens,  "  confiscated  and 
abandoned  estates  to  their  rich  rebel  owner," — estates 
which  in  the  aggregate  would  be  sufficient  to  pay  the 
national  debt. 

Had  the  President  not  been  guilty  of  official  per 
jury  this  bonded  debt,  which  is  now  a  lien  on  every 
man's  property,  would  have  been  paid  out  of  the  con 
fiscated  funds  of  rebels.  Instead,  he  preferred  to 
pardon  them  and  restore  their  property. 

He  intimated  that  the  temptations  of  gold  had  been 
too  much  for  those  in  the  seats  of  power,  and  re 
flection  had  brought  him  to  the  conclusion  that  in 
neither  Europe  nor  America  will  the  chief  executive 
of  a  nation  be  again  removed  by  peaceful  means. 
Money  and  patronage  are  found  stronger  than  the 
law  and  impenetrable  to  the  spear  of  justice.  "If 
tyranny  becomes  intolerable,  the  only  resource  will  be 
found  in  the  dagger  of  Brutus.  God  grant  that  it 
may  never  be  used !  " 

He  recognized  that  this  would  seem  like  "  the  ar 
gument  of  spleen  emitted  by  disappointment  at  re 
cent  events."  He  admitted  that  some  of  these  events 


IMPEACHMENT  519 

had  led  him  to  reflect  deeply  upon  the  possibilities  of 
the  human  heart,  being  led  to  conclude  that  the  lofti 
est  intellect,  the  most  cultivated  mind,  and  the  most 
aspiring  ambition  is  just  as  liable  to  be  purchased  with 
gold  as  those  in  most  limited  circumstances.  Indeed 
the  less  cultivated  mind,  "  who  sails  lower  in  his 
sphere  of  hopes  and  desires,  may  be  harder  to  mislead 
from  the  path  of  virtue,"  while  the  cultivated  intellect 
may  be  the  nest  of  "  malignity,  corruption,  and  de 
pravity." 

He  desired  that  the  people  should  be  able  to  punish 
their  delinquent  rulers  and  that  the  government 
should  never  be  allowed  to  depart  from  the  principles 
of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  especially  from 
the  inalienable  rights  of  life,  liberty  and  its  necessary 
concomitant,  universal  suffrage.  "  Providence,"  he 
said,  "  has  placed  us  in  a  political  Eden.  While  na 
ture  has  given  us  every  advantage  of  soil,  climate,  and 
geographical  position,  man  still  is  vile.  But  such 
large  steps  have  lately  been  taken  in  the  true  direc 
tion  that  the  patriot  has  a  right  to  take  courage." 

Stevens  closed  this  speech  in  certain  knowledge  of 
the  fact  that  he  was  standing  upon  the  verge  of  the 
grave.  He  knew  well  that  he  had  but  few  more  days 
to  live.  His  words  came,  therefore,  as  his  last  for 
mal  message  to  his  countrymen  whom  he  had  served 
so  long,  and  to  the  House  which  his  masterful  spirit 
had  led  for  so  many  years.  His  vision  and  last  wish 
for  his  country  was  that  it  should  rise  from  its  great 
civil  strife,  from  the  wrong,  oppression,  and  injustice 
that  power  and  wealth  had  imposed,  to  be  a  great  and 


520      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

prosperous  nation  ruled  by  the  spirit  of  fundamental 
democracy, —  the  democracy  that  had  been  the  ruling 
passion  in  his  own  long  public  life. 

"  My  sands  are  nearly  run/'  he  said  in  his  parting 
words,  "  and  I  can  only  see  with  the  eye  of  faith.  I 
am  fast  descending  the  down  hill  of  life,  at  the  foot  of 
which  stands  an  open  grave.  But  you,  sir,  are  prom 
ised  length  of  days  and  a  brilliant  career.  If  you 
and  your  compeers  can  fling  away  ambition  and  real 
ize  that  every  human  being,  however  lowly  born  or 
degraded  by  fortune,  is  your  equal ;  that  every  inalien 
able  right  that  belongs  to  you  belongs  also  to  him, 
truth  and  righteousness  will  spread  over  the  land,  and 
you  will  look  down  from  the  top  of  the  Rocky  Moun 
tains  upon  an  empire  of  one  hundred  millions  of 
happy  people." 

1  July  7,  1868,  Globe,  p.  3790. 


CHAPTER  XX 

CONFISCATION 

/"T"VHERE  was  one  aspect  of  Stevens'  policy  in  re- 
•*•  construction  that  did  not  at  the  time  meet  with 
the  sanction  of  the  nation,  and  it  has  certainly  been 
condemned  by  posterity.  I  refer  to  the  policy  which 
he  repeatedly  urged  of  the  confiscation  of  the  estates 
of  ex-Confederates  as  a  war  indemnity.  A  few  \vords 
are  necessary  to  present  this  aspect  of  Stevens'  career. 

Stevens  made  three  notable  speeches  to  urge  upon 
the  country  the  policy  of  confiscation,  one  in  the 
House  in  the  spring  of  1865,  one  at  Lancaster,  Sep 
tember  8,  1865,  before  the  break  with  Johnson  but 
after  the  latter's  policy  on  reconstruction  had  been 
pretty  well  developed,  and  again  in  the  House,  March 
19,  1867,  in  an  attempt  to  impose  a  form  of  confisca 
tion  as  an  addition  to  the  terms  Congress  had  just 
laid  down  in  the  Military  Bill. 

He  believed  that  the  property  of  the  Confederate 
leaders  should  be  seized  and  applied  to  the  payment 
of  the  war  debt  and  to  the  pensioning  of  Union  sol 
diers.  He  looked  to  this  as  a  belligerent  right  of 
the  nation  in  war. 

He  believed  that  the  Confederate  States,  being  a 
belligerent,  and  having  caused  an  unjust  war  and 
staked  their  fate  upon  it,  would  be  but  suffering, 

521 


522      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

by  confiscation,  what  many  other  and  more  innocent 
belligerents  under  defeat  had  suffered  before. 

He  did  not  at  any  time  contend  for  a  universal  and 
general  confiscation,  and  he  repeatedly  raised  his 
voice  in  opposition  to  the  popular  desire  for  the  capital 
punishment  of  the  Confederates.  He  was  not  a  man 
of  blood,  fond  of  sanguinary  punishments,  though, 
in  common  with  nearly  every  one  at  the  close  of  the 
war,  he  expected  a  few  victims  should  propitiate  the 
wrath  of  the  victorious  nation,  in  view,  as  Stevens 
put  it,  "of  our  starved,  murdered  and  slaughtered 
martyrs."  But  he  sought,  rather,  political  punish 
ments  for  political  crimes.  When,  after  the  assassi 
nation  of  Lincoln,  Jefferson  Davis  and  other  South 
ern  leaders  were  accused  of  complicity  in  that  insane 
act,  Stevens  uttered  a  quick  and  complete  disclaimer 
of  such  a  belief.  He  said,  "  I  know  these  men,  and 
they  are  not  capable  of  such  a  deed."  He  appre 
ciated  the  Southern  sense  of  honor  and  manhood;  and 
while  they  had,  as  he  thought,  committed  great  politi 
cal  crimes  for  which  they  should  be  punished,  they 
were  not  capable  of  the  monstrous  and  cowardly 
crime  of  assassination.  He  repeatedly  urged  re 
straint  against  any  scheme  of  bloody  assizes  or  judi 
cial  murders.  He  recognized  the  fact  that  trials  for 
treason  should  not  be  held  by  courts  martial;  that 
would  be  a  stretch  of  public  law.  He  saw  that  South 
erners  would  not  be  convicted  of  treason  by  impartial 
juries,  as  that  would  have  to  be  done  in  the  district  in 
which  the  overt  act  was  committed.  A  jury  might 
be  packed  to  convict,  but  that  would  not  be  an  impar 
tial  trial;  it  would  be  judicial  murder,  an  act  which 


CONFISCATION  523 

Stevens  said  would  rank  in  infamy  with  the  trial  of 
Lord  Russell.  The  same  difficulties  would  arise  in 
trials  for  forfeiture,  as  there  could  be  no  bills  of  at 
tainder.  Therefore,  if  there  were  to  be  punishments 
which  the  voice  of  the  nation  so  generally  demanded, 
Stevens  claimed  that  his  plan  of  confiscation  was  the 
most  feasible  and  effective.1 

He  was  not  asking  the  penalty  of  death  on  any. 
In  principle  he  was  rather  opposed  to  capital  punish 
ments.  In  December,  1866,  he  opposed  a  bill  brought 
in  by  the  Judiciary  Committee  of  the  House  repealing 
the  statute  of  limitations  and  providing  that  all  per 
sons  guilty  of  treason  might  be  tried  at  any  time  for 
the  crime.  This,  to  Stevens,  was  too  much  like  judi 
cial  murder,  and  while  he  knew  that  no  Confederate 
could  be  convicted  of  treason,  he  would  rather  "let 
every  man  of  them  run  unpunished  forever  than  to 
make  a  law  now  by  which  they  could  be  punished." 
"  By  such  a  measure,"  he  said,  "  our  government 
would  be  endangered  in  its  future  existence,  in  its 
sense  of  justice,  in  its  character  before  the  world." 
So  many  were  engaged  in  treason  and  rebellion  that 
"  there  must  be  some  quieting  law."  2 

No  one  wished  more  than  Stevens  that  bloodshed 
might  cease  with  the  war.  In  early  life  he  had 
adopted  a  doctrine  of  milder  punishments.  In  seek 
ing  the  punishment  of  confiscation  he  sought  thereby 
to  bring  about  the  degradation  from  social  rank  and 
political  power  of  the  rich  and  powerful  leaders  of 
the  Rebellion.  These  "  higher-ups  "  were  the  respon- 

1  Speech  at  Lancaster,   Sept.  8,   1865. 

2  McCall,  pp.  287-288. 


524      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

sible  and  guilty  ones.  He  always  contended  that  the 
great  body  of  the  Southern  people  ought  to  be  ex 
cused  from  all  penalties  of  the  war  which  guilt  in 
flicted;  only  the  culpable  leaders  should  be  punished, 
and  that,  not  by  death,  but  by  fines  and  confiscations. 

His  doctrine  was  that  when  two  nations  go  to  war 
to  settle  a  dispute,  where  each  considers  himself  right, 
and  the  one  nation  conquers  the  other,  the.,  conqueror 
has  the  right  to  prescribe  the  terms  of  peace,  impose 
the  burdens  of  confiscation  not  exceeding  the  usages 
of  modern  civilization,  and  uniformly  compel  the  de 
feated  belligerent  in  an  unjust  war  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  war  and  the  damages  it  inflicted. 

The  South  had  proclaimed  and  maintained  a  well 
organized  government  whose  stability  depended  upon 
the  relative  strength  of  the  two  nations  at  war  with 
each  other, —  for  nations  they  were,  for  all  purposes 
of  belligerent  rights  and  liabilities,  so  long  as  either 
remained  unconquered.  The  South's  claim  was  inde 
pendence.  "  Whether  we  ignore  their  pretensions  it  is 
clear  our  Southern  malefactors  could  not,"  said 
Stevens.  Prussia  had  just  made  Austria  pay 
$45,000,000  toward  the  expenses  of  a  war  that  had 
lasted  less  than  a  month.1 

The  confiscation  Stevens  favored  was  the  same  in 
principle  that  had  been  pursued  during  the  war,  the 
same  as  that  announced  by  the  Act  of  1862.  That 
was  enacted  as  a  means  of  carrying  on  the  war  and 
as  a  deterrent  to  rebellion;  this  was  proposed  as  a 

1 A  few  years  later  he  could  have  adduced  a  more  forcible 
illustration  in  the  tremendous  war  indemnity  imposed  by  Ger 
many  upon  France,  1871. 


CONFISCATION  525 

means  of  paying  for  the  war  and  as  a  punishment  for 
offenses  committed.  The  principle  of  belligerency, 
—  the  basis  of  the  policy, —  was  the  same  in  each  case. 
The  Act  of  1862  was  designed  not  as  a  forfeiture  of 
the  property  of  rebels  under  common  law,  but  as  the 
seizure  of  the  enemy's  property  and  its  appropriation 
to  the  expenses  and  damages  of  the  war.  Stevens 
wished  that  policy  to  be  continued  till  it  had  ac 
complished  its  purpose.  This  was  the  extent  of  his 
"  cruel  disposition."  He  claimed  to  be  asking  only 
one-fourth  part  of  the  debt  inflicted,  nor  would  he 
touch  the  poor  and  ignorant.  It  was  the  pride  of  the 
"  nabobs  "  he  was  after,  such  as  "  the  few  rich  about 
Charleston  whose  millions,"  he  asserted,  "  had  been 
earned  by  running  the  blockade,  and  whose  heads 
reached  the  stars  while  their  feet  were  trampling 
upon  freemen  and  freedom." 

Stevens  insisted  upon  this  policy  as  a  means  of  re 
forming  Southern  society.  He  believed  that  the 
foundations  of  Southern  institutions,  political,  mu 
nicipal,  and  social,  should  be  broken  up  and  relaid,  or 
"  all  our  blood  and  treasure  have  been  spent  in  vain." 
This  could  only  be  done  by  holding  the  South  as  a 
conquered  people,  completely  within  the  power  of 
Congress. 

Since  he  wished  to  exempt  the  poor,  and  punish 
only  the  rich,  who  were  the  culpable  leaders,  and  thus 
to  reconstitute  society,  he^proposed  to  confiscate  only 
the  estates  of  those  whose  lands  exceeded  200  acres 
or  were  worth  $10,000.  The  poor,  ignorant,  and  co 
erced  should  be  forgiven,  since  they  had  merely  fol 
lowed  the  example  and  teachings  of  their  wealthy 


526      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

and  intelligent  neighbors.  The  Rebellion  would  not 
have  originated  with  them.  Nine-tenths  would  thus 
escape  all  penalty.  He  estimated  that  about  70,000 
persons  owned  about  200  acres  each,  leaving  71,000,- 
ooo  acres  to  all  others.  There  were  294,000,000  acres 
of  land  in  all.  Use  40,000,000  to  give  40  acres  to 
each  adult  freedman.  Sell  the  rest  to  the  highest 
bidder  at  a  price  that  would  certainly  net  $10  per 
acre,  including  town  property.  The  total  financial  re 
turn  would  be  $3,540,000,000.  Let  this  be  applied  as 
follows : 

1.  Invest  $300,000,000  in  six  per  cent,  government 
bonds,  adding  the  semiannual  interest  to  the  pensions 
of  those  maimed  by  the  war. 

2.  Apply  $200,000,000  for  damages  to  loyal  men 
North  and  South  from  rebel  raids  and  seizures. 

3.  Pay  the  residue,  more  than  $3,000,000,000  on 
the  war  debt. 

Speaking  before  his  people  at  home  in  his  impas 
sioned  plea  for  this  scheme  of  ruin  to  Southern 
wealth-holders,  Stevens  said: 

"Who  can  object?  Is  it  not  just?  Look  around  and  see 
the  men  with  one  leg,  one  arm,  one  eye,  carried  away  by 
rebel  bullets,  or  others  wearing  the  weeds  of  mourning  for 
those  sacrificed  by  rebel  perfidy  and  ask  if  too  much  is  re 
quired.  In  ordinary  transactions  he  who  raises  a  false 
clamor  or  institutes  an  unfounded  suit  is  required  to  pay 
the  cost  of  his  defeat.  How  much  more  should  this  well- 
recognized  principle  of  law  apply  in  such  a  case  as  this ! 
Those  who  have  more  sympathy  with  the  wives  and  children 
of  rebels  than  with  those  of  loyal  men  say  that  this  strip 
ping  rebels  of  their  estates  and  driving  them  to  exile  or 
honest  labor  would  be  harsh  and  severe  upon  innocent 


CONFISCATION  527 

women  and  children.     It  may  be  so,  but  that  is  the  result 
of  the  necessary  laws  of  war. 

"  They  say  it  is  revolution.  No  doubt  it  would  work  a 
radical  reorganization  in  Southern  institutions,  habits,  and 
manners.  It  is  intended  to  revolutionize  their  principles  and 
feelings.  This  may  startle  feeble  minds  and  shake  weak 
nerves.  So  do  all  great  improvements  in  the  political  and 
moral  world.  It  requires  a  heavy  impetus  to  drive  forward 
a  sluggish  people.  When  it  was  first  proposed  to  free  the 
slaves  and  arm  the  blacks,  did  not  half  the  nation  tremble? 
The  prim  conservatives,  the  snobs,  and  the  male  waiting- 
maids  were  in  hysterics.  Heretofore  Southern  society  has 
had  more  the  features  of  aristocracy  than  democracy.  The 
Southern  States  have  been  despotisms.  It  is  impossible  that 
any  practical  equality  of  rights  can  exist  where  a  few  thou 
sand  men  monopolize  the  whole  landed  property.  The 
larger  the  number  of  small  proprietors  the  more  safe  and 
stable  the  government.  As  the  landed  interest  must  govern, 
the  more  it  is  subdivided  and  held  by  independent  owners  the 
better.  How  can  republican  institutions,  free  schools,  free 
churches,  free  social  intercourse,  exist  in  a  mingled  com 
munity  of  nabobs  and  serfs,  of  owners  of  twenty-thousand- 
acre  manors,  with  lordly  palaces,  and  the  occupants  of  narrow 
huts  inhabited  by  low  white  trash?  If  the  South  is  ever  to 
be  made  a  safe  republic  let  her  land  be  cultivated  by  the 
toil  of  its  owners,  or  the  free  labor  of  intelligent  citizens. 
This  must  be  done,  even  though  it  drive  her  nobility  to 
exile.  The  owner  of  ten  thousand  acres  who  drives  his 
coach-and-four  feels  degraded  by  sitting  at  the  same  table 
or  in  the  same  pew  with  the  embrowned  and  hard-handed 
farmer  who  has  himself  cultivated  his  own  thriving  home 
stead  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  acres.  This  subdivision  of 
lands  will  yield  ten  bales  of  cotton  to  one  that  is  made  now 
and  he  who  produces  it  will  own  it  and  feel  himself  a  man. 
Let  us  add  this  plank  to  our  platform:  The  property  of 
the  rebels  shall  pay  our  national  debt  and  indemnify  freed- 
inen  and  loyal  sufferers,  and  under  no  circumstances 
shall  we  allow  the  national  debt  to  be  repudiated.  Let  all 


528      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

who  approve  these  principles  rally  with  us.  Let  all  others 
go  with  Copperheads  and  rebels.  Those  will  be  the  oppos 
ing  parties.  Young  men,  this  duty  devolves  on  you. 
Would  to  God,  if  only  for  that,  that  I  were  still  in  the  prime 
of  life  that  I  might  aid  you  to  fight  through  this  last  and 
greatest  battle  of  freedom."  i 

To  the  need  and  wisdom  of  this  policy  Stevens  fre 
quently  called  public  attention,  as  these  pages  show. 
In  March,  1867,  after  the  reconstruction  measures 
were  passed,  he  introduced  a  formal  bill  to  enact  his 
policy  into  law.  His  bill  involved  essentially  the 
scheme  outlined  in  this  Lancaster  speech  of  1865,  ex 
cept  that  all  estates  above  five  thousand  dollars  instead 
of  ten  thousand  dollars  were  to  be  subject  to  the  pen 
alty.  He  defended  his  measure  in  a  prepared  speech. 
He  would  make  an  issue  before  the  American  people 
on  the  punishment  of  traitors,  "  a  matter  that  had  been 
wholly  ignored  by  a  treacherous  Executive  and  a  slug 
gish  Congress,"  to  see  if  they  "  will  sanction  perfect 
impunity  for  murderous  belligerents  and  consent  that 
loyal  men  who  have  been  despoiled  of  their  property 
shall  go  without  compensation/'  To  that  issue  he  was 
ready  to  devote  the  small  remnant  of  his  life. 

He  dwelt  on  the  cruelties  of  the  war,  on  the  con 
dition  of  the  injured  and  the  destitute,  and  on  the 
great  crime  of  making  war  on  the  republic.  He  was 
ready  to  share  with  the  President  the  credit  of  this 
policy.  The  President  had  favored  it  "  while  he  was 
clothed  and  in  his  right  mind,  but  Seward  had  en 
tered  into  him  and  ever  since  they  have  been  running 
down  steep  places  into  the  sea."  He  quoted  John- 

1  Speech  at  Lancaster,  Pa.,  Sept.  9,  1865. 


CONFISCATION  529 

son  in  favor  of  punishing  traitors,  seizing  their  plan 
tations  and  selling  them  to  honest  men.  "Let  there 
be  no  protection  to  traitors,"  Johnson  had  said  in 
1864,  "  while  the  poor  man  stands  out  in  the  cold/1 
So  Stevens  claimed  that  he  was  but  following  the 
teachings  of  Johnson. 

"  This  bill,"  said  Stevens,  "  is  condemned  only  by 
the  criminals  and  their  friends  and  by  unmanly  men 
whose  intellectual  and  moral  vigor  has  melted  into  a 
fluid  weakness  which  they  mistake  for  mercy  and 
which  is  untempered  by  a  single  grain  of  justice,  and 
by  those  religionists  who  mistake  meanness  for 
Christianity  and  who  forget  that  the  essence  of  re 
ligion  is  to  do  unto  others  what  others  have  a  right 
to  expect  from  you."  He  wanted  no  mawkish 
prating  about  the  fatted  calf  and  the  prodigal  son, 
whose  offense  was  venial  compared  with  "  this  mur 
derous  Rebellion  which  deserved  the  divine  penalty  im 
posed  upon  Cain !  " 

He  insisted  on  the  right  of  the  victor  to  an  in 
demnity  to  the  full  expense  of  the  war.  The  bill  was 
therefore  merciful,  asking,  as  it  did,  for  less  than  a 
tenth  of  our  just  claims.  Safety  requires  stern  jus 
tice,  and  it  was  but  just  on  the  basis  of  lawful  earn 
ings  that  the  unrequited  toil  of  ages,  by  which  the 
slaves  'had  earned  the  land  for  their  masters,  should 
at  last  be  rewarded  by  homesteads  for  the  poor.  "If 
we  refuse  this  downtrodden  race  the  rights  which 
Heaven  has  decreed  them  and  the  remuneration  they 
have  earned  through  long  years  of  oppression,  how 
can  we  hope  to  escape  still  further  punishment  if 
God  is  just?  The  plague  will  .come.  Seek  not  to  cli- 


530      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

vert  our  attention  from  justice  by  a  puerile  cry  about 
fatted  calves!"1 

It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  Stevens  stood  alone 
in  advocating  this  policy.  Sumner,  Wendell  Phillips, 
and  the  radicals  all  favored  it.  The  American  Anti- 
Slavery  Society  in  one  of  its  last  meetings  declared 
for  it.  The  Southern  Unionists  greeted  the  proposal 
with  enthusiasm  and  were  its  persistent  friends.  The 
independent  Republican  journals  of  the  North  treated 
it  with  respect.  George  William  Curtis  in  Harper's 
Weekly  called  it  "  a  mild  confiscation,"  by  no  means 
"  a  frantic  act  of  vengeance,"  as  it  had  been  called. 
The  genial  Curtis,  the  gentleman  and  the  scholar, 
is  never  thought  of  as  "  vindictive  "  or  "  implacable," 
yet  he  gave  a  large  measure  of  endorsement  to 
Stevens'  proposal,  by  urging  that  the  freedmen  and 
poor  laborers,  without  land,  were  every  day  dependent 
upon  landholders,  and  that  if  they  should  refuse  this 
policy  they  would  surpass  in  self-restraint  and  honesty 
any  landless  class  in  history.  To  punish  the  disloyal 
and  to  enable  the  new  landless  citizens  to  obtain  land, 
"  may  be  inexpedient  under  the  circumstances,  but  to 
call  it  vindictive  or  to  suppose  it  has  no  defensible 
reason  is  absurd."  2  The  Nation  thought  it  too  late 
to  carry  such  a  policy  in  1867,  though  that  journal 
approved  the  policy  as  reasonable  for  1865.  Now 
after  two  years  of  peace  when  it  was  seen  that  no 
one  would  be  punished  for  the  Rebellion,  such  a  policy 
"  could  only  breed  heart  burning  and  hatred  which 
centuries  of  good  government  could  not  wipe  out. "(3 

1  Speech,  Cong.  Globe,  March  19,  1867. 
-Harper's  Weekly,  May  18,  1867. 
3  Nation,  May  2,  1867. 


CONFISCATION  531 

Stevens'  policy  could  not  be  carried  out  because 
the  country  was  ready  to  accept  the  reconstruction 
measures  as  final  and  to  feel  that  in  them  enough  had 
been  enacted.  Reverdy  Johnson,  of  Maryland,  repre 
senting  Democratic  conservative  opinion  in  the  border 
South,  accepted  these  measures  as  a  means  of  allaying 
sectional  strife  and  to  prevent  additional  and  more 
drastic  terms.  If  it  had  been  made  to  appear  that 
the  South  was  determined  to  defeat  the  reconstruc 
tion  acts  as  it  had  the  fourteenth  amendment,  and  to 
prevent  the  establishment  and  operation  of  state  gov 
ernments  on  the  basis  of  equal  rights  for  the  freedmen, 
it  is  not  unlikely  that  Stevens  could  have  rallied  Con 
gress  and  the  country  to  his  policy  of  confiscation. 

Stevens'  detractors  have  charged  that  behind  this 
policy  was  the  mean  and  selfish  motive  of  compensa 
ting  himself  for  damages  inflicted  on  his  property 
during  Confederate  raids  and  invasions  into  Pennsyl 
vania.  Stevens  was  used  to  such  charges  and  was 
unmoved  by  them.  It  does  not  appear  that  he  ever 
answered  this  one  in  public.  He  despised  the  men 
who  uttered  it.  He  was,  indeed,  a  considerable  loser 
by  the  war.  In  a  private  letter  of  July  n,  1863,  ^e 
describes  his  losses.  He  says  the  rebels  were  led 
by  some  friend  to  his  place,  his  iron  works  at  Cale 
donia.  They  took  his  horses,  mules,  and  harness  and 
even  the  crippled  horses  that  were  running  at  large. 
They  seized  his  bacon  (about  four  thousand  pounds), 
molasses  and  other  contents  of  the  store;  took  about 
one  thousand  dollars'  worth  of  corn  in  the  mills  and 
as  much  other  grain.  They  burned  his  furnace,  saw 
mills,  two  forges,  and  the  rolling-mill.  They  slept  in 


532      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

the  office  and  store  room  and  next  day  they  burned 
them,  with  books  and  all.  They  even  hauled  off  his 
bar  iron,  being  on  the  road  convenient  for  shoeing 
horses,  and  his  wagons,  about  four  thousand  dollars' 
worth.  They  destroyed  all  his  fencing,  much  of  it 
new  and  extensive.  They  destroyed  his  grass,  about 
eighty  tons,  and  broke  in  the  windows  of  the  dwelling 
houses  where  his  workmen  lived.  "  They  could  not," 
he  concluded,  "  have  done  the  job  cleaner.  It  is 
rather  more  than  I  expected.  They  finally  expressed 
great  regret  that  they  were  not  so  fortunate  as  to  meet 
the  owner,  who  seems  to  be  very  popular  with  the 
chivalry.  I  know  not  what  the  poor  families  will  do ; 
I  must  provide  for  their  present  relief."  1 

Stevens  estimated  his  loss  at  about  ninety  thousand 
dollars,  about  the  savings  of  his  life.  He  recognized 
that  the  government  did  not  indemnify  for  such  losses 
and  he  never  expected  to  recover.  For  the  third  time 
he  was  reduced  to  comparative  poverty ;  yet  he  thought 
that  with  the  little  strength  remaining  to  him  he  would 
be  able  to  make  a  living.  He,  therefore,  refused  to  ac 
cept  a  proposal  from  some  of  his  friends  that  pro 
vision  should  be  made  for  his  declining  age.  It  is  not 
at  all  likely  that  he  would  have  put  in  a  claim  to  the 
government  if  his  scheme  of  confiscation  had  been 
carried.  He  cared  as  little  for  money  in  itself  as 
any  man  living.  "  I  think  I  have,"  he  said,  "  enough 
to  pay  my  debts.  As  to  my  personal  wants  nature 
will  soon  take  care  of  them.  We  must  all  expect  to 
suffer  by  this  wicked  war.  I  have  not  felt  a  mo 
ment's  trouble  for  my  share  of  it.  If  finally  the 

1  Stevens'  Papers,  Library  of  Congress,  July  II,  1863. 


CONFISCATION  533 

government  shall  be  reestablished  over  a  whole  ter 
ritory  and  not  a  vestige  of  slavery  be  left,  I  shall 
deem  it  a  cheap  purchase.  I  hope  to  be  able  with  my 
remaining  strength  to  sustain  myself  until  my 
strength  and  my  temporal  wants  shall  cease  to 
gether."  He  forbade  the  publication  of  these  letters, 
saying  that  he  did  "not  write  for  fame." 

It  will  be  readily  agreed  that  Stevens'  scheme  of 
confiscation,  after  the  war  had  long  since  ceased,  was 
not  a  statesmanlike  policy.  It  was  not  characterized 
by  generosity  nor  nobleness  of  spirit,  nor  was  it  cal 
culated  to  promote  peace,  prosperity  and  good  will 
in  a  restored  Union.  It  partook  of  the  implacable 
and  the  unforgiving,  and  showed  an  unwillingness 
to  be  reconciled  and  to  heal  the  wounds  of  war.  It 
disregarded  the  wisdom  of  experience  in  the  history 
of  human  governments, —  that  generous  amnesty  for 
political  crimes  against  a  government  whose  power  is 
undoubted  and  whose  authority  is  no  longer  contested, 
is  the  surest  guarantee  of  order  and  loyalty  among 
a  disaffected  citizenship.  But  Stevens,  like  all  public 
men,  must  be  judged  by  his  times.  In  holding  that 
the  leaders  and  promoters  of  the  Rebellion  were  crimi 
nals  who  ought  to  be  punished  for  their  crimes,  he- 
was  in  entire  accord  with  the  great  mass  of  the 
Northern  people,  and 'his  utterances  differed  from 
those  of  his  colleagues  and  contemporaries,  if  they 
differed  at  all,  only  in  force  and  intensity,  and  not 
at  all  in  spirit.  That  which  in  Stevens  has  come  to 
be  called  uncharitable  and  malignant  was  at  the 
time  regarded  only  as  a  hot  and  righteous  indignation 
1  Letter  of  July  6,  1863,  to  T.  Stevens. 


534      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

over  stupendous  wrongs  that  had  been  committed 
against  the  nation.  The  bitter  strife  of  those  times 
led  many  men  better  in  moral  nature  than  Stevens  to 
indulge  in  harsh  and  malevolent  utterances  while  they 
were  in  most  of  the  ordinary  relations  of  life,  as 
Stevens  was,  benevolent  in  spirit. 

In  personal  relations  among  his  associates  Stevens 
did  not  usually  manifest  the  implacable  spirit.  Ample 
testimony  may  be  gathered  from  the  good  people  of 
Lancaster  among  whom  he  spent  so  many  years,  to 
the  effect  that  in  the  relations  of  social  and  every-day 
life  few  men  were  more  generally  beloved  by  their 
friends  and  neighbors  than  was  Thaddeus  Stevens. 
He  was  likable,  not  only  among  his  partisans,  but 
even  among  many  whom  he  opposed  in  legal  and  po 
litical  contests;  and,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  Southern 
men,  in  many  instances,  found  him  personally  attrac 
tive  and  agreeable.  His  friend,  Judge  William  D. 
Kelly,  of  Pennsylvania,  said  of  him  that  personally 
"  he  was  incapable  of  a  vindictive  act."  His  policy 
toward  the  South  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  depths 
of  his  political  convictions  and  the  extent  to  which, 
intense  as  he  was  in  nature,  he  allowed  his  political 
opinions  and  passions  to  govern  his  attitude  and  con 
duct  toward  his  fellow  men.  Hard  in  heart  toward 
his  political  foes,  he  sought  to  encompass  their  punish 
ment,  but  his  thought  was  not  of  that  alone.  Pre 
tending  to  no  high  degree  of  morality  or  religion,  he 
claimed  to  be  governed  by  humane  and  strict  justice, 
-the  justice  that  would  give  equal  opportunities  for 
all.  He  looked  upon  his  policy  as  a  necessary  means 
to  breaking  up  the  system  of  land  monopoly  in  the 


CONFISCATION  535 

South  which  he  regarded  as  the  essential  support  of 
the  slavery  system  which  he  would  uproot  and  ob 
literate.  His  vision  of  a  true  republic  had  led  him 
to  see  that  wage-slavery  for  labor  was  but  little  better 
than  chattel  slavery.  He  would,  therefore,  take  power 
from  the  few  and  distribute  it  among  the  many  by 
breaking  down  the  landed  aristocracy  and  relieving  a 
landless  class, —  a  class  that  was  always  dangerous  to 
a  republic.1  His  policy  in  this  matter  as  in  all  others 
was  inspired  in  large  measure  by  his  democracy  and 
his  love  of  the  common  man. 

He  believed  that  justice  would  abolish  the  ills  both 
of  poverty  and  aristocracy;  and  while  claiming  that 
he  had  voluntarily  relinquished  all  claim  for  his  own 
personal  injuries  and  that  his  passions  were  so  en 
tirely  under  his  control  that  he  would  inflict  no 
vindictive  vengeance  upon  those  who  had  done  him 
the  greatest  wrong,  yet  his  conscientious  duty  as  an 
agent  of  his  people,  and  a  true  public  policy  in  view 
of  such  a  gigantic  and  unprovoked  rebellion,  led  him 
to  seek  the  fines  and  penalties,  that,  as  he  thought, 
should  always  be  visited  upon  the  public  enemy  and 
the  defeated  and  guilty  authors  of  an  unjust  war. 

1  Remarks  of  W.  D.  Kelly  in  Memorial  Address  on  Stevens, 
in  Congress,  1868. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  GREENBACKER;   FUNDING,   DEBT   PAYMENT  AND 
CONTRACTION 

A  T  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  in  1865  tne  people 
*  ^  of  the  United  States  were  in  the  enjoyment  of 
unprecedented  prosperity.  Within  eight  short  years 
they  had  passed  through  the  valley  of  adversity  - 
through  a  period  of  loss,  stagnation  in  trade,  fall  of 
wages,  suspension  of  enterprises,  bankruptcy,  disaster, 
ruin.  What  were  the  causes  of  this  woful  change  of 
condition,  of  this  social  and  industrial  catastrophe 
that  appears  to  have  consumed  more  wealth  and 
caused  more  misery  and  destruction,  so  far  as  the  ma 
terial  prosperity  and  happiness  of  the  people  are  con 
cerned,  than  all  the  waste,  losses,  and  disasters  of  the 
four  years  of  war? 

Thi-s  summary  statement  of  a  chapter  in  our  in 
dustrial  history,  with  its  attendant  inquiry,  indicates 
the  pivotal  controversy  in  our  financial  history.  The 
controversy  involved  a  conflict  of  interests,  a  war 
of  industrial  and  financial  classes.  It  involved  the 
whole  problem  of  money,  with  which  the  country  has 
had  severe  periodical  wrestlings  since  the  Civil  War. 
As  one  reviews  the  history  of  the  period  with  its 
many  controverted  issues  and  partisan  strife,  he  is 
led  to  believe  that  the  merits  of  the  great  struggle 
over  money  and  the  currency  were  ill-understood  by 

536 


DEBT  PAYMENT  ANQ  CONTRACTION      537 

the  disinterested  public  opinion  of  Stevens'  day. 
The  financial  policy  then  instituted  under  the  direction 
of  a  rising  powerful  moneyed  interest,  can  not  be  said 
to  have  occupied  the  attention  of  the  people,  fraught 
though  it  was  with  the  direst  peril  to  their  welfare 
and  happiness.  Either  the  financial  policy  adopted 
by  those  in  the  places  of  power  was  pursued  in  the 
face  of  public  sentiment,  or  the  people  of  America 
capable  of  contributing  toward  public  opinion  never 
adequately  understood  the  merits  of  the  controversy. 
The  attention  of  the  country  was  distracted  by  the 
dominant  and  heated  questions  growing  out  of  war 
and  reconstruction,  and  the  people  were  not  permitted 
to  give  direct  and  thoughtful  attention  to  the  vital 
matters  of  currency  and  finance. 

Stevens  himself  lived  through  but  a  few  brief  years 
of  this  struggle,  but  as  he  contributed  to  its  discus 
sions  and  opinions  in  important  ways,  and  since  the 
Stevens  greenback  occupied  the  center  of  the  stage 
for  the  first  decade  of  the  dispute,  one  feels  that  a 
sketch  of  his  life  should  attempt  at  least  a  brief  por 
trayal  of  the  merits  and  issues  which  this  struggle 
involved. 

Stevens  was  a  Greenbacker.  True,  he  did  not  join 
that  historic  political  party.  He  did  not  live  long 
enough  to  do  so,  nor  is  it  certain  that  he  would  have 
abondoned  the  Republicans  had  he  lived  until  the 
Greenbackers  came  into  the  arena, —  clear  in  his  mind 
and  deep  in  his  convictions  though  he  was  as  to  the 
righteousness  of  the  Greenback  cause.  He  had  an 
nounced  principles  and  policies  that  underlay  the  in 
ception  and  progress  of  the  new  radical  party.  He 


538      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

did  what  he  could,  while  living,  to  keep  his  own  party 
from  pursuing  the  policy  of  selfishness  and  error,  as 
he  thought,  which  brought  the  Greenback  party  into 
being, —  a  party  whose  history  and  apologia  have  yet 
to  be  written,  and  whose  cause  has  been  treated  with 
scant  justice,  not  to  say  with  gross  injustice,  by  many 
economic  and  historical  writers.  He  had  tried  to  de 
liver  the  government  from  bondage  to  the  gold  stand 
ard  during  the  war  and  he  believed  that  if  gold  was 
ever  to  be  restored  to  its  former  money  use,  it  would 
be  not  by  the  policy  of  contracting  and  destroying  the 
beneficent  currency  which  the  war  had  produced,  but 
by  the  growth  of  the  country,  by  its  expanding  trade, 
and  by  the  retention  and  larger  legal  use  of  this  paper 
currency, —  all  of  which  would  serve  to  bring  the 
greenbacks  to  a  parity  with  gold.  Thus,  gold,  silver, 
and  the  war  paper,  would  all  circulate  together. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  present,  as  fairly 
as  the  limits  of  space  will  permit,  the  merits  of  this 
contention,  and  to  point  out  the  significance  of  the 
financial  policies  that  were  being  pursued  during  the 
remaining  years  of  Stevens'  life. 

The  war  had  hardly  ended  before  a  policy  was  be 
gun  of  contracting  the  greenback  currency  and  of 
changing  the  national  indebtedness  from  a  basis  of 
paper  values  to  a  basis  of  coin. 

The  struggle  began, —  or  was  again  renewed, —  on 
the  one  hand,  to  discredit  and  destroy  the  war  cur 
rency  and  to  reduce  values  to  a  gold  basis;  on  the 
other  hand,  to  preserve  this  currency  and  to  retain 
the  measure  of  value  that  war  conditions  and  legisla 
tion  had  brought  about.  It  was  contended  by  those 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      539 

who  wished  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  destroying  the 
legal  tender  currency  of  the  war,  that  greenbacks 
were  "  bad  money  " ;  that  they  were  not  money  at  all, 
but  only  promises  to  pay  money;  that,  as  their  issue 
had  been  permitted  only  because  of  the  necessities  of 
war,  their  existence,  as  an  irredeemable  paper  cur 
rency,  should  be  tolerated  only  so  long  as  neces 
sity  compelled ;  that  to  continue  this  "  plethora  of  pa 
per  money "  as  a  permanent  policy  would  be  to 
undermine  the  morals  of  the  people  and  to  strike  at 
the  root  of  our  national  prosperity  by  encouraging 
waste  and  extravagances.1  It  was  said  that  this 
money  was  "  dishonest "  and  that  the  honor  of  the 
nation  demanded  that  the  greenbacks  should  be  "  re 
deemed  "  by  being  called  in  and  destroyed;  that  the 
country's  prosperity,  its  increasing  industries  and  ex 
panding  trade,  while  gold  was  at  a  premium,  could  be 
only  a  "  mock  prosperity," —  a  "  delusion  and  a  snare," 
"  a  hollow  and  seductive  prosperity,"  as  Secretary  Mc- 
Culloch  called  it.2  The  people  merely  thought  they 
were  prosperous,  while,  in  fact,  they  were  not.  They 
were  deluded,  since  the  greenback  prices  were  "  in 
flated,"  "  hocus-pocus  "  and  "  abnormal."  Any  price 
above  the  gold  price  was  "  unnaturally  high,"  3  lead 
ing  to  "  an  unhealthy  condition  of  business  " ;  and 
the  only  road  to  safety  and  real  prosperity  was  to  re 
turn  to  the  gold  standard  which  was  the  measure  of 
"  normal  prices "  and  the  only  "  sound  and  honest 
money  for  the  world." 

iSec'y.  McCulloch's  Report,  Dec.  4,   1865. 

2  Addresses  and  Speeches  by  Hugh  McCnlloch,  pp.  50,  51. 

3  D.  A.  Wells'  Pamphlet,  1876. 
*  Ibid. 


540      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Those  who  held  this  view  contended  that  coin  cir 
culation  was  the  "  normal  volume  "  and  that  the  "  re 
dundant  currency  "  must  be  reduced ;  that  the  only 
honest  and  practical  way  of  restoring  our  paper 
money  to  a  "  sound  condition,  equal  to  the  money  of 
the  world,"  was  to  retire  it  until  what  remains  should 
circulate  as  the  equivalent  of  coin,  and  after  that  was 
done  it  would  be  better  to  substitute  for  the  green 
backs  the  paper  money  of  the  banks,  "  convertible  " 
into  coin  (when  possible  or  convenient)  ;  and  that 
this  "  convertible  "  bank  paper  was  the  only  kind  of 
paper  money  that  should  be  tolerated.  It  was  urged 
vehemently  that,  at  every  hazard,  the  greenbacks 
should  not  be  used  in  the  payment  of  the  public  debt. 
Although  they  had  been  used  to  buy  the  government's 
bonds  when  gold  was  selling  for  two  to  one,  yet  for 
the  government  to  use  them  in  satisfying  the  claims  of 
the  patriotic  bondholders  who  had  made  such  financial 
sacrifices  in  the  war,  would  be  the  last  act  of  national 
dishonor. 

Many  of  the  partisan  advocates  of  this  policy 
charged,  and  no  doubt  many  good  people  were  made 
to  believe,  that  the  only  reason  why  others  favored  a 
currency  and  a  lawful  money  other  than  coin  or  its 
equivalent,  was  because  they  wished  to  cheat  their 
creditors,  repudiate  their  debts,  violate  their  contracts 
and  dishonor  the  nation.1 

1  Many  of  the  honest  yeomanry  of  the  land,  men  who  had 
fought  bravely  for  the  integrity  of  the  nation,  who  were  strug 
gling  manfully  to  meet  their  financial  obligations,  were  de 
nounced  as  "  repudiators,"  "  cheats,"  "  hayseeds,"  "  financial 
lunatics,"  "  wild-eyed  cranks,"  and  "  rag-money  men,"  because 
they  wished  to  retain  in  use,  and,  if  need  be,  to  increase  the 
circulation  of  the  greenbacks  that  had  successfully  carried  the 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      541 

Many  of  the  honest  opponents  of  the  greenbacks, 
the  advocates  of  a  contracted  currency  and  the  gold 
standard,  seemed  possessed  with  the  idea  that  nothing 
but  coin  was  real  money.  They  deemed  no  one  com 
petent  to  deal  with  the  money  question  who  had  not 
recognized  that  as  a  fundamental  fact.1  On  the  basis 
of  this  dogma  as  a  fundamental  premise,  they  had  set 
tled  the  money  question  in  the  most  arbitrary  and 
dogmatic  way,  and  they,  therefore,  usually  met  their 
greenback  opponents  not  so  much  with  reasonable  ar 
guments  as  with  misrepresentation,  denunciation,  rid 
icule,  hoots,  and  sneers.  Had  not  the  continental 
currency  of  the  Revolution  become  worthless?  Had 
not  the  state  bank  currency  of  the  War  of  1812  led 
the  country  to  confusion?  In  all  the  history  of  cur 
rency  had  not  "  paper  money  crazes  "  produced  only 
conspicuous  wreck  and  ruin?  If  Congress  were  al 
lowed,  as  a  permanent  policy,  "  to  coin  money  and 
regulate  its  value,"  and  to  do  this  by  paper  issues,  had 
not  all  experience  shown  that  the  debtor  classes  would 
bring  such  pressure  to  bear  on  government  that  the 
public  printing-presses  would  be  started  to  work  and 
the  legal  tender  notes  would  be  issued  in  such  quanti 
ties  that  they  would  become  altogether  worthless? 
Would  not  debtors  then  satisfy  their  creditors  with 
notes  that  cost  them  little  or  no  effort  to  obtain  ?  Was 
it  not  too  dangerous  to  entrust  such  power  to  the  rep- 
country  through  the  war.  "He  who  is  not  in  favor  of  con 
tracting  the  currency  is  noMn  favor  of  paying  it,  and  he  who  is 
not  in  favor  of  paying  it  is  a  repudiator."  This  was  adopted 
as  a  text,  or  motto,  on  a  pamphlet  on  "  Contraction,"  by  David 
A.  Wells,  in  1876. 

1  John  Sherman,  Speeches  and  Reports  on  Finance,  p.  188. 


542      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

resentatives  of  the  people  under  universal  suffrage? 
Was  there  not  a  "  natural  immutable  law,"  a  "  divine 
law,"  that  there  was  but  one  true  standard  for  money 
and  that  standard  gold  ?  "  From  the  earliest  record 
of  humanity,  from  Solon  to  our  day,  gold  and  silver 
have  been  the  media  to  effect  exchange  and  they 
would  continue  to  be  the  current  coin  till  the  com 
pleted  history  of  nations  now  rising  into  greatness  shall 
be  folded  away  among  the  records  of  time."  1 

What  was  to  be  done  to  work  out  into  law  the  policy 
of  this  idea  of  money?  It  was  simple  enough.  Let 
all  the  paper  obligations  of  the  government,  amount 
ing  to  $1,500,000,000  or  more,  including  its  paper 
money,  be  turned  into  coin  liabilities, —  into  long  time 
gold  bonds.  Let  the  nation  not  dishonor  itself  by  pay 
ing  off,  or  redeeming,  any  of  its  obligations  in  the  so- 
called  "  lawful  money  "  which  it  had  made,  and  which 
had  been  used  to  buy  these  obligations ;  but  let  all  these 
non-interest  bearing  greenbacks  be  called  in  and  re 
tired.  They  were  promissory  notes,  an  evidence  of 
debt ;  let  them  be  burned  up  and  utterly  destroyed  that 
neither  government  nor  people  may  ever  see  their  face 
again,  and  in  their  stead  let  there  be  issued  interest- 
bearing  gold  bonds.  As  for  a  paper  currency  the  na- 

1  Such  propositions,  the  reader  may  be  surprised  to  learn, 
were  laid  down  as  fundamental  postulates  on  the  money  ques 
tion  by  no  less  a  person  than  Senator  John  Sherman,  of  Ohio, 
in  1869.  See  Speeches  and  Reports,  p.  188.  Sherman,  probably 
moved  by  the  political  situation  in  Ohio  and  the  West,  was 
then  resisting  what  he  deemed  too  rapid  a  contraction,  but  he 
was  entirely  controlled  by  the  traditional  and  prevailing  coin 
theory  of  money.  He  lived  to  see  silver  laid  aside  as  standard 
money,  which  had  been  used  from  "  the  earliest  records  of 
humanity,"  and  he  helped  on  in  the  process,  and  that,  too,  quite 
a  while  before  the  completed  history  of  rising  nations  had  been 
entirely  "  folded  away  in  the  records  of  time." 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      543 

tional  banks  could  issue  their  notes  if  they  would,  and 
the  nation's  credit,  in  the  shape  of  its  bonds,  the  only 
legitimate  form  of  the  war  debt,  could  be  had  to  make 
these  bank  notes  good  safe  money.  All  values  were 
again  to  be  based  upon  coin,  and  all  debtors,  con 
tractors,  those  with  enterprises  on  foot,  were  to  be 
forced  to  a  settlement  upon  that  basis. 

To  these  blind  views,  sustained  by  a  prejudice  and 
tradition  that  bordered  on  idolatry,  and  the  fatal  policy 
that  was  instituted  to  carry  them  out,  the  Greenbackers 
(and  Stevens  would  have  been  with  them  in  this)  at 
tributed  the  panic  of  1873.  The  policy  was  directly 
in  the  interests  of  capitalists,  bankers,  and  money  lend 
ers, —  the  men  who  held  the  national  debt.  The 
Greenbackers  looked  upon  this  policy  as  the  rough 
hard  road  by  which  the  country  was  forced  to  travel 
in  reaching  what  was  called  the  "  resumption  of  spe 
cie  payments."  And  when  within  less  than  eight 
short  years  that  policy  had  been  carried  and  it  was 
known  that  at  a  time  fixed  it  would  be  an  accomplished 
fact,  the  debt  of  the  country,  held  by  its  bondholders 
and  measured  by  its  products  and  its  toil,  had  been 
doubled ;  while  the  money  in  circulation  among  the 
people,  the  measure  of  their  contracts,  their  properties 
and  their  values,  had  been  reduced  to  such  a  degree  as 
to  make  industrial  panic  and  desolation  inevitable. 

The  country  reached  the  specie  standard  and  its  at 
tendant  "  real  prosperity."  But  there  were  certain 
classes  of  people  who  seemed  unable  to  appreciate  the 
blessings  of  such  prosperity,  who  insisted  that  another 
money  policy  would  have  been  more  in  harmony  with 
the  interests  of  the  masses  of  the  people, —  of  the  man- 


544      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ufacturers,  laborers,  farmers,  and  producers  of  the 
country's  wealth,  The  greenback  dollar  could  now  be 
exchanged  for  one  in  gold  if  any  one  cared  for  it,  but 
it  was  felt  that  the  country  had  come  to  a  time  when, 
as  Solon  Chase  expressed  it  in  his  homely  way  up  in 
Maine,  there  was  "  too  much  hog  in  the  dollar  "  and 
when  "  them  steers,  while  they  grew  well,  shrank  in 
value  as  fast  as  they  grew."  The  value  of  the  hay 
and  the  corn  which  the  farmers  fed  year  by  year  to 
their  hogs  and  their  steers  was  being  absorbed  year  by 
year  by  the  loan  and  the  bond.  It  was  indeed  pros 
perity  for  a  certain  class, —  but  the  class  represented 
less  than  five  per  cent,  of  the  community. 

Stevens  had  an  eye  exactly  adapted  to  the  detection 
of  that  kind  of  prosperity  and  before  he  died  he  fore 
saw  and  foretold  it.  He  represented  another  view  of 
money  and  the  greenback,  and  another  process  of  re 
covering  the  use  of  coin  in  circulation, —  though  that 
recovery  was  not  at  all  deemed  essential  to  the  progress 
and  prosperity  of  the  country.  Just  as  there  was  a 
conflict  of  interest  and  opinion  at  the  inception  of  the 
greenback  money,  so  now  the  same  forces,  or  inter 
ests,  were  warring  over  its  continuance. 

It  was  held  on  this  side  of  the  controversy,  that  the 
greenbacks  were  doing  the  work  of  money;  that  as 
this  paper  money  was  doing  the  same  money  work 
for  the  country  that  gold  could  do,  it  would  have  the 
same  industrial  effect  to  retire  it  as  would  the  loss  of 
so  much  coin  if  the  country  were  on  a  gold  basis. 
These  friends  of  the  greenbacks  had  the  vision  to  see 
that  the  virtue,  or  essence,  of  money  is  not  in  its  sub 
stance  but  in  its  use;  that  whatever  does  the  work  of 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      545 

money  is  money;  and  they  saw  that  the  greenbacks 
could  and  did  perform  the  only  essential  functions  of 
money, —  they  could  satisfy  debts,  pay  taxes,  and  ef 
fect  exchanges.  As  certain  of  their  own  prophets  had 
taught,  men  like  Peter  Cooper  and  Ejeazar  Lord, — 
practical  and  eminently  successful  business  men  and 
noble  public  spirited  philanthropists, —  the  defenders 
of  the  greenback  now  had  the  faith  to  declare  that 
money  is  the  creature  of  law;  that  all  money,  metallic 
or  paper,  should  be  issued  and  its  volume  controlled 
by  the  government,  and  that  its  value,  other  things  be 
ing  equal,  would  depend  upon  the  quantity  that  gov 
ernment  permitted  to  exist ;  that  a  precious  commodity 
like  gold  was  not  essential  nor  desirable, —  its  supply 
might  be  capricious  or  so  limited  as  to  be  easily  "  cor 
nered";  that  the  value  of  money  (thoughtlessly 
spoken  of  as  "intrinsic")  is  never  inherent  in  the 
substance  used,  but  depends  always  upon  the  relation 
between  the  money  demand  and  the  money  supply ;  — 
money  itself  was  subject  to  that  great  law  of  supply 
and  demand,  like  everything  else.  They  held  that  if 
we  could  but  continue  a  paper  money,  limited  in  sup 
ply,  backed  by  a  financially  responsible  government, 
with  an  unlimited  power  of  taxation,  a  money  receiv 
able  for  all  debts,  public  and  private,  guaranteeing  no 
redemption  beyond  its  acceptance  for  taxes, —  such 
money,  the  Greenbacker  held,  would  be  the  best  that 
could  be  devised. 

The  friends  of  the  greenbacks  claimed  that  these 
notes  had  enabled  the  people  to  build  up  the  country, 
and  that  they  were  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  debt  in  any 
proper  sense,  but  as  money,  which  at  the  time  was 


546     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

very  properly  being  used  to  measure  the  value  of  all 
property,  gold  and  silver  included.  But  if  these  green 
backs  were  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  debt,  they  were  cer 
tainly  the  least  burdensome  of  all  forms  of  the  public 
indebtedness,  and  that  it  would  be  nothing  short  of 
financial  folly,  or  a  plain  case  of  class  favoritism,  to 
substitute  for  them  a  bonded  debt  that  would  cost  the 
government  millions  in  interest  and  the  people  an 
equal  sum  in  additional  taxes  and  shrinking  prices. 

This  party  of  opinion  did  not  object  to  the  use  of 
gold  and  silver  in  the  currency  of  the  country,  but  this 
resumption  of  specie  (not  at  any  time  a  matter  of  im 
portance  to  be  sought  by  legislation)  was  to  be  brought 
about  not  by  a  forced  but  by  a  natural  process,  by  such 
growth  of  the  country  and  the  expansion  of  trade  as 
would  so  increase  the  demand  for  money  that  gold 
and  silver,  as  well  as  all  the  paper  currency,  would  be 
called  into  use,  and  would  be  interchangeable ;  and 
thus  the  parity  of  paper  and  gold  would  be  established. 

In  the  issue  thus  joined  between  the  two  views  of 
money  and  the  greenback,  the  friends  of  the  green 
backs  were  defeated.  They  were  not  fully  heard. 
The  organs  of  public  opinion  were  not  in  their  hands. 
They  were  generally  common  people,  many  of  them 
poor  and  struggling  with  debt.  They  had  but  few 
leaders  of  weight  and  reputation,  while  the  leaders 
they  had,  like  Stevens,  were  absorbed  by  another  great 
public  question,  and  Stevens  was  destined  to  pass  too 
soon  for  this  cause  from  the  field  of  action.  When 
the  policy  of  contraction  had  proceeded  and  forced 
resumption  had  been  decided  upon;  after  the  panic  of 
1873  had  come  and  while  the  country  was  still  in  the 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      547 

midst  of  the  commercial  depression  that  followed,  the 
greenback  protagonists  called  forcible  attention  to 
some  facts  in  the  history  of  the  period  which  they 
deemed  to  be  responsible  for  all  the  suffering  of  panic 
and  disturbance  through  which  the  country  had  been 
carried.  The  essence  of  their  complaint,  so  far  as  it 
may  be  reduced  to  a  summary  statement,  is  as  follows, 
—  involving  what  appears  to  be  a  very  significant  and 
essentially  true  representation  of  the  financial  record  of 
the  time. 

When  the  war  ended,  the  public  debt  of  the  United 
States  stood  at  something  over  $2,800,000,000.  Of 
this  amount  more  than  $1,200,000,000  was  payable  at 
the  option  of  the  treasury  or  within  a  brief  period. 
There  was  in  circulation  among  the  people  a  volume 
of  money  of  more  than  $2,1 00,000,000.  *  As  part  of 
this  currency  bore  interest,  it  was,  therefore,  a  kind 
that  partook  of  the  value  of  an  investment;  but  they 
were  notes  that  had  been  engraved  and  prepared  in  a 
form  to  circulate  as  money,  and  did,  in  fact,  so  circu 
late  until  they  were  funded  into  gold-bearing  bonds, 
or  their  interest  accumulated  so  as  to  make  them  su 
perior  to  the  ordinary  kind  of  currency.2 

All  this  money  was  in  active  and  favorable  circu 
lation  among  the  people  and  was  being  used  as  the 
basis  of  exchange  and  contract  values.  In  ten  short 
years  the  money  of  the  people  was  reduced  from  more 
than  two  thousand  millions  to  but  a  little  over  half  a 
billion  of  dollars.  From  a  circulating  currency  of 

1  Counting  the  greenbacks,  the  bank  notes,  the  compound  in 
terest  notes  and  the  short  time  interest-bearing  notes. 

2  Cong.  Record,  March  31,  1874,  Maynard,  Chairman  of  Com 
mittee  on  Banking  and  Currency. 


548     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

'fifty-eight  dollars  per  capita  in  1865,  the  people  were 
reduced  to  a  little  over  seventeen  dollars  per  capita,  in 
1875, —  while  the  national  debt  measured  in  terms  of 
wealth,  of  its  commands  over  the  products  and  prop 
erty  of  the  earth,  had  almost  doubled.1  Whatever 
show  of  reasoning  or  sophistry,  or  confusion  of  words, 
may  be  arrayed  to  refute  the  quantitative  theory  of 
money  the  instance  has  yet  to  be  adduced  in  the  his 
tory  of  currency  when  such  a  process  as  this  can  be 
gone  through  with  by  a  people  in  so  short  a  time  with 
out  loss,  disaster  and  ruin. 

Thus,  we  see  that  with  a  redundant  paper  currency 
the  country  was  launched  upon  a  quick  voyage  to  a 
specie  standard.  It  was  put  under  the  severe  process 
of  passing  from  an  inflated  currency  to  a  contracted 
currency,  from  paper  currency  under  which  wheat  sold 
at  nearly  three  dollars  a  bushel  to  a  gold  currency  un 
der  which  wheat  could  sell  at  but  little  more  than  one 
dollar  a  bushel.  This  meant  on  all  products  and  prop 
erties  a  sudden  and  disastrous  slump  from  high  prices 
to  low  prices.  It  meant  that  contracts  could  not  be 
kept;  that  debts  could  not  be  paid;  that  ruin  would 
come  to  thousands  of  competent  business  men ;  and  that 
the  owners  of  farms  and  homes  who  had  paid  half  their 
debt  on  purchased  goods  and  properties  had  to  let  their 
property  go  to  satisfy  the  other  half  of  the  claim.  To 
tens  of  thousands  of  sober,  honest,  and  industrious 
citizens  it  meant  the  loss  of  property,  business,  reputa 
tion,  and  home.  As  Mr.  Sherman  said  in  the  Senate, 
it  was  impossible  to  take  such  a  voyage  without  dis 
tress.  To  every  person  except  a  capitalist  out  of  debt, 

1  Zachos,  J.  C.,  Financial  Opinions  of  Peter  Cooper,  p.  9. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      549 

or  to  a  salaried  officer  or  annuitant,  it  was  a  period  of 
loss,  bankruptcy,  and  disaster.  To  every  railroad  it 
was  an  addition  of  at  least  one-third  to  the  burden  of 
its  debt,  and,  more  than  that  deduction  from  the  value 
of  its  stock.  To  every  bank  it  meant  the  necessity  of 
paying  one  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  for  every  hundred 
dollars  of  its  notes  and  deposits,  except  so  far  as  the 
bank  might  transfer  this  to  its  debtors.  It  meant  the 
ruin  of  all  dealers  whose  debts  are  twice  their  capital, 
though  one-third  less  than  their  property.  It  meant 
the  fall  of  all  agricultural  productions  without  any 
very  great  reduction  of  taxes.  '  To  attempt  this  task 
suddenly,  by  a  surprise  upon  our  people,  by  at  once 
paralyzing  their  industry,  by  arresting  them  in  the 
midst  of  lawful  business  and  applying  a  new  standard 
of  value  to  their  property  without  any  reduction  of 
their  debt  or  giving  them  an  opportunity  to  compound 
with  their  creditors  or  distribute  their  loss,  would  be 
an  act  of  folly  without  example  in  modern  times.1 

I  introduce  this  brief  study  bearing  on  the  merits  of 
the  financial  struggle  following  the  Civil  War  because 
Thaddeus  Stevens,  since  the  country  had  entered  upon 
this  controversy  three  years  before  his  death,  bore  in 
the  struggle  a  very  prominent  and  notable  part.  The 
large  and  permanent  significance  of  this  issue,  as  here 
interpreted,  may  not  have  been  clear  to  all  who  took 
part  in  the  struggle,  but  its  underlying  merits  were 
clear  to  Stevens.  He  saw  enough  of  this  conflict 
of  ideas  and  policies  to  lead  him  to  place  himself  upon 
record.  He  was,  in  fact,  already  upon  record,  and  he 

1  John  Sherman,  Speech  in  the  United  States  Senate,  Jan.  27, 
1869,  Speeches  and  Reports  on  Finance,  p.  199- 


550     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

had  now  only  to  follow  consistently  the  course  upon 
which  he  had  begun. 

As  usual,  he  spoke  forth  boldly  his  principles  and 
his  sympathies.  When  the  issue,  as  he  would  put  it, 
between  the  money  of  the  people  and  the  money  of 
the  gold-dealers  came  up  in  a  new  form  Stevens  com 
mitted  himself  instinctively  to  what  he  considered  the 
cause  of  the  people,  to  the  cause  of  the  poor,  of  the 
struggling  masses.  The  other  side,  the  forced  re 
sumption  of  gold  payments  and  dear  money,  he  looked 
upon  as  the  cause  of  the  rich,  the  powerful,  of  the 
pampered  classes  that  were  seeking  special  favors 
from  government.  He  opposed  Secretary  McCulloch's 
policy  of  steady  and  rapid  contraction;  he  resisted 
the  forced  and  rapid  resumption  of  specie  payments; 
and  all  the  wrath  and  indignation  of  his  nature  were 
roused  to  oppose  and  denounce  the  policy  of  turn 
ing  all  the  obligations  of  the  government  into  long 
time  gold  bonds  and  of  repudiating  the  "lawful 
money  "of  the  country  as  a  means  of  debt  payment. 
A  brief  review  of  his  opinions  on  these  financial  pro 
posals  of  the  time  will  serve  to  make  clear  his  atti 
tude  toward  what  he  deemed  the  ruinous  policy  which 
for  years  he  had  sought  to  avert. 

During  the  continuance  of  the  war  Stevens  had  fre 
quent  occasion  to  discuss  the  loan  policy  of  the  gov 
ernment.  When  the  Loan  Act  of  March,  1863,  was 
pending  he  made  known  his  dissatisfaction  with  the 
policy  that  was  being  pursued.  This  act,  in  addition 
to  authorizing  $900,000,000  in  ten-forty  bonds  at  six 
per  cent.,  provided  for  the  issue  of  short  time  treasury 
notes.  These  notes  were  to  bear  interest;  they  were 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     551 

to  be  a  legal  tender  for  their  face,  and  were  convertible 
into  greenbacks;  that  is,  government  would  accept  or 
redeem  them.  They  had  coupons  attached,  and  as  the 
interest  accumulated  they  were  taken  in  and  held  by  the 
banks;  and  on  the  basis  of  these  notes  as  a  reserve  (on 
which  the  holders  were  drawing  gold  interest)  the 
banks  would  issue  more  of  their  own  notes,  thus  in 
flating  the  currency.  When  the  coupons  were  clipped 
and  the  interest  was  collected  in  gold  the  notes  were 
once  more  sent  out  to  circulate  among  the  people, — 
until  the  interest,  always  in  gold,  accumulated  to  an 
amount  sufficient  to  make  them  an  object  for  hoard 
ing.  Thus  there  was  recurring  inflation  and  contrac 
tion  of  the  government  currency  as  the  periodical  pay 
ment  of  interest  would  inflate  it  and  the  hoarding  of 
the  notes  by  the  banks  might  be  used  to  contract  it. 

Stevens  vigorously  attacked  this  policy.  He 
thought  it  was  directly  in  the  interests  of  the  banks 
and  those  who  could  hoard  the  notes  for  gold.  To 
him  it  was  plain  class  legislation,  and  destructive  to 
the  interest  of  the  government.  He  proposed  a  sub 
stitute  providing,  what  he  had  always  at  heart,  that 
the  government  pay  its  interest  in  "  lawful  money," 
just  such  money  as  other  people  pay  theirs  in,  ex 
cept  where  our  faith  is  specifically  pledged  to  pay  in 
gold;  and  the  public  faith  to  pay  in  gold  he  would 
pledge  no  further.  "  What  justice  is  there  in  com 
pelling  the  people  to  receive  their  interest  in  a  currency 
of  forty  per  cent,  less  value  than  is  paid  to  the  banks 
and  capitalists  who  invest  in  government  bonds?  It 
seems  to  me  a  rank  injustice."  With  so  small  an  in 
terest-bearing  debt  as  we  now  have  gold  is  at  forty 


552      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

per  cent,  premium.1  What  will  it  bring  when  the 
debt  is  ten  times  as  great,  as  it  will  be  when  all  the 
prospective  bonds  are  issued?  Gold  would  be  at  a 
premium  of  sixty  per  cent.  He  saw  a  rising  debt  of 
more  than  $_3, 000,000,000  with  an  interest  burden  in 
gold  so  great  that  the  taxes  made  necessary  to  meet 
this  claim  would  lead  to  but  one  result,  namely,  bank 
ruptcy  and  repudiation. 

If  the  government  could  be  brought  to  the  wise  and 
reasonable  policy  of  paying  its  interest  in  legal  tender 
notes,  both  on  its  short  time  loans  and  its  long  time 
bonds,  then  the  short  loans  when  they  fall  due,  may 
either  be  paid  in  legal  tender  or  be  funded  into  twen 
ty-year  bonds.  He  calculated  that  $50,000,000  of 
gold  would  be  received  annually  from  customs,  being 
$26,000,000  above  the  ordinary  government  needs. 
This  surplus  could  be  used  as  a  sinking  fund  for  ten 
years,  deposited  in  state  banks  on  ample  securities. 
Before  this  fund  could  be  exhausted  the  decreasing  in 
terest  and  the  increasing  receipts  would  "  enable  the 
sinking  fund  to  pay  the  whole  debt  in  coin  without 
buying  a  dollar." 

His  policy  was  to  offer  long  time  twenty-year  bonds 
whose  principal  was  to  be  specially  payable  in  coin, 
while  the  interest  was  to  be  payable  in  legal  tenders, 
in  the  belief  that  after  the  lapse  of  twenty  years  the 
country  would  again  be  on  a  specie  basis,  from  its 
assured  growth  in  population  and  trade.  He  thought 
his  specie  bonds  would  sell  better  than  "  the  lawful 
money  bonds  "  that  the  committee  was  proposing,  with 
gold  interest.  "I  object,"  he  said,  "to  the  payment 

1  He  was  speaking  on  January  20,  1863. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     553 

of  specie  for  interest,  as  it  sets  the  government  and 
the  merchant  in  competition  and  puts  them  both  in 
the  power  of  banks  and  brokers.  Besides  it  is  a  shame 
to  use  one  currency  for  the  government  and  another 
for  the  people."  He  thought  it  would  be  better  for 
the  investor  to  take  his  interest  in  legal  tender,  which 
will  answer  all  the  purposes  of  business,  and  get  the 
principal  in  gold,  than  to  take  driblets  of  interest  in 
coin  and  the  substantive  capital  in  legal  tender  or  what 
ever  else  the  government  makes  money.1 

Stevens'  counter-proposal  to  save  the  treasury  from 
being  worsted  in  the  financial  deal  and  to  recall  the 
government  from  its  policy  of  bidding  for  gold  and 
thus  boosting  the  gold  premium,  was  not  successful. 
But  the  discussion  shows  very  clearly  in  what  kind 
of  money  Stevens  thought  the  bonds  that  were  then 
being  issued  might  be  paid.  His  warning  went  un 
heeded.  The  war  was  impeded  and  the  treasury  dis 
tressed  in  order  to  get  the  rising  gold  for  interest  pay 
ments.  But  Stevens  did  not  despair  of  the  republic. 
"  Such,"  he  said,  "  is  the  great  wealth,  the  fertility, 
the  irrepressible  energy  of  this  great  country  that  she 
\vill  be  able  to  rise  from  her  prostration,  like  the  fabled 
giant  who,  when  felled  to  earth,  drew  fresh  strength 
from  the  bosom  of  his  mother, —  and  hurl  to  destruc 
tion  all  the  rebels  of  the  South  and  all  the  traitors  of 
the  North,  who,  within  this  House  and  out  of  it,  may 
be  seeking  for  their  own  grasping  ends  to  put  unjust 
and  double  financial  burdens  upon  the  backs  of  the  peo 
ple,  or  who  are  basely  advising  us  to  lay  down  our 
arms  and  meanly  sue  for  peace." 

1  Globe,  Jan.  20,  1863,  p.  411.      -  Globe,  Jan.  20,  1863,  p.  411. 


554      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Stevens,  however,  never  rested  under  the  policy  that 
had  been  adopted.  He  believed  that  the  effort  of  the 
government  to  continue  interest  payments  in  coin 
would  in  the  end  prove  disastrous.  To  that  policy  he 
attributed  the  annoyances,  uncertainties,  losses,  and  ab 
normal  prices  resulting  from  the  speculations  in  gold. 
He  was  especially  irritated  because  the  gold  dealers 
had  such  influence  with  the  government  and  because 
they  were  still  able  to  dominate  the  money  market. 
He  let  no  occasion  slip  to  criticize  their  ways  or  to 
embarrass  them  in  their  proceedings.  One  of  his 
measures,  which  seems  only  like  a  blind  stagger  to 
ward  accomplishing  its  purpose,  was  probably  pro 
posed  as  a  means  of  agitation  rather  than  as  a  practical 
measure  of  legislation  that  he  expected  to  carry  to  a 
conclusion.  On  December  6,  1864,  he  introduced  a 
bill  to  prevent  gold  and  silver  coin  and  bullion  from 
being  paid  or  exchanged  for  a  greater  value  than  their 
real  current  value,  and  from  preventing  any  note  or 
bill  issued  by  the  United  States  and  made  lawful 
money  from  being  received  for  a  smaller  sum  than  is 
therein  specified.  The  bill  provided  that  a  contract 
made  payable  in  coin  might  be  paid  in  legal  tender 
United  States  notes  and  that  no  difference  in  sale  or 
value  should  be  allowed  between  them ;  that  "  no  per 
son  shall  by  any  device,  shift  or  contrivance,  receive 
or  pay  or  contract  to  receive  or  pay  "  any  treasury 
note  for  "  less  than  its  lawfully  expressed  value  ";  and 
that  if  "  any  person  shall  in  the  purchase  or  sale  of 
gold  or  silver  agree  to  receive  in  payment  notes  at  less 
than  their  par  value,  he  shall  be  deemed  to  have  of- 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      555 

fended  against  the  provisions  of  this  act  and  shall  be 
punished  accordingly." 

This  may  serve  to  indicate  Stevens'  eagerness  to 
break  up  "  gold  gambling."  It  was  generally  believed 
that  gold  fluctuations  were  due  to  "  unpatriotic  and 
criminal  efforts  of  speculators  and  probably  of  secret 
enemies  to  raise  the  price  of  gold  regardless  of  the  in 
jury  inflicted  on  the  country,  and  that  '  gold  gam 
blers  ' 1  as  a  class  were  disloyal  men  in  sympathy  with 
the  South."2  The  short  lived  "gold  bill"  of  the 
previous  summer  3  had  been  passed  at  the  suggestion 
of  Secretary  Chase  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  this 
speculation.  It  was  futile,  as  this  similar  proposal 
now  reported  by  Stevens  was  sure  to  be.  The  opera 
tion  of  such  a  law  would  have  been  a  pestiferous,  not 
to  say  tyrannical  and  intolerable,  interference  with 
all  business  dealing  and  contracts.  It  is  hard  to  say 
what  chaos  would  have  resulted.  Of  course,  as  a 
means  of  reducing  or  controlling  the  price  of  gold,  or 
of  boosting  the  greenback,  this  was  purely  an  artificial 
process  and  was  entirely  vain.  It  is  difficult  to  believe 
that  Stevens  did  not  perceive  this.  He  did  not  press 
his  proposal,  though  he  used  it  as  an  occasion  for  a 
little  salutary  education.  Stevens'  better  course 
would  have  been  to  pursue  the  consistent  policy  of  urg 
ing  the  repeal  of  the  "  exception  clause  "  in  the  green 
back  acts.  This  would  have  produced  some  effect,  and 
Stevens  could  then,  at  any  rate,  have  resigned  himself 

1  Book  of  Drew,  Ind.,  Dec.  2. 

2  Senatorial  Opinion,  cited  by  Dewey,  p.  295. 

3  June  17,  1864. 


556      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

and  his  country  to  allowing  gold  to  take  care  of  itself 
and  go  where  it  would. 

It  was  not  difficult  for  the  opponents  of  this  pro 
posal  to  expose  its  weakness.  Elaine  attacked  it  as 
impossible  and  said  that  if  it  should  become  a  law  the 
entire  population  of  the  Pacific  Coast  would  be  liable 
to  indictment  and  conviction  for  a  criminal  offense, — 
for  believing  and  acting  on  the  belief,  as  they  did,  that 
a  gold  dollar  was  worth  more  than  a  paper  one.  It 
certainly  was  worth  more,  partly  by  act  and  favor  of 
government.  Stevens  indulged  in  some  satire  against 
Elaine, —  as  to  his  "  intuitive  way  of  getting  at  great 
national  questions."  For  himself  he  confessed  he  did 
not  know  how  far  his  bill  was  practicable,  or  how  far 
it  should  be  modified,  but  he  \vas  sure  there  should  be 
some  law  to  prevent  gold  gambling,  by  which  it  is  put 
at  two  and  a  half  times  its  value, —  a  system  that  is 
making  every  man  who  eats  food  pay  three  prices  for 
it.  These  gamblers  would  take  advantage  of  anything 
to  put  up  the  price  of  gold.  He  would  not  say  that 
this  legislation  would  reach  it,  but  he  claimed  that  it 
was  just  such  legislation  that  England  had  used  in  her 
great  wars  with  Napoleon  and  had  found  beneficial. 

On  February  28,  1865,  while  another  loan  bill  was 
pending,  Stevens  spoke  at  length.  He  reviewed  the 
currency  and  loan  history  of  the  war  and  called  at 
tention  to  his  repeated  efforts  to  change  the  financial 
system  that  had  been  adopted  and  to  inaugurate  a  new 
one  which  would  have  reduced  the  price  of  gold  and 
the  price  of  every  article  of  living  and  all  munitions  of 
war.  He  now  intended  to  make  one  more  effort  to 
bring  about  a  change.  He  had  entertained  high  hopes 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      557 

of  success  until,  as  he  said,  "  I  saw  operating  here  cer 
tain  influences  which  I  regretted  to  observe.  .  .  .  Last 
year  we  were  successful  until  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  came  here  and  sat  behind  us,  when  our  ac 
tion  was  reversed."  *  He  was  shocked  at  the  proposal 
of  Boutwell  in  favor  of  continuing  to  pay  in  gold  all  our 
obligations  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Perseverance  in 
this  policy  must  lead  to  disaster  which  should  have 
been  foreseen  before  we  entered  upon  a  system  so 
palpably  unwise.  This  policy  will  bring  us  in  interest 
payments  and  other  expenses,  with  gold  selling  at  three 
to  one,  to  an  annual  burden  of  $900,000,000  to  be 
raised  by  taxation.  "  No  young  nation  has  ever  borne 
such  a  tax.  In  my  judgment  the  people  would  not  and 
could  not  bear  it.  I  would  not  be  understood  that  this 
country  would  under  any  circumstances  repudiate  her 
debt,  but  she  would  be  driven  to  suspend  payment  of 
interest  for  a  while  and  that  would  be  a  disgrace  not  to 
be  contemplated."  If  we  had  made  the  legal  tender 
notes  receivable  for  customs  and  had  made  our  interest 
payable  in  such  lawful  money,  we  could  have  sold  our 
loans  at  par  and  have  maintained  our  notes  on  an 
equality  with  gold.  Instead,  what  have  we  done? 
We  have  given  a  hundred-dollar  gold  bond  for  one 
hundred  dollars  in  currency.  That  hundred  dollars 
in  currency  can  be  bought,  no  doubt  was  bought,  for 
forty  dollars  in  gold,  and  we  instantly  began  paying 
one  hundred  dollars  in  coin  for  it;  for  when  we  pay 
the  interest  in  gold  and  the  principal  when  due,  it 
is  all  gold  from  the  beginning.  So  under  this  wise 
system  we  have  actually  been  selling  our  bonds  at 

1  Globe,  Vol.  68,  p.  1202. 


558      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

sixty  per  cent,  discount.  Nor  have  we  the  merit  of 
using  a  currency  which  would  keep  down  prices.  We 
have  used  only  the  currency  which  we  ourselves  have 
decried  and  depreciated.  He  pleaded  that  the  govern 
ment  should  no  longer  discriminate  between  classes  of 
creditors,  or  declare  that  one  form  of  its  money  was 
better  than  another  and  by  legislation  depreciate  its 
own  money.  If  Congress  had  declared  that  gold 
should  not  be  legal  tender  and  should  not  be  received 
for  duties  nor  paid  in  interest,  but  that  United  States 
notes  and  silver  should  be,  gold  would  have  depre 
ciated  below  either  of  the  others.  But  Congress  cre 
ated  an  absolute  necessity  for  gold  in  proportion  to 
the  increasing  amount  of  our  debt  and  made  it  alone 
receivable  for  duties,  thus  declaring  all  other  money 
inferior  to  it. 

Our  duties  last  year  were  one  hundred  millions. 
The  holders  of  gold  knew  that  at  least  twenty-five 
millions  must  be  had  each  quarter,  no  matter  what  it 
cost.  The  average  amount  in  New  York,  outside  the 
banks  required  to  keep  a  reserve,  was  just  about 
twenty-five  millions.  Whoever  possessed  that  could 
compel  the  merchants  to  pay  whatever  price  their  con 
sciences  would  permit  them  to  ask.  A  few  men 
could  monopolize  the  whole  of  it.  The  struggle  for 
such  a  monopoly  would  raise  the  price;  the  buyers  of 
gold  would  indemnify  themselves  by  exhorting  from 
the  merchants,  who  in  their  business  receive  only 
United  States  notes  and  currency.  They  were  there 
fore  at  the  mercy  of  the  speculators, —  a  class  of  men 
the  most  worthless  in  the  community, —  men  who  con 
sume  the  fruits  of  the  earth  but  produce  nothing. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     559 

Congress  made  this  gold,  when  no  longer  money 
nor  a  circulating  medium,  the  standard  of  value. 
Every  article  came  to  be  measured  by  the  price  of 
bullion,  the  extorted  unnatural  price  paid  by  the  mer 
chants.  Everything  purchased  by  rich  or  poor,  by  in 
dividuals  or  government,  went  up  in  price.  The 
orists  have  attributed  this  to  our  inflated  currency. 
If  this  were  so  prices  would  not  fluctuate  with  the 
fluctuations  in  the  gold  market,  for  the  volume  of 
currency  does  not  thus  vary.  The  merchant  holds  his 
goods  higher  or  lower  as  the  price  of  gold  rises  or 
falls.  He  marks  and  re-marks  them  according  to  the 
thermometer  of  the  Israelites  in  the  gold  room,  not 
according  to  the  contraction  or  expansion  of  the  cur 
rency. 

Stevens  did  not  by  this  intend  to  deny  that  undue 
expansion  would  raise  prices,  and  that  prices  fall  at 
contraction.  He  recognized  that  this  would  happen 
no  matter  whether  the  currency  is  in  coin  or  paper. 
He  understood  and  accepted  the  quantitative  theory 
of  money.  But  he  held  that  the  currency  was  never 
inflated  so  long  as  there  is  no  more  than  is  necessary 
for  the  business  of  the  country;  the  proper  quantity 
would  depend  on  the  business  demands.  He  con 
tended  that  the  currency  of  the  country  was  not  swol 
len  beyond  the  necessary  amount,  since  the  country 
required  in  1865  double  the  amount  required  before 
the  war. 

It  had  been  said  that  if  all  our  loans  had  been  made 
for  "  lawful  money," —  such  money  being  received 
for  public  dues  and  paid  for  interest  —  the  loans 
would  never  have  been  taken  abroad.  "  That  to  me," 


560      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

said  Stevens,  "  would  have  been  a  merit.  The  annual 
net  earnings  of  this  country  would  have  been  suffi 
cient  to  absorb  all  our  loans  and  pay  all  the  expenses 
of  the  war.  Now  what  is  sold  abroad  is  sold  at  forty 
dollars  on  the  hundred  and  we  immediately  pay  one 
hundred  in  coin  for  it  as  interest,  and  we  must  ulti 
mately  pay  one  hundred  in  principal  for  every  forty 
dollars  when  specie  payments  are  resumed.  What 
an  immense  sacrifice  to  a  foolish  theory !  "  *  On  ac 
count  of  his  financial  policy  Stevens  was  opposed  and 
denounced,  as  a  matter  of  course,  by  those  who  repre 
sented  the  moneyed  interests  and  the  financial  centers. 
The  Wall  Street  operators  did  not  like  him.  "  We 
recollect,"  says  Mr.  Forney,  "  how  he  made  the  dry 
bones  of  Wall  Street  brokers  rattle  last  winter  and 
the  winter  before." 2  This  Wall  Street  opposition 
does  not  prove  that  Stevens'  course  was  the  one  for 
the  intelligent  patriot  to  follow,  though  it  may  lend 
favor  to  that  view.  Neither,  on  the  other  hand,  does 
the  fact  that  the  "  expert  financiers  "  were  all  against 
him  prove  that  Stevens  was  either  incompetent  or  dis 
honest  in  his  dealing  with  the  problems  of  national 
finance.  Too  much  is  taken  for  granted  by  the  ortho 
dox  on  questions  of  money.  A  fair  review  of  the 
whole  discussion  will  show  that  Stevens'  course  was 
sincere  and  straightforward,  and  that  he  applied  his 
great  ability  and  intelligence  in  favor  of  a  policy  cal 
culated  to  preserve  the  honor  of  the  nation  and  pro 
mote  the  interest  of  the  common  people. 

1  Speech,  Feb.  28,  1865,  Cong.  Globe,  Vol.  68,  p.  1202. 

2  Philadelphia  Press,  Sept.  12,  1865. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  GREENBACKER;  FUNDING,  DEBT  PAYMENT  AND 
CONTRACTION   (continued) 

IN  view  of  this  clear,  positive,  and  persistent  record 
on  the  subject  of  finance,  however  mistaken  his 
adversaries  may  have  considered  it,  it  is  not  sur 
prising  that  Stevens'  ire  was  stirred  when  his  name 
was  used  and  his  words  quoted  to  give  support  to 
the  policy  of  forced  contraction  and  the  immediate 
funding  of  all  the  government's  paper  obligations 
into  gold  bonds.  That,  almost  as  much  as  the  de 
fense  of  "  Andy  Johnsonism,"  drew  the  fire  of  his 
indignant  wrath. 

Secretary  McCulloch's  annual  report  of  November 
30,  1867,  decried  the  greenbacks  and  urged  their  retire 
ment.  By  no  means  should  they  be  used  to  decrease 
the  national  debt.  The  Secretary  made  an  argument 
for  paying  all  the  paper  and  bonded  obligations  of  the 
government  in  gold, — "  according  to  the  understand 
ing  when  the  subscriptions  were  solicited  and  ob 
tained."  "  Can  there  be  any  question,"  he  asked,  "  in 
regard  to  the  nature  of  this  understanding?"  The 
seven-thirty  notes,  more  than  eight  hundred  millions 
of  them,  were  clearly  by  the  terms  of  their  issue  pay 
able  in  greenbacks.  But  they  might  also  be  converted 
into  bonds.  If  they  were  converted  into  bonds,  Sec- 

561 


562      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

retary  McCulloch  insisted  that  the  bonds,  principal  as 
well  as  interest,  were  to  be  paid  in  coin.  "  Was  not 
this/'  he  asked,  "  the  understanding  of  the  Congress 
that  passed  the  loan  bills  and  of  the  people  who  fur 
nished  the  money?  Did  any  member  of  the  House  or 
of  the  Senate,  prior  to  1864,  in  the  discussions  of 
these  bills,  ever  intimate  that  the  bonds  to  be  issued 
might  be  paid  when  redeemable  in  a  depreciated  cur 
rency?  Was  there  a  single  subscriber  to  the  five- 
twenty  bonds,  or  to  the  seven  and  three-tenths  notes 
(which  by  their  terms  were  convertible  into  bonds), 
who  did  not  believe,  and  who  was  not  given  to  under 
stand  by  the  agents  of  the  government,  that  both  prin 
cipal  and  interest  were  payable  in  coin?  Would  the 
self-sacrificing  people  of  the  United  States,  even  to 
sustain  the  government  in  war,  have  sold  their 
stocks,  their  lands,  the  products  of  their  farms,  fac 
tories  and  shops,  and  have  invested  the  proceeds  in 
these  government  funds  if  they  had  understood  that 
the  bonds  were  to  be  redeemed  after  five  years  in  a 
currency  of  whose  value  they  could  form  no  reliable 
estimate?" 

Would  Congress  or  the  treasury,  "  when  the  fate 
of  the  nation  was  trembling  in  the  balance,  and  when 
a  failure  to  raise  money  for  the  support  of  the  Fed 
eral  army  would  have  been  success  to  the  Rebellion 
and  ruin  to  the  Union  cause,  have  dared  to  attempt 
the  experiment  of  raising  money  on  bonds  redeem 
able  —  in  a  currency  whose  value  might  not  depend 
on  the  solvency  of  the  government,  but  upon  the 
amount  in  circulation?  The  bonds  were  negotiated 
with  the  definite  understanding  that  they  were  pay- 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     563 

able  in  coin.  The  contracts  were  made  in  good  faith 
on  both  sides,  a  part  of  them  when  the  government 
was  in  imminent  peril.  Good  faith  and  public  honor, 
which  to  a  nation  are  of  priceless  worth,  require  that 
these  contracts  should  be  complied  with  in  the  spirit 
in  which  they  were  made."  1 

It  was  urged  by  the  Secretary  that  when  the  five- 
twenties  were  authorized  it  was  specifically  promised 
that  only  $150,000,000  of  the  greenbacks  would  be 
issued.  How  unfair  it  would  now  be  to  pay  bonds 
in  these  notes  after  so  many  more  were  issued  and 
they  had  thereby  become  so  depreciated. 

By  such  arguments  the  Secretary  urged  his  policy 
of  quick  contraction  and  immediate  resumption. 
There  seems  to  be  an  intimation  here  that  it  might 
have  been  honest  to  pay  in  greenbacks  if  so  many 
had  not  been  issued.  The  fact  that  only  a  limited 
amount  were  to  be  issued,  and  for  a  short  time,  suf 
ficiently  explains,  as  Mr.  McCulloch  contended,  why 
it  was  not  deemed  necessary  to  state  that  these  green 
back  notes  would  not  be  used  to  pay  the  principal  of 
the  bonds.  "  It  is  not  supposable,"  said  Mr.  McCul 
loch,  "  that  Congress  intended  to  provide  for  funding 
the  floating  debt  in  bonds  which  might,  in  five  years, 
be  called  in  and  paid  in  the  very  notes  which,  with 
the  other  treasury  notes,  were  thus  to  be  funded." 

The  Secretary  entirely  neglected  the  maxim  of  law 
that  "  exceptions  strengthen  the  force  of  a  law  in 
cases  not  excepted."  An  exception  was  made  as  to 
the  use  of  these  notes  in  paying  customs  dues  and 
government  interest.  This  clearly  meant  that  they 

1  McCulloch's  Report,  Nov.  30,  1867. 


564     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

were  not  to  be  excepted  in  any  other  respect,  not  even 
the  payment  of  bond  principal.  Clearly  there  was  no 
law  requiring  the  payment  of  the  five-twenty  bonds  in 
gold.  No  lawyer  of  repute,  except  in  a  brief  for  a 
client,  would  have  staked  his  reputation  by  asserting 
that  such  payment  was  legally  required.  The  legal 
advisers  of  the  Rothschilds  and  the  Frankfort  bankers 
and  other  foreign  bond-dealers  clearly  understood  this 
at  the  time,  as  indicated  by  the  low  price  bid  for  our 
bonds. 

Nor  is  it  at  all  clear  that  the  understanding  of  the 
five-twenty  loan  was  as  Secretary  McCulloch  stated  it. 
What  Jay  Cooke  may  have  said  while  acting  as  a 
selling  agent  for  the  government;  what  an  assistant 
secretary  of  the  Treasurer  may  have  said  to  the  ef 
fect  that  it  had  always  been  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  pay  gold  and  he  presumed  it  would  con 
tinue  so  to  be;  what  Horace  Greeley  may  have  said 
in  the  Tribune;  or  what  certain  members  of  Congress 
may  have  said  while  the  Loan  Act  was  pending  in  dis 
cussion, —  none  of  these  things  nor  all  of  them  to 
gether  could  determine  even  the  understanding  of  the 
loan  —  since  there  were  also  contrary  understandings 
and  opinions.  Much  less  could  they  determine  the 
scope  and  operation  of  the  act  itself.  The  law  de 
termined  that,  and  what  the  law  was  in  the  case 
Stevens'  legal  mind  perceived  with  perfect  honesty 
and  accuracy.  But  by  the  policy  of  Secretary  Mc 
Culloch  and  of  those  so  greatly  interested  in  the  trea 
sury  management,  whatever  the  intention  and  under 
standing  were,  no  matter  at  what  price  or  with  what 
kind  of  money  the  five-twenty  bonds  had  been  bought, 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      565 

they  should  be  paid  in  coin,  and  that  coin  obligation 
should  be  assumed  and  announced  immediately. 

This  policy,  which  Stevens  abhorred,  and  which 
was  so  clearly  in  the  interest  of  those  who  held  the 
government  funds  and  against  the  interest  of  the 
tax-paying  people,  was  supported  by  Secretary  Mc- 
Culloch  in  an  unfair  and  partisan  way  with  quota 
tions  from  Stevens  himself.  "  Where  could  a  miser 
invest  his  money  ? "  Stevens  had  asked.  He  an 
swered  his  own  question :  "  In  United  States  loans 
at  six  per  cent.,  redeemable  in  gold  in  twenty  years, 
—  the  best  and  most  valuable  permanent  investment 
that  could  be  desired."  Again,  he  had  said,  "  I  pity 
no  one  who  has  money  invested  in  the  United  States 
bonds  payable  in  gold  in  twenty  years,  with  interest 
semi-annually." 

These  words,  uttered  in  the  debate  on  the  original 
Greenback  Act  in  February,  1862,  were  now  appro 
priated  by  Stevens'  opponents  to  sustain  the  policy  of 
gold  payments.  They  were  quoted  in  the  House  by 
General  Garfield  to  weaken  Stevens'  position  in  favor 
of  bond  payment  in  lawful  money.  Garfield  sought  to 
convict  Stevens  of  promising  gold  payment,  or  security, 
on  these  bonds  immediately,  asserting  that  nothing 
else  had  been  originally  thought  of.1  Stevens  de 
nounced  this  application  of  his  words  as  "  a  total  per 
version  of  the  truth."  "  It  would  not  be  too  harsh," 
he  said,  "  to  call  it  an  absolute  falsehood.  I  do  not 
know  that  I  should  have  taken  any  notice  of  what  the 
papers  were  repeating,  some  of  them  half  rebel,  some 
half  secession,  and  more  of  them,  I  suppose,  in  the 

1  Globe,  July  23,  1868,  pp.  4370  ff. 


566     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

pay  of  the  bondholders.  I  am  too  feeble  now  to  ex 
plain  this  whole  matter,  but  I  shall  take  occasion  here 
after  to  expose  the  villainy  of  those  who  charge  me 
with  having  said  on  the  passing  of  the  five-twenty  bill 
that  its  bonds  were  payable  in  coin.  The  whole  de 
bate  from  which  they  quote  and  all  my  remarks  which 
they  have  cited  were  made  on  an  entirely  different 
bill.  I  spoke  only  of  the  payment  of  gold  after 
twenty  years,  as  no  one  doubted  the  resumption  of 
specie  payments." 

The  gold  question,  as  brought  into  issue  between 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  the  country  in  1866 
and  1867,  had  not  arisen  when  Stevens  made  the 
speech  now  quoted  to  embarrass  him.  It  was  in  this 
case  as  it  was  in  those  to  which  reference  is  made  in  a 
preceding  chapter, —  Stevens'  words  on  one  proposal 
were  used  as  if  they  were  uttered  on  an  entirely  dif 
ferent  proposal.  He  was  right  in  denouncing  this 
practise  as  a  downright  perversion  of  his  ideas 
and  his  record  upon  this  financial  legislation.  He 
cautioned  the  public  against  putting  faith  "  in  the 
fabrications  of  demagogues  and  usurers  "  1  and,  at  a 
moment  when  he  was  not  permitted  to  reply  to  Gar- 
field's  use  of  McCulloch's  words,  he  promised  that 
when  the  proper  time  came  he  would  "  show  that 
there  is  not  a  word  of  truth  in  what  either  of  them 
says."  2 

So  far  as  the  record  shows  these  were  the  last 
words  that  Stevens  ever  uttered  in  the  House.  The 
"  proper  time  "  when  he  would  have  shown  the  falsity 

1  Globe,  July  22,  1868. 

2  Globe,  July  23,  1868. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AN©  CONTRACTION      567 

of  the  charge  against  him  in  his  own  invincible  way 
never  came.  The  feebleness  to  which  he  referred 
had  laid  its  final  hold  upon  him  and  in  less  than  three 
weeks  he  was  dead.1  He  did  not  have  the  strength  to 
make  good  his  promise,  but  his  record  is  his  sufficient 
vindication.  Garfield  had  said,  no  doubt  without  the 
least  intention  to  accuse  falsely,  that,  so  far  as  he 
could  learn,  the  first  word  ever  spoken  in  Congress 
suggesting  the  possibility  of  paying  the  five-twenty 
bonds  in  anything  but  coin  had  been  used  by  Stevens 
in  the  discussions  on  the  Loan  Act  of  1863.  This  was 
a  year  after  his  utterance  on  the  first  Legal  Tender  Act 
that,  as  McCulloch  would  have  the  public  believe, 
indicated  Stevens'  assurance  that  the  bonds  were  to 
be  paid  in  coin.  The  words  were  the  words  of 
Stevens  but  the  application  that  was  now  made  of 
them  was  misleading.  They  had  not  been  uttered  on 
any  such  issue  as  was  now  presented.  It  was  but  a 
play  of  politics  in  favor  of  a  policy  that  certain  finan 
cial  leaders  and  their  political  supporters  were  seeking 
to  carry  to  a  conclusion.  The  record  clearly  shows 
that  Stevens  was  then  speaking  (February,  1862)  in 
favor  of  notes  and  bonds  issued  under  a  policy  and  for 
a  length  of  time,  as  he  thought,  that  would  have 
brought,  if  they  did  not  constantly  keep,  both  notes 
and  bonds  at  a  par  with  specie.  Then  it  would  be 
a  matter  of  indifference  whether  specie  were  paid 
or  not.  Another  policy  was  adopted, —  a  policy  that 
had  as  its  result,  if  not  as  its  object,  the  depreciation 
of  the  greenback  notes  that  bonds  might  be  bought 
with  them  and  then  the  appreciation  of  the  bonds  by 
1He  died  on  August  n,  1868. 


568      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

their  being  funded  into  gold  securities.  The  result 
of  this  policy  Stevens  foresaw  and  foretold,  and  his 
face  was  ever  set  against  it  in  stout  and  unbending 
opposition.  What  manner  of  fairness  is  there  in 
using  the  words  that  he  had  uttered  in  favor  of  his 
own  policy  as  if  they  supported  any  part  of  an  op 
posite  policy  that  he  had  always  reprobated  and  con 
demned  ? 

Stevens  was  on  record  in  too  many  instances  on  the 
subject  of  paying  government  bonds  in  greenbacks 
where  the  law  and  the  contract  permitted,  to  leave 
any  one  in  doubt  either  as  to  his  policy  or  consistency. 

While  the  Loan  Act  of  1863  was  under  discussion 
Stevens  insisted  that  the  principal  of  its  proposed  ten- 
forty  bonds  was  payable  in  lawful  money  unless  coin 
were  specified.  He  insisted  that  the  people  should  be 
allowed  to  know  exactly  in  what  kind  of  money  these 
obligations  would  be  paid.  He  offered  an  amend 
ment  specifying  coin,  both  for  the  long  time  bonds 
and  for  the  short  time  treasury  notes  that  were  to  be 
issued.  "If  the  amendment  be  voted  down,"  he  said, 
"  the  people  will  see  that  they  will  be  payable  in  what 
ever  at  the  time  is  lawful  money."  Morrill,  of  Ver 
mont,  accused  him  of  wishing  to  put  the  bill  into 
such  a  shape  that  it  would  not  pass  the  House.  His 
amendment  was  voted  down,  whereupon  Stevens  re 
marked,  "  It  is  evident  that  these  bonds  are  to  be  paid 
in  shin-plasters."  Later,  the  long  time  bonds,  the 
ten-forties  of  1863,  were  made  payable  in  coin,  but 
the  three-year  treasury  notes  were  redeemable  in 
"  lawful  money."  They  were  "  a  kind  of  indebted- 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      569 

ness  that  was  to  be  held  by  the  people,"  *  with  interest 
as  an  inducement  to  keep  them  from  circulating, —  a 
gold  interest  which  the  banks  would  get  as  fast  as  it 
accumulated. 

This  was  the  discriminating  policy  that  Stevens  was 
always  trying  to  prevent.  His  interpretation  of  the 
law  led  the  bond-dealers  to  see  to  it  that  "  coin  "  was 
put  into  the  contract  for  the  new  long  time  bonds. 

Again,  in  discussing  the  Loan  Bill  of  1866,  address 
ing  himself  to  the  first  report  of  Secretary  McCul- 
loch,  he  denounced  as  "  most  extraordinary "  the 
recommendation  that  the  five-twenties  be  paid  in  coin. 
"  For  whose  benefit  was  this?  For  that  of  European 
capitalists.  Those  men  holding  now  $600,000,000 
will  have  30  per  cent,  added  to  the  value  of  their 
bonds  by  a  single  act  of  legislation.  These  bonds 
were  purchased  by  European  capitalists  when  gold 
was  at  250, —  at  60  per  cent,  discount.  If  now  made 
payable  in  gold  they  will  obtain  $100  for  every  $40 
paid  out.  The  idea  that  the  nation  is  to  be  benefited 
by  such  a  proceeding  is  beyond  my  comprehension. 
Doubtless,  if  I  had  my  pocket  full  of  five-twenties  I 
could  realize  the  propriety  of  making  both  interest  and 
principal  payable  in  gold  after  it  had  been  understood 
for  five  years  that  that  principal  should  be  payable 
in  currency.  If  there  is  wisdom  in  the  project  I  con 
fess  that  to  my  poor  intellect  it  is  inscrutable  and  past 
finding  out."  2 

He  denounced  the  contraction  provided  for  in  the 

1  Merrill,  of  Vermont,  Jan.  22,  1863,  Globe,  p.  454. 

2  Globe,  March  16,  1866. 


570     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Loan  Act  of  1866,  an  act  that  gave  such  unlimited 
power  over  the  currency  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury,  whose  policy  Stevens  constantly  deprecated. 
"  Was  ever  such  discretion  confided  to  a  single  man, 
— to  borrow  wherever  he  pleases,  at  any  rate  he 
pleases?  Wise  men  would  never  confer  such  power 
on  the  ablest  and  purest  man  that  ever  lived."  * 

After  such  a  record  was  it  surprising  that  Stevens 
suffered  some  vexation  of  spirit  when  his  words  were 
perverted  by  a  high  official  of  the  treasury,  in  sup 
port  of  a  policy  which  he  had  so  constantly  con 
demned?  The  depth  of  his  feeling  upon  this  subject 
is  shown  by  his  oft-quoted  utterance  in  the  House 
during  the  last  session  that  he  ever  attended.  It  was 
in  July,  1868,  after  the  presidential  nominations  had 
been  made  and  the  party  platforms  adopted.  It  is 
well  known  with  what  vigor  and  intensity  Stevens 
hated  the  Democratic  party.  That  party's  candidate 
for  Vice-President  in  1868,  Mr.  Frank  P.  Blair,  of 
Missouri,  was  especially  distasteful  to  Stevens,  partly 
for  personal  reasons,  partly  on  account  of  the  revolu 
tionary  policy  that  Blair  had  proposed  for  the  un 
doing  of  the  congressional  work  in  reconstruction.2 
When  Stevens  heard  it  suggested  in  the  House  that 
certain  loans  were  payable  only  in  gold,  he  broke  in 
boldly  with  his  well-known  declaration :  "  After 
they  fall  due  they  are  payable  in  money,  just  as  the 
gentleman  understands  money,  just  as  I  understand 
it,  just  as  we  all  understood  it  when  we  passed  the 
law  authorizing  that  loan;  just  as  it  was  a  dozen  times 

1  March  16,  1866.  Globe. 

2  See  Blair's  Brodhead  Letter. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     571 

explained  upon  the  floor  by  the  chairman  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Ways  and  Means  when  called  upon  by  gentle 
men  to  explain  what  it  meant,  and  just  as  the  whole 
House  agreed  that  it  meant.  I  want  to  say  that  if  I 
knew  that  any  party  in  this  country  would  go  for 
paying  in  coin  that  which  is  payable  in  money,  thus 
enhancing  it  one-half;  if  I  knew  there  was  such  a 
determination  this  day  on  the  part  of  my  party,  I 
would  vote  for  the  other  side,  Frank  Blair  and  all. 
I  would  vote  for  no  such  swindle  upon  the  taxpayers 
of  this  country;  I  \vould  vote  for  no  such  speculation 
in  favor  of  the  large  bondholders,  the  millionaires 
who  took  advantage  of  our  folly  in  granting  them 
coin  payment  of  interest.  And  I  declare  —  well,  it  is 
hard  to  say  it  —  but  if  even  Frank  Blair  stood  upon 
the  platform  of  paying  the  bonds  according  to  the 
contract,  and  the  Republican  candidates  stood  upon 
the  platform  of  paying  bloated  speculators  twice  the 
amount  which  we  agreed  to  pay  them,  then  I  would 
vote  for  Frank  Blair,  even  if  a  worse  man  than  Sey 
mour  headed  the  ticket.  That  is  all  I  want  to  say."  * 
This  expression,  indicating  that  Stevens  might  sup 
port  the  Democratic  party  in  the  campaign,  caused  his 
Republican  followers  some  annoyance.  It  met  with 
criticism  and  dissent  among  many  of  his  loyal  sup 
porters  at  home.  On  July  23,  1868,  Stevens  wrote  to 
the  Lancaster  Express  saying  that  he  "  had  not  de 
clared  for  Seymour  and  Blair  and  never  expected  to. 
I  have  only  declared,"  he  said,  "  against  fools  and 
swindlers  who  have  fabricated  the  most  atrocious 
falsehoods  as  to  my  position  on  the  currency  ques- 
1  Globe,  July  17,  1868,  p.  4178. 


572     THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

tion."  He  promised  when  he  was  a  little  stronger  to 
give  "  a  full  history  of  the  matter."  1  The  editor  ex 
pressed  the  hope  that  when  he  got  strong  enough  to 
write  the  "  history "  referred  to  he  would  "  avoid 
the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  his  letter,"  since 
calling  his  opponents  by  such  endearing  terms  as 
"  fools  and  swindlers  "  furnished  no  evidence  "  either 
of  his  own  wisdom  or  of  the  strength  of  his  position." 

The  "  history/'  as  we  know,  could  never  be  pre 
pared.  But  a  few  days  later,  July  30,  1868,  Stevens 
seemed  relieved  to  be  able  to  write  to  his  home  paper 
that  the  gold  question  was  settled  by  "  the  comprom 
ise  funding  bill "  of  Senator  Sherman.  He  ad 
mitted  that  the  vexed  question  of  what  kind  of  cur 
rency  the  five-twenties  were  payable  in,  had  been  dis 
cussed  in  an  unbecoming  temper  and  style,  so  far  as 
he  was  concerned.  The  settlement  now  arrived  at 
provided  for  bonds  equal  in  amount  to  the  five- 
twenties  with  interest  at  four  per  cent,  payable  in  coin 
after  thirty  and  forty  years.  This  reduced  the  na 
tional  loan  to  uniformity,  informed  every  bondholder 
what  and  how  much  he  is  to  receive,  and  showed,  as 
Stevens  had  contended,  that  "  there  was  a  difference 
in  value  between  the  original  five-twenties  and  what 
they  would  be  if  payable  in  coin." 

The  fact  that  Stevens,  while  descending  to  his 
grave,  seemed  relieved  to  accept  this  so-called  com 
promise,  which  was  but  a  meager  concession  to  his 
contention,  should  not  be  taken  to  indicate  that  he  had 
in  the  least  lost  faith  in  the  rightfulness  of  the  cause 
for  which  he  had  been  contending.  The  gold-paying 
1  Lancaster  Express,  July  25,  1868. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     573 

policy  and  the  rejection  of  the  greenback,  which  he 
had  denounced  so  vigorously,  was  but  part  of  a  sys 
tem, —  a  system  of  dishonored  and  mutilated  na 
tional  notes  and  of  gold  interest, —  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  Stevens  had  opposed  with  all  his  might  from 
the  beginning.  His  opposition  here  should  be  con 
sidered  as  a  part  of  his  opposition  to  the  system  as  a 
whole, —  that  war  system  of  finance,  the  like  of  which 
as  he  said,  "  no  human  folly  had  ever  before 
witnessed." 

This  system  or  policy  he  brought  into  public  review 
by  an  open  letter  to  an  old  German  constituent,  John 
Gyger,  a  banker  friend  in  Lancaster.  Gyger  wrote  a 
letter  to  Stevens  which  the  latter  prompted,  if  he 
did  not  compose,  and  Stevens  answered  the  letter. 
Stevens  thus  made  for  himself  an  opportunity  to  dis 
cuss  the  money  question. 

He  apparently  wrote  with  deep  feeling  and  convic 
tion,  as  one  would  who  had  been  the  witness  and  an 
tagonist  of  a  great  wrong  and  injustice  that  had  been 
cunningly  wrought  upon  an  unsuspecting  people. 
"  Would  to  God,"  he  said,  "  that  my  intellectual  vigor 
might  increase  in  proportion  to  my  disease  that  I 
might  properly  depict  this  important  subject  to  the 
American  people." 

The  appeal  to  commercial  integrity  and  national 
honor  in  support  of  this  "  monstrous  swindle  on  the 
part  of  European  capitalists  "  excited  his  contempt 
and  spirit  of  satire.  "  Who  are  these  reasoners,"  he 
asked,  "  who  talk  so  learnedly  of  the  laws  of  finance 
and  the  morality  of  human  dealings,  whose  con 
sciences  are  so  raw  and  stick  out  so  far  from  their 


574     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

excited  covering  that  no  pharmaceutist  can  heal  their 
inward  wound  ?  "  The  plain  truth  was  as  Stevens 
saw  it,  this  system  that  had  been  instituted  by  the 
bullion  dealers  was  but  "  a  gambling  game  in  the  two 
unequal  legal  tender  moneys."  "  Hopes  were  excited 
much  more  rampant  than  the  lottery  dealers  or  the 
faro  players;  and  in  the  belief  that  a  single  turn  of 
the  cards  would  bring  up  the  holder's  fortune, 
palaces  were  opened  for  the  purpose  of  inviting  specu 
lation  and  dealings  in  this  new  system  of  gambling. 
Some  became  rich  while  others  went  to  beggary. 
Everything  became  excited  and  inflated,  from  the 
commonest  fabric  to  the  most  valuable  estate.  Thus 
the  cost  of  the  war  was  vastly  increased,  but  the 
honest  Jews  of  the  gold  room,  Shadrach,  Meshach, 
and  Abednego,  came  out  unsinged." 

Stevens  said  he  would  not  begrudge  the  poor  specu 
lator  or  the  rich  capitalist  his  earning  who  has  en 
tered  the  gold  room  a  beggar  and  come  out  with  a 
princely  fortune.  That  is  not  his  folly,  but  the  folly 
of  the  government  which  "  though  a  hundred  times 
warned  would  never  take  heed." 

He  believed  that  this  gambling  of  the  "  gold 
room  "  was  directly  promoted  by  the  policy  of  estab 
lishing  two  kinds  of  money  and  making  gold  a  fa 
vored  kind.  "  The  government's  gold  sales "  were 
used  to  help  on  the  speculative  tendency,  and  in  some 
instances,  as  Stevens  believed,  the  treasury  seemed 
to  be  controlled  in  the  interests  of  the  gold  brokers.1 

1  Stevens  had  reasons  for  these  suspicions  and  he  was  not 
without  knowledge  on  gold  manipulations.  In  1866  the  govern 
ment  offered  gold  for  sale  by  Van  Dyck,  the  assistant  treas 
urer,  through  one  Myers,  a  broker,  between  whom  and  the 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     575 

The  seven-thirty  notes  of  1861,  issued  when  we  had 
no  other  currency  than  gold,  were  paid  in  greenbacks 
in  1864;  the  gold-paying  public  creditor  for  the  gold 
he  had  paid  to  the  government  was  obliged  either  to 
take  his  pay  in  greenbacks  for  commercial  use  or  take 
them  and  convert  them  into  bonds.  That  whole  loan 
was  thus  redeemed.  These  were  short  time,  little 
creditors,  among  the  common  people,  the  "  hand  to 
mouth  men,"  who  had  made  a  temporary  loan  of  their 
good  gold  to  save  the  government.  The  big  gold 
brokers  had  no  compunctions  about  cheating  them, 
but  the  heavy  long  bond  creditors  you  must  not  cheat ; 
you  must  let  them  cheat  you.1  The  loans  were  to  be 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury  there  was  a  family  connection;  and 
it  was  charged  that  Myers  owed  his  appointment  as  _  selling 
agent  of  the  government  entirely  to  this  family  relationship. 
Myers  and  another  broker  played  into  each  other's  hands, 
the  treasury,  through  Myers,  selling  gold  till  the  price  came 
down  from  140  to  124,  Myers'  partner  buying  heavily  at  the 
lower  figures.  The  partner  then  held  his  accumulations  till  the 
price  went  up  to  144,  the  merchants  who  needed  the  gold  for 
customs  dues  being  compelled  to  go  to  those  who  had  it.  Thou 
sands  of  dollars  changed  hands.  It  was  a  plain  case  of  Wall 
Street  thimble-rigging,  and  the  treasury  officials  were  sus 
piciously  close  to  the  deal.  A  Philadelphia  merchant  com 
plained  of  these  processes  in  a  letter  to  Stevens  and  Thomas  J. 
Stewart,  of  New  York,  repeatedly  wrote  to  him  of  them,  urging 
public  exposure.  The  favored  brokers  knew  when  the  treas 
ury  would  offer  gold  and  depress  the  price.  Stewart  said  that 
"the  treasury  of  the  United  States  in  this  city  has  been  used 
by  Van  Dyck,  Myers,  and  their  secret  association  as  an  enor 
mous  fund  in  their  gold  speculating.  Millions  have  been  made 
and  will  continue  to  be  made  unless  a  vote  of  censure  is  passed 
by  Congress."  The  result  was  a  resolution  offered  in  the 
House  calling  on  Secretary  McCulloch  for  an  explanation. 
Stewart  expressed  the  hope  that  Stevens  would  recover  his 
health  and  "  stand  on  the  quarter-deck  of  the  House  while  this 
battle  rages."  Men  believed  that  God  had  given  to  Thaddeus 
Stevens  a  heart  of  honesty  and  a  tongue  with  a  hot  vocabulary 
for  just  fights  as  these  abuses  called  for.  Stevens'  Correspond 
ence,  1866.  See  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce,  June  7,  1866. 
1  This  is  adapted  as  expressing  Stevens'  view  from  a  speech 
of  B.  F.  Butler,  Nov.  26,  27,  1867,  Globe,  Appendix,  p.  29,  1st 
Sess.,  Fortieth  Cong. 


576      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

paid  in  coin  only  when  they  had  been  contracted  for 
in  large  job  lots  for  rich  capitalists  or  foreign  holders, 
and  when  they  had  been  bought  with  cheap  depre 
ciated  money, —  a  money  that  had  been  made  cheap  by 
the  very  policy  of  these  gold  dealers. 

The  claim  had  been  set  up  that  these  bonds  were 
payable  in  gold  because  Stevens  had  not  said  when  the 
act  was  passed  that  the  principal  was  payable  in  cur 
rency.  Stevens  retorted  that  he  had  not  said  so  be 
cause  he  did  not  suppose  that  anybody  but  a  fool 
would  think  they  were  not  payable  in  currency.  The 
11  old  man  sarcastic,"  as  Ben  Butler  called  him,  was 
generally  able  to  take  care  of  himself  in  these  con 
gressional  bouts. 

When  in  1862  the  legal  tender  measure  was  forced 
by  necessity,  "  no  one,  I  suppose,"  said  Stevens, 
"  doubted  that  the  loans  of  the  United  States  of 
every  description  were  payable  in  money  of  the  United 
States  of  every  description.  But  to  change  that  as 
pect  the  New  York  money  changers  appeared,  Jew 
and  Gentile,  mingling  in  sweet  communion,  to  dis 
cover  some  cunning  invention  to  make  in  a  day  what 
it  would  take  weeks  for  honest  men  to  earn.  They 
went  to  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  and  asked 
that  the  interest  be  payable  in  coin,  leaving  the  princi 
pal  as  it  was.  The  committee  utterly  rejected  the  ab 
surd  proposition  of  two  currencies  —  two  legal  tend 
ers  —  in  the  same  empire  and  for  the  same  com 
modities.  The  brokers  then  resorted  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury.  He  was  more  easily  persuaded 
and  went  with  them  to  the  Senate  Committee  to  urge 
the  change.  The  Senate  agreed  and  sent  back  the  bill 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     577 

so  amended.  The  House  disagreed,  but  in  confer 
ence  was  forced  to  consent  to  make  the  interest  pay 
able  in  a  different  kind  of  currency  than  the  loan  it 
self.  To  get  the  coin  customs  dues  were  made  pay 
able  in  that.  Thus  as  any  one  can  see,  the  Congress 
declared  that  while  she  created  two  kinds  of  money, 
she  had  made  them  of  unequal  value  and  for  different 
purposes." 

Stevens  had  once  made  a  calculation  to  ascertain 
the  difference  between  the  two  modes  of  paying,  and 
he  had  brought  in  bills  in  hope  of  saving  the  differ 
ence.  "  But  each  session  the  noise  of  the  gold  room 
was  much  louder  than  what  I  was  pleased  to  call  the 
voice  of  reason.  Take  $100  and  count  it  into  green 
backs,  when  gold  was  high.  It  will  produce  $281. 
So  convert  or  use  it  every  day  for  a  year  and  you 
have  $66,000, —  the  gold-bearers  costing  the  govern 
ment  that  much  more  than  the  legal  tenders.  The 
gold  exchange  on  the  basis  of  the  daily  cost  of  the 
war  cost  the  government  $1,600,000,000  more  than 
the  straight  use  of  the  greenbacks  would  have  done." 

He  believed  that  the  present  and  prospective  busi 
ness  of  the  country  would  fairly  absorb  an  amount  of 
currency  large  enough  to  redeem  these  bonds  as  they 
became  due,  say  $4,000,000  monthly,  so  as  impercept 
ibly  to  affect  the  currency.  Business  men  were  com 
plaining  that  the  retiring  of  $4,000,000  of  currency 
without  a  substitute  causes  a  stringency  in  the  money 
market  very  injurious  to  business.  The  additional 
issue  of  that  amount  would  be  better  and  would  be 
taken  up  without  injuring  business  by  undue  expan 
sion. 


578     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Stevens  denied  that  he  wished  to  delay  specie  pay 
ments,  and  he  claimed  to  believe,  with  everybody  else, 
that  that  was  a  desirable  end  to  be  attained  as  soon 
as  possible.  His  notion  about  resumption  was  that 
the  sooner  the  government  converts  all  its  indebted 
ness  into  a  paper  currency  which  the  people  will  be 
willing  to  accept  as  a  long  loan  and  to  a  considerable 
amount,  the  sooner  it  would  be  able  to  resume  specie 
payments.  If  the  end  could  ever  have  been  accom 
plished  in  this  way,  the  course  would  certainly  have 
been  a  longer  way  round  though  it  might  have  been 
easier.  Herein  lay  Stevens'  error  and  inconsistency, 
as  a  Greenbacker.  His  true  course  lay,  as  he  hardly 
seemed  to  perceive,  in  disregarding  specie  payments 
altogether,  and  in  looking  upon  the  use  of  gold  and 
silver  in  the  currency  as  altogether  unnecessary  and 
incidental,  as  something  that  might  come  in  time  by 
the  natural  order  of  trade  and  development,  but 
about  which  there  need  be  no  concern.  He  claimed 
anxiety  to  resume  the  use  of  coin  as  a  legal  tender  not 
because  it  is  any  better  as  a  measure  of  value  or  as  a 
token  of  debt,  but  because  it  had  been  adopted  by 
most  of  the  other  civilized  nations.  "  But  I  do  not 
wish,"  he  said,  "  to  resume  by  breaking  the  bones  of 
every  manufacturer,  mechanic,  and  agriculturist  for 
the  benefit  of  foreign  operators  who  have  now  their 
fixed  capital  in  these  loans." 

To  pay  these  loans  according  to  the  contract  would 
have  saved,  according  to  Stevens'  calculation,  $737,- 
000,000.  That  is  about  the  sum  which,  as  alleged, 
the  greenbacks  had  added  to  the  cost  of  the  war. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      579 

"  But  tender  consciences  have  compelled  the  nation  to 
pay  this  debt  in  coin  because  Jay  Cooke  and  the  Tri 
bune  have  pledged  their  word  that  it  should  be  so 
paid.  I  have  no  objection  to  their  paying  it,  but  I 
dislike  to  take  the  balance  left  me  by  the  rebels  to  pay 
my  part." 

How  does  the  case  appear  to  a  plain  honest  man, 
—  to  the  farmer  or  laborer  who  earns  an  honest  living 
by  the  sweat  of  his  brow?  Is  his  conscience  violated, 
his  elemental  sense  of  justice  outraged  by  an  honest 
payment  according  to  the  contract?  Here  is  the  case 
as  Stevens  illustrated  it:  A  capitalist  takes  $400  in 
gold.  It  buys  $1000  in  bonds  by  first  buying  $1000 
in  greenbacks.  At  the  next  yearly  interest  payment 
he  gets  6  per  cent,  in  gold  on  $1000.  That  is  15  per 
cent,  above  taxes  on  his  investment.  He  continues  to 
draw  at  that  rate  while  the  debt  runs.  He  now  de 
mands  that  the  principal  also  be  paid  in  gold,  which 
would  net  250  per  cent,  more  on  the  investment. 
"  This  is  what  they  call  honor,  conscience,  justice, 
through  the  custom  of  the  country,  and  they  tell  the 
farmers  of  America  that  they  are  in  honor  bound  to 
pay  the  money  dealers  of  Europe  this  enormous  rate 
to  save  their  property  from  destruction;  and  the 
moral  (?)  men  of  New  York  denounce  you  and  me 
and  others  as  dishonorable  robbers  and  swindlers  if 
we  do  not  in  forty  years  quadruple  the  capital  of  the 
Rothschilds,  Goldsmiths,  and  other  large  money  deal 
ers.  I  must  beg  leave  to  judge  for  myself  of  this 
monstrous  proposition  and  to  see  whether  I  am  in 
honor  bound  to  pay  any  more  than  he  demands  who, 


580     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

with  pistol  at  my  breast,  commands  me  to  stand  and 
deliver."  l 

Such  are  the  merits  of  the  issue  on  funding  and 
paying  the  war  debt  as  Stevens  brought  them  into  re 
view  a  few  months  before  his  death. 

The  capitalistic  press  denounced  the  policy  advo 
cated  by  Stevens  as  a  "  greenback  confiscation,"  as 
"  a  wholesale  act  of  repudiation,"  and.  as  "  a  breach 
of  faith  toward  a  class,  the  bankers  and  money 
lenders,  who  gave  most  noble  succor  to  the  nation 
in  her  hour  of  trial,"  as  one  of  the  clerical  teachers 
of  financial  honor  saw  fit  to  express  it.2  The  New 
York  press  generally  referred  to  Stevens'  views  as 
"  eccentric."  But  Stevens'  "  eccentric "  views  con 
sisted  merely  in  constant  opposition  to  the  financial 
policy  pursued  by  the  government  for  six  full  years, 
and  in  a  belief  that  by  that  policy  the  government  had 
thrown  away  millions  by  mismanagement,  and  that 
those  who  loaned  money  to  the  government  were  paid 
back  two  or  three  times  over  what  they  were  justly 
entitled  to.  A  fair  perusal  of  the  record  is  likely  to 
lead  the  unbiased  layman,  if  not  the  "  professional  fin 
ancier,"  to  Stevens'  conclusion.  The  system  of 
greenbacks  and  gold  payments  adopted  from  1862  to 

1  Open  Letter  of  Stevens  to  John  Gyger,  Banker,  Nov.  4,  1867, 
in  Cincinnati  Commercial,  Nov.  12,  1867. 

2  "  Repudiation,"     "  cheating,"     "  dishonor/'     "  destroying     the 
national    credit,"    were    the    cheap    terms    of    abuse    employed 
against  those  who   opposed  the  gold-bond,  specie-paying  policy. 
Of  course,  Stevens  did  not  escape  these  flings.    "  But,  if  in  all 
this    broad    land,"    said    Mr.    Forney,    who    knew    Stevens    well, 
"  there   is    a   man   who   hates    repudiation   more  than   Thaddeus 
Stevens   we  do  not  know  him.     There  was  a  time  in   Pennsyl 
vania  when  he   fought  against  that  crime   and  crushed   it  with 
his  Titanic  blows."    Philadelphia  Press,  Sept  12,  1865. 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION      581 

1869  richly  deserved  Stevens'  "  oft  defeated  "  efforts 
in  resistance  as  well  as  his  "  oft-repeated  "  denuncia 
tions.  For  one  may  well  doubt  whether  there  was 
ever  a  more  outrageous  fleecing  and  robbery  of  a  pa 
triotic  people  than  that  perpetrated  through  the  in 
fluence  of  capitalists  and  money  lenders  by  the 
manipulation  of  government  finance  during  and  im 
mediately  following  the  American  Civil  War. 

The  shrewd  and  the  unscrupulous  rich  are  ever 
seeking  to  use  the  government  and  control  the  laws 
for  the  exploitation  of  the  masses.  The  cunning 
hand  was  at  work  w7hile  true  men  were  at  the  front 
in  the  dark  and  trying  days  of  the  Civil  War.  While 
the  homes  of  the  nation  were  anxiously  watching  the 
fortunes  of  war;  while  the  mass  of  the  people,  in  pa 
triotic  ardor,  were  seeking  to  safeguard  the  welfare 
of  the  Union,  there  were  selfish  and  unscrupulous 
men  who  seized  upon  the  situation  merely  for  the  base 
purpose  of  making  money  out  of  the  necessities  of 
the  country.  To  gain  cent  per  cent,  was  the  only  call 
which  the  war  and  the  state  of  the  country  presented 
to  them.  The  Old  Commoner  despised  such  men, 
and  they  knew  full  well  that  they  could  not  use  him 
for  their  purposes.  He  withstood  them  to  their  face. 
Their  course,  then,  was  to  break  him  down,  to  destroy 
the  weight  of  his  influence  and  opinions  with  the 
country.  Untrained  as  he  was  for  this  special  prob 
lem;  worried  by  the  distractions  of  a  thousand  public 
cares  in  many  directions;  opposed  as  he  was  by  the 
organs  of  traditional  and  orthodox  opinion  on  ques 
tions  of  money,  it  is  surprising  that  he  put  up  as 


582      THE  LIFE  OF!  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

strong  a  fight  as  he  did  on  the  financial  issues  that  he 
was  forced  to  meet. 

He  was  defeated  in  the  policies  that  he  sought 
to  have  adopted.  But  the  ideas  that  he  accepted  and 
promulgated  were  not  destined  to  disappear.  The 
struggle  that  he  had  upon  these  questions  and  the  op 
position  that  he  encountered  led  him  to  take  a  radical 
and  an  advanced  position  on  the  subject  of  money. 
He  went  to  the  root  of  the  question,  as  his  radical 
mind  and  temper  led  him  to  do,  and  he  announced 
principles  of  money  utterly  subversive  of  the  gold 
standard  and  the  moneyed  interest  He  came  to  be 
lieve  in  a  uniform  national  currency,  issued  as  bills  of 
credit  by  the  general  government  alone.  "  Money  is 
the  creature  of  law/'  he  said,  "  just  what  the  law 
makes  it."  He  had  come  to  the  faith  that  the  gov 
ernment  has  the  constitutional  power  to  make  money 
of  whatever  material  it  chooses,  whether  metal,  paper, 
leather,  tin,  nickel,  greenbacks,  or  old  bones.  The 
material  does  not  matter,  except  for  convenience.  It 
is  quantity  and  use  that  count.  If  money  be  too 
abundant  or  too  scarce  it  is  of  no  consequence 
whether  it  be  coin  or  paper.  One  thousand  million 
too  much  of  gold  is  just  as  injurious  in  inflating  prices 
as  one  thousand  million  too  much  of  greenbacks. 
And  he  desired  that  the  volume  of  money  be  regulated 
by  a  sovereign  representative  government  in  the  in 
terests  of  the  toilers  and  producers  and  not  by  combi 
nations  of  capitalists  controlling  the  gold  of  the  world 
in  the  interests  of  moneyed  classes. 

These  views  of  money  have  been  accepted  by  mil 
lions  of  his  countrymen  since  the  day  when  Stevens 


DEBT  PAYMENT  AND  CONTRACTION     583 

contended  for  them  without  much  public  support.  If 
it  be  said  that  experience  has  not  vindicated  them,  it 
may  be  answered  that  in  many  respects  they  have  been 
vindicated  and  that  Time,  the  unceasing  worker,  has 
not  yet  wrought  out  all  the  causes  and  issues  on  that 
subject  which  are  in  store.  By  the  "  experts  "  and 
"  financiers  "  the  doctrines  of  Stevens  have  been  rid 
iculed  as  the  vagaries  of  foolishness.  But  in  the  light 
of  fifty  years  of  controversy  on  questions  of  finance, 
it  is  not  unreasonable  to  say  that  the  final  word  of 
wisdom  on  money  and  its  uses  may  be  found  to  be 
much  nearer  to  the  ideas  of  Stevens,  the  Greenbacker, 
than  his  hostile  critics  ever  conceived  it  possible  to 
believe. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

CLOSING   DAYS   AND    CHARACTERISTICS 

AFTER  Stevens'  last  formal  speech  on  impeach 
ment  his  words  in  the  House  were  confined  to 
brief  colloquy  while  he  was  suffering  under  weakness 
of  body.1 

Two  days  later  in  July,  1868,  he  offered  from  the 
Committee  on  Education  in  the  District  of  Columbia 
a  bill  to  establish  free  schools  for  the  District.  It 
was  the  last  measure  he  ever  offered  in  the  House, — 
a  fitting  final  act  of  his  career,  as  the  first  cause  that 
had  brought  great  honor  to  his  name  was  the  cause 
of  free  education.  He  would  have  no  child  in  the 
republic  grow  up  in  ignorance.  This  education  of 
the  children  for  citizenship  should  not  be  only '  the 
concern  of  the  church  and  of  private  beneficence  but  it 
should  be  the  highest  and  constant  concern  of  the 
state;  and  not  of  the  commonwealth  alone,  but  of  the 
nation  at  large,  in  every  case  wherein  the  power  to 
care  for  this  great  cause  had  been  bestowed. 

Thaddeus  Stevens  died  in  Washington  City  at 
twelve  o'clock  midnight,  August  n,  1868,  aged 
seventy-six  years,  four  months  and  seven  days.  The 
closing  scenes  of  his  life  were  of  an  impressive  char 
acter.  His  nephew,  Thaddeus  Stevens  Jr.,  and  Mrs. 
Lydia  Smith,  his  colored  housekeeper,  were  at  hJs 

1  See  p.  505. 

584 


CLOSING  DAYS  585 

bedside,  also  Sister  Loretta  and  Sister  Genevieve, 
colored  sisters  of  charity  of  the  Providence  Hospital, 
who  had  been  visiting  him  daily  in  his  illness  and 
whose  benevolent  and  charitable  work  had  been  so 
heartily  supported  by  Stevens  in  personal  and  legisla 
tive  efforts.1 

On  the  afternoon  of  his  death  he  talked  with  cheer 
fulness  and  animation.  The  doctor  had  changed  his 
medicine  and  Stevens,  noticing  the  change,  remarked, 
"  Well,  this  is  a  square  fight,"  and  his  face  lightened 
up  with  a  grim  smile  of  mingled  humor  and  deter 
mination.  He  commented  on  Seward's  purchase  of 
Alaska  saying  that  it  was  "  the  biggest  thing  in  his 
life,"  and  if  he  could  have  purchased  Samana  it  would 
have  been  "  the  crowning  event  of  his  whole  career." 
He  remarked  to  a  relative,  Simon  Stevens,  "  Simon, 
the  great  questions  of  the  day  are  reconstruction, 
the  finances,  and  the  railway  system  of  the  coun 
try."  He  seemed  somewhat  anxious  about  the  state 
of  the  country  because  of  indication  of  trouble  in 
Louisiana.  He  referred  with  kindness  and  confi 
dence  to  William  M.  Evarts  whom  he  called  "  a  sound 
lawyer  and  statesman,"  who  would  "  so  advise  the 
President  as  to  make  unnecessary  a  meeting  of  Con 
gress  in  September,"  which  Stevens  was  anxious  to 
avoid.  At  seven  o'clock  two  colored  ministers,  Rev 
erend  Mr.  Hall  and  Reverend  Mr.  Reed,  arrived  and 
requested  permission  to  see  Mr.  Stevens  and  pray  with 
h  m.  When  asked  if  they  should  do  so  he  said,  "  Oh, 

1  Mr.  Stevens  had  secured  a  special  congressional  appropria 
tion  of  thirty  thousand  dollars  for  this  institution,  in  spite  of 
great  opposition.  It  was  a  Washington  charity  for  negroes. 


586      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

yes."  As  they  approached  his  bedside  he  looked 
toward  them,  nodded  his  head  and  smiled.  Reverend 
Mr.  Hall  said,  "  Mr.  Stevens,  you  have  the  prayers  of 
all  the  colored  people  of  the  country."  About  ten  min 
utes  before  his  death  Sister  Loretta  requested  the  per 
mission  of  his  friends  to  perform  the  baptismal  rite, 
and  no  objection  being  offered,  the  impressive  cere 
mony  was  performed  amid  reverential  silence.  Mrs. 
Smith,  the  colored  housekeeper,  knelt  at  the  foot  of  the 
bed  while  the  sisters,  also  kneeling,  continued  to  read 
the  prayers  for  the  departing  soul.  The  plaintive  tones 
of  the  holy  sisters,  the  repressed  and  troubled  breath 
ing  of  the  dying  man,  mingled  with  the  sobs  of  his 
nephew  and  of  his  faithful  friend  and  housekeeper, 
Mrs.  Smith,  were  indications  of  coming  death.  The 
annalist  relates  that  "  the  clock  struck  twelve,  and  in 
three  minutes  he  was  dead.  His  last  hour  was  one 
of  tranquillity,  and  when  death  came  he  passed  calmly 
and  peacefully  away  as  though  falling  into  a  sweet 
slumber."  l 

The  body  lay  in  state  in  the  rotunda  of  the  Capitol 
for  two  days  and  was  then  taken  to  Lancaster  by 
special  train.  At  the  tomb  the  Reverend  Bishop  Big- 
ler  of  the  Moravian  church  read  the  Ninetieth  Psalm. 
Reverend  E.  H.  Nevin  of  the  Presbyterian  church 
offered  prayer.  The  services  of  the  Lutheran  church 
were  read  by  Reverend  W.  V.  Getwald,  and  Doctor 
Wombert  delivered  an  address  on  the  life  and  services 
of  Stevens. 

1  Lancaster  Express,  August  12,  1868,  and  the  current  number 
of  the  Philadelphia  Press. 


CLOSING  DAYS  587 

The  death  of  Stevens  occurred  four  days  before  his 
expected  renomination  for  Congress.  Martin  S.  Fry, 
the  chairman  of  the  Republican  County  Committee, 
after  consultation  with  party  leaders,  recommended 
that,  "  as  a  fitting  tribute  to  the  memory  of  our  most 
able  and  distinguished  champion  of  freedom  and  jus 
tice  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  party  be  cast  for  the 
name  of  Thaddeus  Stevens  in  the  ensuing  primary 
meetings  and  that  arrangements  be  made  later  for 
filling  the  vacancy."  This  was  done  as  a  last  political 
tribute  and  testimonial  of  the  confidence  and  esteem 
in  which  Thaddeus  Stevens  was  held  by  his  constit 
uents  and  neighbors. 

Among  the  papers  in  the  court  records  of  Lancaster 
County  may  be  found  the  last  will  and  testament  of 
Thaddeus  Stevens.  Many  of  the  items  of  the  will  are 
significant  and  characteristic.  The  biographer  de 
ciphered  from  the  difficult  handwriting  of  Stevens 
himself  the  following  bequests: 

"  To  the  town  of  Peacham,  Vermont,  one  thousand  dol 
lars  at  six  per  cent.,  in  aid  of  the  Library  Association  which 
was  founded  at  the  Caledonia  County  Academy, —  if  the 
same  is  still  in  existence. 

"  To  the  Trustees  of  the  graveyard  in  which  my  mother 
and  brother  are  buried  in  the  town  of  Peacham,  Vermont, 
five  hundred  dollars,  the  interest  to  be  annually  paid  to  the 
sexton  on  condition  that  he  keep  the  graves  in  good  order 
and  plant  roses  and  other  cheerful  flowers  at  each  of  the 
four  corners  of  said  graves  every  spring. 

"  If  either  of  said  legacies  should  lapse  the  same  shall  go 
to  the  support  of  the  Baptist  church,  or  meeting,  nearest  to 
Danville  Center,  my  native  town  in  Vermont." 


588     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

To  his  housekeeper,  Lydia  Smith,  he  gave  five  hun 
dred  dollars  a  year  for  the  rest  of  her  life,  or,  if  she 
chose  instead,  she  might  have  a  lump  sum  of  five  thou 
sand  dollars.  She  was  permitted  to  occupy  his  house 
for  five  years. 

To  his  nephew,  Thaddeus  W.  Stevens,  of  Indian 
apolis,  he  gave  two  thousand  dollars.  He  provided, 
also,  that  if  at  the  end  of  any  five  years  Thaddeus 
should  show  that  he  had  totally  abstained  from  all  in 
toxicating  drinks  during  that  time,  the  trustees  might 
convey  to  him  one-fourth  of  the  whole  property;  and 
if  at  the  end  of  the  next  successive  five-year  period 
Thaddeus  should  show  that  he  had  totally  abstained 
from  all  intoxicating  drinks,  he  should  have  another 
fourth  of  the  property,  and,  if  he  fulfilled  the  same 
condition  for  another  five-year  period,  he  was  to  have 
the  whole  property  in  fee  simple. 

Here  was  a  lesson  and  an  inducement  to  temper 
ance  for  young  Thaddeus,  but  he  was  not  able  to  bear 
it.  He  was  not  able  to  qualify  for  his  inheritance 
under  the  terms  of  the  will,  and,  as  in  that  case  pro 
vided,  the  remaining  aggregate  property  was  to  go 
"  to  erect,  establish  and  endow  a  house  of  refuge  for 
the  relief  of  homeless  orphans."  The  sum  of  twenty 
thousand  dollars  was  to  be  expended  in  building,  and 
the  orphans  were  to  be  provided  a  home  till  they  had 
reached  the  age  of  fifteen,  and  longer  if  they  were 
infirm.  They  were  to  be  educated  carefully  in  the 
English  branches  and  in  all  industrial  pursuits.  No 
preference  was  to  be  shown  on  account  of  race  or 
color  in  admission  or  treatment,  and  no  one  should  be 
excluded  on  account  of  the  race  or  religion  of  his 


CLOSING  DAYS  589 

parents,  and  all  should  be  educated  alike  in  the  same 
classes,  and  fed  at  the  same  table. 

In  a  separate  codicil  to  his  will  Stevens  provided 
that  one  thousand  dollars  be  paid  to  Pennsylvania  Col 
lege,  at  Gettysburg,  for  the  use  of  Stevens  Hall  In 
another  he  said,  "  I  bought  John  Shertz'  property  at 
sheriff's  sale  at  much  below  its  value.  I  only  want  my 
own.  All  except  three  hundred  dollars,  the  proceeds 
of  it  and  the  interest,  I  direct  shall  be  returned  to  the 
estate."  In  another  codicil  he  provided  that  one  thou 
sand  dollars  be  paid  to  the  Baptist  church  in  Lancaster 
for  a  new  church  building.  "  I  do  this,"  he  said,  "  out 
of  respect  to  the  memory  of  my  mother  to  whom  I  owe 
what  little  of  prosperity  I  have  had  on  earth,  and 
which,  small  as  it  is,  I  desire  emphatically  to  acknowl 
edge." 

The  will  is  of  interest  since  it  reveals  something  of 
the  character  of  Stevens  and  the  interests  and  pur 
poses  of  his  life.  It  was  more  than  twenty  years  be 
fore  the  estate  was  finally  settled  up  by  the  admin 
istrators  and  then  it  was  found  that  the  proceeds  and 
residue  of  the  property  amounted  to  about  forty 
thousand  dollars.  This  sum  was  supplemented  by  an 
appropriation  by  the  state  of  Pennsylvania  and  was 
devoted  to  the  establishment  of  Stevens  Institute,  an 
industrial  school  for  poor  boys  and  girls.  Its  worthy 
site  and  buildings  in  the  suburbs  are  an  ornament  to 
the  city  of  Lancaster.  The  work  this  school  is  doing 
and  will  continue  to  do  will  be  a  fitting  memorial  in 
the  years  to  come  to  the  commoner  of  Pennsylvania. 

It  would  not  seem  at  all  fitting  to  close  a  biography 
of  Thaddeus  Stevens  without  some  reference  to  the 


590     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

anecdotes  and  stories  that  gathered  about  his  life;  — 
especially  is  this  so  since  these  anecdotes  aid,  in  a 
way,  in  the  revelation  of  his  character. 

The  Stevens  stories  are  innumerable, —  perhaps 
about  no  other  man  in  American  history  have  more 
good  stories  been  gathered.  Colonel  John  W.  Forney 
in  his  sketch  of  Stevens  l  says  that  no  justice  can  be 
done  to  the  story  side  of  his  life,  and  that  "  if  some 
congenial  Boswell  had  been  by  his  side  there  might 
have  been  collected  a  volume  of  his  sayings."  It  is 
to  be  regretted  that  a  suitable  and  reliable  collection 
was  not  made  by  a  contemporary  and  friend  compe 
tent  to  perform  that  task.  Stevens'  wit  was  spontane 
ous,  never  studied  nor  artificial.  His  jokes  sprang 
from  the  circumstance  in  which  he  found  himself; 
none  was  ever  lugged  in  for  the  sake  of  the  joke  it 
self.  He  was  not  a  story  teller,  but  he  was  strong  in 
retort,  in  repartee,  in  quaint  interrogatory.  His  fine 
sense  of  humor  he  carried  with  him  in  disease  and  af 
fliction  even  to  his  death-bed.  His  friend  John  Hick- 
man  visited  him  in  his  last  illness,  and  remarked  how 
well  he  appeared.  "  Ah,  John,"  was  Stevens'  quick 
reply,  "  it  is  not  my  appearance  but  my  disappearance 
"*  that  troubles  me."  When  a  House  member  was  pacing 
the  aisle,  walking  up  and  down  and  back  and  forth 
during  his  speech,  Stevens,  after  watching  the  peri 
patetic  performance  for  a  while,  called  out  to  this  mem 
ber,  "  Mr.  -  -  do  you  expect  to  collect  mileage  for 
that  speech  ?  " 

Mr.  Justin  S.  Morrill  who  served  with  Stevens  for 
many  years  in  the  House  says  that  "  never,  indeed,  was 
1  Published  in  the  Philadelphia  Press,  August,  1868. 


CHARACTERISTICS  591 

wit  of  all  varieties,  coarse  and  fine,  exhibited  in  more 
bewildering  profusion.  He  daily  wasted  ...  in  his 
distribution  of  mirth,  sense,  and  satire  ...  a  capital 
sufficient,  could  it  have  been  preserved,  to  rival  almost 
any  of  the  acknowledged  masters  among  the  collo 
quial  wits  of  this  or  possibly  of  any  age."  1  Much  of 
his  wit  was  personal,  too,  frequently  partaking  of  the 
gall  of  bitterness,  but  it  was  generally  remarked  even 
by  those  who  suffered  from  his  unerring  shafts  that 
no  man  was  more  ready  to  repair  the  injuries  he  in 
flicted.  Once  his  vote  was  solicited  at  a  general  elec 
tion  in  Lancaster  by  an  impecunious  and  incompetent 
man  who  was  a  candidate  for  "  Poor  Commissioner." 

"  Certainly,"  said  Stevens,  in  a  most  amiable  way, 
"  we  should  make  you  Poor  Commissioner,  for  I  know 
of  no  one  in  all  Lancaster  county  who  would  make  a 
poorer  Commissioner  than  you." 

A  judge  in  court,  somewhat  ruffled  by  Stevens'  evi 
dent  disgust  and  subdued  expressions  of  displeasure 
at  some  of  the  court's  rulings,  intimated  that  Stevens, 
if  he  were  not  careful,  might  be  arraigned  for  man 
ifesting  contempt  of  court.  "  Manifesting  contempt, 
your  Honor!"  said  Stevens.  "Sir,  I  am  doing  my 
very  best  to  conceal  it." 

It  was  always  a  delight  to  the  man,  who  despised  a 
trimmer,  and  to  his  party  adversaries  who  admired 
the  bold  and  honest  candor  with  which  Stevens  ex 
pressed  his  political  opinions  and  programs,  to  listen 
to  his  frequent  exposures  of  the  pretenses,  conceal 
ments,  evasions,  and  the  wavering  weakness  of  some  of 
his  party  associates.  A  notable  instance  was  in  his 

1  Senate  Memorial  Speeches,   Globe,  December  18,   1868. 


592      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

proposing  that  messengers  be  sent  to  the  lobby  of  the 
House  to  inform  the  weak-kneed  Northern  Whigs  who 
had  dodged  the  vote  on  the  historic  Fugitive  Slave  Law 
in  1850,  that  they  might  safely  return  to  the  hall  now 
that  the  vote  had  been  taken  and  the  bill  had  passed. 
On  one  occasion  a  member  who  seemed  to  have  no  con 
victions  on  any  question  and  who  often  confessed  that 
he  seldom  investigated  a  subject  without  finding  him 
self  a  neutral,  asked  for  a  leave  of  absence  and  a  pair. 
"  Mr.  Speaker,"  said  Stevens,  "  I  do  not  rise  to  ob 
ject,  but  to  suggest  that  the  honorable  member  need 
not  ask  this  favor  for  he  can  easily  pair  off  with  him 
self." 

He  wished  his  party  colleagues  and  his  party  to 
stand  out  boldly.  In  June,  1868,  a  few  weeks  before 
his  death,  he  expressed  his  dissatisfaction  with  the  plat 
form  of  his  party  which  had  just  been  framed  by  his 
party  convention  for  the  contest  of  that  memorable 
year.  He  called  it  "  tame  and  cowardly  "  on  the  sub 
ject  of  the  suffrage,  which  his  party  was  unwilling  to 
confer  upon  the  negroes  in  the  North.  "  For  twenty 
years  before  the  war,"  he  wrote,  "  the  North  behaved 
like  poltroons  in  all  their  legislative  controversies  with 
slavery.  They  have  much  more  physical  than  moral 
courage.  .  .  .  What  did  the  bold  men  at  Chicago  mean 
by  selling  the  right  of  suffrage?  The  Declaration  of 
Independence  contains  no  such  folly,  no  such  wicked 
ness.  We  can  not  maintain  liberty  by  skulking."  He 
liked  stiff-backed  men ;  they  were  his  kindred  in  moral 
and  spiritual  qualities.  "  I  wish  you  would  say  to  Mr. 
Stevens  for  me,"  said  Chief  Justice  Chase  to  a  visitor 
who  was  starting  to  see  Stevens,  not  long  before  his 


CHARACTERISTICS  593 

death,  "  that  when  he  goes  out  of  the  House  he  will 
take  with  him  more  backbone  than  he  will  leave."  1 

He  was  not  always  scrupulous  as  to  the  methods  of 
accomplishing  his  ends.  He  often  supported  meas 
ures  to  which  he  could  not  give  his  unqualified  assent, 
recognizing,  as  he  said  on  one  occasion  that  "  Con 
gress  is  composed  of  men,  not  of  angels."  He  sought 
the  best  attainable,  and  he  believed  that  the  game  of 
"  practical  politics  "  demanded  the  use  of  means  which 
in  themselves  he  could  not  defend.  In  this  he  was 
guilty  of  the  common  error  and  folly  of  the  so-called 
"  practical  men  "of  his  time.  He  was  far  from  be 
ing  the  strict  moralist  or  purist  who  would  stand  for 
the  absolute  good  regardless  of  the  circumstances  and 
opposition  confronting  him.  Mr.  Samuel  S.  Cox,  of 
Ohio,  was  a  party  to  an  affair  which  illustrates  this 
disposition  of  Stevens. 

Soon  after  the  war  Mr.  Stevens  introduced  a  bill 
to  appropriate  $800,000  to  reimburse  the  state  of 
Pennsylvania  for  expenses  incurred  in  repelling  in 
vasions  and  suppressing  insurrections.  The  bill  was 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Appropriation,  of  which 
Stevens  was  chairman.  Without  delay  he  reported 
the  bill.  During  the  Antietam  and  Gettysburg  cam 
paigns  bodies  of  troops  had  been  organized  for  de 
fense,  and  expense  had  been  incurred  by  towns  and 
counties,  but  no  actual  service  had  been  performed. 
The  appropriation  was  intended  to  provide  for  the 
payment  of  these  expenses.  There  was  opposition  led 
by  Dawes,  of  Massachusetts;  Boutwell,  of  Massachu 
setts,  prepared  a  brief  for  Dawes'  use.  When  it  be- 

1  Letter  of  Jonathan  Bianchard. 


'594     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

came  apparent  that  the  bill  would  be  lost,  Cox,  of  Ohio, 
arose  and  moved  to  insert  after  the  word  Pennsylvania 
the  words  Maryland,  West  Virginia,  Ohio,  Indiana, 
Kentucky,  Illinois,  Missouri,  Kansas  and  the  Territory 
of  New  Mexico.  Also  to  strike  out  $800,000  and  in 
sert  $10,000,000.  This  brought  to  the  support  of  the 
measure  the  members  from  all  those  states  and  thet  bill 
was  passed.  The  Senate  never  acted  on  the  bill. 
Bout  well  was  indignant  at  the  action  of  the  House  and 
exclaimed  to  Stevens,  whose  seat  was  near  to  Bout- 
well's,  "  This  is  the  most  outrageous  thing  that  I  have 
seen  on  the  floor  of  the  House."  Stevens  doubled  his 
fist,  but  not  in  anger,  shook  it  in  my  face  and  said: 
''  You  rascal,  if  you  had  allowed  me  to  have  my  rights 
I  should  not  have  been  compelled  to  make  a  corrupt 
bargain  in  order  to  get  them."  "  Thus,"  says  Bout- 
well,  "  he  admitted  his  arrangement  with  Cox  and  the 
character  of  it  and  laid  the  responsibility  on  me."  1 

It  was  not  parliamentary  to  call  a  man  a  liar  in  the 
House,  but  when  Stevens  wished  to  convey  an  im 
pression  to  that  effect  concerning  Brooks,  of  New  York, 
the  Democratic  leader,  he  maintained  his  contention  by 
saying  that  "  there  is  nothing  to  the  contrary  but  the 
remark  of  the  gentleman  from  New  York,  which,  I 
beg  leave  to  say,  is  not  now  evidence  in  a  court  of  jus 
tice." 

^  He  frequently  gave  vent  to  his  feelings  in  profan 
ity.  On  one  occasion,  hearing  a  crash  of  some  dishes 
in  his  dining-room  and  knowing  that  something  was 
broken,  he  shouted  to  the  colored  servant  with  im 
patience  :  "  Well,  — —  it,  what thing  have  you 

1  George  S.  Boutwell,  Reminiscences,  Vol.  II,  pp.  9  and  10. 


CHARACTERISTICS  595 

broken  now?"  "I  bless  de  Lawd,"  said  the  colored 
woman,  "  that  it  am  not  de  third  commandment." 
Stevens  smiled  in  good  humor  and  accepted  the  re 
proof. 

His  two  strong  stalwart  colored  servants  were 
carrying  him  up  the  steps  of  the  Capitol  in  his  chair, 
as  their  custom  was,  during  the  last  weeks  of  his  at 
tendance  upon  the  House.  It  had  been  apparent  for 
some  time  to  those  about  him  that  he  had  but  a  short 
time  to  live.  One  of  the  servants  thought  Stevens 
seemed  unusually  sad  one  morning  and  ventured  to 
ask  the  reason  for  his  depression.  "  Oh,"  said  Stev 
ens,  "  I  was  thinking  of  your  great  kindness  and  won 
dering  who  will  carry  me  up  these  steps  when  you  two 
men  are  gone."  Mr.  Forney  says  there  is  nothing 
finer  in  the  annals  of  humor  than  this.  "  Here  was 
not  only  uncommon  wit,  but  a  sense  of  intellectual  im 
mortality."  1 

The  common  report  is  that  Stevens  was  an  invet 
erate  gambler.  He  played  poker  and  other  games  of 
cards  for  money,  as  the  custom  was  in  his  time  and 
community.  But  he  was  not  a  professional  gambler. 
He  played  from  the  love  of  the  game,  for  the  excite 
ment  and  sociability  of  the  gaming  table,  not  from 
avarice  or  love  of  money,  or  from  a  purpose  and  de 
sire  to  reap  ill-gotten  gains.  When  his  friend  Blanch- 
ard  who  was  ever  anxious  for  the  welfare  of  Stevens' 
soul  and  who  from  love  of  Stevens  never  hesitated  to 
rebuke  him  for  his  sins  and  errors,  once  inquired  about 
his  gambling  Stevens  told  him  a  story  of  a  good  old 
Lutheran  pastor  in  Lancaster  who  applied  to  him  once 
1  Anecdotes  of  Public  Men,  p.  37. 


596      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

to  prosecute  one  of  his  own  church  officers  for  slander 
ing  him.  Said  Stevens,  "Why,  Father  H.,  what 
does  Hans  accuse  you  of?"  "Why,  gambling." 
"  Gambling!  What  did  the  fellow  make  the  story  out 
of  ?  "  The  old  gentleman  said  he  was  taking  a  friendly 
game  in  the  back  room  of  a  beer  saloon  owned  by  an 
other  of  his  officers,  and  "  Hans,  he  peeped  his  nose 
in,  and  vent  and  told  that  ve  vas  gambling."  "  Father 
H.,"  said  Stevens,  "you  are  sure  there  was  no 
money  on  the  card  table?"  "Vy,  shust  a  leedle  on 
one  corner  to  give  interest  to  de  game."  Stevens  ad 
vised  the  old  pastor  not  to  prosecute.  "  Thus  you 
see,"  said  Stevens  to  Blanchard,  "how  an  honest 
man  can  play  cards  for  money  and  not  consider  it 
gambling.  I  condemn  the  practise.  But  I  live  alone 
in  my  hotel  and  I  play  for  the  amusement  and  the 
excitement." 

This  story  and  apology  may  explain  his  motive  in 
the  game,  but  it  does  not  reveal  the  extent  of  his  sin 
ning.  The  gambling  spirit  was  strong  in  him  and 
probably  few  men  were  more  fond  of  "  fighting  the 
tiger."  One  acquaintance  testifies  to  seeing  him  lose 
two  thousand  dollars  in  one  night,  but  he  was  at  the 
game  again  the  next  night.  He  did  not  carry  this 
mania  with  him,  however,  to  his  later  years,  for 
Blanchard  testifies  that  Stevens  told  him  but  a  few 
weeks  before  his  death  that  he  had  not  touched  a  card 
at  gambling  in  five  years. 

One  of  the  familiar  stories  suggesting  his  gambling 
habit  relates  to  his  spontaneous  contribution  to  a 
negro  church  in  Washington.  A  former  Vice-Presi 
dent,  Mr.  Adlai  Stevenson,  gives  Mr.  James  G.  Blaine 


CHARACTERISTICS  597 

as  authority  for  the  story,  that  as  Mr.  Elaine,  during 
his  first  term  in  Congress  was  walking  down  Penn 
sylvania  Avenue  he  met  Stevens  coming  down  the 
steps  of  what  was  then  known  to  be  a  high-toned 
gambling  house.  Immediately  after  his  cordial  greet 
ing  to  Mr.  Elaine,  Stevens  was  accosted  by  a  negro 
preacher  who  earnestly  requested  a  contribution  to 
ward  the  building  of  a  church  for  his  people.  Stev 
ens  was  fresh  from  his  earnings  and  promptly  taking 
a  roll  of  money  from  his  vest  pocket,  he  handed  the 
negro  a  fifty  dollar  bill,  and  turning  to  Elaine  he 
observed  with  solemn  mien, 

"  God  moves  in  a  mysterious  way 
His  wonders  to  perform." 

He  was  generous  with  his  winnings  as  this  story  il- 
lustrates.  He  did  not  look  upon  the  stakes  with  a 
selfish  and  grasping  love  of  money.  He  was  gener 
ally  the  victim  of  men  who  had  more  skill  and  less 
honor  than  himself,  but  he  won  at  times,  and  that 
worried  him  as  much  as  to  lose.  A  good  natured 
Irish  friend  challenged  Stevens  one  night  to  a  game 
of  poker.  Stevens  accepted  and  before  they  arose 
from  the  table  he  had  won  the  Irishman's  five  hundred 
dollars, —  the  whole  sum  that  he  had  so  laboriously 
saved  for  his  wedding  that  was  to  come  off  the  follow 
ing  week.  Fitz  had  promised  the  bride-elect  a  wedding 
trip.  He  was  now  disconsolate,  but  necessity  drove 
him  to  inform  his  intended  of  his  losses  at  gambling 
and  that  he  could  not  take  her  upon  the  extended  trip 
which  they  had  been  so  fondly  anticipating.  "  Well," 
said  the  girl,  "don't  be  downcast  nor  discouraged; 


598     THE  LIFE  OF;  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

we'll  get  married  and  take  the  trip  anyhow,  fpr  I  have 
money  to  pay  the  bills."  On  the  wedding  journey, 
but  not  till  then  as  she  had  been  enjoined,  she  told  the 
happy  bridegroom  where  she  got  the  money  for  their 
journey, —  that  Mr.  Stevens  had  brought  it  to  her  the 
day  after  Fitz  had  "  lost "  it  and  pressed  it  upon  her, 
saying  he  wished  her  to  join  with  him  in  teaching  Fitz 
a  lesson.  One  may  feel  quite  sure  that  Stevens  had 
another  devoted  friend  and  supporter  among  his  Irish 
constituency. 

It  was  well  known  that  Stevens  did  not  like  the 
Camerons.  He  was  displeased  with  Simon  Cameron's 
presence  in  Lincoln's  Cabinet.  Cameron  and  Stevens 
represented  different  elements,  or  factions,  in  the  Re 
publican  politics  of  Pennsylvania.  Cameron  was  the 
original  founder  and  boss  of  the  modern  Republican 
machine  in  that  state  which  for  crooked,  dark,  sordid, 
and  debasing  trickery  stands  unrivaled  in  the  history 
of  American  politics.  Late  in  Stevens'  life,  in  the 
winter  of  1866-7,  ne  and  Cameron,  Governor  Curtin, 
and  John  W.  Forney  were  candidates  for  the  United 
States  Senate  before  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature. 
Curtin  had  no  chance  in  the  scramble.  Forney  with 
drew  and  advocated  the  claims  of  Stevens.  If  the 
election  could  have  been  left  with  the  people  Stevens 
would  have  been  elected  without  much  concern  or  at 
tention  upon  his  part;  at  least,  his  friends  so  claimed. 
But  certain  members  of  the  legislature  were  Cam 
eron's  henchmen.  The  hidden  intrigues  of  the  secret 
caucus  were  resorted  to,  though  there  was  no  possible 
danger  of  the  election  of  a  Democrat  in  the  open  leg 
islature.  Money  was  used  and  "  men  were  bought  as 


CHARACTERISTICS  599 

so  many  oxen  or  asses."  1  Stevens,  although  he  had 
not  been  guiltless  of  the  illegitimate  use  of  money  in 
his  campaigns  for  nomination  and  election  to  Congress, 
could  not  compete  with  Cameron  in  this  respect,  nor 
did  he  wish  to.  He  had  never  relied  upon  the  party 
machine  for  his  successes.  It  may  have  been  some 
thing  more  than  his  impending  defeat  for  the  Senate 
by  a  man  who  could  outdo  him  in  the  corrupt  use  of 
money  that  now  brought  Stevens  to  make  a  plea  for 
the  purity  of  elections.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  he 
was  so  much  of  a  misanthrope  in  his  politics.  He  was 
inclined  to  believe  that  all  men,  or  at  least  the  great 
majority  of  men,  would  in  the  last  resort  always  be 
governed  by  their  material  interests  and  the  baser  in 
fluences,  that  sordid  selfishness  and  not  the  public  in 
terest  would  control  men.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that 
this  was  at  heart  his  real  philosophy.  His  own  life 
belied  it,  and  he  had  known  and  appreciated  zealous 
and  noble  evangels  like  his  friend  Blanchard,  whose 
life  of  loyalty  to  ideals  and  sacrifices  for  a  cause  would 
serve  to  burn  out  such  a  belief  from  any  man's  mind. 
At  any  rate,  Stevens  in  his  later  years  had  come  to  a 
keener  appreciation  of  the  woful  results  to  free  insti 
tutions  of  the  control  of  elections  by  the  corrupt  use 
of  money,  and  he  desired  that  his  candidacy  for  the 
Senate  should  be  conducted  in  the  open  where  the 

1  Letter  of  Samuel  Kaufman  to  Stevens,  January  4,  1867. 
This  letter  was  written,  as  several  others  from  Kaufman,  to 
urge  Stevens  to  throw  himself  personally  into  the  senatorial 
fight.  This  friend  urged  Stevens  to  investigate  and  expose 
Cameron.  "  Give  up  a  little  of  your  niggerism  and  try  to  ferret 
out  dishonest  government  officials,  no  matter  whom  it  may  hit. 
Whig,  Republican,  Democrat,  Rebel,  Union  man,  Odd  Fellow,  or 
Free  Mason." 


6oo      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

public  could  see  and  scrutinize  his  action  and  that  of 
his  friends.  But  Cameron  managed  to  have  the  secret 
caucus  nominate,  and  there  he  could  *'  buy  the  mem 
bers  with  his  ill-gotten  treasure."  1 

Kaufman  reminded  Stevens  that  as  a  member  of 
Congress  he  ought  to  have  known  "  that  Cameron 
while  Secretary  of  War  was  defrauding  the  govern 
ment  out  of  millions  by  awarding  contracts  at  large 
figures  and  dividing  the  spoil, —  given  at  times  to  Cop 
perhead  gamblers ;  James  Duffer,  of  Marietta,  a  notori 
ous  gambler,  received  a  large  share !  "  Stevens  shared 
Kaufman's  opinion  that  Cameron  was  "  the  most  con 
summate  scoundrel  in  Pennsylvania."  One  of  the 
Stevens  stories  is  to  the  effect  that  Lincoln  once,  in  an 
swer  to  Stevens'  protest  against  an  appointment  for 
Cameron,  asked  Stevens  if  he  intended  to  say  that 
Cameron  would  steal.  "  Well,"  said  Stevens,  "  I  do 
not  think  he  would  steal  a  red  hot  stove."  Lincoln 
thought  this  too  good  to  keep  and  he  told  it  to  Cam 
eron  who  demanded  a  retraction  from  Stevens.  The 
latter,  always  ready  to  make  amends,  went  to  Lincoln 
and  said :  "  Mr.  Lincoln,  why  did  you  tell  Mr.  Cam 
eron  what  I  said  ?  He  is  very  mad  and  made  me  prom 
ise  to  retract.  I  will  now  do  so.  I  believe  I  told  you 
that  I  didn't  think  he  would  steal  a  red  hot  stove.  I 
now  take  that  back." 

Many  stories  of  another  kind  were  told  of  Stevens 
in  derogation  of  his  moral  life, —  the  kind  that  many 
men  like  to  roll  as  sweet  morsels  under  their  tongue. 
His  personal  and  political  enemies  charged  him  with 
all  kinds  of  misdemeanors  with  the  other  sex.  Ac- 

1  Letter  of  Kaufman,  January  4,  1867. 


CHARACTERISTICS  601 

cording  to  these  his  colored  housekeeper  was  his  mis 
tress;  he  was  the  father  of  mulattoes;  and  to  his  latest 
years  he  was  nothing  short  of  "  a  hoary,  habitual,  and 
beastly  debauchee." 

In  this  respect  Stevens  has  but  suffered  the  fate  of 
many  another  honored  public  man.  It  will  not  be 
claimed  that  his  life  was  above  reproach,  but  impartial 
witnesses  who  knew  him  best  would  not  hesitate  to 
brand  such  stories,  in  their  main  content,  as  false  and 
malicious  slanders.  So  far  as  can  be  learned,  but  twice 
in  his  life  did  Stevens  consent  even  to  notice  these 
charges.  He  was  a  man  of  truth.  His  worst  enemy 
never  charged  him  with  lying  and  hypocrisy.  His 
friends  and  neighbors  who  knew  his  life  will  generally 
assert  that  he  would  rest  under  the  charges  and  carry 
them  to  his  grave  rather  than  to  deny  them  falsely. 
But  late  in  his  life,  while  Stevens  was  at  the  height  of 
his  power  and  fame,  his  old  friend,  Jonathan  Blanch- 
ard,  who  honored  and  applauded  Stevens  in  his  heated 
political  struggles  of  more  than  thirty  years  before, 
came  to  him  with  the  reports  that  were  circulating 
concerning  his  way  of  living.  Blanchard  was  like  a 
veritable  prophet  in  Israel  who  would  have  said  with 
out  fear  or  favor,  to  courtier  or  king,  "  Now  hear  the 
word  of  the  Lord!"  He  seemed  determined  that 
Stevens  should  hear  the  word  of  rebuke  and  warning 
for  the  reputed  sins  of  his  life, —  licentiousness  and 
gambling.  Before  the  interview  which  he  sought 
Blanchard  wrote  Stevens  a  letter. 

"  At  present,"   he   wrote,   "  in   every   part  of  the   United 
vStates  people  believe  that  your  personal  life  has  been  one 


602      THE  LIFE  OE  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

prolonged  sin;  that  your  lips  have  been  defiled  with 
blasphemy;  your  hands  with  gambling;  and  your  body  with 
women !  A  man  in  Newburyport,  Massachusetts,  now  a 
Christian  but  then  a  card-playing  lawyer,  told  me  three 
weeks  since  that  he  had,  at  the  card-table,  heard  from  your 
mouth  language  fit  only  for  an  ordinary  brothel,  and  such  is 
the  general  belief.  Now  you  owe  it  to  yourself  and  to  your 
mother's  God,  to  leave  some  means  of  correcting  this  belief, 
if  false,  or  to  show  that  you  have  always  condemned  and 
despised  yourself  on  account  of  these  besetting  sins ! 

"  I  have  a  strange  hope  that  you  are  not  to  be  lost. 
Though  I  will  not  insult  your  intelligence  by  arguing  that 
'  whore-mongers  and  adulterers '  are  necessarily  left  outside 
of  heaven  with  dogs,  sorcerers  and  murderers,  or  that  if  you 
die  in  these  sins,  where  Christ  is,  you  can  not  come. 

"  But  as  I  have  studied  you  the  last  quarter  of  a  cen 
tury,  you  seem  to  me  to  have  been  at  times  able  to  say, 
'  With  the  mind  I  myself  serve  the  law  of  God,  but  with  the 
flesh  the  law  of  sin ' ;  that,  as  I  do,  you  really  loathe  and 
despise  yourself  on  account  of  sins.  The  good  you  have 
done  the  country  (and  none  have  done  more,  if  so  much) 
is  no  offset  for  vices  such  as  I  have  named  above.  '  God 
will  not  hold  one  guiltless  for  such  violations  of  His  law, 
nor  ought  He.'  Besides,  what  makes  bad  government  is  bad 
and  sinful  men.  If  there  were  no  vile  men  there  would  be 
no  bad  government. 

"  But  if  you  will  say  now,  at  the  eleventh  hour  of  life, 
and  just  ready  to  strike  twelve ; —  if,  even  now,  you  will  go 
to  Christ,  He  has  all  the  power  in  Heaven  and  earth  and  can 
make  your  scarlet  sins  white !  I  have  loved  and  followed 
you  with  a  strange  fascination.  I  have  prayed  and  do  still 
pray  for  you  with  a  terrible  earnestness,  and  now  I  bid  you 
farewell." 

This  letter  was  written  by  Blanchard  from  Wash 
ington,  February  15,  1865.  The  brave  and  faithful 
preacher  of  righteousness  wrote  thus  to  Stevens  after 


CHARACTERISTICS  603 

visiting  him  for  the  purpose  of  soliciting  funds  for  a 
college ! 1  He  had  made  it  clear  to  Stevens  that  he 
would  not  waive  his  religion  to  secure  Stevens'  friend 
ship,  and  while  disclaiming  any  knowledge  of  the  truth 
or  falsehood  of  the  charges  to  which  he  referred,  he 
sought  Stevens'  help,  as  he  told  him  in  fullest  candor, 
as  "  that  of  a  wicked  man  of  influence  in  behalf  of  a 
good  cause  which  it  was  for  his  interest  to  serve." 

Blanchard  afterward  learned  and  acknowledged  the 
injustice  of  much  that  was  implied  in  this  private  let 
ter,  and  he  reports  the  following  words  in  Stevens'  re 
ply. 

"  This  is  the  first  line  or  word  I  have  ever  penned  in 
explanation  of  my  conduct  as  assailed  by  my  enemies. 
Probably  as  between  us  and  our  Creator,  all  of  us  are 
somewhat  deficient.  I  know  I  am  deplorably  so.  But 
as  to  my  fellow  men,  I  hope  so  to  live  that  no  one 
shall  ever  be  wronged,  or  suffer  on  my  account." 

"  I  believe,"  added  Blanchard,  "  that  his  confession 
was  as  sincere  as  his  purpose  was  magnanimous." 
When  he  wrote  his  remarkable  letter  Blanchard  did 
not  know  how  Stevens,  very  early  in  his  political 
career,  had  prosecuted  and  closed  up  a  Democratic 
newspaper  for  charging  him  with  licentiousness  and 
indecent  blasphemy.  He  had  been  charged  among 
other  coarse  and  indecent  things  with  "  administering 
the  sacrament  to  a  dog."  "  I  have  allowed  slander 
ers,"  continued  Stevens  in  his  reply,  "  to  say  what  they 
pleased.  I  made  up  my  mind  not  to  answer  anything 
till  I  saw  this  charge.  That  was  a  little  too  much.  I 
knew  if  my  mother  saw  that  and  had  any  idea  that  it 

1Wheaton  College,  in  Illinois. 


604     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

was  true  it  would  break  her  heart.  I  pursued  and 
brought  the  slanderers  to  the  door  of  the  prison  and 
then  the  Governor  pardoned  them  out." 

Again  two  years  later,  September  14,  1867,  being 
earnestly  urged  for  public  reasons,  he  wrote  to  a  con 
fidential  friend, 

"  Perhaps  no  man  in  the  state  has  received  more  slanders 
or  been  charged  with  more  vices  or  malignant  crimes  than 
I  have.  It  has  been  my  misfortune  for  forty  years  to  be  a 
bitter  object  of  attack  by  violent  politicians.  I  have  seldom 
noticed  them, —  never  to  contradict  them  unless  they 
affected  my  moral  character  aside  from  politics  or  unless  a 
contradiction  was  required  by  the  interest  of  others.  You 
tell  me  the  charge  may  influence  the  next  election;  hence  I 
notice  it." 

He  then  made  full  denial  of  certain  specific  charges 
brought  against  his  private  life,  and  continued: 

"  This  is  a  larger  disclosure  than,  I  believe,  I  have  ever 
made  before  of  my  private  affairs,  and  I  have  done  it  now 
only  out  of  what  you  think  is  required  by  public  affairs. 

"  These  calumnies,  and  worse,  have  been  perennially  pub 
lished  all  around  me,  by  fellows  living  within  sight  of  my 
door.  I  know  of  no  one  who  has  believed  any  of  them,  or 
scarcely  pretended  to  believe  them." 

He  was  accused  of  being  coarse  and  contemptuous 
toward  all  religion  and  of  always  "  sitting  in  the  seat 
of  the  scornful."  In  fact,  he  had  no  scorn  nor  con 
tempt  for  true  religion.  He  was  not  a  Christian  in  the 
churchly  or  orthodox  sense.  But  for  true  piety  and 
humility,  for  holy  sacrifice  and  service,  for  Christian 
living  and  the  ideals  of  the  Christian,  he  had  a  deep 
and  sincere  respect.  When  Blanchard  asked  him  in 


CHARACTERISTICS  605 

his  last  interview  what  he  thought  of  Christ,  he  said, 
"  Why,  to  know  Him  and  not  to  love  Him  a  man  must 
be  a  brute  indeed,  but  whether  I  do  or  not  God  is  my 
judge." 

He  was  accused  of  drunkenness.  Instead,  he  was 
a  man  of  sobriety.  In  his  early  life  he  had  been  a 
drinker.  But  one  night,  after  a  carousal  with  some 
companions,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  drink  no  more, 
and  by  his  own  testimony,  for  the  last  thirty  years  of 
his  life  not  a  drop  of  intoxicating  liquors  passed  his 
lips  except  by  the  prescription  of  a  physician,  and  then, 
he  said,  he  took  "the  stuff"  with  distaste  and  re 
luctance. 

He  was,  indeed,  a  man  of  serious  shortcomings  and 
imperfections.  His  life  was  in  the  limelight  and  in 
public  strife  with  men.  He  could  not,  therefore, 
escape  reproaches  that  his  fellow-sinners  escaped.  As 
he  was  great  in  his  virtues  his  vices  may  have  appeared 
correspondingly  great,  but  that  he  was  especially  darker 
in  his  moral  life  than  the  men  of  his  place  and  time 
is  not  believed  by  those  who  lived  by  him  through  a 
long  period  of  years.1  It  is  sufficient,  after  noticing 
the  tales  of  slander  about  his  life,  to  let  his  denial  and 
the  respect  of  his  neighbors  and  friends  stand  against 
hateful  and  irresponsible  accusation.  "  It  should  be 
remembered  that  the  life  of  public  men  is  a  life  of 
calumny  and  misery.  When  therefore  they  have  re 
tired  let  their  good  deeds  be  inscribed  on  tables  of 
brass  and  over  their  errors  be  thrown  the  mantle  of 
oblivion."  In  these  words  of  Stevens  himself,  uttered 
early  in  his  career  while  pleading  in  the  Pennsylvania 

1  Conversations  with  citizens  of  Lancaster. 


606     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

Legislature  for  a  School  of  Liberal  Arts  for  his 
adopted  commonwealth,  one  finds  expressed  a  fair 
criterion  for  dealing  with  the  character  of  public  men. 

The  chief  theme  of  the  biographer  is  the  public  life 
of  his  subject,  what  he  contributed  through  public 
speech,  influence,  and  policy  to  the  welfare  and  to  the 
history  of  his  country,  and  what  factors  in  his  char 
acter  prompted  him  so  to  do.  Like  most  great  leaders 
who  guide  the  destinies  of  contending  parties  in  a 
crisis  of  revolutionary  strife,  Stevens'  character  has 
been  the  subject  of  most  divergent  views.  To  his  ad 
mirers  he  was  brave  and  lion-hearted,  ready,  without 
thought  of  self,  to  sacrifice  life  and  fortune  and  the 
favor  of  his  fellow  men  for  the  sake  of  noble  purposes 
and  high  ideals.  To  his  detractors  he  was  but  little 
short  of  a  monster,  who,  reckless  of  his  country's  wel 
fare,  deformed  in  body  and  misanthropic  in  spirit, 
found  a  keen  and  malicious  pleasure  in  inflicting  injury 
upon  those  whom  he  hated. 

It  is  obvious  that  neither  of  these  extreme  views  of 
the  man  is  worthy  of  acceptance.  It  is  undoubtedly 
the  verdict  of  history  that  Stevens  indulged  too  long 
and  too  intensely  the  heat  and  wrath  and  hate  en 
gendered  by  a  bloody  civil  war.  This  aspect  of  his 
public  life,  during  a  divided  and  distressing  period  of 
his  country's  history,  has  made  him  appear  as  alto 
gether  implacable  and  unforgiving.  But  his  hatreds 
were  not  personal,  and  the  enemies  whom  he  faced  in 
heat  and  passion  were,  as  he  thought,  not  his  own 
enemies,  but  the  enemies  of  his  country,  the  enemies 
of  a  righteous  and  noble  cause.  It  was  for  this  sake 
and  not  for  his  own  that  he  used  the  language  of  de- 


CHARACTERISTICS  607 

nunciation.  He  must  be  judged  not  by  the  feeling  and 
disposition  of  these  later  and  happier  times  of  peace, 
reconciliation,  and  good  will  between  the  sections,  but 
by  the  times  of  strife  and  passion  in  which  he  lived. 

There  was,  no  doubt,  nobility  and  greatness  in  Ste 
vens'  character.  He  brought  to  his  country's  service 
learning  and  eloquence,  firmness  of  will,  directness  and 
tenacity  of  purpose,  the  noblest  courage,  and  a  fine  and 
consuming  scorn  and  contempt  for  evasion  and  hypoc 
risy  and  the  low  arts  of  political  tricksters.  He  was 
an  unrelenting  foe  to  every  form  of  tyranny  over  the 
minds  of  men.  He  was  a  man  of  great  mind  and 
clear  vision,  to  a  degree  quite  rare  among  men,  and, 
what  is  rarer  still,  he  had  the  courage  to  assert  his  mind 
and  to  follow  his  vision.  The  time-server  and  the 
trimmer  stepped  aside  to  let  him  pass.  Amid  the  great 
est  changes  that  ever  occurred  in  any  decade  of  our 
national  life,  facing  the  detraction  of  enemies,  the  ti 
midity  of  friends,  the  corruption  and  tyranny  of  power, 
and  the  cowardice  of  party,  he  stood  with  Puritan  and 
Spartan  firmness  for  a  definite  end,  the  goal  of  equity 
and  justice  that  had  been  fixed  for  him  by  his  unwaver 
ing  democratic  faith.  Indifferent  to  praise  or  blame 
where  his  cause  was  at  stake;  unmoved  by  considera 
tions  of  rank,  title,  wealth,  or  position,  selfish  motives 
did  not  animate  his  public  conduct.  The  selfishness 
that  was  in  him,  as  it  is  in  all  men,  was  not  of  the  mean 
and  miserly  kind.  While  seeking  his  own  interest  and 
his  own  end  in  private  life  he  would  not  defraud  and 
oppress  his  neighbor.  His  selfishness  in  public  life 
also  was  of  the  nobler  kind.  While  he  frequently 
sought  place  and  power,  not  in  honor  preferring  oth- 


608      THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

ers,  but  crushing  them  or  pushing  them  aside,  some 
times  with  seeming  meanness  sacrificing  his  friends; 
and  while,  in  natural  vanity,  he  was  possessed  of  a 
strong  love  of  prominence  and  public  praise,  yet  he 
pursued  his  ends  and  sought  place  and  power  not  chiefly 
for  his  own  glory,  but  that  he  might  elevate  his  country 
and  lift  up  the  mass  of  downtrodden  humanity  which 
he  saw  around  him. 

He  was  not  a  saint  by  any  means;  but  like  Crom 
well,  who  was  in  many  ways  his  prototype,  he  was 
ready  to  be  painted  as  he  was.  "  I  am  just  what  I 
am  whether  you  like  me  or  not,"  he  said.  In  spite 
of  the  defects  of  his  character  —  and  they  were  many 
—  it  seems  clear  to  those  who  study  his  life  that  the 
motives  and  aims  that  impelled  him  to  speak  and  fight 
and  labor  and  spend  himself  for  his  cause  were  not 
mean  nor  selfish.  His  detractors  were  generally  little 
men  of  conventional  opinion,  without  vision  or  the 
spirit  that  would  lead  them  to  do  battle  and  sacrifice 
for  a  cause.  Stevens,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  man 
of  large  mold  and  of  great  purposes,  who  was  striving 
with  his  whole  soul,  to  carve  other  and  better  channels 
for  the  life  of  society,  pursuing  steadily,  without  vari 
ation  or  shadow  of  turning,  the  two  great  purposes  of 
his  public  life,  the  unity  of  the  nation  and  the  freedom 
of  the  slave. 

"  He  was  undoubtedly,  all  things  considered,"  says 
Mr.  Forney,  "  the  ablest  parliamentary  leader  of  his 
time.  Tall  in  stature,1  deliberate  in  utterance  and  in 

1  Stevens  was  five  feet  eleven  inches  tall,  clear,  ruddy,  smooth 
of  skin,  a  fine  horseman,  an  excellent  swimmer,  and  fond  of  the 
chase.  A.  H.  Hood,  History  of  Lancaster  County. 


CHARACTERISTICS  609 

gesticulation,  and  with  a  massive  head  and  features  so 
remarkable  that  no  one  who  saw  him  once  could  ever 
forget  him,  his  whole  presence  conveyed  the  idea  of 
dignity  and  force.  His  forehead  was  uncommonly 
high  and  broad,  his  features  were  bold  and  striking,  his 
brows  projecting  and  his  cavernous  eyes  bright  and 
piercing  and  full  of  expression.  He  was  simple  and 
direct  in  conversation,  and  when  he  listened  he  looked, 
as  it  were,  into  the  very  soul  of  the  talker,  piercing 
through  duplicity  and  laying  bare  deceit."  * 

In  the  chief  cemeteries  of  Lancaster  it  was  stipulated 
by  charter  that  no  person  of  color  should  be  interred 
therein.  Stevens  had  lots  in  both  cemeteries,  but  he 
sent  back  the  deeds,  preferring  to  be  laid  to  rest  in 
Shreiner's  cemetery,  a  private  and  humble  burying- 
ground  not  far  from  the  center  of  Lancaster  and  near 
one  of  its  public  schools.  There  on  a  worthy  monu 
ment  erected  to  his  memory  the  visitor  may  read  these 
characteristic  words  composed  for  his  epitaph  by  the 
Great  Democractic  Commoner  himself: 

I  repose  in  this  quiet  and  secluded  spot, 

Not  from  any  natural  preference  for  solitude, 

But  finding  other  cemeteries  limited  by  charter  rules 

as  to  race, 
I  have  chosen  this  that  I  might  illustrate 

in  my  death 
The  principles  which   I   advocated  through 

a  long  life, 
Equality  of  man  before  his  Creator. 

He  died  as  he  lived,  the  relentless  foe  of  Privilege, 
the  uncompromising  advocate  of  Democracy, —  of 

1  Philadelphia  Press,  August  12,  1868- 


6io     THE  LIFE  OF  THADDEUS  STEVENS 

equal  rights  for  all  and  special  privileges  for  none  be 
neath  the  law.  "  I  know  not  what  record  of  sin 
awaits  me  in  the  other  world,  but  this  I  know, —  that 
I  have  never  been  guilty  of  despising  a  man  because  he 
was  poor,  because  he  was  ignorant,  or  because  he  was 
black."  These  words  fitly  apply  to  the  life  and  char 
acter  of  Thaddeus  Stevens.1  Before  all  else  he  stood 
for  liberty  and  the  equal  rights  of  men.  To  this 
faith  he  bore  his  consistent  testimony  from  early  life 
to  the  open  grave  and  beyond.  No  truer  democrat, 
no  abler  advocate  of  popular  rights,  ever  stood  in 
American  legislative  halls. 

1  Attributed  to  Governor  John  A.  Andrew,  of  Massachusetts. 


THE  END 


INDEX 


INDEX  613 

Abolitionists,  57  sqq. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  154,  155,  156. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  69. 

Alaska,  purchase  of,  585. 

Amnesty,  295. 

Anti-Lecompton  Democrats,  130,  142. 

Anti-Masonic  party,  13  sqq. 

Archer,  Stevenson,  10. 

Arkansas,  reconstruction  in,  303. 

Ashley,  of  Ohio,  200. 

Aydelotte,  Doctor,  68. 

Banks,  General  N.  P.,  298. 

Beecher,  Henry  Ward,  53,  126. 

Bigelow,  John,  500. 

Bingham,  John  A.,  341,  379,  380,  399,  400,  402,  437,  443,  445,  451, 

452,  463,  464,  498,  504,  505. 
Birney,  James  G.,  69. 
Elaine,  James  G.,  336,  337,  386,  387,  433,  463,  468,  479,  482,  498, 

556,  597. 

Blair,  Francis  P.,  226  sqq.,  317,  570,  571. 
Blanchard,  Jonathan,  8,  57  sqq.,  68,  601  sqq. 
Blockade,  213. 
Border  states,  169,  187. 
Boutwell,  George  S.,  341,  419,  462,  495,  557. 
Brooks,  James,  339,  340. 
Brooks,  Phillips,  483,  484. 
Brown,  John,  133,  136. 
Brown,  William  J.,  82. 
Brownson,  O.  A.,  354,  355. 
Buchanan,  President,  157,  159,  160. 
"Buckshot"  war,  27  sqq.,  137. 
Bull  Run,  171. 

Burgess,  Professor  J.  W.,  441. 
Burrowes,  28,  31,  32. 
Butler,  Benjamin  F.,  293,  510,  575. 


614  INDEX 

Calhoun  and  Southern  leaders,  75. 

California,  73,  77,  113. 

Cameron,  Simon,  151,  239,  598;  600. 

Chase,  Salmon  P.,  67,  69;  policy  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 

242  sqq. ;  333,  555. 

Chase,  Samuel,  impeachment  of,  493. 
Chase,  Solon,  544. 

Cheever,  Doctor  H.  T.  approves  Stevens,  355. 
Circulating  medium  in  1865,  547,  548. 
Civil  rights  bill,  366,  371,  379,  381,  383. 
Civil  War,  and  slavery,  168  sqq. ;  and  the  constitution,  207  sqq. ; 

ways  and  means  in,  239  sqq. 
Clay,  Henry,  65,  71,  81,  111,  113,  269. 
Clemens,  of  Virginia,  147. 
Cobb,  Howell,  81,  90. 
Covode's  resolution,  498. 
Col  fax,  Schuyler,  340. 

Confiscation,  173,  210,  215,  217,  350,  521  sqq. 
Congressional  campaign  committee,  407. 
Conkling,  Roscoe,  341,  387,  388. 
Constitution,  the,  in  the  war,  207  sqq. 
Contraction,  536  sqq. 
Cooke,  Jay,  564,  579. 
Cooper,  Peter,  269,  277,  545. 

"Copperheads",  193  sqq.,  349,  352,  364,  365,  396,  528. 
Corwin,  Thomas,  130,  137,  146. 
Crittenden  compromise,  156. 
Crittenden  Resolutions,  171,  172,  174. 
Curtis,  Benjamin  R.,  507,  508. 
Curtis,  George  William,  484,  530. 

Dana,  Charles  A.,  235. 
Davis,  Garrett,  367. 
Davis,  Henry  Winter,  306  sqq. 
Davis,  Jefferson,  228,  522. 
Debt,  national,  240,  241. 


INDEX  615 

Debt  payment,  536  sqq. ;  561  sqq. 
Demand  notes,  245. 

Democratic  party,  policy  on  reconstruction,  312  sqq.;  on  John 
son's  reconstruction,  325  sqq. 
Dewey,  Professor  D.  R.,  quoted,  256. 
District  of  Columbia,  slavery  in,  78  sqq. 
Disunion,  152  sqq. 
Doolittle,  Senator,  409. 
Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  155. 

Ellmaker,  Amos,  25. 

Emancipation,  210. 

Evarts,  William  M.,  507,  585. 

Fessenden,  William  P.,  248,  249,  279,  341,  433. 

Finck,  Representative,  466,  467. 

Forney,  John  W.,  50,  560. 

Fourteenth  amendment,  384  sqq.;  attitude  of  the  South  toward, 

434,  470. 

Free  schools,  Stevens'  fight  for,  41  sqq. 
Free  soil,  struggle  for,  55  sqq. 
Free-soil  party,  155. 

Freedmen's  Bureau  bill,  355,  358,  369  sqq. 
Fremont,  John  C,  128,  183,  210. 
Fugitive  slave  law,  79  sqq.,  110,  122  sqq.,  165. 
Funding  the  war  debt,  536  sqq. 

Gallatin,  James,  246,  261. 

Garfield,  James  A.,  437,  565,  566,  567. 

Gibson,  John  B.,  125. 

Giddings,  Joshua  R.,  70,  83,  90,  114,  126. 

Gilmer,  of  North  Carolina,  131,  132,  133,  137,  138. 

"Gold  gamblers",  555,  574,  575. 

Gold  standard  and  greenbacks,  269  sqq.,  287  sqq. 

Gorsuch  case,  122  sqq. 

Granger,  Francis,  65. 


616  INDEX 

Grant,  General  U.  S.,  458,  495,  513. 

Greeley,  Horace,  155,  515,  564. 

Greenbacks,  239  sqq. ;  amount  of,  280;  and  cost  of  the  war,  28? 

sqq.,  541  sqq.,  565. 

Greenback  party,  277,  290,  291,  537  sqq.,  561  sqq. 
Gyger,  John,  573. 

Hahn,  Michael,  294,  298,  318. 
Hanway,  Castner,  122  sqq. 
Harrison,  William  Henry,  25,  26. 
Helper,  Hinton,  131,  133,  139. 
Howard,  General  O.  O.,  370. 
Hunter,  General,  183,  184,  185. 

Impeachment  of  Johnson,  491  sqq. 
"Impending  Crisis",  131. 

Johnson,  Oliver,  126. 

Johnson,  President,  and  reconstruction,  324  sqq.;  early  life  of, 
328  sqq.;  military  governor  of  Tennessee,  329;  character 
of,  330;  breach  with  Congress,  339  sqq.;  denounces  Stev 
ens,  Sumner  and  others,  358;  veto  of  civil  rights  bill,  372 
sqq. ;  "swinging  round  the  circle",  410  sqq. ;  obstacle  to  re 
construction,  433;  impeachment  of,  491  sqq.;  defense  of, 
507;  acquittal  of,  516. 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  531. 

Julian,  George  W.,  84. 

Kansas-Nebraska  act,  127. 
Keitt,  of  South  Carolina,  134,  135. 
Kelly,  William  D.,  462,  534. 
Ketcham,  John  L.,  354. 
Know-Nothings,  130. 

Lamar,  L.  Q.  C,  136. 
Lancaster,  11. 

LeBlond,  Representative,  465,  466. 
Legal  tender  notes,  249  sqq.,  282. 


INDEX  617 

Letcher,  Governor,  224. 

Liberty  party,  67,  70. 

Lincoln    President,  152  sqq.,  168,  199,  208;  misuse  of  patronage, 

235 ;  plan  of  reconstruction,  293  sqq. ;  veto  of  Wade-Davis 

bill,  320. 

Loan  bill  of  1863,  550,  567,  568;  of  1865,  556. 
Logan,  John  A.,  498. 

Lord,  Eleazar,  financial  writings,  250,  258,  259,  260,  261,  268,  269, 
«?45. 

Louisiana,  reconstruction  in,  293  sqq. 
Lowell,  James  Russell,  484. 

McCall,  Samuel  W.,  43,  156,  341,  363,  425. 
McClure,  A.  K.,  65. 

McCulloch,  Hugh,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  539  sqq.,  550,  561 
sqq. 

McElwee,  Thomas  B.,  37,  38. 

McLean,  Justice,  151. 

Mann,  Horace,  84,  90,  102,  103,  114. 

Medill,  Joseph,  484. 

Merrill,  Samuel,  7,  8,  354. 

Mexican  cessions,  73. 

Missouri  compromise,  127. 

Morrill,  Justin  S.,  250,  252,  341,  568,  590. 

Morrill  tariff,  151. 

"National  Union"  convention,  408. 
Negro  suffrage,  486. 
Nevada,  admission  of,  235. 
New  Orleans,  capture  of,  293. 

Orth,  Godlove  S.,  56. 

Peace  democrats,  214,  218,  231. 

Peacham  academy,  4. 

Pendleton,  George  H.,  130,  200  sqq.,  209,  214,  236,  312-316. 


618  INDEX 

Pennsylvania  college,  51. 

Penrose,  Charles  B.,  31,  32,  61. 

Phillips,  Wendell,  155,  358,  397,  410,  411,  530. 

Pierpont  government,  221,  222,  331,  361. 

Randall,  Josiah,  66. 

Randall,  Samuel  J.,  435. 

Raymond,  Henry  J.,  427,  434,  435,  467,  468.  " 

Reagan,  John  H.,  140. 

Reconstruction,  Lincoln's  plan,  293  sqq. ;  Johnson's  plan,  324  sqq. ; 
joint  committee  on,  340  sqq.,  357,  397,  398,  416,  417,  reap- 
pointed,  442,  445,  458,  498;  first  congressional  plan,  369 
sqq.;  before  the  people,  406  sqq.;  military  process  of, 
431  sqq. 

Reconstruction  acts  of  1867,  458  sqq.,  506. 

Reed,  W.  B.,  196. 

Republican  party,  127  sqq. ;  in  reconstruction,  307  sqq. 

Resumption  of  specie  payment,  546. 

Rhodes,  James  R,  on  Stevens,  450,  451,  472,  474,  509. 

Ritner,  Joseph,  14,  27,  29,  33,  35,  57,  125. 

Root,  Joseph  M.,  84,  87  sqq. 

Saulsbury,  Senator,  377. 

Schurz,  Carl,  355,  484. 

Scott,  Winfield  S.,  65,  72,  120,  121. 

Secession,  152  sqq. 

Seward,  William  H.,  68,  69,  136,  345,  407. 

Seymour,  Horatio,  571. 

Shellabarger,  Representative,  462. 

Shepley,  George  R,  293. 

Sheridan,  General,  412,  495. 

Sherman,  John,  130,  542,  548,  572. 

Sickles,  General,  347. 

Slavery,  168  sqq. 

Smith,  Garrit,  69. 

Soldiers  and  sailors  convention,  407. 

South,  the,  constitutional  rights  of,  in  war,  215  sqq. 


INDEX  619 

"South  Americans",  131,  142. 

Spaulding,  E.  G.,  251. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  495  sqq.,  511,  515. 

Stephens,  Alexander  H.,  86,  336,  337. 

Stevens,  Thaddeus,  birth  and  early  life,  1  sqq.;  student  life,  5 
sqq.;  admission  to  the  Bar,  9;  settles  in  Gettysburg,  11; 
early  anti-Mason,  13  sqq. ;  denounces  masonry,  15  sq. ;  in 
the  ''Buckshot"  war,  28  sqq. ;  in  the  Pennsylvania  legisla 
ture,  34  sqq. ;  defender  of  free  schools,  41  sqq. ;  early  Free- 
soiler,  55  sqq. ;  in  Pennsylvania  constitutional  convention, 
64  sqq.;  opposition  to  Clay,  65;  supports  Harrison,  65; 
removes  to  Lancaster,  66;  in  Congress  before  the  war,  73 
sqq.;  anti-slavery  Philippics,  90  sqq.;  tariff  views,  114  sqq.; 
defender  of  fugitive  slaves,  122  sqq. ;  eulogy  on  Chief  Jus 
tice  Gibson,  125,  126;  on  eve  of  the  war,  125  sqq.;  conflict 
with  Southern  radicals,  141  sqq. ;  on  Ways  and  Means  Com 
mittee,  149;  denounces  Buchanan,  159  sqq.;  opposition  to 
compromise,  163;  estimate  of  abolitionists,  170;  opposes 
Crittenden  Resolutions,  171  sqq.;  on  confiscation,  173,  471, 
521  sqq.;  on  arming  the  blacks,  174,  185;  radical  anti- 
slavery  war  policy,  175  sqq.,  230;  approved  by  anti-slavery 
constituents,  181  sqq.;  approves  military  emancipation,  184 
sqq. ;  criticizes  Lincoln,  186  sqq. ;  opposes  the  "Union  as  it 
was",  192,  193;  approves  Lincoln,  199;  hatred  of  slavery, 
204  sqq. ;  on  the  constitution  in  war,  207  sqq. ;  controversy 
with  F.  P.  Blair,  226  sqq. ;  doctrine  of  Southern  belliger 
ency,  227  sqq. ;  doctrine  of  the  abrogation  of  the  constitu 
tion,  230  sqq. ;  chairman  of  Ways  and  Means  Committee, 
239  sqq. ;  aspirant  for  Cabinet  appointment  under  Lincoln,, 
239 ;  policy  on  legal  tender  money,  249  sqq. ;  opposition  to 
the  gold  standard,  268  sqq. ;  as  a  Greenbacker,  286  sqq.,  536 
sqq. ;  on  Lincoln's  reconstruction,  302  sqq. ;  open  struggle 
with  Johnson,  340  sqq.;  party  motive  in  reconstruction, 
352  sqq.;  advocacy  of  equal  rights,  353,  429;  public  ap 
proval,  354;  mock  eulogy  of  Johnson,  362  sqq.;  in  Con 
gressional  reconstruction,  369  sqq. ;  on  civil  rights  bill,  377 
sqq. ;  on  the  fourteenth  amendment,  384  sqq.,  470 ;  in  the 
campaign  of  1866,  418  sqq.;  on  military  reconstruction, 
434  sqq.,  458  sqq. ;  vindictiveness  of,  450,  451 ;  triumphs 
in  reconstruction,  472 ;  criticisms  of,  474  sqq. ;  in  impeach 
ment  trial,  491  sqq. ;  and  Wall  Street,  560,  575 ;  advocates 
bond  payment  in  greenbacks,  570,  571 ;  closing  days,  584 
sqq.;  will  of,  589;  anecdotes  of,  590  sqq.;  character  of, 
601  sqq. ;  epitaph,  609. 


620  INDEX 

Stevens  Institute,  589. 

Stockton,  Senator,  375. 

Stuart,  Reverend  Moses,  112. 

Sumner,  Charles,  126,  322,  355,  395,  411,  438,  484,  530. 

Sumter,  Fort,  166,  170. 

Taft,  Alphonso,  approves  Stevens,  354. 

Talleyrand,  Count,  2. 

Tariff,  114. 

Tenure  of  Office  act,  496,  501,  506,  508,  511  sqq. 

Texas,  73 ;  reconstruction  of,  335. 

Thirteenth  amendment,  235. 

Thomas,  Lorenzo  B.,  496  sqq.,  513. 

Toombs,  Robert,  85,  91,  120. 

Trumbull,  Lyman,  322,  374. 

Vallandigham,  C  C,  142. 
Van  Buren,  Martin,  76. 
Virginia,  division  of,  221  sqq. 

Wade,  Benjamin,  307,  320,  376,  377,  484,  500. 

Wade-Davis  plan  of  reconstruction,  307  sqq.,  333. 

Walker  tariff  of  1846,  116. 

Washburn,  E.  B.,  128. 

Wells,  David  A.,  541. 

Welles,  Gideon,  500. 

West  Virginia,  admission  of,  221  sqq. 

Wheelock,  John  and  Eleazar,  6. 

Whig  party,  25,  66,  118  sqq. 

White,  Horace,  quoted,  276,  279. 

Wilmot,  David,  74,  82. 

Wilmot  proviso,  74  sqq.,  88,  91,  114. 

Wilson,  Henry,  278,  484. 

Winthrop,  Robert  C.,  81,  83. 

Wirt,  William,  14. 

Wolf,  Governor,  22,  23,  47,  50. 


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